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TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

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A BILL FURTHER TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 2

FEBRUARY 4 TO FEBRUARY 10, 1941

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TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1941

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room, Senate Office Building, Hon. Walter F. George presiding.

Present: Senators George (chairman), Harrison, Connally, Thomas of Utah, Van Nuys, Murray, Pepper, Green, Barkley, Reynolds, Guffey, Gillette, Clark of Missouri, Byrnes, Glass, Johnson of California, Capper, La Follette, Vandenberg, White, Shipstead, and Nye.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Is Dr. Beard in the audience?

STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. BEARD, NEW MILFORD, CONN.

(Dr. Beard taught at Columbia for 10 years, becoming professor of politics before his retirement in 1917. He is past president of the American Historical Association, the National Association for Adult Education, and the American Political Science Association. He is author or coauthor of some 25 historical works. Dr. Beard was educated at DePauw, Oxford, Cornell, and Columbia Universities, receiving his Ph. D. from the last of these. He appears for himself, individually.)

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Beard, will you please give the committee, for the record, your address and present connections?

Mr. BEARD. I have given the reporter my name and address, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, you may proceed as you elect, but if you have a prepared statement you may present that, first, without questions until that is concluded, if you desire.

Mr. BEARD. I would prefer that, if it is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. That is agreeable to the committee. You may proceed with your prepared statement before any questions are presented.

Mr. BEARD. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, the problem raised by the bill before us is not one in political arithmetic which our Congress can safely turn over to experts in war and diplomacy. If Congress were so minded the state of the world, including our own country, would indicate that their expertness is less than perfect. Nor is it a mere question of patriotism, honor, and decency. Unless we can assume that all parties to this debate possess these virtues, we may as well shut up Congress and make the discussion a contest in vituperation to be closed on a dueling field.

The problem before us, as I see it, is that of safeguarding the security and liberties of our country by appropriate choices within the range of choices left to us by the history of the past. It is a problem, therefore, as I see it, in great history—the nature and course of the events that have brought us into the present situation and of the future destined to come out of that past and our living present. There are some among us who speak, with the assurance of Almighty God, as if they knew the intimate nature and ultimate design of His universe. I am not one of these. I have devoted 50 years to the study of history, here in my own country and abroad, in Europe and Asia; but the older I grow the more I am convinced that the wisest amongst us knows little about the great history in which we are now acting.

Yet we all know some things about it. We know that war does not spring out of nothing; we know that it springs out of actions taken by men in time of peace and often in the very name of peace. We know that it is easy to start a war amid tumult and shouting. We know that war breaks the bonds of ordered and settled society. We know that war outruns all sober calculations and noble intentions and brings consequences wholly unexpected by those who make the tumult and do the shouting. Illustrations of the unexpected abound in history.

Who among us in September 1939, for instance, could foresee that the French nation, which had stood like a wall for 4 cruel years, would collapse like a house of cards in 4 cruel months? Who among us could then foresee that, within so short a time, France would surrender the principles of 1789, strike the word "republic" from its national title, and set up a dictatorship modeled on fascism?

Or, to take illustrations from great history close to home, I had ancestral relatives on both sides of the Civil War. In 1861, leaders of the Southern Confederacy, men of high honor and high principle, convinced of the rectitude of their intentions, set out to save the rights of States and preserve the institution of slavery. The unforeseen consequences of their action were the destruction of State sovereignty and the institution of slavery. In 1932 critics assailed President Hoover for adding a few billions to the national debt and charged him with pursuing a course leading to ruin. Who, among the critics, then foresaw that they themselves, within a brief period of time, would speak lightly and blithely of a \$65,000,000,000 debt, as if it did not matter at all? It is such readings of great history, of intentions utterly defeated, of consequences unforeseen by either side, of disasters un contemplated, of capricious changes in our opinions and slogans, that should sober us all into humility and give pause to every impulse of hatred, unreason, and recrimination.

It is in this spirit, I must beg you to believe, gentlemen of the committee, that I approach the issue before us. There is no question here of sympathy for Britain; this Nation is almost unanimous in its sympathy. There is no question here of aid to Britain; the Nation is agreed on that. Our immediate task is to analyze the meaning of the language employed in this bill, and to calculate as far as may be humanly possible the consequences for our country that are likely to flow from its enactment into law—to rend, if we can, some corner of the dark veil that hides the future from our vision.

By the definitions of section 2, every article or commodity, all resources and powers of production, which the President is pleased to regard as for defense, are placed unreservedly at his command. In other words, he may use and dispose of, as he likes, every machine, every tool, every ship, every industry, the labor of every able-bodied person, in any way that he deems desirable, under the loose, indeed limitless, phrase, "national defense."

In the midst of a declared war already raging, President Wilson called upon Congress for no such powers, no such surrender of its constitutional prerogatives. Even in the midst of a frightful civil war, testing whether this Nation could endure, President Lincoln demanded of Congress no such abject capitulation and humiliation.

There can be no doubt about this. The bill would subject all labor energies and all the wealth of the United States to the President's personal orders issued at his discretion. Only the lines of the poet Milton seem appropriate to describe such power:

Without dimension, where length, breadth, and height,
And time, and place are lost.

After the President has "procured" this wealth or any part of it, what may he do with it? The bill indicates some possible actions. It says that the President may "sell, transfer, exchange, lease, or lend" any part of it or all of it to any government whose defense he deems vital to the defense of the United States; that is, to any government he pleases so to designate.

That is not all. The President is not limited to selling, transferring, exchanging, or leasing the wealth of the United States or any part of it. Paragraph 2 of section 3 also provides that the President may "otherwise dispose of" this wealth or any part of it. Mark the words, "otherwise dispose of." If words mean anything, he may give it away and use the armed forces of the United States to carry it anywhere on terms which he alone may prescribe.

There is more involved. Paragraph 3 of section 3 gives the President power to repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise place in good working order any war craft for any government which he is pleased to name as vital for the defense of the United States. If words mean anything, these words mean that the President can turn naval bases, shipyards, and harbors of the United States over to the business of repairing and outfitting vessels for belligerents named by his orders; that is, he can convert areas of the United States into areas of warfare and thus expose them to direct retaliation by other belligerents.

Given the sweeping language of this bill, it seems fitting to suggest that the title is imprecise. The title is—

An act to promote the defense of the United States.

It should read:

All provisions of law and the Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding, an Act to place all the wealth and all the men and women of the United States at the free disposal of the President, to permit him to transfer or carry goods to any foreign government he may be pleased to designate, anywhere in the world, to authorize him to wage undeclared wars for anybody, anywhere in the world, until the affairs of the world are ordered to suit his policies, and for any other purpose he may have in mind now or at any time in the future, which may be remotely related to the contingencies contemplated in the title of this Act.

I suggest that as a new title for the bill.

We come to the consequences likely to flow from this act. If the bill is not to be an empty gesture, the President will act under its provisions. First, he will begin, without any statutory or constitutional restraints worthy of mention, to draft the industries, labor, and resources of the United States under orders of his own formulation. Second, under paragraph 3, section 3, he will designate certain harbors and shipyards as bases for the repair of belligerent vessels and thus turn them into areas of war activity. Third, he will, if he deems it appropriate, assure the transfer of American goods to Great Britain by conveying them across the sea, because it certainly would defeat the intention of this act if the United States built ships by the hundreds and manufactured munitions in billion dollar lots on its own motion and then allowed German submarines and bombing planes to sink them in the ocean as fast as the United States can produce them.

Unless this bill is to be regarded as a mere rhetorical flourish—and respect for its authors precludes the thought of such frivolity—then, I submit, it is a bill for waging an undeclared war. We should entertain no delusions on this point. We should now face frankly and with such knowledge and intelligence as we may have the nature and probable consequences of that war. Without indulging in recriminations, we are bound to consider that fateful prospect.

The contention that this is a war measure has been, I know, hotly denied. The bill has been called a bill to keep the United States out of war. It has been said that we are "buying peace" for ourselves, while others are fighting our war for democracy and defense. I invite your special attention to this line of argument. I confess, gentlemen of the committee, an utter inability to understand the reasoning and morals of those who use this formula. My code of honor may be antiquated, but under it I am bound to say that if this is our war for democracy and if foreign soldiers are now fighting and dying for the defense of the United States, then it is shameful for us to be buying peace with gold, when we should be offering our bodies as living sacrifices. As I am given to see things, buying peace for ourselves, if this is our war, buying it with money renders us contemptible in the eyes of the world and, if I understand the spirit of America, contemptible in our own eyes. However, that may be, there is no guaranty that this bill will buy peace and keep us out of war, despite professions to that effect.

If the bill is enacted into law and efficiently carried into execution, it will engage our Government in war activities, involve us officially in the conflicts of Europe and Asia, and place in jeopardy everything we cherish in the United States. It is true that some Americans doubt this risk. They appear to be confident that they can divine the future in Europe and Asia infallibly. They seem to believe that the United States can determine the destiny of those continents without incurring the peril of war and ruin for the American people. But I am not one of those astrologers. My knowledge of Europe and Asia is less extensive than theirs. I am merely certain that Europe is old, that Asia is old; that the peoples and nations of Europe and Asia have their respective traditions, institutions, forms of government, and systems of economy; and that Europe and Asia have been torn by wars, waged under various symbols and slogans, since the dawn of recorded history.

The history of Europe and Asia is long and violent. Tenacious

emotions and habits are associated with it. Can the American people, great and ingenious though they be, transform those traditions, institutions, systems, emotions, and habits by employing treasure, arms, propaganda, and diplomatic lectures? Can they, by any means at their disposal, make over Europe and Asia, provide democracy, a bill of rights, and economic security for everybody, everywhere, in the world? With all due respect for those Americans who clamor that this is the mission of the United States, I am compelled to say that, in my opinion, their exuberance is on a par with the childish exuberance of the Bolshevik internationalists who preach the gospel of one model for the whole world. And I am bound to say, furthermore, that it is an exuberance more likely to bring disasters upon our own country than to carry happiness and security to the earth's weary multitudes.

Against embarking on such a crusade, surely we are put on our guard by the history of the last World War. For public consumption and partly with a view to influencing American public opinion, several European belligerents put forth numerous formulations of war origins and war aims. Later, unexpected revolutions in Russia, Germany, and Austria ripped open the diplomatic archives of those countries. Then were revealed to us the maneuvers, negotiations, and secret treaties spread over many years, which preceded and accompanied that World War. I have spent many weary months studying these documents, and I will say, gentlemen of the committee, that these documents do not show that the European conflict was, in the aims of the great powers, a war for democracy, or for the defense of the United States, or had anything to do with protecting the interests of the United States.

And to state the case mildly, those secret agreements among the powers do not exactly square with the public statements of the belligerents respecting the origins and aims of that war. Nor indeed did the so-called settlement at Paris, in 1919, exactly square with the declared war aims of President Wilson.

This is not to say that the present war is identical with the last war or to recite that false phrase, "History repeats itself"—for it never does. Yet we do know that the present war did not spring out of a vacuum, nor merely out of the Versailles Treaty. Its origins, nature, and course are rooted in the long history of the Old World and the long conflicts of the great powers. In the light of that long history and those long conflicts, a discussion of their mere war aims shrivels into futility.

We, however, poised now on the brink of the fateful decision respecting ourselves, are under positive obligation to discuss the aims of the Government of the United States in the activities which would be let loose under this bill, if enacted. Indeed it becomes the solemn duty of all Members of Congress to do this. If they are not to vote thoughtlessly and recklessly, they will ask themselves certain grave questions before they vote. And I may say, gentlemen of the committee, I do not envy you that solemn task that falls upon you. Congress cannot in truth escape these questions, for it will be answering them if it passes this bill—answering them conceivably in a manner fraught with infinite tragedy for the United States.

Here are the questions:

Does Congress intend to guarantee the present extent, economic resources, and economic methods of the British Empire forever to the

Government of Great Britain by placing the unlimited resources of the United States forever at the disposal of the British Government, however constituted?

Does Congress intend to supply money, ships, and commodities of war until the French Republic is restored? until the integrity of its empire is assured? until all the lands run over by Hitler are once more vested with full sovereignty? until Russia has returned to Finland and Poland the territories wrested from them? until democracy is reestablished in Greece? until the King of Albania has recovered his throne?

Is Congress prepared to pour out American wealth until the Chungking government in China has conquered the Nanking government? Until Japan is expelled from the continent? Until Chinese Communists are finally suppressed? And until Soviet Russia is pushed back within the old Russian borders?

And if European or Asiatic powers should propose to make settlements without providing democracy, a bill of rights, and economic security for everybody, everywhere, will Congress insist that they keep on fighting until the President of the United States is satisfied with the results? If none of the countries deemed under the terms of this bill to be defending the United States succeeds in defeating its enemy with the material aid rendered by the United States, will Congress throw millions of boys after the billions in dollars?

Two more crucial questions are before our Nation in council. After Europe has been turned into flaming shambles, with revolutions, exploding right and left, will this Congress be able to supply the men, money, and talents necessary to reestablish and maintain order and security there? Are the Members of Congress absolutely sure, as they think about this bill, that the flames of war and civil commotion will not spread to our country? That when the war boom of fools' gold has burst with terrific force, Congress will be able to cope at home with the problems of unemployment and debts with which it had wrestled for years prior to this present false prosperity by borrowing money to meet the needs of distressed farmers, distressed industries, the distressed third of the Nation?

As a nation in council, we should not mislead ourselves by phrases and phantoms. The present business of our Congress, it seems to me, is not to split hairs over the mere language of this bill or to try to restrict its consequences to 1 or 2 years of Presidential experimentation. The present business of Congress is to decide now, in voting on this bill, whether it is prepared on a show-down to carry our country into the war in Europe and Asia, and thus set the whole world on fire, or whether it is resolved, on a show-down, to stay out to the last ditch and preserve one stronghold of order and sanity even against the gates of hell. Here, on this continent, I believe we may be secure and should make ourselves secure from the kind of conflict and terrorism in which the old worlds have indulged for such long ages of time.

In opposing this bill I am not insisting upon negation. A plan for constructive action is possible and desirable. I propose, first of all, that Congress reject this bill with such force that no President of the United States will ever dare again, in all our history, to ask it to suspend the Constitution and the laws of this land and to confer upon him limitless dictatorial powers over life and death.

I propose that this Congress then resume the legislative power assigned to it by the supreme law of this land, and, by specific legislation of its own drafting, authorize using the credit of our Government in aid of American industries engaged in supplying Great Britain with goods, under positive conditions, coordinated with American defense production. Such legislation would put limits on the amount and term of such credit. It would place the amount generously above a careful estimate of British needs. It would make the credit immediately available—within 48 hours. It would require pledges from the British Government based on assets available to it in the United States and elsewhere, but not instantly realizable. It would enable the British Government to draw upon the full capacity of American industries as rapidly as untrammelled American enterprise can develop that capacity. It would furnish aid to Great Britain without erecting a bureaucratic monstrosity which would frighten and divide our Nation and thrust the agencies of our Government into the very midst of belligerent activities.

Such legislation would keep the war-making powers in the hands of Congress where it belongs under the Constitution, under every decent, patriotic conception of American democracy, under every ideal cherished by the American people since the foundation of our republic. Finally and fundamentally, it would conserve our energies and our great powers for that day when the United States, strong and unafraid, may, in keeping with its historic traditions, tender to the shattered nations of the earth those services which it can competently offer, in keeping with our peace and security on this continent.

All these issues, gentlemen of the committee, I submit to your minds and consciences, are involved in five pages of print bearing the number 275.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Doctor.

Senator HARRISON, have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Not for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas, do you have any questions?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper?

Senator CAPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds, have you any questions?

Senator REYNOLDS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions, but I want to thank Dr. Beard, as an American and as a Senator, for a very superb statement of Americanism.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes?

Senator BYRNES. I have no question, nor any statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson, you intimated you might have some questions later.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You are the author of a little volume entitled "A Foreign Policy for America," are you not?

Mr. BEARD. I confess that I am guilty.

Senator JOHNSON of California. It is a very informative, illuminating, and valuable volume, from my standpoint. You had in this volume some statements as to the derivation of "isolationist," a word that as you know has become a term of reproach and bandied about by men who do not know what it means, to our detriment in this contest; and it is applied now equally with "appeaser" and with "friendliness for dictators," indiscriminately. Do you recall a chapter in your book upon the "isolationist"?

Mr. BEARD. I recall mentioning that, discriminating between what I call "continentalists" and "isolationists."

Senator JOHNSON of California. You prefer "continentalist" to "isolationist"?

You will recall that the word became a byword twenty-odd years ago, when we were making a fight upon the League of Nations, do you not?

Mr. BEARD. I do.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And it was applied then, as it is applied now, as a term of reproach. I can recall, if you will pardon me a personal reference, twenty-odd years ago on the floor of the Senate endeavoring to define it, and resenting the fact of its application in the manner that it was applied by opponents of ours. And thereafter, again, I did the same thing, and finally we accepted the name, because we did not care what the terminology might be of a particular cause, if the cause were understood; and in that way we passed through the storm of 1919-21, and we succeeded in our "fell design" of beating the League of Nations.

Do you recall the derivation of the word, and the way in which it was applied?

Mr. BEARD. Yes, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON of California. These gentlemen who think it appropriate to call everybody an "isolationist" do so as if it were a terrible term; yet it disagrees with them. Let me read to you your conclusion in regard to that particular name:

Far from pursuing a "hermit" policy, they were eager to promote commerce and intercourse with other nations, "forcing nothing," as Washington put the case. At the very outset, diplomatic and consular relations were established with the leading countries. Treaties of commerce and amity were sought, signed, and ratified. Wherever American trading interests extended, the United States gave them customary diplomatic protection. When irregular and high-handed officials maltreated American merchants and sailors, as did the Barbary pirates, the Government of the United States applied force, in the Mediterranean or along the shores of the Atlantic and the Pacific.

No simple phrase fully characterizes this system of foreign policy. The leaders who created it were not isolationists. They were noninterventionists.

in respect of European wars which were not projected into the Western Hemisphere. They were also noninterventionists in respect of the purely domestic conflicts arising in other countries everywhere, including this hemisphere. With reference to the center of their affections, ambitions, and hopes they were continentalists, not Europeans or internationalists. As Jefferson set forth their view, while Europe was engaged in destroying lives and property, America was to concentrate on construction, on building a civilization here. It was, therefore, unfortunate and unhistorical when, long afterward, the policy so established and so pursued was ineptly and inexacty branded by a false name—"isolationism." If a single term is to be applied to their system, it may well be "continentalism."

Do you recall that?

Mr. BEARD. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That was your view concerning the isolationist, was it not?

Mr. BEARD. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. If time permitted, I would begin at the beginning and come down through the years, with the term defined by all of our earlier Presidents, to establish conclusively the facts that are here stated, but time will not permit me this morning, so I simply want to read your conclusion, as I have done, concerning isolationists.

There is not a man who uses the term in derision that understands it or knows what it means, or where the policy came from—not a man, I do not care who he is. And then, as yesterday I heard stated, the President himself paid the greatest compliment to isolationists that could be paid to them when, at Chautauqua, he made the statement, "The isolationists wish to keep this country out of war." That is the purpose that we had—not that this country would never fight, but to keep this country out of Europe's wars; and that is the distinction you try to draw concerning it in this passage, is it not?

Mr. BEARD. It is.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Now, I would like to read to you, but I do not know that you would care for it nor for the time that it would take, the foreign policy that you suggested for the United States. Do you remember what it was?

Mr. BEARD. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Just let me read to you:

Continentalism did not seek to make a "hermit" nation out of America.

That is what we are accused of all the time—being an ostrich, sticking our heads in the sand, and being unable to see what transpires. We do not want European wars, and the difference between us and the interventionist is that he wants war. He can deny it all he pleases, but down deep in his soul there is a desire on his part for war, and we decline to be party to it.

Continentalism did not seek to make a "hermit" nation out of America. From the very beginning * * * it never had embraced that impossible conception. * * * It did not deny the obvious fact that wars in Europe and Asia "affect" or "concern" the United States. * * * It does, however, recognize the limited nature of American powers to relieve, restore, and maintain life beyond its own sphere of interest and control—a recognition of the hard fact that the United States, either alone or in any coalition, did not possess the power to force peace on Europe and Asia, to assure the establishment of democratic and pacific governments there, or to provide the social and economic underwriting necessary to the perdurance of such governments. * * *

Besides forcing a concentration of attention, energy, and intelligence on overcoming the grave economic and social crisis at home * * * continentalism, strictly construed, meant a return to the correct and restrained diplomacy of an earlier time. The freedom of the people and the press to discuss foreign affairs

and favor foreign nations, parties, factions, and causes, within the limits of neutrality laws was accepted as axiomatic. Equally axiomatic, if America was to keep its peace, was the duty of public officials, especially the President and Secretary of State, speaking in the name of the whole Nation, to abstain from denouncing and abusing foreign states, good or bad, with which diplomatic relations are maintained when the United States is at peace.

Correct policy likewise commanded such public officials to couch protests in the language of dignity; to speak and write as briefly and courteously as possible in necessary dealings with foreign governments; to make no boasts which the Army and Navy cannot enforce with a reasonable prospect of success; to carry on international relations with restraint, and in the subdued style of approved diplomatic usage—speaking softly, keeping the powder dry, withholding wrath except when war is intended as a last resort. Such official conduct would enable the Government of the United States to escape innumerable hatreds abroad, offer its services and cooperation to troubled peoples with authority on proper occasions, and command respect, even affection and esteem, throughout the earth.

You have the same opinion still, have you not?

Mr. BEARD. I would still have the same opinion.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is all.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator La Follette.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Dr. Beard, in your statement concerning the policy which you conceive this bill designed to implement, you adjoined upon members of this committee and the Congress consideration of the possibility of disasters which might flow in its wake to the United States of America. For the benefit of the committee and the record would you be willing to amplify that phrase or that statement?

Mr. BEARD. That is trying to see into the dim future. I have said that this bill, if enacted into law, will be acted upon. I have said that it seems to me that it would defeat the intentions of this bill to manufacture munitions and ships in billions of dollars' worth at a time and then send them unprotected across the Atlantic Ocean and allow the Germans to sink them into the sea as fast as we make them. So I am led to believe that in the intention of the bill or in the bill as it will be realized in action, if not in the intention, these munitions will be convoyed across the Atlantic. I submit it to your judgment, Senator, wouldn't it be preposterous to make hundreds of ships and then send them out unprotected across the Atlantic, millions and millions of dollars of planes and millions and millions of dollars' worth of guns and munitions and allow them to be sunk?

All right, then, we will convoy them. These convoyed ships undoubtedly will be attacked by the Germans, by planes and submarines.

Then what? Are we not in the war? Can you conceive of the American people then drawing back and saying, "We will not send any more ships or anything else?"

That is the way that I interpret the bill. It is an interpretation.

Now, you ask about the domestic difficulties? Well, Senator, for nearly 10 years we wrestled with the great depression. And I might say that I was profoundly impressed by the magnificent way in which President Roosevelt attacked that depression, his courage and, I might say, his fine public spirit. Yet when you look at the situation you find that we have been buying our way out of the depression with borrowed money, that every year we have been adding more and more to our national debt. And before the present war boom began we were in a recession, and we had eight or nine million men unemployed, for whom, after 10 years of action by Congress, no employment had been found.

Now, let's look at what happened after the last World War. In 1920 we had a ruinous explosion and farm prices began to slide down hill. In a way I think we saved ourselves from that depression by "pump priming" in Europe, that is, by lending ten or fifteen million dollars of American money, most of which is gone. Then, after we had come to the end of the "pump priming" in Europe that economy exploded.

It seems to me that if there is anything in the experience of history we should look beyond this present situation, let us say, to a time of peace, which, I hope as much as any member of this committee, our country will have the good fortune to have when this war boom will explode. And then we will have perhaps sixty-five billions of debt—not thirty billions, which you had in 1929 or even later, but you will have sixty-five, seventy-five, or one hundred billion dollars of debt to start with. Then what are you going to do with ten or fifteen million men unemployed, with debts mounting high, and the country full of unrest? What are you going to do then?

It seems to me that all that is involved in the action that you take here.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. A little while ago, Doctor, you spoke of the similarity of events leading up to our participation in the last war and the propaganda that was put out in connection with our entering the last war. Would you amplify that a little bit, Doctor, as to the similarity of the pattern of propaganda now being used and that put out preceding our entrance into the last war?

Mr. BEARD. We know very little about the present propaganda. As students of history we have an enormous body of documents and matter and materials and propaganda in the first World War.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I might say, Doctor, that a number of the members on this committee have been using our very best efforts to ascertain some of the facts about the propaganda now going on; but we have not been able to do it.

Mr. BEARD. Students of history may get them 50 years from now when archives are opened. As a matter of fact, when I was a student in England in 1898 there were some archives of the British Government as far back as 1815 that were not opened to students.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. There are no further questions, Doctor. Thank you very much for coming over.

Major Eliot, will you come forward, please?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I want to make perfectly plain that Major Eliot is not called by this particular side here. We have no objection to his testifying. We recognize the right of any man here to have any witness that he desires; but I want to make perfectly plain that he does not, at the instance of myself or my associates on this side of the table.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

The CHAIRMAN. Major Eliot, will you please give your name and present occupation to the reporter?

Major ELIOT. George Fielding Eliot. I am military commentator for the Columbia Broadcasting System and for the New York Herald Tribune.

The CHAIRMAN. Major Eliot, have you a prepared statement?

Major ELIOT. I have some notes here, Senator, from which I should like to make a brief statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed without interruption until you have finished such formal statement as you desire to make.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, before the major proceeds may I make a brief statement?

The major has been called at my request delivered to the chairman and the subcommittee. I was interested in some letters and correspondence that I have had with the major in which he had suggested that he had in mind some amendments to the pending measure that had for me considerable interest, and I requested that he be called for the purpose of presenting those suggestions, which I am sure the committee will be glad to hear. I accept full responsibility for making the request.

The CHAIRMAN. That is quite all right, Senator Gillette. Major Eliot has been called by the committee.

And we will be pleased to hear you, Major Eliot.

Major ELIOT. It seems to me that the problem before the committee, and eventually before the Congress, is a very old one. It is the recurring need in a republic for the giving of emergency powers to the Executive and at the same time providing for such restrictions of those powers as shall be in the interest of a democratic form of government, and for reclamation when the necessity for their exercise shall have passed.

Such limitations, as well as the grant of power, are necessarily the responsibility of the legislative branch. In times gone by the Roman Republic in times of great peril used to appoint a dictator with complete powers, but only for a period of 6 months. The present Emergency Powers Act of Great Britain had originally a time limitation of 1 year, which has now been extended to 2 years. Thus there can be limitations in the time for which emergency powers are granted. That is one form of legislation which the legislature may properly consider.

Another form of limitation is that provided by legislative review of the acts of the Executive and his exercise of the particular powers that may be granted.

During the Civil War the Congress saw fit to establish a joint select committee on the conduct of the war, which consisted of three members of the Senate and four members of the House of Representatives, which conducted during the actual progress of hostilities many investigations; and although its activities were sometimes considered injurious to discipline because of examination of subordinates of a general officer actually commanding in the field—that is, on his conduct—nevertheless, it brought to light many facts which otherwise might have remained unknown, and it did a great deal of good.

If this Congress saw fit to set up a joint select committee to review the exercise of such powers as it might grant to the Executive under this bill, not only could such a committee act as a reviewing group, but also, I should think, a great deal of good might be done if this committee were empowered to examine the question of the national

defense in general, there being no committee at the present time or no body where the legislature can bring together under one head the examination of the various angles which affect the national defense in its relation to foreign policy.

Another type of limitation is that which is implicit in the type of executive organization that might be created to exercise or assist in the exercise of the powers granted.

In that respect it seems to me that this country is in very serious danger. We are now faced with what must be described as a serious national emergency, involving at least the peril that we may have to go to war. If we do not, certainly we are going to have to move very carefully during the next few months or years. But we do not have in this country anything resembling the machinery for dealing with military and foreign policy such as the British possess, for example, in the Committee of Imperial Defense. The Committee of Imperial Defense consists of the Prime Minister and the heads of the principal Cabinet posts, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Air Staff, and the First Sea Lord; and they may call in such other eminent citizens as they desire to confer with them or to sit as temporary members of the committee.

While this may not be a proper matter for the consideration of the Congress—I doubt if it could be established by legislation, and I think the Executive powers now existing are ample for the purpose—it seems to me that a council of national defense, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Commerce, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of the Office of Production Management and his Associate Director, and perhaps one or two eminent civilians, might very usefully function in the capacity of a committee or council of national defense, and that the relations between this committee and the joint select committee, which I have heretofore proposed, of the Congress, might be usefully made very close.

Of this committee the President, by virtue of his constitutional position as Commander in Chief, would be ex officio chairman, and one of the new Executive Assistants to the President might be the vice chairman of the committee and have charge of the permanent secretariat. Of course, the committee should have a permanent secretariat which would maintain the records and would also be charged with maintaining the proper liaison between this committee and the Congress and the executive department.

Subordinate agencies and subcommittees would naturally grow, as they did under the British Committee of Imperial Defense, dealing with such matters as planning, joint intelligence, morale, shaping economic defense, and other matters for the consideration of which there is now no coordinated executive agency.

I think also that if such machinery were to be formally created—of course, some of these things are, in fact, being done, but the public does not realize it—I think it would tend very greatly to increase the authority with which the Executive would deal with the subjects which come under the Presidential consideration.

That is another form of limitation of the Executive power. But it tends in one way really to increase the efficiency with which that power may be exercised.

Direct limitations, such as restrictions as to the amount of money to be spent under the bill, restrictions as to specific powers, such as using naval vessels for convoying, and so on, are matters which are outside the scope of the discussion which I have prepared.

But it does seem to me that we should have an organization of national power, an organization of the Nation to deal with these emergencies with which we are now confronted, and to deal with them as may seem proper and absolutely necessary, and that we must have some means of examining into their nature and some means of determining with what resources we may meet them, and in what manner and whether a given course of action is in the interest of the United States, and even our powers to follow through. There exists now no such body either in Congress or in the executive branch of the Government. And I hope that the creation of such a body and the consequent formulation of a sound foreign and military policy going hand in hand, and coordinated in the manner that such policies are coordinated in what we may call totalitarian states, may in some fashion be accomplished.

I do not mean that we should adopt totalitarian methods here. I merely mean that we must be more efficient if we are to deal with a menace coming from a totalitarian source. We must find—and I believe we can—within the proper limits of our democracy—what is just as efficient and as smooth-working as the totalitarians have found by the exercise of their authority.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes the formal statement that I wished to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, Senator Harrison?

Senator HARRISON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Major Eliot, you stated that the joint select committee on the conduct of the war which was created during the Civil War had accomplished some good. It has been a common practice to deride the activities of that committee. Would you be willing to amplify your statement?

Major ELIOT. Yes; I would.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. And state what was accomplished.

Major ELIOT. I think they continually brought to light many facts with regard to the conduct of the war which otherwise might not have been brought to the bar of public judgment, so to speak. And although the effect on discipline was bad, I think that is a matter of procedure rather than a matter of principle. I believe in the principle of a proper legislative check and examination of executive conduct.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Aside from the adverse effect upon discipline, is it your judgment after studying the activities of that committee that one contribution was to improve the efficiency with which the Civil War was conducted?

Major ELIOT. I feel that it did improve it. I will not say from the point of view strictly of military efficiency, Senator. I think it did some harm in that respect and some good. But I do think that it

improved the ability of the State as a whole to conduct war and subsequently to make peace.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I think you also suggested that such a committee should have the authority and the duty of reviewing the progress of national defense generally.

Major ELIOT. I think a general examination of the national defense would be very useful. I don't know that it has ever been made by competent authority.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Does that suggestion come because of your feeling that otherwise progress may not be made as rapidly and as efficiently as is necessary?

Major ELIOT. I do think, Senator, that we ought to have an examination of the problem as a whole. I do not believe that that has been made. I do not believe that there exists any agency for making it. After all, it is on the appropriation of the money by Congress that the whole matter depends. Therefore, the action should be initiated by Congress. There are now Military Affairs Committees and Naval Affairs Committees of both Houses and the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee dealing with military and naval affairs, and you really have 8 bodies that are dealing with these matters. Then you have your 2 Foreign Relations Committees which are directly associated with military policy. Don't you really have 10 bodies in Congress that are concerned with the military policy and national defense? I think if you had a single committee—not taking the place of any of these committees at all, but a place where broad general policies might be reviewed, where there might be some degree of coordination, where the secretary of that committee might become a clearing house of information for the other committees—that would be a very useful method.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Is it fair to assume that you hold the view that the Congress and the public generally are entitled to information as to the detailed progress of our national-defense efforts?

Major ELIOT. Within such limitations as are necessarily imposed by military secrecy; yes. Certainly there are some matters that ought not be dragged out into the light of day. The closer we approach to hostilities or the possibility of hostilities the greater the necessity for secrecy in some matters. But I rather think there is a greater necessity for open and understood policies along broad general lines.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. As a person engaged in studying, in writing, and in commenting upon these generally related subjects, have you experienced any difficulty in getting information not relating to military and naval secrets but relating to the progress of the national defense effort?

Major ELIOT. Such difficulty as I have experienced I think is not due to unwillingness to give information but to a considerable degree of confusion which seems to prevail. You get different sorts of information from different sources. At the present time I do not believe there is any one person, except possibly the President, who knows exactly what progress has been made and exactly what has been done. That is natural in the tremendous expansion that is taking place. And I think that probably the record keeping apparatus will presently catch up and give us a little better idea as to what is going on.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. You said you had not prepared any comment as to limitations that might be considered by the Congress with regard to specific powers. I think you mentioned in that connection the power of convoy. As a student of this present military situation would you care to express an opinion as to the probable military necessity, assuming the premise upon which this bill is predicated, of effective aid to Britain by convoys in the future?

Major ELIOT. Senator, I had hoped to avoid that line of discussion.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I will withdraw it if it embarrasses you.

Major ELIOT. No; it does not embarrass me in the least. I am perfectly willing to state my opinion.

I believe the danger to this country arises from the destruction of the balance of power in Europe. That has not happened before since the Napoleonic wars. I believe the gaining of direct access to the Atlantic Ocean by a power which has become the master of Europe by land is a definite peril to American interests. I do not believe that we are going to be invaded within any short period of time. I think the change in the balance of power necessarily produces an entirely different situation from any that we have faced heretofore, and that we must deal this matter realistically. Therefore, I believe that the powers that the Executive asks for in this bill should be granted him, with proper limitations upon their exercise.

I do not believe a restriction upon the use of naval vessels for convoy is a proper limitation. It is a circumstance which may arise; and I think it is an improper guard on his freedom of action to use the armed forces of the United States in the protection of our interests.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I had understood from your writings that that was your position. But I was asking for your opinion, if you care to state it, from your study from a military standpoint of the effectiveness of submarines and air attack upon shipping on the high seas under the present strategic circumstances, and assuming for the sake of the argument the premise behind this bill, whether you believe that the problem of naval convoy is one which in the near future we will have to face.

Major ELIOT. It seems to me, sir, that the battle of Britain is divided into three distinct phases—the battle of production, in which we are now engaged; the battle of combat, in which we hope to avoid being engaged; and the intermediate stage is the battle of transportation. In other words, we must get the supplies to the place where they will be useful, if we are to aid Britain. Munitions delivered in Britain are a furtherance of that aid. Munitions remaining in the United States are of some use in our defense. But a ton of munitions at the bottom of the ocean is a net loss to everyone.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Therefore, in your judgment, we must frankly face that probability in the near future?

Major ELIOT. Except that the difficulties of implementing it are enormous. The convoy system does not work by sending out destroyers from the United States to cross the Atlantic Ocean with a convoy. The convoy escort consists of three parts. I am assuming that the British are using the same system that they used in the last war, which seemed effective and which seems to be what they are using now. The first is the ocean escort which starts out with the convoy from the convoy assembly ports, those ports being used by England now being Halifax, Trinidad, Bermuda, and Freetown.

Then the ocean escort consists only of a single cruiser or possibly an armed merchant vessel or cruiser whose duty is to provide safety against ocean surface raiders. When the convoy arrives at the edge of the submarine zone, which is fixed more or less by experience, and arrives at an approved and previously arranged rendezvous, it is met by destroyers which take it through the submarine zone, there being six to eight destroyers or sloops, or what we would call a gunboat, or vessels similar to our Coast Guard cutters. These sloops take the ships through the submarine zone. They operate from bases in the British Isles.

When the dispersal point is reached the ships proceed singly or in pairs to different ports, being accompanied by motorboats and so on, which see that they get safely to port of destination. Obviously for us to run a convoy system we would have to have bases on the other side of the water to operate our destroyers from, and patrol vessels. And it seems to me that presents very grave difficulties.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys, have you any questions?

Senator VAN NUYS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. Major Eliot, I am one of those who read your articles on military strategy from time to time. I am glad to see you come here today. I have been very much interested in what you said about a danger being presented to the United States which we have not experienced in a century past, that is, by the passage of the balance of power in Europe. You think that in the past the existence of that situation has been of very material importance to the security and safety of the United States?

Major ELIOT. Yes, I do. I think, as Admiral Mahan wrote some 40 years ago, we never had to fear the full weight of any European power but only what they could afford to detach and send against us. While they have anxieties closer to home, naturally those are the primary anxieties, and any expedition crossing the water, the outcome being doubtful, must be only a secondary affair.

When that balance of power is destroyed so that one nation becomes supreme upon the Continent it is relieved of the continental difficulties; and if in addition that nation gains free access to the Atlantic Ocean, obviously a new situation has arisen in which the strategic balance of the entire world is upset, which is, of course, a considerable menace to American interests.

Senator PEPPER. As I understand you, Major Eliot, that would be a military menace and a source of potential danger to the United States which we have not experienced in at least a century of our history.

Major ELIOT. It would confront us with a new military situation. I do not belong to that group which believes that we are in immediate peril of invasion, but it is a situation in which we would have to maintain a very much larger military establishment than we have maintained hitherto, and in which I believe we would have to adopt new policies,—commercial, financial, and otherwise,—because this new conqueror of Europe makes total war and integrates all of the elements of the state under a single head and does nothing political which does

not have economic and military significance, and nothing economic that does not have military and political significance.

Senator PEPPER. As a student of military history I will ask you if even Napoleon, at the time he had mastery of Europe, ever integrated the continent in such a way as Hitler since he has had control of it?

Major ELIOT. Hitler is now attempting, apparently, to deprive the states that he has conquered of industrial power; that is, of their heavy industries, insofar as he can do so, by taking the skilled workmen into Germany and by removing certain types of machinery. He hopes, I think, or it is clear from the statements of his henchmen, to make these states auxiliary or feeder states for a great German nation. In Napoleon's day war was not dependent upon industry as it is now.

Senator PEPPER. In other words, Hitler, instead of thinking in terms of states in Europe being independent states, thinks of them as simply being economic provinces of that one State in Europe, Germany?

Major ELIOT. If one may judge from the statements of responsible German leaders, that is to be Germany's position in Europe.

Senator PEPPER. And the closest approach to that situation in anything like modern history was during the time of Napoleon?

Major ELIOT. Yes. But the situation was quite different, as has been pointed out.

Senator PEPPER. But even that was nothing like this state that Hitler has created.

Major ELIOT. That was the closest we have come to an actual overthrow of the balance of power in Europe, that is, with the rise of Napoleon.

Senator PEPPER. Major Eliot, what new danger or what new potential danger to the integrity of the security of the United States has arisen in the last 3 decades in another part of the world which adds to our dangers along with this change in the balance of power.

Major ELIOT. Of course, there has been a balance of power in Asia. Japan and Russia have more or less offset each other, and still do to some extent. Japan is a natural sea power. It is an insular government.

In understanding the principle of the balance of power it is necessary to point out that no nation with a continental frontier has ever become for a long period of time a great sea power. The two do not go together, because your first consideration must always be the defense of your own country against invasion. Therefore, you cannot put too much of your resources into naval power. The Portuguese and Dutch colonial and maritime empires collapsed for this reason. Although France, Germany, and Russia have at various times tried to create great sea powers, they have not been successful.

Japan, with her gratuitous frontiers, while she continues to be so occupied in China, I do not believe is a great menace to us except insofar as she might try to stand in the areas from which we draw necessary supplies, and from which the British Empire, as has been frequently stated in public comment, draws absolutely essential supplies for the operation of its middle eastern campaign.

Senator PEPPER. Before we get away from the military aspects purely, the Japanese naval power is a development of rather recent years, is it not?

Major ELIOT. Yes; it is a development of the last 40 years or so.

Senator PEPPER. And, of course, that has injected an entirely new element into the situation that surrounds us, so far as military potentialities are concerned?

Major ELIOT. Yes. And it concerns Great Britain, because up to the turn of the century there was no great naval power except in Europe. Then our Navy began to grow, and also the Japanese Navy.

Senator PEPPER. You might say that the first development was the development of Japan into a world power or into a comparable world power?

Major ELIOT. And the development of the United States, from the British point of view, where they could no longer control the ports of the world by blockading the sea coast of Europe.

Senator PEPPER. The establishment of the Japanese Empire and the creation of the Japanese Navy comparable with the major navies of the world, and during the time that development was in progress, in addition to their natural geographical location, now we do not have the balance of power in Asia to which you referred a little while ago? That is, Russia and Japan are opposing each other. But up until relatively recent years we had what might be called a balance of sea power in Europe which gave us essential security on that side, and the balance of power in the Orient or in the east.

Major ELIOT. So we really needed only to develop our full strength in one of those two directions.

Senator PEPPER. Now, then, suppose that simultaneously both of those balances of power should be upset. Suppose that Germany should destroy the balance of power in Europe and become the master of one state, a European state under Germany, and at the same time certain conditions should be provided so that Japan should have nothing to fear from any other nation in the Orient. That would present a situation the like of which we never had in our history, would it not?

Major ELIOT. It would, yes, sir; and it would impose upon us very considerable military and economic burdens, and I think would have a very adverse effect not only on the measures we should have to take to beat it—the regimentation of our economy, and so on—but I am afraid upon our standard of living.

Senator PEPPER. Major, I am interested in having you say that, because there are some people who very conscientiously speak as if this measure were designed to take democracy away from the United States and to regiment our economy and our political and our social systems. As I understand your last remark, you say that if we do not do anything in the way of participation in the present conflict, either with materials or men, and England should fall or the opponents of Hitler should succumb, and he should rise as the master of the master state of Europe, with free access to the seas, our troubles would probably just begin instead of end?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir. After all, sitting still is a policy, and I think the risk of that policy is much greater than the risks of taking some forthright and intelligent action about the state of the world before it is too late.

Senator PEPPER. May I say that you assume in those risks, in reference to that statement, the risk of sending men eventually to

participate in armed conflict is greater than sending materials now to avoid the existence of that eventuality?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir; and I happen to believe, Senator, that the manpower of Great Britain and the United States will never be sufficient to overcome the manpower at Hitler's command in Europe. That would never be an intelligent military policy for us to adopt, but I think that the politically and economically integrated state which the Germans have built can be attacked with economic weapons much more successfully than any other form of state that we have hitherto seen, and that the weapons of blockade and the economic organization of the non-European world against Germany can destroy Germany—the economic foundations of the totalitarian state on which its political structure rests—much more easily than Napoleon could be destroyed by the same means.

Senator PEPPER. And you admit that this measure, insofar as the primary objective is concerned, is calculated not only to keep the peace of this country, to save the lives of our sons, but also to save the democracy of this country rather than to destroy it?

Major ELIOT. I believe, Senator, that a firm and forthright and, indeed, a bold foreign policy in support of Great Britain is calculated to those ends. I hold no brief for this particular measure, but I think that additional powers must be granted to the Executive and that the Legislature should consider wisely the granting of those powers and a proper restriction on them.

Senator PEPPER. Thank you, Major.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. Major Eliot, I want to be sure I understand you when you say that you think our foreign policy should stem from the proposition that we must maintain the balance of power in Europe. How do you maintain the balance of power in Europe if either side wins this war conclusively?

Major ELIOT. I do not say that we should maintain it, Senator. I do not think our position toward it is as intimately associated with the balance of power as Great Britain's is. What I am afraid of is that one nation, being master of Europe, gains free access to the sea. That has not happened before. I do not think we ought to interfere in every European quarrel. I do not think we ought to interfere in every Asiatic quarrel. I think we should only take measures that are necessary when the results of these wars are such as to menace directly our own interests, and I think they are menaced now.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think they are menaced to a degree, too, but I fail to understand how you can logically pursue the thesis that it is our job to prevent the destruction of the balance of power in Europe and not arrive at the conclusion that it is our job to see that it is not a military conclusiveness to an ultimate victory in this war.

Major ELIOT. Well, unless that military conclusiveness be such as shall tend toward a preservation of world peace and of the interests of this country, and I think that the application of the world-wide scale of the principle of the balance of power, supported by the wise exercise of the sea power of this country and in association with the British Commonwealth, can do a great deal toward preserving peace.

In the one hundred years following the Napoleonic wars there was a period of peace in which wars took place only of limited duration.

There were no great world wars. There were no wars involving sea power except the Russo-Japanese War.

I think such another period of peace might see also a similar period of human progress, and I am hoping that we can make some contribution to that end. If we cannot, we are just throwing away our time.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, what balance of power in Europe is it that you want to exist? The balance of power that existed prior to Versailles or the balance of power that existed at the time of Versailles?

Major ELIOT. I think it has gone beyond the balance of power in Europe now. I think it is a question of preserving a world balance of power, and to stem the world-be world conquerors so that they shall not be able to assemble the materials of war for making war, and I think that sea power can do it.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think that is a substantial amendment to your original statement. Your original statement was that the balance of power in Europe should be——

Major ELIOT. No. My statement was that the destruction of the balance of power in Europe had brought about a situation that was menacing to us and that there was not a balance of world power.

Senator VANDENBERG. Let me ask you one or two questions about congressional cooperation with the Executive departments in the, shall we say, supervision of this defense effort. That has greatly interested me. I may say that I am quite sympathetic to your point of view. I tried to get an amendment in an appropriation bill a few years ago to permit a two- or three-billion-dollar defense blank check to be at least casually consulted by a congressional committee, but I was quite ridiculed out of the Senate in connection with this, so I can tell you what you are headed for.

If there were such an effort, it would depend for its success, would it not, upon complete candor and complete access to all essential information on the part of the Representatives of the Congress?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir. I suggest that the joint select committee which I have suggested is a proper recipient for such Executive confidences.

Senator VANDENBERG. What I want to ask you is whether it is possible to have candor in such a relationship. This is what I mean. You are very familiar with military practice and procedure. Suppose the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations come into this joint committee meeting. Are they free agents to express their own candid opinions or are they not bound completely by the opinions of the Commander in Chief?

Major ELIOT. That question arose, Senator, as you will probably recall, in connection with decisions that were made by the British war cabinet in connection with the Dardanelles expedition, and it was then considered by the Chief of Staff and by the First Sea Lord, Jackie Fisher, that they were bound by the opinions of their civilian chiefs; that these chiefs having taken certain positions, it was up to the service chiefs in the war cabinet, of which they were nominal members, to stand mute.

Thereafter decisions were taken in their presence and with their tacit approval, which did not in fact have that approval.

Subsequently, in the parliamentary investigation of the Dardanelles expedition, this attitude was very sharply attacked; and it is now the considered practice of the service chiefs, and it is their bounden duty, to state their views when they are called upon.

I think that the making of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations members of a council of national defense coequal with the members of the Cabinet in that council, and with a clear statement that it is their duty to state their opinions, would have considerable value.

Of course, you cannot eliminate the fact that these officers are the subordinates of the President of the United States, who is constitutionally the Commander in Chief, but I think the matter of their duty is a difficult one. It proved to be in Britain. It will prove to be here. We will probably solve it only by the process of trial and error.

Senator VANDENBERG. Let me personify the question in a little more detail. I happen to favor maximum material aid to England so long as we do not become a collaborator and so long as we do not dissipate the essential nucleus of our own national defense. Now, it becomes a question of vital judgment as to where the line shall be drawn to protect the essential nucleus of our own national defense, does it not?

Major ELLIOT. Yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. Suppose there is a meeting of the joint committee which had to pass upon that question in a specific instance, let us say in connection with assistance. Suppose it is the policy of the Commander in Chief to give 85 percent of our airplane production to England. Suppose it is the opinion of the Chief of Staff that 50 percent is the limit of safety. Do you think he would be free to say so under the circumstances, if the Commander in Chief had made his statement?

Major ELLIOT. I think he ought to be. I think that is a practical question which is exceedingly difficult to solve, but, after all, you have seated in this committee gentlemen of great and eminent worth. You have Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and, presumably, you have a couple of civilians of great eminence. Mr. Baruch, for example, would be a very useful member of such a committee.

If you have people of that sort in there, they are going to ask questions, and you have your joint select committee, which is reviewing what is going on from time to time, and they are going to ask questions.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think you have your finger at the moment on the point which to me is the most disturbing hazard in our congressional situation; namely, our congressional inability to have the full, free, and frank use of the expert information of our service departments. Now, I freely concede that I do not understand how, under military discipline, it is possible to operate otherwise, but if that is the case, then these experts are not free agents, even when they come into this joint committee of yours.

I have heard so many private opinions from high-ranking Army and Navy officers which are at complete variance with their official statements on the same subjects that I am just a little dubious as to whether or not it is possible for us to have, under your proposal, the candor and the independence of opinion and thought that is necessary to make it work.

Major ELIOT. Well, Senator, I am just trying to improve the situation. I do not believe there is a perfect solution, but I believe the suggestion I have made would make an improvement, anyway, and we need to move forward and we need to improve the situation as much as we can.

Senator VANDENBERG. If anything could bring to Congress a more complete source of information from expert sources, I certainly agree with you. It would be a godsend to us and to the country.

Major ELIOT. I think the members of this committee, given the broader view instead of the necessarily specialized view of the present committees, would themselves acquire a very considerable competence in time in dealing with these matters.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey, have you any questions?

Senator GUFFEY. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. Major, whatever merit your suggestion may have in regard to a joint congressional committee to review acts of the President and the departments on the subject of national defense and also the setting up of a council made up of Cabinet Members, you do not think it could be worked in as part of this particular bill, do you?

Major ELIOT. No, sir; except that I would like to see a machinery set up for the exercise of the authority granted under this bill.

Senator BARKLEY. You are speaking now of your general attitude toward the creation of such a committee, not, of course, as it would be dealt with by this legislation?

Major ELIOT. No.

Senator BARKLEY. That has to deal also with our domestic defense and all matters relating to it; that does not relate merely to aid to Britain?

Major ELIOT. No, sir. It seems to me that this is an example of the type of policy that requires that sort of set-up.

Senator BARKLEY. We have had discussions of the creation of joint committees of the two Houses in the name of trying to prepare legislation, and our experience has not always been happy. You have, as you say, these 8 to 10 committees. What you would do would be to set up an eleventh committee to try to duplicate, probably, some of the work done by the others. It would be inevitable that that would happen.

Major ELIOT. There might be some duplication, but I believe, if you would get all the broad matters of policy in one committee and the specific ones in the other, while there may be duplication at first, very shortly there would be a division which would be along clearer lines. I think also that this joint select committee is, of course, only a temporary device to deal with the present emergency. I do not think it is necessarily part of the permanent machinery of Congress.

Senator BARKLEY. Under our methods of constitutional procedure it is impossible for us to select methods of other countries.

Major ELIOT. That is true. We must adapt them to present conditions.

Senator BARKLEY. In testimony given on such legislation there has been a complaint made by some witnesses that Members are not

subject to cross-examination by Congress. That goes to the form of our Government.

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. You cannot remedy that without changing that form, and you do not advocate that?

Major ELIOT. No, sir; I do not advocate changing our form of Government. I would like to see a better machinery for developing our national defense.

Senator BARKLEY. You would like to see it in better form?

Major ELIOT. Yes. I advocate using the machinery in the organizations we already have and coordinating them better.

Senator BARKLEY. Under the provisions of this bill is any power conferred on the President with reference to the conveying of ships that he does not already possess?

Major ELIOT. I have read the bill quite thoroughly. The President has the power to do it now. I do not believe the bill amplifies or restricts it.

Senator BARKLEY. He has those powers already?

Major ELIOT. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. He can send them anywhere in the world, as his judgment dictates?

Major ELIOT. I would not like to see those powers restricted.

Senator BARKLEY. You are a military student and have had experience in the Army?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. You attained your majority in the Army?

Major ELIOT. I was in the World War.

Senator BARKLEY. I read not only what you write, but I listen every day to your comments over the radio, and I have found them very intelligent and comprehensive.

Major ELIOT. Thank you.

Senator BARKLEY. I appreciate your viewpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White is not here.

Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, one or two questions. You heard my statement, Major Eliot, that I had requested you to be called before the committee?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir; and I have confined my statement to the subjects which we have discussed and, under questioning, I have replied to questions conscientiously.

Senator GILLETTE. Very properly, and may I say that I asked for you because of my high regard for your ability, which I share along with hundreds of thousands of other Americans, in the field on which you comment and write, reserving, of course, my right to disagree with your conclusions.

I was interested in the limitations which you suggested, and which were the subject of correspondence between you and me and appealed to me as worthy of exploration. The suggestions you made here in your formal statement of limitations were based, were they not, on your convictions that because of the custom of granting plenary power—during an emergency, it was best to restrict that power to the needs?

Major ELIOT. I think it always should be so, sir. I would be definitely opposed to any grant of power to the Executive that was

not necessary for the proper conduct of Government and the security of the Republic, and I think it ought to be taken back the moment the need for it has passed.

Senator GILLETTE. Was it your opinion, or is it now your opinion, that this bill as now drafted needs amendment in the way of limitations and restrictions?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir. I think it needs to be limited in time. I think it needs to be limited in legislative review. What limitations in the matter of Executive reorganization can be applied, I do not know. I think that probably is within the power of Congress, unless a joint resolution were passed on certain Executive reorganizations. As to direct limitations, I can think of none that I would advocate at the moment.

Senator GILLETTE. In response to a question addressed to you by Senator Barkley a few minutes ago, I believe you said that you agreed with him that there was no power of convoy granted the President in this bill, if passed in its present form, that he does not now possess?

Major ELIOT. I think that is correct.

Senator GILLETTE. Under the Constitution, as Commander in Chief of the Navy?

Major ELIOT. Unless it be implicit in the power to transfer, which is a word used there—a defense article to a foreign power whose defense the President considers necessary to ours—but I do not think that creates any power to send the Navy. I think that power he already has.

Senator GILLETTE. He already has that power as Commander in Chief of the Navy?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. But is not there a very grave possibility, Major, in the passage of this bill in its form at present of the Chief Executive's construing it as a direction from the Congress to use the power that he already possesses to carry out the special power conferred by the bill?

Major ELIOT. Well, does not the House Amendment cover that? That says, "This is not a grant of power to convoy that the President does not already possess." That places the Congress on record as not giving him any fresh mandate to convoy.

Senator GILLETTE. That House Amendment in effect would have the same bearing as a statement that the sun is going to rise tomorrow.

Major ELIOT. Well, it avoids the particular peril that you mention—that it might be taken as a mandate to do so.

Senator GILLETTE. On the part of the President?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Going back to your statement made in response to questions from the Senator from Wisconsin—if I misquote you, correct me, because I am trying not to do it—I gather that you agree with Dr. Beard, who was just on the stand, that it would be a useless thing to provide matériel in aid to Britain and allow it to be sent to the bottom of the ocean and not reach there?

Major ELIOT. I do think so. I think that is a question that we will have to face realistically and that we may have to face as a matter of policy in a very short time, because I think the first thing the Germans are going to do as the weather clears in the North Atlantic

is to commence, on a much higher scale than we have seen before, activity against British shipping and British ports.

Senator GILLETTE. Exactly. Then, following out your statement that to make a convoy effective it is necessary to have bases on the other side——

Major ELIOT. That is right.

Senator GILLETTE (continuing). To secure or to make certain the delivery of this aid to Great Britain, using the convoy power that the President constitutionally has, but giving him power to authorize him to extend this aid to England without payment, as provided by the neutrality law, would necessitate convoying and would necessitate the establishment of American bases from which those convoys could operate effectively?

Major ELIOT. But I do not know any place you could establish them, unless you established them in Ireland.

Senator GILLETTE. Your statement was that it was essential to an effective convoy system to operate from such bases?

Major ELIOT. I said that presented very great difficulties. I did not quite see how we were going to overcome them.

Senator GILLETTE. If we are going to grant this aid to Britain and are going to see that it gets there, we will have to meet those difficulties?

Major ELIOT. We will have to find some way of dealing with them. I cannot see at the moment how we are going to meet them, unless we are going to transfer destroyers.

Senator GILLETTE. How about bases on foreign soil from which our protective vessels could operate?

Major ELIOT. To be frank with you, I would rather see that than give up the policy of aid to Britain and see Britain go down, under German attack. If we have to do it, I think we ought to do it. I hate to see that decision made, but I think the risks are less that way rather than see England destroyed.

Senator GILLETTE. I want to know what those risks are. I want the American people to know what is facing us.

Major ELIOT. There is lesser risk in that than in the risk of the contrary policy.

Senator GILLETTE. Necessarily there are the risks that you just outlined?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir; there are.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, going back just one moment to the suggested limitation, which would be in effect the limitation of a supervisory committee, about which you were just interrogated by the Senator from Michigan, I am frank to confess to you I was so interested in that, that was my particular reason for urging that you be called, because of the possibility of the effective use of such a supervisory committee as that, either as consultative or after the action. But I am impressed by the point made by the Senator from Michigan of the impracticability of a subordinate officer, however, high in rank, declaring his free and open opinion in the face of a position taken by his Commander in Chief. I believe you stated he ought to do it, and you and I would hope that he would do it.

Major ELIOT. That arose, as I pointed out to Senator Vandenberg, in the question of the Dardanelles campaign, and subsequently the British practice has made the three Chiefs of Staff into a subcom-

mittee of the Committee of Imperial Defense, which is specifically stated to be jointly responsible for the giving of military advice to the Committee of Imperial Defense and to the War Cabinet.

Senator GILLETTE. And you think, in spite of that limitation and that difficulty, such a committee as you suggest would be of value?

Major ELIOT. It would be of value; yes, sir. As I say, there is no perfect solution for the matter under our constitutional arrangements. After all, the President is Commander in Chief, and he is so stated to be in the Constitution. He is the superior officer of the Chief of Staff and of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator GILLETTE. And no legislation that we can enact can change that situation?

Major ELIOT. No, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. May I call your attention to one concrete instance in this connection. Before the Naval Affairs Committee of this Senate was called the Assistant Secretary of the Navy—and I shall not say now whether it was the Chief of Naval Operations or someone representing him; my impression is it was the Chief of Naval Operations—last June, and we inquired as to the consideration of the transfer of destroyers to England. They both stated that there was no such matter under consideration. They both stated over and over again that should such a proposition be presented to them they would oppose it with all their strength; but within a very few weeks the destroyers were transferred.

Major ELIOT. Well, I think that it is fair to say, sir, that I have reason to suppose that there was opposition in the Navy to the transfer of the destroyers. That opposition was altered when the question of these bases came up, because the bases represented, from the naval viewpoint—and I am not speaking for anyone in the Navy Department but merely of naval opinion in general—a very great gain to the defense of the United States. The question of the transfer of the destroyers was completely altered, from the naval viewpoint, when the matter of the bases was introduced. That was not in the first set of considerations that was presented—merely selling or transferring destroyers to Britain.

Senator GILLETTE. I am not raising the question in criticism of the actual transaction. It may or may not be advisable, according to viewpoint. I am just calling attention to it as a concrete instance of the difficulty of subordinate officers, however high I rank, going contrary to the wishes and to the constitutional powers of the Commander in Chief, as bearing on the suggestion that you have made.

Major ELIOT. Yes; it is a difficulty; and I do not see how, under our form of government, it is going to be wholly overcome. We can only hope to improve it and try to give these officers such position—and the body of which they are made members—and prestige and authority that they will gradually come to a greater degree of free participation in its councils than they might now be willing to do.

Senator GILLETTE. Thank you, Major.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Major, you spoke a while ago, in response to a question of Senator Barkley's, of your war experience. May I ask whether that war experience was in the United States Army?

Major ELIOT. No, sir. It was in the Australian Imperial Force.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Australian Imperial Force?

Major ELIOT. That is right, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What was your rank?

Major ELIOT. I was a lieutenant and then I was a captain. I was an acting major at the end of the war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You went over and enlisted in the Australian Army?

Major ELIOT. I was in Australia when the war broke out and lived there since I was 8 years of age.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You served in the Australian Army?

Major ELIOT. I was an officer in the Officers' Reserve Corps from 1922—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am speaking of the World War.

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You became a major in the Australian Army and not the United States Army?

Major ELIOT. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You spoke of the practices of the ancient Roman Republic, in times of danger and troubles, appointing a dictator.

Major ELIOT. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Finally there came a time when they did not take back his powers?

Major ELIOT. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That was the end of the Roman Republic?

Major ELIOT. No, sir. That was not the case. The power was seized by a military officer who was a provincial major—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He also retained the power of a dictator?

Major ELIOT. He was not a dictator appointed by the senate. Julius Caesar was never made a dictator by the senate for more than a period of 6 months.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He had had dictatorial powers conferred on him?

Major ELIOT. After he marched into Rome and conferred with the senate—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He had dictatorial powers conferred on him, and that was simply the outgrowth of a dictatorship during a period of many years.

Major ELIOT. Senator, I again want to point out that the point that I made about the constitutional appointment of dictators under the Roman Republic and the seizure by military force of power of a provincial government have no relation whatsoever.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That may be a matter of dispute. You also undertook to refer to the dictatorial powers granted to Mr. Churchill at the present time as an analogy to our system.

Major ELIOT. I am merely pointing out the practices of other governments in limitation of time.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. There is one very great difference between the British system and ours, is there not, in that the British House of Commons may regain at any time the dictatorial powers they have granted to Churchill and regain them by a simple majority,

whereas, in this country, if we once grant dictatorial powers it takes a two-thirds majority of either House to ever regain them?

Major ELIOT. That is correct, if the President vetoes it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Assume a man had dictatorial powers and did not want to give them up and vetoed the bill. It would take at least two-thirds of each House to regain them, whereas, in England—

Senator BARKLEY. Let him answer.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You seem to be very fearful that someone will get cut off; let me finish my question—whereas in England they can be regained by a simple majority in the House, unless it is completely abandoned.

Major ELIOT. So far as granting it for the period of 1 year, which has been extended to a period of 2 years as to certain specific acts affecting the expenditure of money from the Treasury, the limitation is one of 28 days, but it seems to me that the provisions of our Constitution, to which you have just referred, make it all the more important that there should be a limitation of time, at the end of which the powers will definitely terminate.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The only difference between you and me is that you are in favor of putting a time limitation on it and I am opposed to granting dictatorial powers in any situation.

Assuming that the British have granted dictatorial powers for a period of 1 year or 2 years, whatever the period may be, Parliament tomorrow can take those powers away, unless the dictator chose to put that down by military force. In other words, if the British Constitution is still in effect at all, by a simple act of Parliament they they can take those powers away from Churchill tomorrow, if they wanted to?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir. The bill can be repealed.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Whereas, it would be very greatly different for us, after granting such powers, either for a limited period or longer?

Major ELIOT. I want to go on record as saying I am not sufficiently familiar with the British Parliamentary procedure to say definitely whether the Parliament can repeal it or not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You used that as an illustration. That is why I brought that up.

Major ELIOT. Only with regard to the time limitation.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I think any lawyer will agree that the British Parliament could revoke those powers tomorrow.

You spoke of a possible emergency, the possibility that somebody might interfere with the British supplies for the middle eastern operations; that is, supplies coming from the Orient for the British middle eastern operations.

Major ELIOT. I think so.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you think that the United States ought to engage in a war in extreme eastern Asiatic waters for the protection of British supplies for the middle eastern army?

Major ELIOT. Senator, I am hoping to avoid engaging in a war at all, and I think if we support the British at the center of their power, which is the British Isles, where that power is menaced, we shall be doing all we can. We have interests in the Far East, too, which we

have managed so far to look after. I think we will be able to continue to do so provided we have a wise policy.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In answer to Senator Pepper you stated that one emergency which might confront us is some interference with British supplies going from their far eastern possessions——

Major ELIOT. My exact statement was, sir, that under certain circumstances—and especially I had in mind the collapse of Britain—Japan might be encouraged to extend her power in this region surrounding the South China Sea. This would not only be a menace to Britain but a menace to us, to certain sources of our raw materials, and the whole world situation, viewed as a whole, and not one single part. You cannot put this in a watertight compartment. It would be of immense menace to this country, in my opinion.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is what I am trying to find out, whether you think the United States would be justified in engaging in a war 8,000 miles from home for the purpose of protecting the British supply line to the middle eastern army or anybody else.

Major ELIOT. With due respect, you are trying to particularize this particular situation, without viewing the situation as a whole.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You particularized it, because you particularly mentioned this example yourself. Do you think the United States would be justified in engaging in a war 8,000 miles from home for the protection of the British line of supplies to their middle eastern army or anywhere else?

Major ELIOT. I do not think the United States would be justified in engaging in a war for a British line of supplies as such. I think we would be justified in engaging in war when American interests are at stake sufficiently to make war advisable. I can conceive of circumstances under which it might be wise for us to undertake war against Japan in the western Pacific.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You spoke of the danger to the United States from interference with any balance of power in Europe. As a matter of fact, has not that very proposition of the balance of power been responsible for every war Europe has had for 300 years?

Major ELIOT. The balance of power was responsible for the maintenance of peace from the year 1815 to 1914 except for wars of limited duration and extent.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. How many wars have there been in Europe over the balance of power?

Major ELIOT. During the time that the balance of power was maintained and peace reigned in Europe, I ask you to compare the existence of a citizen in 1815, I ask you to compare the progress of civilization and the standard of living in 1815 and 1914, and I ask you whether or not, therefore, the balance of power has or has not made a great contribution to our civilization.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is what I want to find out. You are familiar with the balance of power principle?

Major ELIOT. The balance of power is not anything I am committed to. It is a great historical fact which we all have to recognize.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Are you in favor of the United States engaging in a war abroad to establish or maintain a balance of power in Europe?

Major ELIOT. I am in favor of the United States adopting toward the rest of the world the historic policy of Great Britain toward con-

tinental Europe during those 100 years. I believe we have to face that responsibility, since we are a world power.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are in favor of the United States engaging in war to establish the British principle of balance of power?

Major ELIOT. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is what I understood you to say.

Major ELIOT. That is an unfair interpretation of what I said.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are perfectly free to answer it in any way.

Major ELIOT. I believe this to be fact which we cannot avoid. The British did not have to fight during the 100 years I referred to when the balance of power was established. I think we can equally maintain a position of commanding such a world balance of power. We are the greatest world power. We have to face that. We cannot run away from that. We cannot run and hide.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you believe the principle or the propaganda of the William Allen White committee to get us into war that this war must be continued until the United States and England are in a position to dictate?

Major ELIOT. I object to being tied up with the William Allen White committee propaganda, and I do not know what propaganda has been put forth.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You know to whom I am referring—Mr. Eichelberger?

Major ELIOT. I am not going to agree with what Mr. Eichelberger said until I have read it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am not suggesting that there is any connection, but there seems to be a similarity of view, and I am asking you if you agree with that proposition.

Major ELIOT. What is the proposition?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. His proposition was that this war must continue—he made the speech in St. Louis Friday night—until the United States and Great Britain were in a position to dictate the terms of peace.

Major ELIOT. I think the terms of peace which could be agreed upon by the United States and Great Britain would certainly be better terms of peace than Hitler will impose on the world if he wins.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That does not answer my question. Do you think that the United States ought to insist on the continuance of this war until the United States and Great Britain can dictate the terms of peace?

Major ELIOT. I do not think we have any right to insist on the continuance of the war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I agree with you. That is what I want to find out.

Major ELIOT. We have no right to tell people how long to go on fighting. I think that is a responsibility of theirs.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You referred to the technical experts such as the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, and with all respect to those men, who are able and patriotic men, as we all know, is it not a fact that the opinion of the Chief of Staff or the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations is necessarily the opinion of the Commander in Chief?

Major ELIOT. No, sir; I do not think it is necessarily so. The opinions of the Chief of Staff are arrived at after consideration of estimates submitted to him by various officers who have cognizance of a particular matter, and he is supposed to be the military adviser of the President in those matters. When a decision has been taken by the President as to the exercise of military power, it is the duty of every officer of the Army loyally to support the position taken by the Commander in Chief.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Supposing that the Chief of Staff in his capacity as adviser—principally technical military adviser to the President of the United States—advises very strongly against a certain course, and, subsequently, the President decides he wants that course to be put into operation. That developed before the Military Affairs Committee. He is asked a question and he will say it is the opinion of the staff, and he expresses not his own technical opinion but the opinion of the Commander in Chief.

Major ELIOT. That is why I wish to have a body in which these matters can be kept in the consultive and advisory stages a little longer, until these decisions have been gone over a little more carefully before they are taken.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That won't interfere with the power of the Commander in Chief to make up his own mind at any time he wants to?

Major ELIOT. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have to agree with him. It is very easy for him to supplant them and get a man that will agree, if they do not agree, is it not?

Major ELIOT. No, sir; I do not think it is that easy. I think very frequent changes will cause congressional restlessness.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Take the testimony had before the Military Affairs Committee with reference to the French airplane deliveries. It was testified by the Chief of Staff himself that he objected very strongly to this matter of transferring American airplanes to the French, and he held that opinion not only as Chief of Staff but as Secretary of War at that time, and he had held up the transfer of any of our military secrets to France and any transfer of any planes or a suggestion of a transfer of any planes. Later, however, after consultation with the President, this officer, for whom I have the very highest regard and under whom I served in the war, appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee and said that it was the opinion of the General Staff that certain things ought to be done, and I told him that I did not care anything about the opinion of the General Staff, which I knew was the opinion of the Commander in Chief, and I asked him for his personal opinion.

He gave his personal opinion, which was at variance with that of the General Staff.

Can any of the General Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations fail to yield if the President as Commander in Chief tells them his policy is to do something else?

Major ELIOT. You answered your own question. You said that when you asked for his personal opinion he gave it to you.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Certainly, but when he is asked his opinion in his official capacity, the Chief of Naval Operations or the Chief of Staff has to give the opinion of the Commander in Chief.

Major ELIOT. He should give the opinion of the Commander in Chief if the decision is taken. That is why I think we should provide for a machinery for the taking of opinions.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Referring to what Senator Gillette said—I happen to know you know this, because I heard it at a meeting at which you and I were present—that the Acting Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations had, a day or two before, stated that great pressure had been put on them to approve a deal for the transfer of these destroyers and that they had opposed it very bitterly on the ground that the United States could not spare the destroyers, and a few days after we saw the publication of this deal.

Major ELIOT. After the bases exchange.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Of course, the British gave those, but we had paid for them on their own debt long before. The base proposition was a matter of a hoax, as we all know.

Major ELIOT. I do not agree.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. But the Navy Department did change its mind when told to do so by the Commander in Chief?

Major ELIOT. After a new consideration had been presented which caused it to change its mind.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I think you said you studied the bill?

Major ELIOT. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I refer you to paragraph (4) of section 3 on page 3:

To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

That means we can transfer any of our military secrets, such as the bomb sight, or any detecting apparatus for the approach of air-planes, and when we transfer them to one belligerent power, in effect we are transferring it to all belligerent powers, are we not?

Major ELIOT. I think the answer to that is, in the first place, there are very few military secrets which are kept secret for any time. In the second place, we have had very frank discussions in British military affairs, who have communicated to us all of the information and all of the results of their research resulting from active service, which is far more valuable than the results of our research in time of peace. We have received that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I have heard General Craig and General Arnold testify that this bomb sight was our most cherished military secret.

Major ELIOT. I think it is.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If we transfer that to the British, is it not a fact that as soon as the first British plane using our bomb sight is shot down over territory held by the Germans that will no longer be a secret, least of all to the Germans, because when they get models of the bomb sight, with all the research at their command, they will be able to discover the secret?

Major ELIOT. My suggestion to you is that this sight is being developed by the Navy for the use of bombing vessels at sea, and unless the British high command has gone mad, they are not going to use it so that it will be captured and used by the enemy, because it is the British ships that then would be destroyed.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The Army had this bomb sight in many planes.

Major ELIOT. Yes. It is a Navy development.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Yes; but our bombers have used it.

Major ELIOT. Yes; but why should the British wish to use it for that purpose?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. As soon as any secret development we may have is turned over to one belligerent, it is turned over to all belligerents in time?

Major ELIOT. In some cases.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The British know all the devices that the Germans use.

Major ELIOT. Most of them, and they have passed everything they have on to us.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It is true, is it not, that after the fall of France there were a lot of airplanes that we furnished to the French which were used against the British?

Major ELIOT. Some were; yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And in the event of turning over our vessels or airplanes, such as the flying fortresses and any other bombers—I use that term because it is familiar to the public—in the event of disaster to the British those very same planes or ships may be used against us?

Major ELIOT. That does not seem to me to be very important. It seems to me that if the British go down a greater part of the material that we may have furnished to them is going to be in pretty bad shape. I think the one essential factor in the defeat of Britain would be in the destruction of the British Fleet.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is problematical. Everybody thought, before France went down, that their arms would be destroyed and their material dissipated, but, according to Winston Churchill, after the fall of France they used France's material against the British.

Major ELIOT. I do not remember any view being expressed that if France collapsed it would be after all their material would be used, but Great Britain is an island and has a navy with great traditions. I think we may reasonably anticipate that if Great Britain is defeated the navy will be in great part destroyed.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You do not subscribe to the doctrine that if England is defeated the Germans will take the British Navy?

Major ELIOT. No, sir. That is one proposition that I cannot agree with.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You do not take any stock in the probability of direct invasion of the United States?

Major ELIOT. I think dangers from other sources are far more imminent and far worse in their results than a direct attempt at invasion would be, which we could beat.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In your consideration of these economic dangers you are not speaking in your capacity as a military expert?

Major ELIOT. They are economic, political, and military dangers.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In your testimony of the danger of invasion you are speaking in your capacity as a military expert?

Major ELIOT. Senator, you cannot divorce economic and political factors from a study of modern war. You cannot take them out and put them in a watertight compartment.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I thought you were set up to be a military expert and not an economic expert as well.

Major ELIOT. I do not set myself up to be an economic expert, but I do endeavor to study the connection between them. If I did not I would not know anything about it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes?

Senator BYRNES. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye has gone.

Before we recess I shall hand to the reporter a statement furnished by Senator Clark on the unanimous action taken by an open forum of American citizens on Wednesday evening, January 15, 1941, opposing this bill in any form.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

On Wednesday evening, January 15, 1941, an open forum of American citizens passed, unanimously, the following resolution; to be sent to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives.

"We, attendant at this forum, are unalterably opposed to the so-called lend-lease bill (H. R. 1776), and any other legislation granting dictatorial powers to the President of the United States."

O. W. DAVENPORT, Jr.,
Coordinating Chairman.

RICHARD C. GEDNEY,
Chairman of External Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. I should also like to read into the record the following telegram, which has been received from the Southern Governors Conference in convention at Montgomery, Ala.:

The following southern governors have authorized me to urge on their behalf and on mine the passage of the lease-lend bill substantially as introduced, believing that the passage of this bill at this time is essential to the safety of the Nation: Burnet R. Maybank, South Carolina; J. Melville Broughton, North Carolina; Spessard L. Holland, Florida; Homer M. Adkins, Arkansas; Paul B. Johnson, Mississippi; Sam H. Jones, Louisiana, and James H. Price, Virginia.

This telegram is signed by Frank M. Dixon, chairman of the Southern Governors Conference and Governor of Alabama.

The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

Thank you very much, Major Eliot. At 2 o'clock we shall hear General Wood.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

(The recess having expired, the committee reconvened at 2 p. m., and proceeded further as follows:)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

This afternoon, the committee has as a witness Gen. Robert E. Wood, acting national chairman of the America First Committee.

The committee is glad to have you here, General Wood, and if you prefer you may proceed with such formal statement as you desire to make before any questions are asked by any of the members of the committee. If that suits your purpose, you may proceed now with the general statement.

General WOOD. I have a short, formal statement which I will read, if that is agreeable to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It is quite agreeable, General; yes.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT E. WOOD, ACTING NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, AMERICA FIRST COMMITTEE

General Wood. Certainly no patriotic citizen at this time wishes to be put in the light of an obstructionist but Senate bill 275 is of such a character that any citizen opposed to our entry into the war has no choice but to oppose it.

As far as the defense program is concerned, there is no question but that any specific proposals the President desired to put forth would have the overwhelming support of all citizens.

If, as appears from the Secretary of War's testimony, there are any regulations or red tape that interfere with the President's desire to obtain increased production for defense, he can certainly obtain the overwhelming support of all citizens to remedial action.

If the President desires action to obtain unified purchasing and production, he could and should get unanimous support.

If, in accordance with his lease-lend message, he wants further credits or gifts for Britain when her own resources are exhausted so that the manufacture and supply of munitions may continue uninterrupted, he could probably obtain such action.

I, with the majority of American citizens, favor any measure tending to expedite our defense or any measure to expedite material help to England.

But this bill is not a defense measure or a lease-lend bill; it is really a war bill, transferring the war-making powers of Congress to the President. As such, I oppose it.

There are no limits in the bill as to time, countries, and money. The word "any" is repeated exactly 30 times in its verbiage—that little word seems to mean unlimited as to numbers, quantity, and degree. There is no limitation whatever to the President's judgment.

There is nothing in the bill to prevent the use of merchant vessels into the war zone. That step means war. Yet the Secretary of War objects to any prohibition against such a step being placed in the bill.

There appears nothing in the bill to prevent the use of our Navy or our air force by Great Britain. That means war.

There is apparently nothing in the bill to prevent sending our armed forces to the scene of the European conflict.

There is nothing in the bill to prevent involvement in war as distinguished from a declaration of war by Congress.

There is nothing in the bill to prevent alien ships now in sanctuary in our harbors from being seized. That may mean war.

The provision in the bill permitting the use of our ports for the repair and supply of foreign warships is contrary to international law, and contrary to agreements which I understand we have recently signed. This may or may not mean war.

The bill gives the President a blank check on the American taxpayers' money for the defense of Britain with no safeguards or checks. I presume the majority of the American people would approve a pretty big check, but I doubt whether they would make it unlimited. If we are to throw open the doors of our Treasury to Britain, it seems only fair that all British resources in this country be liquidated. Large companies, unlisted, like Lever Bros., the American Viscose Corporation, the Dunlop Tire Co. plant, insurance companies, cotton plantations, cattle ranches, other real estate, evidently did not ap-

pear in Secretary Morgenthau's figures. That does not mean Great Britain would be stripped of resources, for she has large resources in other countries. My remarks only pertain to her resources in this country.

It is not to the point to say that these powers will not be exercised; they can be exercised, and Congress is dodging its responsibilities when it transfers these powers. And no consideration is given to any possible illness or accident to the Chief Executive, whereby these immense powers may be lodged in other hands, who might be desirous of getting us into this war as an active belligerent.

I cannot understand the pressure on time put on the passage of the bill. Its passage does not of itself produce a single additional airplane, ship, or tank. Certainly the defense program is being rushed, and we understand that the bulk of munitions now being produced is being shipped to Britain as fast as possible. While I can see the urgency of England's condition, while I certainly want to see her hold out, and while I concur in all possible aid short of war being sent to her, I cannot subscribe to the opinion that even if she is defeated this country is in immediate danger of invasion. There should be no occasion for fear on our part.

After 22 years out of the Army I do not profess to be a military expert, but I do know something about the question of supply and lines of communication. I know something about the preparation involved in such an immense undertaking as an invasion from Europe by land, air, or sea power from a point 3,000 miles from our shores. I know what the immense difficulties of supply are over such an extended line of communication. I would say unhesitatingly that even with the great military power possessed by Germany, it would take a minimum of 1 year after the conclusion of the present European war before such an attempt could even be started. And by the middle of 1942 we ought to be in such shape as to repel such an attempt, if made. I do not believe it will ever be made, not that I believe any Nazi promises, but because I think it is plainly in their self-interest not to make such an attempt. Our people seem to overlook the truth of the mathematical axiom that a force varies inversely as the square of the distance. The military strength of Germany is great on the Continent of Europe; translated 3,000 miles away, it becomes very weak. Conversely our industrial strength is immense here, even in the Caribbean, but translated 3,000 miles away, it becomes weak.

I cannot understand the defeatism of some of my fellow countrymen. When this Nation was small and weak, it had no such fears. Now with a population of 130,000,000 people, with 16,000,000 young men between the ages of 21 and 35, with the greatest industrial plant in the world, with two great ocean barriers, we seem to be paralyzed with fear of Hitler. What we need is not faith in England, fear of Hitler, but faith in ourselves. The great Nation that trusts to other countries for its protection, and not in itself, is on the road to destruction.

Our cabinet officers have told us that if this bill is not rushed through to passage it may be too late to save England. What class of aid that we are not giving now will be given if the bill is passed? Does the passage of this bill mean convoys, the sending of our Navy or air force to the assistance of England—in other words, definite involvement in the war, in definite violation of the President's preelection pledges and the platforms of both parties? What objection can there be to telling

the American people frankly just what is proposed to be done under the terms of this bill? I have read the testimony of the cabinet officers, and I do not yet grasp the specific objectives of this bill, or how they cannot be attained by a specific bill or bills giving specific authority.

There is not or should not be any question of partisanship in regard to the bill. It should only be considered from the point of view of the best interests of the country. The real question is not one of defense or aid to Britain, but whether this country is going to be involved in this war as an active belligerent, and that is the greatest decision that the American people have had to face since the Civil War. Now we can have our differences on domestic policy; if one side makes mistakes, sooner or later another Congress or another Chief Executive can undo those mistakes and the country is strong enough to stand the consequences. But if we make a mistake now, in entering this war, it is probable that no succeeding Congress or President can undo the consequences of that mistake, and succeeding generations will bear those consequences.

The heart of S. 275 lies in its granting of virtually unlimited powers to the President to aid "the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States." Here is enunciated a policy unprecedented in American history—namely, that our continued national existence depends on the defense of foreign countries. In effect you are called upon to write into law the admission that the United States cannot defend its own integrity by itself. In those few phrases we in a way abandon our independence as a nation. These phrases do not say that the continued resistance of certain nations may be helpful to our own world position under certain future conditions; they say that we cannot survive as a nation unless these other nations survive.

I am not ready to admit that our material and moral resources are so low that we must fall back on the resources of other nations or else go under ourselves. I doubt whether the American people really understand the implications of these phrases. They have been told that this is a bill to promote the defense of the United States. They have not been told that this is a bill which puts equal importance on the defense of foreign nations. They have been told that this is a bill to aid the Allies. They have not been told that this is a bill which definitely makes the cause of the Allies our own; that national defense, which is the supreme concern of all Americans, would be identical with defense of the Allies. For Congress to admit that we must tie our fate to the fate of any foreign nation seems to me to be bad enough. But this bill is even worse. It gives the President the sole power to decide which are the foreign nations whose defense is synonymous with United States defense. This bill turns over to the President the blood and resources of our entire Nation and gives him power to use it wherever in the world he deems there is a country vital to the defense of the United States.

It seems to me it is more important for the supporters of this bill to consider the advisability of its passage than for its opponents. It is not a question of political power, prestige, or pressure to pass a bill, it is a question of the good of our country now and in future. Certainly the President and Congress desire at this time national unity. I do not believe they can get national unity by the passage of this bill, with 85 percent of the people still opposed to our entry into the

war. If as a result of the passage of this bill we are actively involved in the war within the next 90 days—and I believe there is this possibility if the bill passes—you can not have a united people. A vast minority if not an actual majority of the people will believe that we have been tricked into the war by the passage of this bill, will believe their leaders in Congress have betrayed them. If we are to go into this war as an active belligerent, the mass of the people must be convinced that it is necessary to do so, and certainly they are not convinced thus far.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison?

Senator HARRISON. I do not desire to ask any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I will ask the General some questions later.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson, have you any questions?

Senator JOHNSON of California. General, where do you reside, please?

General WOOD. Chicago.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You have resided there a great many years?

General WOOD. I have resided there since the close of the last war.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Were you in the last war?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How long did you serve, and in what capacity, please?

General WOOD. I was out of the Army when the war began, although I was a graduate of the Military Academy. I was called back, and I assisted General Goethals for 3 months in the Emergency Fleet. I then went over to France as a colonel of infantry in the Rainbow Division.

I arrived in France in September 1917. I was then transferred to the General Staff at Chaumont, and I was called back at the end of March 1918, to become Acting Quartermaster General of the Army, and I served as such.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You were at Chaumont for what period, please?

General WOOD. Between October 1917 and March 1918.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I asked you that question purely from a personal standpoint. I did not know whether you knew my lad, there, or not.

General WOOD. No, sir; I did not.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How?

General WOOD. I did not, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. What position do you hold in Chicago now, in reference to any committee?

General WOOD. You mean my business position?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No; first, tell me your business.

General WOOD. I am chairman of the board of Sears, Roebuck & Co.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Now, tell me if you preside over the destinies of any committee there?

General WOOD. I am acting chairman of this America First Committee.

Senator JOHNSON of California. The purpose of that committee is what?

General WOOD. The purpose of that committee was essentially to counteract the so-called William Allen White committee.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Did you succeed?

General WOOD. I do not know, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. During the period that you have been the head of that committee, have you had charge of any petitions to the Congress or to others?

General WOOD. Not of petitions.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How?

General WOOD. Not of any petitions that I know of, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. You were in the Army some years, were you not, General?

General WOOD. Yes, sir; I served after my graduation from West Point until 1915. I went out in business, I went back in 1917, and then I got out again in 1919.

Senator CONNALLY. Did you not serve as Quartermaster General at one time?

General WOOD. Yes; I served as Quartermaster General of the Army, from April 1918 until the close of the war. I was also Chief Quartermaster on the Panama Canal, during its construction.

Senator CONNALLY. You came back from France in 1918, I assume?

General WOOD. I was called back in March 1918.

Senator CONNALLY. Now, I notice in your prepared statement you say:

I, with the majority of American citizens, favor any measure tending to expedite our defense, or any measure to expedite material help to England.

Is that correct?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. By "national defense" of course you mean the increase of our Army and Navy and their equipment and supply?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. We are undertaking to do that, as you no doubt are aware, as rapidly as it can be done effectively and efficiently.

Now, what do you mean by "material aid to England"?

General WOOD. Well, what we are doing now.

Senator CONNALLY. What are we doing now?

General WOOD. We are shipping planes and other things.

Senator CONNALLY. Who? Who is shipping?

General WOOD. The United States.

Senator CONNALLY. Oh, no.

General WOOD. Well, the citizens of the United States.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Yes; it is, too.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, who is paying for them?

General WOOD. They are.

Senator CONNALLY. Certainly. So we are helping them by making a good deal of money off them, are we not?

General WOOD. Well, I do not know whether we are making much money or not.

Senator CONNALLY. Somebody is selling them this stuff?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Now, I want to know what you mean, though, when you say "or any measure to expedite material help to England." How far would you go?

General WOOD. I read the Secretary of War's testimony in the House, and as I understand there are certain bottlenecks, there are certain regulations. There are certain regulations that interfere with production. They want of course to increase production very rapidly.

Senator CONNALLY. I am not talking about what the Secretary of War thinks. I want to know what you think. You say you are strong—you say you favor "any measure," not "some measure," but "any measure to expedite material help to England." Now, I want to know what you mean by that.

General WOOD. What I mean by that is that anything that can be done to rush these supplies over or to increase the production of those supplies, I am in favor of.

Senator CONNALLY. All right. And would you favor the United States loaning money and equipment in order to expedite the supplies going to England?

General WOOD. Possibly, when her own resources are exhausted.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, "possibly." Why "possibly"? You know. Do you, or do you not?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Let him finish.

Senator CONNALLY. I will. I am conducting this examination, with all due deference to the Senator from California. You have had your turn, and I offered to let you interrupt me. If you want to take the witness back, go ahead.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I want you to let the witness answer the questions.

Senator CONNALLY. I will give the witness every opportunity to answer.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is all I want.

Senator CONNALLY. I do not recognize any right of the Senator from California to censor or supervise my questions.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I will, though.

Senator CONNALLY. You may try.

Well, I would like to have an answer, General. I am not hostile to the General. I want to know what he means. He has come here and told us that he favors "any measure to expedite material help to England." I just want to know what he means by that.

General WOOD. I thought I said in my prepared statement that if her resources are exhausted it might be advisable to either make her a gift or loan her money.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you favor that?

General WOOD. I have not made up my own mind yet, Senator.

Senator CONNALLY. Now, you are in a pretty fix to advise us, when you have not made up your own mind, are you not, General?

General WOOD. Well——

Senator CONNALLY. Or to give your statement; are you?

General WOOD. All right, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. On the first page, the fourth line from the bottom; read those two lines, please.

General Wood (reading):

I with the majority of American citizens favor any measure tending to expedite our defense, or any measure to expedite material help to England.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, give us a few samples now of that—"measures to expedite material help to England." What do you mean by that, and how far would you go?

General Wood. What I meant was material, there. In other words, if the production at plane factories is being slowed up, and there is any measure that will hasten that plane production, I am in favor of it.

Senator CONNALLY. All right.

General Wood. If there is any bottleneck preventing the shipment of those planes to England, I am in favor of removing those bottlenecks. If she is not getting enough steel, rush steel over to her—rush anything she wants, now. That is what I meant by "expediting material help."

Senator CONNALLY. Now, you mean by that that you are willing for the Government to do these things?

General Wood. Well, I made no distinction of that kind.

Senator CONNALLY. I want to see what your distinction is. The point I am trying to get at is, are you simply willing for England to buy all the products over here she can, and pay for them in cash, in her own money, or are you favorable to extending her credits either in money or in giving her or loaning her materials, airplanes, cannon, and supplies? Now, which did you mean?

General Wood. Well, in that statement, I referred purely to what she is doing now.

Senator CONNALLY. To what she was doing, now?

General Wood. What she is doing now.

Senator CONNALLY. In other words, you are strong for her going on, paying for every dollar's worth that she gets, but the Government doing nothing?

General Wood. As long as she has resources in this country.

Senator CONNALLY. All right. Well, assuming that she has no dollar exchange. I do not know whether she has or not. Supposing that her cash resources will be exhausted when the present orders are filled, would you favor then extending credits?

General Wood. I think I would, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you "think" you would?

General Wood. Only I would not say "credit," I would say give it to her.

Senator CONNALLY. Money? You would give it to them?

General Wood. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you favor, then, giving her planes, giving her artillery, and giving her tanks?

General Wood. When her resources are exhausted.

Senator CONNALLY. My question was predicated upon her cash resources, and that is the only way now she can get anything, is to pay cash.

General Wood. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. She cannot swap other articles for it. Now, I predicated my question upon the assumption that if it would take all of her dollar exchange available to pay for orders that she has already given, and that she could not place any more orders without

additional credits, would you favor either giving her the materials or extending her that credit?

General WOOD. I think I would favor giving her the materials.

Senator CONNALLY. You would favor giving her the materials?

General WOOD. But I would want to be sure her resources in this country were exhausted.

Senator CONNALLY. I predicated my question on that assumption.

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not know about her cash resources, do you?

General WOOD. I saw the statement the Secretary of the Treasury presented, but, as I stated in my statement, there are a good many resources which are not listed.

Senator CONNALLY. They are not cash, though, are they?

General WOOD. No; but she can get cash for them.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you think she could sell all this real estate for cash, that you list here? Of course, I suppose she could, in the course of time, and I understand that England is now doing that, reducing the holdings of her citizens in corporations and in securities in this country, to get cash, by requiring their owners in England to turn over to the British Treasury their certificates and their stocks, and then the British reselling them here on the American market. That is the way she is getting her money now?

General WOOD. Yes; that is what they are doing.

Senator CONNALLY. That is something that you and I probably with our present information cannot determine, but we can determine what we would do upon a certain given state of facts, and as I understand, your view now is that whenever England is unable financially to buy more materials or to buy more war supplies here, you would then favor giving her those supplies?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. How?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Arms, munitions, airplanes, tanks—all of the instrumentalities of war?

General WOOD. Always providing it did not impair our own defense.

Senator CONNALLY. Yes; of course; certainly; that is right.

Well, we are not so far apart. Now, according to your construction, you think that this bill would mean inevitably war, and you call it a "war bill"?

General WOOD. That is my understanding of it, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You have read the bill, of course?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Several times? That is based upon the assumption that the President would use the powers conferred to get us into war, is it not?

General WOOD. That is based on the assumption that he might use those powers, or some of his assistants.

Senator CONNALLY. Now, let us see. Suppose he does not do anything under this bill, except when their money plays out he gives them munitions, he gives them airplanes, and he gives them tanks, just as you want them to have them at that time, would that get us into war?

General WOOD. No.

Senator CONNALLY. That would not get us into war?

General WOOD. I do not think so, no.

Senator CONNALLY. All right; that is fine.

Now, you say there are no limits in the bill as to time. You are aware that the House has adopted, or will adopt, an amendment limiting the operation of the measure, are you not?

General WOOD. I saw the amendment, but I did not know it had been adopted.

Senator CONNALLY. I did not say "adopted." I said it had adopted, or would adopt. I understand that it will.

You say, here:

There is nothing in the bill to prevent the use of our Navy in convoy service. That step means war.

General WOOD. I changed that, in my reading, Senator Connally.

Senator CONNALLY. I am sorry.

General WOOD. What I meant was the sending of merchant ships, which is a violation of the Neutrality Act. It is not so much the use of the Navy as a convoy as the sending of merchant ships into the armed zone.

Senator CONNALLY. Where is there anything in the bill that authorizes that?

General WOOD. There is nothing in the bill that authorizes that, but there is nothing in the bill that prohibits it.

Senator CONNALLY. It is already in the law that they cannot go into the danger zone.

General WOOD. But I thought the laws could be nullified.

Senator CONNALLY. They are not nullified, except in the respects that the bill points out, and there is nothing in there about sending ships into war zones. Then you would correct yourself on that?

General WOOD. That provision of the Neutrality Act, then, is not nullified?

Senator CONNALLY. I would not think so. It does not say so. All that this act says is that, notwithstanding other laws, he can do certain things, and among the things that he can do is not mentioned sending ships into war zones.

Now, you modify your language here about convoys, As a matter of fact, the President is Commander in Chief of the Army, and as such he has a right under the Constitution to convoy them now, if he wants to, has he not?

General WOOD. He could convoy them now, but-----

Senator CONNALLY. Yes; he could convoy them.

General WOOD. But you say he cannot send the merchant vessels?

Senator CONNALLY. That is right.

General WOOD. That is what I mean to imply.

Senator CONNALLY. I know, but, since we are on this, the President, as Commander in Chief of the Navy, can send a convoy anywhere he wants to, today, can he not?

General WOOD. Yes, sir; he has the right.

Senator CONNALLY. As Commander in Chief of the Army he can send the Army anywhere he wants to, can he not?

General WOOD. I assume so, unless there is some law to the contrary.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, the Constitution. There cannot be any law that is stronger than the Constitution?

General WOOD. No.

Senator CONNALLY. The Constitution makes him Commander in Chief of the Army, does it not?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. As Commander in Chief, if he wanted to get us into war he would not have to rely on this bill, would he?

General WOOD. No.

Senator CONNALLY. He could send an armed force to Europe, as Commander in Chief of the Army, or he could send the fleet into the Mediterranean or into the war zones, whenever he took a notion to, could he not?

General WOOD. I assume so.

Senator CONNALLY. General, you studied international law at West Point?

General WOOD. Yes; but that is a long time ago, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. How?

General WOOD. That is a long time ago.

Senator CONNALLY. But your mind has not deteriorated with age, I am sure. [Laughter.] I would not want to make that general statement, but certainly not as to your mind. And you know as a matter of fact that under the Constitution he is Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. And as such he can send either one of these services anywhere he pleases?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. That is all I wanted to ask you.

Now, in your statement, at the bottom of page 2, you say this bill gives the President a blank check. You say:

The bill gives the President a blank check on the American taxpayers' money for the defense of Britain, with no safeguards or checks.

That is the first line of the last paragraph. Do you mean that?

General WOOD. That is what I get from a reading of the bill.

Senator CONNALLY. Does not the bill provide that his action is only authorized, but that Congress must appropriate from time to time money, before he can spend a dime?

General WOOD. Well, does it? I will ask you.

Senator CONNALLY. If you will read the bill, you will find it does. I thought you said you had read it. I think I can find it. Let's see if I can find it, General.

That is what it means, whether it says that in specific language or not, that nobody can draw a dime out of the Treasury until there is an appropriation made for it.

Senator BARKLEY. Section 6, page 4.

Senator CONNALLY. Thank you, Senator.

Section 6, page 4:

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this act.

Now, under that language the President cannot spend a dime for any of these purposes, until Congress shall have first appropriated the money. In the light of that, would you want to revise your statement there, that that is a blank check?

General Wood. Well, I will ask for information, there. It says:

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated * * *.

Senator CONNALLY. That is right. That is the usual language in all the bills.

General Wood. That is the usual language? Well, I took that as a blanket authorization, not being very familiar with the ordinary language of bills.

Senator CONNALLY. I will say to you, General, that these authorizations are simply a matter of planning ahead, to comply with rules which the Houses have adopted; but even if they have an authorization, until Congress comes along and makes a specific appropriation for some purpose contained in the authorization, the President, nor his Chief of Staff, nor anyone else can spend a dime. Now, the Senators are all here, and if I am not correct in that, I should be glad to be corrected.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator is making an open invitation to correct his statement, I will be very glad to be recognized for that purpose.

Senator CONNALLY. I would rather you waited. I have no objection, the Senator can have a turn at it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I certainly do not want to interrupt the Senator's testimony, but if he is issuing a general challenge----

Senator CONNALLY [interposing]. Oh, no.

Senator CLARK of Missouri (continuing). On that last statement that he made, I will be very glad to indicate a correction. I do not wish to interrupt the Senator's examination.

Senator CONNALLY. I thank you, Senator.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. But if the Senator means that last statement of his to go unchallenged----

Senator CONNALLY. I just meant that, as a matter of good faith, if I am in error, I will be glad to have any Senator correct me. I would rather it not be done at this time. You will get your time later on, Senator.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is the reason I stated what I did.

Senator CONNALLY. You will have an opportunity to interrogate General Wood.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is the reason I said that I did not wish to interrupt the Senator; but if he wishes that last statement of his to go unchallenged, I am not willing to do it.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, I will withdraw that. If it will relieve the Senator from Missouri any, I will withdraw the last statement, and I will make the statement myself, without inviting his comment, which I know I will get without an invitation.

Now, General, it is my contention--and I will not speak for any other Senator--that under this bill, section 6, there is a mere authorization to the Congress, whenever it sees fit or desires to do so, to make specific appropriations to carry out this program. In other words, if the President wanted 100 tanks, he would have to obtain the money from Congress with which to buy the 100 tanks, before he could give them to England. If he wanted 100 airplanes, he would have to come to Congress, through the Budget Bureau, to get his money for his supplies.

General Wood. I did not understand it that way, Senator.

Senator CONNALLY. All right, I am glad to be of a little bit of help to you.

General WOOD. If I am in error, why, that is a different thing.

Senator CONNALLY. So, if that is true, you would not want to insist on this statement, would you, that it is a blank check on the Treasury?

General WOOD. If that is true, why, my statement is not correct. If it is not true, my statement is correct.

Senator CONALLY. Further on, then, you say:

If we are to throw open the doors of our Treasury to Britain, it seems only fair * * *.

And so forth.

You would want that modified similarly, I suppose, would you not?

General WOOD. No. I think that if we are going to give a great deal of financial help to Britain, certainly their resources in this country should be liquidated first.

Senator CONNALLY. That is right. I think so, too.

General WOOD. Before we tax ourselves for her benefit.

Senator CONNALLY. I agree with you on that. I understand they are liquidating it, but if we wait around here until everything is liquidated, we may be liquidated also.

General WOOD. These companies I mention could all be liquidated very quickly. Some of them are immensely valuable companies.

Senator CONNALLY. I will be glad to submit these items to the Treasury, to see just what the process of liquidation is. We had a hearing before the Committee some time ago, in which the Secretary gave us a list of a great many British corporations that are being liquidated, and so I will submit these to him, if you have no objection.

General WOOD. Certainly.

Senator CONNALLY. You know about these particularly?

General WOOD. I know about these particularly.

Senator CONNALLY. What kind of concern is Lever Bros.?

General WOOD. That is the greatest soap concern in the world.

Senator CONNALLY. It is a soap concern?

General WOOD. Yes; next to Proctor & Gamble. They probably have \$100,000,000 worth of assets in this country.

Senator CONNALLY. \$100,000,000?

General WOOD. \$100,000,000. The American Viscose has \$150,000,000. That is owned by the Courtauld's Co., in England. I think Senator Harrison knows about Oscar Johnson's plantation in Mississippi.

Then there are in America \$400,000,000 in insurance companies owned by Great Britain or their nationals.

Senator CONNALLY. I assume some of those are being liquidated.

General WOOD. No; if I may correct you, Senator, what are called the listed securities are being liquidated.

Senator CONNALLY. These corporations, the American Viscose?

General WOOD. No; they are not listed on the stock exchange.

Senator CONNALLY. They are not listed?

General WOOD. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. How?

General WOOD. They are not listed on the stock exchange. The listed securities—some of the shares of my own company were being liquidated the other day, I think.

Senator CONNALLY. Now, General, I want to interrogate you just a little more, and then I am going to desist.

General WOOD. All right.

Senator CONNALLY. On page 3, you say:

It is not to the point to say that these powers will not be exercised * * *.

I assume you mean the powers to give aid to Britain; is that right?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. How is that?

General WOOD. The powers given in the bill.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, I say——

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. You say it is not to the point——

They can be exercised, and Congress is dodging its responsibilities when it transfers these powers.

Assuming that you were giving aid to Britain—and you said you would under certain conditions?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. You would give all the aid possible—how would you go about carrying that out? Whom would you authorize to execute and administer the work?

General WOOD. The distinction I make, Senator, is, I am not afraid of transferring the powers to the President, of shipping planes and tanks, to get production up, to turn these over to Great Britain. The powers I am talking about are powers that might involve us in the war.

Senator CONNALLY. Let me approach that gradually. The first thing we would do would be to give them some supplies. Now, somebody must do that. Congress cannot go out into the warehouse to get out these supplies, itself, and put them on the boat or on the train. It must give somebody the power or the authority to do it, must it not?

General WOOD. Yes, Senator; but why can they not be given specifically?

Senator CONNALLY. All right—that is what I am going to ask, right now. Would you give those powers to the Secretary of War? Would you turn over to the Secretary of War the power contained in this bill?

General WOOD. No; of course not.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you give it to the Secretary of the Navy?

General WOOD. No; I would give the powers to ship material, to do anything that is now being done under the neutrality law, to the President.

Senator CONNALLY. To the President? That is what I am getting at.

General WOOD. I said in that first page; I tried to describe everything that I would do.

Senator CONNALLY. You say:

Congress is dodging its responsibilities, when it transfers these powers.

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. I assumed by that you meant we ought to keep them.

General WOOD. No—the power to involve us in war.

Senator CONNALLY. No; I am talking about something concrete; now. You say you want to give them all the aid you can, but necessarily when you give them that aid you must tell somebody to do it, must you not?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. That is just as you would do in Sears, Roebuck—you cannot sell every article in your store, but you must have some assistants? You have some executives downstairs, do you not?

General WOOD. That is true.

Senator CONNALLY. You would tell somebody to get these planes up and to give them to England?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. And you would tell somebody to get these tanks ready and to give them to England? Now, to whom would you delegate that power?

General WOOD. I would give it to the President, of course.

Senator CONNALLY. You would give it to the President? The reason I asked you that is that a lot of people are wiring in and writing in and testifying, who say, "Congress ought to keep those powers. Congress ought to do that." Well, Congress is not an executive or an administrative body, it is a legislative body.

General WOOD. I know, Senator, but the bill is not specific. It is not specific.

Senator CONNALLY. In what respect?

General WOOD. I mean it leaves open, it seems to me, the power to involve the country in the war. It is not just a question of letting the President have specific authority to do this or that.

Senator CONNALLY. Of course the grant of authority is broad, because we do not know, we are living in a time when things are moving rapidly, are we not, and events are transpiring that we cannot always anticipate? I am sure that you as a businessman realize that in the business and economic world.

Well, the point I am getting at is, there is nobody else, except the President, to whom to delegate whatever power we are going to delegate, is there?

General WOOD. That is true; I will agree with you.

Senator CONNALLY. We cannot give it to the Supreme Court, we cannot give it to the Cabinet, and we cannot do it ourselves, so the only repository of the power would be the Presidency; is that right?

General WOOD. The President; that is right.

Senator CONNALLY. On page 4 you say that there is no danger, we are not exposed to any danger, we ought not to be afraid.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Where, on page 4, Senator?

Senator CONNALLY. It is about in the middle of the page. It says:

With two great ocean barriers, we seem to be paralyzed with fear of Hitler. What we need is not faith in England, fear of Hitler, but faith in ourselves.

As a matter of fact, General, do you believe that the oceans are barriers any longer, unless you commanded them with the Navy?

General WOOD. I certainly do. I think that on our side of the ocean; I mean, say, adjacent to our shores, we are in perfect condition for defense. I know what it takes to equip and supply an army and move it 3,000 miles.

Senator CONNALLY. It is a job.

General WOOD. The same way with the air force. There is not a single bomber in the German air force that can fly from Europe and back, and if it goes to Iceland and Greenland it would still have an awful long flight.

Senator CONNALLY. Suppose it came up from Mexico? It could still fly across the Rio Grande? It could get across the river, could it not?

General WOOD. It could fly across the Rio Grande, assuming you had a base at Matamoras; yes.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you think our lives down there are just as precious as those in New York or in Chicago—the man on the main street of Brownsville thinks just as much of his life as the gentleman on Michigan Boulevard in Chicago, does he not?

General WOOD. That may be, but they have first to get the base at Matamoras; they have first to equip it and supply it.

Senator CONNALLY. You are evidently not a big-Navy man. In other words, you do not believe——

General WOOD (interposing). Yes; I believe in a strong Navy; certainly I do.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, if they cannot get to us, what is the use bothering with a Navy at all?

General WOOD. We have got to have a Navy, of course.

Senator CONNALLY. Unless you have a sufficient Navy to command an ocean it is not a barrier, is it, with another nation that has a fleet, of course?

General WOOD. Certainly.

Senator CONNALLY. All right.

Well, I do not want to take up all the time. I believe that is all. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper, have you any questions?

Senator CAPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys is not present, I believe. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. General, you spoke of your experience as a member of the American Expeditionary Force in the last war, and also as Acting Quartermaster General of the Army, and of the problem entailed in the matter of supply and transport for an expeditionary force across the Atlantic. Is your statement, contained in your original presentation to the committee, that you do not believe this country needs to fear invasion, predicated in part upon that experience?

General WOOD. Yes. I saw the immense difficulties of supply. True, we took 2,000,000 men over to France, but it took us 18 months to do it, and of course we had bases all prepared for us. We had docks, we had ports, we had a friendly country, we had rolling stock; and even then it took 17,000,000 tons of material; that is, food, ammunition, forage, everything for the American Army in France. Only 7,000,000 tons of that was shipped from this country; 10,000,000 tons was obtained in Europe, because we never had the shipping or the facilities even to do that; and it would be utterly preposterous to move an invading force into this country across that 3,000 miles, and,

after you got them here, to supply them, because our ammunition would not fit the German guns. It seems so utterly preposterous to me that I do not understand why anyone can think about it.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. There has been some theory advanced by those who do fear actual military invasion, that the Germans might take control of a portion of Africa and then have only 1,600 miles of ocean between that point and the easternmost point of Brazil. Does it seem to you that trying to move supplies first from Europe to Africa and then from Africa to Brazil, and then from Brazil to the United States would present any less difficult problem than going directly across the Atlantic?

General WOOD. It would present an even greater problem. They would first have to get it down to Dakar. They would have to take it 1,600 miles across to Brazil, and then they would be farther away from this country than when they started, with no railroads, roads, means of communication, or anything else to move an army.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. General, the Senator from Texas pointed out the provision in this bill, the usual provision authorizing appropriations from time to time out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and indicated that the Chief Executive under the terms of the powers conferred under this bill would have to come back to Congress before any action could be taken under it.

Is it not a fact that this bill applies to all of the existing equipment of our Army and our Navy, that the bill also applies to the billions of dollars which Congress has already appropriated money for, but for which we have not yet received deliveries?

General WOOD. That is what I understand.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. And to that extent it certainly is a check or an authorization, rather, against an enormous value in dollars of existing equipment, and equipment now in the process of production, is it not?

General WOOD. That is what I understand; sir.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Also, have you given consideration to section 3 (a) of this bill, appearing on page 2, which reads:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

Does not the power conferred in that section, when you take into consideration the definition of "defense article," apply to practically everything being produced in the United States?

General WOOD. That is my understanding.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Now, I noted your reference to the fact that in reading Secretary Morgenthau's testimony you came to the conclusion that he was not including, or rather that the British Treasury in furnishing the information had not included the unlisted securities which British nationals own in concerns located in the United States.

I wish at this time to call your attention to an article appearing on the financial page of the New York Times of Monday, February 3. I shall ask to have the entire article inserted in the record.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Monday, February 3, 1941]

LONDON FEELS UNEASY OVER SIGNS OF THINNING DOLLAR RESOURCES—FINAL REALIZATION AGAINST ACTUAL STAKE IN UNITED STATES BUSINESSES STIRS DOUBTS OVER WISDOM OF POLICY

(By Lewis L. Nettleton)

LONDON, February 2.—Frequent interruptions by daylight air-raid warnings kept the volume of stock exchange transactions down almost to a minimum last week, but sentiment continued to reflect confidence. In any case, business doubtless would have remained at a low ebb, owing to the knowledge that as time progresses, there must be many reminders of the additional tax burdens that the country must expect in order to finance its war effort.

The markets are facing a period in which investment initiative will probably have but little chance to develop. In this quieter current phase there seems to the average observer no reason for any lessening of the confidence of recent months. There is no shrinking under the constant threat of invasion, which, according to expert opinion, comes nearer day by day; nor is there any quailing over the further sacrifices and inroads on private resources which the government is bound to demand.

Some idea what these sacrifices may involve was gleaned from the British Treasury's announcement last week that, owing to the ebbing of dollar resources, examination of the possibilities of a realization against British interests in United States businesses is to be undertaken by Sir Edward R. Peacock. This problem took precedence over all others in financial discussions of the week. It is felt that the situation of many leading British companies may be greatly affected by the sale of these direct investments. While admitting that no stone must be left unturned to provide Great Britain with dollar resources, there appears to be a divergence of opinion as to how these important business assets should be used.

Britain will not lightly part with such assets as Courtauld's 90-percent interest in the American Viscose Co.; Unilever's investment in Lever Bros., of Massachusetts; the Royal Dutch majority holdings in Shell Union Oil or British-American Tobacco's interests in the United States, to mention only a few of such holdings, which clearly are of a vastly greater value and importance to British interests than the holdings of ordinary dollar securities.

It is admitted that Britain should scrape the pot before seeking actual American financial aid, but it also is argued that in many instances it would be better to keep these businesses in British hands for the dollars which they can return through earnings for the British cause, not only now but also in the future.

To date the reaction of the markets in London to the possibilities of this exploration of Great Britain's capacity to pay has been slight, but an uneasy undercurrent has been set in motion, and developments will be awaited with deep interest, mingled with concern, lest Britain ultimately should be driven into making bad bargains.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. It is very brief, but to save time I wish to read a paragraph from it:

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Have you any other such investments in mind than those that are mentioned in this article or were mentioned in your statement?

General WOOD. I omitted to put in my statement one of the largest of all, which is the knocked-down sale values of American branches, American-owned subsidiaries of English fire and casualty insurance companies, which amounts to \$400,000,000 alone, and that was not included, and the American Viscose and Lever Bros., the conservative value of which would be \$250,000,000. There is \$650,000,000, alone, of what you call unlisted securities, which certainly did not appear in the statement of Secretary Morgenthau; and without throwing any aspersions, it looked to me as if our British friends were holding out on us.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. General, have you read or did you hear the testimony of Secretary Morgenthau before this committee?

General WOOD. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You do not know then whether or not he stated before this committee, both before and after interrogation, that all the resources owned by the British Government or by British nationals in this country were upon his records, upon his listings; and you do not know whether or not his attention was particularly directed to the subject to which you refer, Lever Bros., I believe; and he did answer in the affirmative that they were included. Do you know whether or not he made such statement?

General WOOD. No, sir; I do not. I understood that he said he had not checked the lists.

Senator PEPPER. Well, do you know? Have you examined the list to see whether these commodities that you have mentioned are not listed?

General WOOD. No; I have not, sir; but I understood him to say—I understood the testimony to be that it included their listed securities.

Senator PEPPER. You have not actually examined the list, though?

General WOOD. No, no; I have not, Senator.

Senator PEPPER. And do you know whether or not Secretary Morgenthau, upon the query of one of the Senators now at the table, asked him if he cared to give the name of the security or the article or the piece of property that he had in mind, and assured him that the list would be examined with a view to seeing whether or not the article mentioned was on the list; do you know whether he gave any such invitation to the Senators present at this table, or not?

General WOOD. No, sir; I do not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, may I intervene to ask the Senator from Florida whether he intends to convey the impression that the Secretary ever conveyed to this committee or to anybody else, so far as he knows, any list which might be checked, or which was subject to being checked?

Senator PEPPER. The Senator from Florida intends to convey his understanding of the testimony of Secretary Morgenthau to the effect that the British Government had furnished him with a complete list of all the property of all kinds owned by the British Government or by British nationals in this country, and that the Secretary of the Treasury, while he was being interrogated by the Senator from North Dakota, Senator Nye, invited the Senator from North Dakota

to mention any security or piece of property which he had in mind or had information was not on the list that the Secretary had, to have it examined, to see whether or not it was there.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Does the Senator mean to suggest—and, Mr. Chairman, I apologize for interrupting on a procedural matter, but I think it is not fair to examine the witness on a false assumption—does the Senator wish to suggest that the Secretary of the Treasury ever submitted to this committee or to anybody else, where it was subject to examination by General Wood or by any member of this committee or by anybody else, a list of British assets in the United States?

Senator PEPPER. The Senator from Florida never made such a statement, and never gave any facts which would permit such an inference. I simply was asking the witness a question, and I asked the witness whether or not he knew that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That was certainly a fair assumption, by your question. If the Senator did not mean that, why of course——

Senator PEPPER. I certainly never intended to give any such impression, but I was asking the witness whether or not he had ever examined the American list—I mean the list that the Secretary of the Treasury was supposed to have and advised this committee he did have—to see whether or not, before he made charges here or left the inference in his testimony, the properties mentioned by him were not on the list.

General WOOD. Naturally, Senator, I, a private citizen, could not ask to see the list, and the Secretary of the Treasury would not show it to me.

Senator PEPPER. So you are not prepared?

General WOOD. I did get the impression from something the Secretary said that his list only included listed securities.

Senator PEPPER. Yes; but you are not——

General WOOD (interposing). I do not know. It will be easy to find out.

Senator PEPPER. Yes.

General WOOD. These companies can be shown to the Secretary.

Senator PEPPER. Yes; it would be.

General WOOD. And you can find out very easily.

Senator PEPPER. Yes; but the point I wanted to clarify was, you do not purport to have any personal knowledge that any article mentioned by you is not on the list in the possession of the Secretary of the Treasury?

General WOOD. No, sir; because I do not know, I have not seen his list.

Senator PEPPER. I notice on the bottom of page 1, General, that you say:

But this bill is not a defense measure or a lease-lend bill; it is really a war bill, transferring the war-making powers of Congress to the President. As such, I oppose it.

Now, what part of the bill, in view of your response to queries of the Senator from Texas, do you regard as the "war bill"? Let me ask you whether or not you regard section 3, with its subdivisions, the principal grants of power conferred by the bill?

General WOOD. Senator, my objection to the bill is the sweeping nature of the authorities given. I see no objection to specific authorities being given, but the sweeping nature of these authorities might cause this country to become involved as an active belligerent.

Senator PEPPER. But there isn't any one particular subsection or grant of power to which you refer?

General WOOD. No.

Senator PEPPER. It is just the general cumulative effect of all of them?

General WOOD. It is just the theory of the bill. If there were any bill that proposed specific things, I certainly would never object to it.

Senator PEPPER. Now, General, referring to page 2 of your statement, you have already covered that in your answers to the queries of Senator Connally. You did not assert that there was any granted authority in this bill to the President to convoy vessels, did you?

General WOOD. My second paragraph is in error. I changed it as I read it.

Senator PEPPER. On page 2 you used this language:

There is nothing in the bill to prevent the use of our Navy or our air force by Great Britain.

Is there anything in the bill that permits the use of our Navy or air force by Great Britain?

General WOOD. No; there is nothing in the bill that specifically says so, certainly.

Senator PEPPER. On page 2, about the middle of the page, you used this language:

There is apparently nothing in the bill to prevent sending our armed forces to the scene of the European conflict.

Is there anything in the bill that permits sending of our armed forces to the scene of the European conflict?

General WOOD. No, no.

Senator PEPPER. On page 2 you used this language:

There is nothing in the bill to prevent alien ships now in sanctuary in our harbors from being seized.

Is there anything in the bill that permits alien ships now in sanctuary in our harbors to be seized?

General WOOD. No; unless where it states, "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law." I am not enough of a lawyer to know, but would it be possible under that section to prevent the practical repeal of any section of the Neutrality Law?

Senator PEPPER. Well, have you had the opinion of any competent legal authority to substantiate your suspicion that such authority might be conferred by this bill?

General WOOD. I have had some analysis made, but whether the authority is competent or not I could not say.

Senator PEPPER. Now, General, on page 4 you used this language—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Page 4 of the general's statement?

Senator PEPPER. It is at the top of page 4, the second line:

And by the middle of 1942 we ought to be in such shape as to repel such an attempt, if made.

That refers to an attempt at invasion. That is your language, is it not?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You have indicated there that you did not feel confident of our ability before the middle of 1942 to repel the invasion if it were attempted. Are you aware——

General WOOD (interposing). I did not want to give that inference, Senator.

Senator PEPPER. Is that what you said?

General WOOD. No; I say by the middle of 1942 we ought to be in shape to repel such an attempt, if made.

Senator PEPPER. Why did you say "by the middle of 1942"? Why did you not say "now"?

General WOOD. I think, first, I cannot conceive of any invasion being made, Senator, for the reasons I have given.

Senator PEPPER. Yes?

General WOOD. Second, our Army should be certainly well equipped by that time. I mean if the present defense program goes through.

Senator PEPPER. General, you are a military man—why did you use the language, "by the middle of 1942 we ought to be in such shape as to repel such an attempt, if made"? Why did you put that time limit in that statement?

General WOOD. Because it followed the previous sentence, in which I say that even if this war were concluded right now, or this spring, it would take Germany at least 1 year to make the preparations for such an invasion.

Now, it took her, if you will notice, about 7 months after the campaign of Poland to prepare for the battle of France. If she makes an attempt this spring at an invasion either on land or in the air, it has taken her 8 months since the battle of France.

Senator PEPPER. General, you do not subscribe, then, to the view that one of the worthy purposes of this bill as suggested by Secretary Knox is to buy time in which the United States can defend itself against any attack that might come?

General WOOD. I do not agree with the views of the Secretary.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think we need to buy any time, that we are alright, now?

General WOOD. I think you have got the time.

Senator PEPPER. Why, then, do you say you are in favor of sending aid to England?

General WOOD. If I may take the liberty, I am quoting from Lord Lothian, in an article he wrote. He said:

We long ago realized that the best and cheapest way of assuring our own security was to encourage other nations to fight for their own security, and when there was doubt as to their ability to do so by themselves, to assist them with finance, and, if necessary, with arms.

Senator PEPPER. Now, if I understand you, you are the chairman of the America First Committee, are you not?

General WOOD. Yes, sir; acting chairman.

Senator PEPPER. Acting chairman of the America First Committee? I suppose therefore you mean to indicate that your committee is concerned only with the defense of America?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Now, if you do not think that England's holding out has anything to do with the defense of America, why are you willing to give England supplies?

General WOOD. We do, we do.

Senator PEPPER. Oh, you do?

General WOOD. We believe it is only common sense.

Senator PEPPER. Why? Why is it common sense to help England?

General WOOD. Because, if you have got a potential adversary, it is good policy to weaken him.

Senator PEPPER. Who is our "potential adversary?"

General WOOD. Germany is the potential adversary.

Senator PEPPER. Did you not say Germany could not invade us?

General WOOD. She cannot invade us for some time.

Senator PEPPER. Why is she our potential adversary, if she cannot invade us?

General WOOD. Well——

Senator PEPPER. You said further we need have no reason to be afraid of Hitler. Now, why do you want to do these things, to keep him off?

General WOOD. I say it is only good insurance to weaken a potential adversary, even if you do not think he can invade you.

Senator PEPPER. So you are willing to take part in a European war in order to weaken a potential adversary, are you?

General WOOD. No; I am not willing to take part in a European war.

Senator PEPPER. Well, why would you want to send aid to England, then?

General WOOD. For the same reason that England has done so for 200 years. I am perfectly willing to give her arms, to give her equipment.

Senator PEPPER. But if you think of America first, and you say we are now able to defend ourselves, we do not need to wait until 1942, and that there is no fear of invasion of this country or of this continent by Hitler, why give our money and our materials to England?

General WOOD. We have not given our money yet to England.

Senator PEPPER. But you advocate it, do you?

General WOOD. I think as Senator Connally said—she is buying our materials now.

Senator PEPPER. But did you not say in response to a question by Senator Connally a minute ago——

General WOOD (interposing). I said if her resources were exhausted.

Senator PEPPER. Now, excuse me just a minute. You said if England's resources were exhausted you would be willing to give them these materials, taking the taxpayers' money in the United States, and give it to the British people, in the British Nation; yet you say there is no danger to this country from Hitler?

General WOOD. I say there is a potential danger.

Senator PEPPER. So then you do admit that some other people might advocate aid to England as a good way and a timely way to defend America, do you not?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Against a potential enemy?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Oh, I see. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. General Wood, when I cross-examined Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, I asked him specifically about these

indirect investments in the United States, and I think it is fair to say for him that he specifically asserted that Lever Bros. were included in the statement which he made.

But I call your attention to the fact that after listing the \$616,000,000 of what he termed "marketable United States securities," which I assume means listed securities, he placed the total of other miscellaneous British dollar investments in the United States at only \$900,000,000. Now, as I understood you a few minutes ago, you recited offhand four or five hundred million dollars worth, did you not?

General WOOD. I gave the value of the American Viscose at \$150,000,000, and the value of these insurance companies at \$400,000,000. There is \$550,000,000. That does not include any real estate.

Senator VANDENBERG. And what was your value on Lever Brothers?

General WOOD. Approximately \$100,000,000.

Senator VANDENBERG. That would be \$650,000,000 out of the Secretary's \$900,000,000 that we have located in about a minute and a half.

Would you think that the estimate of \$900,000,000 under those circumstances might be inadequate?

General WOOD. I think it is too low, but I could not prove it.

Senator VANDENBERG. General, a great deal has been said about blank checks, and you have been given a course of instruction about congressional authorizations and appropriations. For your further information I would like to add my own observation that I have rarely seen an authorization in Congress that did not result in an appropriation. When the camel gets his nose under the tent he usually goes the rest of the way under the tent.

But there might be another interpretation of this term "blank check," as Senator La Follette indicated, and as I want to make definitely plain.

Starting at the bottom of page 2, this bill authorizes the President to "sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of"; and that phrase has been officially interpreted as meaning "gift"; "to any such government," and that phrase is interpreted as meaning any government which the President wants to identify as useful to our defense; "any defense article."

Therefore, under the terms of the bill unquestionably the President is authorized to give away any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat; machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article thus described. He is authorized to give it away, which would include the entire Navy and every gun of our existing arsenals.

He is authorized to give it to whom he pleases so long as it is his opinion that it is useful to us.

Might that not be modestly described as a "blank check" in the viewpoint of gentlemen like you, who, as a layman, have only the privilege of paying taxes?

General WOOD. That is what I thought, at any rate.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green is not present. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. General, getting back to the blank-check situation, of course anybody is at liberty to put any interpretation on this bill that suits his fancy, and you have taken advantage of that privilege, as others have; but as a matter of fact, the Congress, if any-

body raised a question of a point of order against an appropriation that is unauthorized, would not have the power and does not ordinarily have the power to make appropriations to run the ordinary expenses of the Government, except by a law that authorizes it. And that has been peculiarly true or more true since the establishment of the Budget Bureau than it was previous to that time, and in the Senate, as we know, frequently, and in the House, Members make points of order against an appropriation that is even brought in by an appropriating committee, unless there has been a previous authorization.

You may not be familiar with that parliamentary procedure in the Congress, but that is true; so that it has become customary where large expenditures are involved to pass a bill authorizing the appropriation, which is to be followed by the appropriation which has been previously authorized; so that is what Senator Connally was speaking about when he was interrogating you.

Of course, theoretically Congress could appropriate money, and sometimes does, if nobody makes a point of order; it makes a gift on account of some disaster or something for which there is no previous authorization, but anybody could on any appropriation bill strike out an appropriation that was not authorized by some law previously enacted, and it has come to be the general interpretation of language like this in the bill for the authorization, for Congress to appropriate the moneys necessary to carry out the purposes of the bill; and that would be done from time to time and not all in a lump sum; so that it really is not a blank check so far as the monetary considerations are concerned, is it?

General WOOD. Not being a parliamentarian, and seeing that there is apparently some difference of opinion among you Senators yourselves, I would not be in a position to decide. It seems to me, though, Senator, it would be so easy to draw up a bill giving specific authorities, taking away this uncertainty, and accomplishing what the President may be wanting to accomplish.

Senator BARKLEY. You would still have to authorize appropriations to carry out the purpose.

General WOOD. Well, if he wants to give a billion dollars' worth of material to Great Britain, or if he wants to give \$2,000,000,000 worth of material to Great Britain, why is there not a specific bill brought in to that effect?

Senator BARKLEY. Those who have participated in the drawing of this bill, I assume, in answer to your question, have come to the conclusion that they do not want to enact a law simply authorizing him to give a billion or two billion dollars.

There may be other ways by which to assist rather than by an outright gift. That is more or less a technical legislative matter, and the Members of Congress and sometimes good parliamentarians think differently about it.

I notice here in your statement, beginning up at the top, or near the top, the second paragraph [reading]:

As far as the defense program is concerned, there is no question but that any specific proposals the President desired to put forth would have the overwhelming support of all citizens.

You mean there the defense of our own country?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. You have no relation there to any aid to any other country?

General WOOD. No.

Senator BARKLEY. In that paragraph?

General WOOD. I mean our own defense.

Senator BARKLEY. Yes.

General WOOD. As I understand, there may be some lack of authority for correcting delays to production that they may want to obtain or regulations that may be removed by legislation.

Senator BARKLEY. Yes.

We have already fulfilled your idea in that second paragraph by the appropriations which we have made in response to the request of the President for our own national defense, in the way of enlarging our Army and increasing production, and the Navy, and so on.

Now, you say:

If, as appears from the Secretary of War's testimony, there are any regulations or red tape that interfere with the President's desire to obtain increased production for defense, he can obtain the overwhelming support of all citizens to remedial action.

You still have in mind in that paragraph our own internal defense?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. You are not speaking there of any aid to any other country?

General WOOD. No.

Senator BARKLEY. You state further:

If the President desires action to obtain unified purchasing and production, he would and should get unanimous support.

You are still talking there about our own national defense inside of the United States?

General WOOD. Our own defense.

Senator BARKLEY. Further [reading]:

If, in accordance with his lease-lend message, he wants further credits or gifts for Britain when her own resources are exhausted so that the manufacture and supply of munitions may continue uninterrupted he could probably easily obtain such action.

You would be for that, according to that statement?

General WOOD. I think so.

Senator BARKLEY. That is, when England's resources are exhausted? Would you wait until they are actually exhausted, or would you wait until they can no longer make any contracts, because they have no resources with which to pay for additional contracts?

General WOOD. I think that, Senator, is a matter that could be very easily discovered by the Senate, by checking over these lists. Personally, I believe that it would be at least a year before British resources in this country—I am not speaking of her entire resources all over the world, I am just speaking of her holdings of American securities and properties, are exhausted.

Senator BARKLEY. I understand.

General WOOD. I think that it will certainly suffice for 1 more year, possibly more. At the same time, Senator, to answer your question, I would continue to supply—I mean the manufacture of munitions, uninterruptedly.

Senator BARKLEY. Yes. In other words, you would not want so completely to exhaust British resources as to create a hiatus----

General WOOD (interposing). In the production.

Senator BARKLEY. In the production?

Now, if you knew that they are holding up certain contracts now and have not signed them because they have no dollar exchange in prospect with which to pay for them when they would be produced, would you say that we ought to take note of that and do something to remedy it?

General WOOD. Frankly, Senator, I do not believe that.

Senator BARKLEY. If the Secretary of the Treasury testified to that, you still do not believe it?

General WOOD. I might say that I think the Secretary of the Treasury might be misinformed.

Senator BARKLEY. If he is fortified by a statement from Mr. Knudsen, Chairman of the Defense Council, would you still say you did not believe it?

General WOOD. I do not think Mr. Knudsen would know the extent of British resources.

Senator BARKLEY. Why not?

General WOOD. I do not know that he would know more than you would.

Senator BARKLEY. Well, he would know whether contracts were being held up for a lack of funds?

General WOOD. He would know whether contracts were being held up.

Senator BARKLEY. Yes.

General WOOD. But he would not know whether they were being held up by lack of resources.

Senator BARKLEY. Secretary Morgenthau testified here before this committee that on the day before he testified Mr. Knudsen had advised him that the British resources, the dollar exchange, had reached the point where contracts could not be signed for certain types of airplanes, and possibly other supplies, and the Secretary of the Treasury conveyed that information to this committee and to Congress, and it was of course in line with his figures here showing the total amount of marketable resources which people had in the United States.

Would you still insist that that ought not to be taken into consideration?

General WOOD. If it were true—yes; but I think there has been some misinformation there, because I know that one of these companies alone—I mean, say, a \$150,000,000 company—could have been sold. In fact, two of them—Lever Bros. and the American Viscose Co. could be sold within a very few days. They do not want to sell them. They do not want to part with those resources yet.

In other words, I think, Senator, their dollar exchange is not yet exhausted. It would be very easy for a senatorial committee to find out. A private citizen could not find out.

Senator BARKLEY. As I understand you, you do not want to wait until they are actually exhausted, though?

General WOOD. No, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. You want production to continue?

General WOOD. To continue; certainly.

Senator BARKLEY. Uninterruptedly?

Now, you say here at the bottom of your first page:

I, with the majority of American citizens, favor any measure tending to expedite our defense, or any measure to expedite material help to England.

Regardless of your opposition to this bill, you think this bill will materially aid England, do you not?

General WOOD. Yes; but I think the same result can be obtained by a bill not so broad or sweeping in its powers.

Senator BARKLEY. If I understood your answer awhile ago, you did not object to any of these specific grants of power in subsections 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of section 3 (a), but you objected to all of them together, is that true?

General WOOD. Yes; the whole thing.

Senator BARKLEY. The whole thing?

General WOOD. In other words, Senator, it strikes me and the layman that the bill is so broad that it affords unlimited chance for our involvement in the war.

Senator BARKLEY. Now, let us see. Let me analyze that.

General WOOD. Now, I cannot cope with you as a lawyer.

Senator BARKLEY. No; I am not coping with you as a businessman, or as a lawyer, either, but language is pretty plain to an ordinarily intelligent, educated man, and you are above the ordinary in both respects.

No. 1 says that the President, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, may authorize the two Secretaries or any other agency—

to manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure—

Which I suppose means he would go out into the open market to buy—

any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

That is, he can either have it manufactured in arsenals, factories, or shipyards, under Government control, or go out to buy these things for the benefit of such nation.

Do you think that that is an unwarrantable grant of power?

General WOOD. It seems to me that he might buy them for Turkey or for any other country in the world.

Senator BARKLEY. Of course, he would have to think that the defense of any such country was vital to the defense of the United States.

General WOOD. Do you think that is wise to transfer the power. After all, the real question, as I understand it, is to aid England. Why shouldn't we put it in in a specific way?

Senator BARKLEY. If we want to aid a country we should name the country?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. Name England this time?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. And name Greece the next time?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. And perhaps China later on?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. I suppose you realize that this whole situation changes almost overnight. Do you think that Congress should have to wrangle over every bill to aid some country and encounter the delay that would ensue?

General WOOD. I don't see that there would be any delay. You could put through the appropriations very quickly to aid specific countries.

Senator BARKLEY. Sometimes we do but sometimes we do not. You say this is not only a lend-lease bill but a transfer of war-making powers of Congress to the President. Do you think it is a transfer of war-making powers if the President manufactures in arsenals?

General WOOD. No.

Senator BARKLEY. Is it a war-making power to permit the President to sell them to any other country, or to transfer them, or lease them, or lend them? That is No. 2. We are doing those same things now, except that they are being done in private factories and they are being paid for in cash. You don't charge that as a war-making power, do you?

General WOOD. No.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think it is a war-making power that Congress is giving away to test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, or recondition?

General WOOD. No; I do not. But it seems to me that it is a question of what can be done with the powers in this bill.

Senator BARKLEY. When you discuss what can be done under any Presidential power it is hardly fair to take some fantastic and exaggerated example of what might be done because the man who is the Chief of the Navy might send it out into the ocean and sink it. He might do that, but, of course, he would not do it. Under the authority that he has now he could do a lot of things. You can conjure up a lot of imaginary situations where he could do something that no sane man would think of doing. Therefore, the question is whether you are to withhold from him all power merely because of some extreme situation that you can imagine.

General WOOD. Why can't you furnish specific power to him to do all of these things he wants to do?

Senator BARKLEY. Of course, when you undertake to enumerate specifically every item that any Executive can do, one of the dangers is that you will leave out something that is very vital which you do not happen to think of when you are drawing the bill. You have to make your authority general instead of attempting to make it specific.

Of course, these are matters on which opinions may differ. We could argue until doomsday and we would not change each other's views. So, General, I will not take up any more of your time.

I thank you for your courtesy in your answers to me. I have no doubt at all of your sincerity. But it is just one of those things about which we differ.

Those are all the questions I wish to ask, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds, have you any questions?

Senator REYNOLDS. From all that I have read in the newspapers for the past several weeks, or at least since the lend-lease bill was introduced in Congress, and from all that I have heard over the radio by commentators and others, and the majority of questions that I have heard propounded with reference to this bill, I have been led to believe that the question raging over the country today is the question of how we can best aid England and how we can best save her. Do you get that same impression from the observations that you have

made of the columns of the press and from the comments of the radio commentators?

General Wood. Frankly, Senator, I do not understand that the passage of this bill could alter what will aid England the most in the present situation; what she needs most is the shipment, the rapid shipment, of materials to her, and particularly planes. I don't know that the passage of this bill would produce a single additional plane or would ship a ton of material any faster. So I do not see the connection between the passage of this bill and help to England. Certainly, from all I hear, this Defense Commission is doing everything in its power to get production.

Senator REYNOLDS. For whom?

General Wood. Right now, a lot of it for England, as I understand that 95 percent of our fighting planes—not trainers—are going over to England. I cannot verify that figure, but that is what I understand is going over there. You can't ship much more.

I don't see that the passage of this bill is going to expedite in any way the help to England. I do see the point that Senator Barkley brought out, which is that if contracts are stopped and it interferes with the future production of munitions there is a hiatus. But my answer to that is that I do not think their resources are exhausted; and I think they can continue to sign contracts. Again, that is a thing that I, as a private citizen, cannot find out, but you as Senators can find out very quickly.

Senator REYNOLDS. Isn't it true that the predominant question in the minds of the majority of the American people today is how can we best aid England.

General Wood. I think so.

Senator REYNOLDS. That is true, isn't it?

General Wood. I think so.

Senator REYNOLDS. Before I ask you a few questions generally, I want to state that insofar as I am concerned, I am interested firstly and only in the United States of America.

General, do you think the war that is raging now in Europe is our war?

General Wood. I do not.

Senator REYNOLDS. Then, General, if you do not think that this is our war, why should we provide England with anything?

General Wood. Well, I read to Senator Pepper that extract from Lord Lothian's speech. There is no denying that from our own attitude Germany is a potential enemy.

Senator REYNOLDS. Isn't it true that all countries of the world today are certainly our potential enemies?

General Wood. I am afraid that they might be. But, I mean we haven't done anything to make either Germany, Italy, Japan, or Russia feel particularly friendly toward us. But you ask why should we aid England at all?

Senator REYNOLDS. If it is not our war.

General Wood. Because if Germany is a potential enemy and England is fighting her, it is certainly to our interest to weaken Germany; and we can give that aid to a country that is fighting. We should not get into the war.

Senator REYNOLDS. Do you think, therefore, that we should endeavor to weaken or destroy every country in the world because every country in the world is actually, as you stated, our potential enemy?

General WOOD. No; I do not.

Senator REYNOLDS. General, is this a war between England and Germany, or is it a war between the British Empire and Germany?

General WOOD. I think that England is fighting for her existence and for the preservation of her Empire.

Senator REYNOLDS. England itself, the isles, are merely a part of the British Empire. Isn't that right?

General WOOD. She is the head of the British Empire.

Senator REYNOLDS. I beg your pardon.

General WOOD. She is the head of the British Empire, Senator.

Senator REYNOLDS. The isles are a vast portion of the area that they own and control? That is true, is it not?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Isn't it likewise true that Australia, India, South Africa, and Canada and other portions of the British Empire are interested in maintaining the Empire as it is at the present time?

General WOOD. Probably not as much as the isles. And you have to draw a distinction between the self-governing dominions and others.

Senator REYNOLDS. But they are contributing to the support of the inhabitants of England, are they not?

General WOOD. The Dominions are; yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. They are contributing men, are they not?

General WOOD. Some.

Senator REYNOLDS. They are contributing money, are they not?

General WOOD. I don't know.

Senator REYNOLDS. Well, you know, of course, that Australia, Canada, and India are all contributing to the cause of the English in this war. That is true, is it not?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Now, before I go into the question of contributions from the financial end which was mentioned a little while ago, is England a democracy?

General WOOD. The island is a democracy. The Dominions, the self-governing Dominions, are democracies, but not India and the Malay Peninsula and what you would call the dependencies.

Senator REYNOLDS. Germany and Italy are not democracies?

General WOOD. They are totalitarian states.

Senator REYNOLDS. They are totalitarian states?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. And England is fighting Germany and Italy, or England and Greece are fighting Germany and Italy?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Is Greece a democracy?

General WOOD. I am not familiar with its government, but I had understood that it is a dictatorship.

Senator REYNOLDS. That it is what?

General WOOD. That it is a dictatorship.

Senator REYNOLDS. General, you participated in the World War, did you not?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. In 1917 and 1918, April to November of the following year?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. At that time my recollection is that they stated that they were fighting then to save Christianity.

General WOOD. No; it was to save democracy.

Senator REYNOLDS. To save Christianity and democracy and stop all wars for all time? That is correct, isn't it?

General WOOD. My recollection is that it was to save democracy and stop all war for all time. I don't remember the Christianity part of it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And to end wars.

General WOOD. And to end wars; yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Will you please state just how many wars have been fought since the armistice of November 1918, and how many people have actually been killed in war since you fought to end all wars in 1918?

General WOOD. Well, I couldn't give you the figures, Senator. All I know is that the men in my generation were greatly disillusioned.

Senator REYNOLDS. They were greatly disillusioned?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. You know that a war has raged and is now raging in China?

General WOOD. For 3 years.

Senator REYNOLDS. And that more than 2,000,000 have been killed? That is correct, isn't it?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. You do know that a war raged in Spain and that more than a million were killed? That is correct, isn't it?

General WOOD. That is a figure that I have heard.

Senator REYNOLDS. You do know that a war raged down in South America between Paraguay and Bolivia and that approximately 5,000 were killed? That is correct, isn't it?

General WOOD. I don't know the figures.

Senator REYNOLDS. You would say that approximately four to five million people have been killed in wars since you fought to end all wars? Is that correct?

General WOOD. I don't know the exact figures; but I would say that it is approximately correct.

Senator REYNOLDS. Now, General, many people have told me that you fought for the purpose of saving Christianity. Can you tell this committee how many people who worshiped in churches have been killed or murdered since you fought to save Christianity?

General WOOD. I cannot tell you that, Senator. I don't know.

Senator REYNOLDS. As for the third, you will admit that it has not ended all wars?

General WOOD. Oh, absolutely.

Senator REYNOLDS. What is the present war being fought for? It is not to save democracies, because you stated a moment ago that Greece is a dictatorship. Are we aiding England to help save the dictatorship of Greece?

General WOOD. I think, Senator, it is a war for power in Europe, one party wanting to preserve its power, the other party trying to take some of it away.

Senator REYNOLDS. Now, with reference to financing this war—but before we get to that, General, you mentioned a moment ago that before Hitler could invade the Western Hemisphere it would be neces-

sary for him to transport his supplies from Berlin to Dakar. That is what you said a little while ago; isn't it?

General WOOD. I said if he wanted to come that way.

Senator REYNOLDS. In French West Africa?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. And then from Dakar in French West Africa to the easternmost point of Brazil. I will ask you if it is not farther from Berlin to Dakar than it is from Dakar to Brazil.

General WOOD. Yes; it is.

Senator REYNOLDS. And I will ask you if it is not farther from Berlin to Dakar than it is from Berlin to the United States.

General WOOD. Yes; it is.

Senator REYNOLDS. And I will ask you if it is not farther from Brazil to the United States than it is from the United States to Berlin.

General WOOD. It certainly is.

Senator REYNOLDS. Have you ever been in Brazil?

General WOOD. No; I have been in Venezuela.

Senator REYNOLDS. You know where the most eastern point in Brazil is, don't you?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. It is called Natal, I believe. I will ask you if it is not a fact that there is not a railroad within a thousand miles of Natal; and I want to ask you how Hitler could get any troops or supplies from Natal over 2,000 miles of swampland without the sign of a road or a railroad.

General WOOD. It is utterly ridiculous.

Senator REYNOLDS. How can he do it?

General WOOD. He could not.

Senator REYNOLDS. With reference to how we are going to pay for this war, we are selling to Great Britain now and they are putting the cash on the barrel-head. That is right, isn't it?

Mr. Morgenthau stated that they had handed out three or four billion dollars in this country, didn't he?

General WOOD. I did not see his statement. I thought it was less than that.

Senator REYNOLDS. In view of the fact that you say that this is not our war, don't you think that all of the resources and assets of India, South Africa, Canada, and Australia and New Zealand ought to be put into this war before you and other taxpayers in the United States are called upon to take their money and sell their property and finance a war that is not ours? Or do you? Do you think that you ought to take the money out of your pocket and contribute it over there in this fighting before the people of Australia, India, South Africa, and Canada take the money out of their pockets?

General WOOD. I haven't crossed that bridge yet, Senator. But I do know this, that I do not want any United States taxpayer to take the money out of his pocket until I am sure the British resources at hand in this country are used up.

And I am by no means sure that there are not sufficient resources in this country or British assets in this country to finance at least another year of this war. I think there are probably enough assets to finance another 18 months of this war. But that is a point the Senate can find out—not myself as a private individual. And I am

quite certain that the figures that have been given thus far do not represent the British assets in the United States.

Senator REYNOLDS. Now, I got that impression. I read the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and I got the impression that he under-listed the assets of England in the United States. And he made no mention whatever of the assets of India, of South Africa, of Canada, of New Zealand, of Australia or any of the other portions of the Empire. Was that your impression?

General WOOD. He said they did not include the Dominions.

Senator REYNOLDS. That they did not include them?

General WOOD. Yes; that is right.

Senator REYNOLDS. Don't you think the people of Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and Australia ought to put up all of the money they can to finance their war before the people of the United States themselves are called upon to take the money out of their pockets to finance a war which you say is not theirs?

General WOOD. Senator, I have not thought that over, or I have not thought it through, and I prefer not to give you an answer.

Senator REYNOLDS. I will put it more simply. Don't you think the man living in New Zealand, under the protection of the British Empire, ought to pay his part of the war before you as an individual in the United States are called upon to pay when you have no interest in that war?

General WOOD. I would certainly prefer to have it so.

Senator REYNOLDS. Don't you think that would be right and just?

General WOOD. Without knowing their situation in New Zealand or Australia I would not answer. I am only considering so far the question of the British assets in this country.

Senator REYNOLDS. You mean the English assets?

General WOOD. I mean the English assets in this country.

Senator REYNOLDS. Do you know how much annually the 375,000,000 people of India contribute to the British Empire?

General WOOD. I understand they take about a billion.

Senator REYNOLDS. How much?

General WOOD. About a billion dollars a year.

Senator REYNOLDS. You said a "billion dollars," did you?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Senator Clark has just reminded me of a statement that I read the other day by Mr. Churchill to the effect that 2 Englishmen out of every 10 were supported by the people of India. You probably saw that.

Do you know how much money annually the Confederation of South Africa contributes to the British Empire?

General WOOD. No; I do not.

Senator REYNOLDS. Or do you know how much annually is contributed by New Zealand?

General WOOD. No; I do not.

Senator REYNOLDS. Or by Australia?

General WOOD. No; I do not.

Senator REYNOLDS. Or by Canada?

General WOOD. No, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. Or by Canada?

General WOOD. No, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. Well, you do know that the British Empire owns more real estate than any other single nation on earth, don't you?

General Wood. Well, they have assets all over the world, I know.

Senator REYNOLDS. They own about—well, it might be one-half of the earth. That is about correct, isn't it? The Russian Empire has about one-sixth of the world. It has been said that the British Empire, upon which the sun never sets, covers about one-half.

Now, General, in this war which is raging in Europe, which you say is not our war, if the British do not have the assets, that is, if they do not have the dollar exchange in this country with which to pay for the property which they are desirous of procuring from our shores, don't you think that if and when their money is exhausted that before we sell on credit or before we give away, we ought to have a mortgage on something to secure the payment of that debt?

General Wood. I don't know any mortgage that would be any good.

Senator REYNOLDS. I beg your pardon?

General Wood. I don't know any mortgage that would be any good, when you speak of war loans, except the British assets in this country.

Senator REYNOLDS. Don't you think that it would be possible for them to negotiate for the transfer of Newfoundland to us?

General Wood. It might be.

Senator REYNOLDS. And from the standpoint of defense don't you believe that Labrador, which is only a few miles north of Newfoundland, would be just as good a point of defense as is Newfoundland? It is a little closer to Greenland; isn't it?

General Wood. Yes. And Greenland is a base, I think it has been shown.

Senator REYNOLDS. We have already made arrangements for a base on the island of Newfoundland, haven't we?

General Wood. Yes. We leased it.

Senator REYNOLDS. Don't you think it would be well for us, in the interest of our constituents in the United States, to endeavor to negotiate with Great Britain for the transfer of Newfoundland?

General Wood. Well, if we have to give-----

Senator REYNOLDS. I am talking about before we have to give. I am talking about that so that we can be secured for the trade, or what we are going to transfer to them. If we can get them to transfer to us Newfoundland wouldn't that be better than giving it away?

General Wood. You mean buying Newfoundland?

Senator REYNOLDS. Yes; trading it.

General Wood. Yes; get a quid pro quo.

Senator REYNOLDS. On account.

General Wood. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. In view of the geographical location of Labrador don't you think that it would be well to try to get them to arrange to give us that on account too?

General Wood. I don't know much about Labrador.

Senator REYNOLDS. You know its geographical location?

General Wood. Yes; I do.

Senator REYNOLDS. We have heard so much about a bombing expedition from Greenland-----

General Wood. I think that bombing expedition was ridiculous.

Senator REYNOLDS. Let's go across the continent. Before we give anything away—we can't always be giving—don't you think it would

be well to endeavor to negotiate with the British Empire to arrange for Canada in that section covered by British Columbia to give us a strip of land north of Seattle to the Alaskan line for the construction of our national-defense highway, before giving anything else away?

General WOOD. I understood that Canada was willing to do that.

Senator REYNOLDS. I had not heard of it. I do not think so.

General WOOD. I don't know, Senator.

Senator REYNOLDS. One of the Congressman from the Seattle section is on that committee to negotiate for it.

Don't you think it would be well for us to endeavor to secure not the island possessions in the Caribbean, particularly because we do not want to be worried with the economic situations there at the present time, but don't you think it would be well for us to endeavor to negotiate for British Honduras to be received on account, particularly in view of the fact that British Honduras is in Central America, and all who know anything about defense of the Western Hemisphere know that we must be possessed of, or exercise control over, every country in Central America because of the Rio Grande and the Canal Zone?

General WOOD. To answer your question as I understand it, Senator, if we have to furnish large sums of money to Great Britain, I am in favor of getting a quid pro quo.

Senator REYNOLDS. Getting what?

General WOOD. A quid pro quo, or something in return, whether Newfoundland, Honduras, or anything else. I am not competent to say just what we could get or what we should get.

Senator REYNOLDS. Don't you think that we should get all that we can?

General WOOD. I certainly do.

Senator REYNOLDS. Because you are for protecting the interests of the American people before considering the interests of any other people in the world, are you not?

General WOOD. I certainly am.

Senator REYNOLDS. I thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey, have you any questions?

Senator GUFFEY. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White is not present.

Senator Shipstead, we are very glad to have you back with the committee. Have you any questions?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I would like to ask the general a question. He is making his observations as to the assets held in the United States. There are a great many holdings in Canada that could be sold here. Is there any reason why the railroad holdings and the mine holdings could not be sold here? There is plenty of money here to buy them; and they could get dollar exchange.

General WOOD. You mean British national in Canada?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Or Canadian. Canada is in this war too.

General WOOD. I don't think the Canadians would do it. But I do not see any objection to the British national holdings in Canada being sold here and being considered available for dollar exchange.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You do not think the Canadians would do it?

General WOOD. I don't think they would sell their holdings, because, as I understand it, the British Government does not have the power to make the Canadian national turn in his private holdings.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I understand that. But Canada has declared war. She is a sovereign in her own right.

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I am talking about English holdings in Canada, and also in South Africa.

General WOOD. The British national holdings of Canadian securities I think should be turned in because they are negotiable in this country.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Don't you think Canadian bonds are good assets? Couldn't Canada sell some of her bonds here and get exchange?

General WOOD. If the war goes on long enough I doubt whether the Canadian bonds are a good asset.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Well, you have a different opinion of Canada than I have.

General WOOD. I am a great believer in Canada. But if the war goes on—

Senator SHIPSTEAD. How long will it take for the war to continue before the Canadian bonds are not a good security, in your opinion?

General WOOD. I think if the war went on 2 years longer that Canadian bonds would depreciate very greatly. I am a director in one insurance company which held \$5,000,000 worth of Canadian bonds. At the outbreak of the war I advised this insurance company to sell them, but they had unlimited faith in Canada. They delayed. Well, they have already depreciated quite a bit. And, in my opinion, the longer the war goes on the more they will depreciate.

That is just an opinion, Senator. I might be wrong, of course.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You are familiar with the great national assets and resources of Canada?

General WOOD. Yes. On the other hand, they already have an enormous debt, and all out of proportion to their population. They have, as you say, the resources; but they have burdened themselves, due to the last war, very much more than we did as a country. I mean the national debt of Canada is far in excess of anything that the United States had, prior to recently.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Then, do you think that England is absolved from any method or manner in which they can get American exchange, even to the extent of selling nationals' holdings, that is, of British nationals? I mean English nationals in South Africa, in India, in Canada, and in Australia.

General WOOD. I don't know, sir; because I don't know anything about their holdings in any other countries except the United States and, to a limited extent, in Canada.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Wouldn't it be well to find out?

General WOOD. I think we should find out. I think that is one of the questions the Senators should satisfy themselves on before they advance money or give credit to England. I think that is one of the things that should be found out and checked before we begin to tax our own taxpayers for Britain's defense.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. General, there are a couple of matters that I wish to inquire about. There was some discussion in the inter-

rogations that we have had here with reference to the exception that was taken to your statement that this bill contemplates a blank-check grant of power; and your attention was directed by some of the Senators to the provision in the bill in section 6, which provides for the authorization of the necessary money to be appropriated to carry out the powers and activities under the bill.

You are not appearing here or attempting to appear here as a constitutional lawyer or a parliamentarian.

General WOOD. Most certainly as neither.

Senator GILLETTE. In that connection may I direct your attention to subsection (2) of section 3 and subsection (b) of subsection 5, page 3, in which the power is given to the President to dispose of defense articles in such manner as he sees fit and on such terms as he sees fit, to the direct or indirect benefit of the United States.

Now, with that power it is possible, as has been testified, for the President to give away these defense articles. Do you so construe the bill?

General WOOD. That is my understanding of the bill, that he could give them away.

Senator GILLETTE. And it is my understanding. Now, if he gives them away there is no appropriation needed to take care of that action, is there?

General WOOD. No, sir. And, as I understood Senator La Follette or Senator Vandenberg, that really constitutes the blank check.

Senator GILLETTE. In addition to that, if the President exercises the powers given by subsection (1) of section 3, "to manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards, or otherwise procure," if under that power the President enters into a contract for the manufacture of defense articles or purchases them from some other country or in some other way, can you imagine the Congress of the United States, or any Member of the Congress, refusing to appropriate the money to sustain the President in the power that we authorized him to exercise?

General WOOD. Not if it were manufactured, because it would be no good for anything else.

Senator GILLETTE. Then the check provided by section 6, as suggested by my colleagues here would not, in fact, be a check at all on the President if he gave away the material or if he entered into contracts under the powers that we gave him?

General WOOD. That is my understanding.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, General, there is one other matter. In the interrogation and colloquy carried on between you and Senator Connally, of Texas, I was afraid that possibly there would be some misconception of your testimony because of the line of interrogation pursued by the Senator from Texas. And I wish he were here now, since I am referring to it. But particular attention was directed to subsection (2) of section 3--

To sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article--

and you were questioned as to whether this bill gave additional power to the President over the power that he now has to dispose of such articles.

In that connection I want to ask you one question; and I will trespass upon the time of the committee to preface it by reading from two or three provisions of the present law.

Section 3 says, as its opening phrase, "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law."

Then go down to subsection (2)—

To sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article * * * notwithstanding the provisions of any other law.

Now I will read to you two or three provisions of the present law—our neutrality law, section 2 (a):

Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a) it shall thereafter be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any passengers or any articles or materials to any state named in such proclamation.

That is the present law.

(c) Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a) it shall thereafter be unlawful to export or transport, or attempt to export or transport, or cause to be exported or transported, from the United States to any state named in such proclamation, any articles or materials until all right, title, and interest therein shall have been transferred to some foreign government, agency, institution, association, partnership, corporation, or national.

That is the present law.

Subsection (i)—that every American vessel to which the provisions of subsections (g) and (h) apply, and every neutral vessel to which the provisions of subsection (1) apply, shall, before departing from a port or from the jurisdiction of the United States, file a sworn statement as to what he is carrying and to where he is carrying it.

That is the present law existing at this time.

Section 8 (a) of the same law says:

Whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation under the authority of section 1 (a), it shall thereafter be unlawful for any person within the United States to solicit or receive any contribution for or on behalf of the Government of any State named in such proclamation or for or on behalf of any agent or instrumentality of any such State.

That is under existing law.

Now, without reading any further from those laws, if this bill is enacted into law with the "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law," the President shall have the power to dispose of these munitions in such manner as he sees fit, when he sees fit, and on such terms as he sees fit.

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. Then this law, if enacted, is a decided change in the present authority that the President has, is it not?

General WOOD. That is exactly my understanding of it, Senator—that this law has the power to nullify or abrogate the provisions of the neutrality law. But, not being a parliamentarian or a lawyer, I cannot argue with the Senator from Texas as to what the bill means. You gentlemen will have to do that arguing.

Senator GILLETTE. And it is a fair deduction that the purpose of the law is to abrogate all existing provisions which now prevent those very things?

General WOOD. I think that is what gets the layman and alarms them in this law, "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law." I think that is the crux of a lot of distrust of the law. And it seems to me that it is needless, because a law could be framed that gives the specific authority that the President wants.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. General, I hope you will not be offended if for a particular purpose I take the trouble to qualify you again as a witness.

You are a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point, are you not?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You served for a number of years as an officer in the Regular Army?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You did participate in the construction of the Panama Canal, did you not?

General WOOD. Yes; for 10 years.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And Congress recognized your services in that connection?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You were advanced two steps out of your turn in promotion as a result of your services in connection with the construction of the Panama Canal?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You entered business and were very successful in business between the time of your retirement from the Army and the event of the World War?

General WOOD. Fairly successful.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And you came back into the service as a colonel, didn't you, General, in one of the great combat divisions of the World War—the Rainbow Division?

General WOOD. I came back as a major, and then I was made a colonel, and I went over with the Rainbow Division; but I didn't have the opportunity of serving much with them.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The Rainbow Division was one of the first two outfits that went over, was it not?

General WOOD. We were the second outfit that went over.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And during your service you were a major general?

General WOOD. No, sir. I was a brigadier general. I was acting quartermaster general. I could not be made quartermaster general because I had never served in the Quartermaster Corps of the Army.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You acted in the Quartermaster Corps of the Army during the period of the great emergency?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Since your retirement you have been extremely successful, as I understand it.

Now, General, in view of your own experience I would like to call your attention to a speech which was made on Friday night in my home city of St. Louis by a gentleman who served a few months by appointment in the United States Senate, who is now a professional propagandist in favor of getting us into war, and who is particularly in favor of this bill—Mr. Ernest Gibson, Jr., I would like to emphasize the difference between the senior and the junior. He said in St. Louis the other night, or he intimated very strongly, that the American First Committee was affiliated with Mr. Goebel's organization and various German propagandist organizations, and he said that Lord

Haw Haw spoke in favor of the American First Committee as a group of patriots who had Goebel's blessing. I would like to ask you this question because I am interested in it. Have you been in treasonable correspondence with Goebel or any propagandist organization? What has been the connection of the American First Committee, yourself, or any other member of the committee, so far as you know, in any manner, shape, or form, with the Goebels in Germany or their propagandist organization in this country?

General WOOD. None whatever, and anybody who says so is a liar.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I was very certain of that, and that is the reason why I asked you.

I think that you said awhile ago that this America First Committee was organized to combat the efforts of the William Allen White committee. You mean the ex-William Allen White committee?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, William Allen White was blacked out when he said he was not in favor of engaging the United States in war; is that not so?

General WOOD. Mr. White said he went into it in good faith.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am sure he did.

General WOOD. To afford England aid short of war, but that he found, in his New York and Washington chapters, that their real purpose was not to aid England but to get us into the war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. When this organization, under its president's control, found out that Mr. White was not going whole hog with them, Mr. White was blacked out?

General WOOD. He certainly was.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And the statement that I just read to you a moment ago was a statement of the ex-William Allen White committee, rather than the William Allen White committee?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. General, we had some discussion—I am sorry Senator Pepper and Senator Connally have retired—in which they endeavored to put words in your mouth that the provisions of this bill were not a blank check; that is, that they simply amount to an authorization. I understand you are not a lawyer, General. You said several times you are not a lawyer, but you have had some experience, observation, and possibly personal experience, with appropriations in Congress, have you not?

General WOOD. I have not had since the days of the Canal, when I was up before the Appropriations Committee. I know the general procedure; yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are familiar with the fact, as most Americans are who have ever taken the trouble to investigate the matter at all and are familiar with it at all, that the authorization is always the camels' nose getting into the tent?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And that if there is a general authorization in that limited amount and the President, in pursuance of such general authorization, proceeds to enter into contracts, whether Congress has previously appropriated for those contracts or not, a deficiency estimate may be sent in, with the appropriation of the actual money to which the United States will have been committed by the action of the President acting under these general authorizations.

That is a matter known to all Members.

Since the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Florida took the trouble to make ex parte statements, I would like to make an ex parte statement to the extent that everybody who is familiar with Congressional practice knows that it is true that when an authorization has once been made and the President enters into a contract under that authorization and the Budget Bureau estimates for them, the credit of the United States is committed and the appropriation must necessarily follow.

Now, General, something has been said about the powers of the President under this bill. I would like to direct your attention to the provisions of the bill again on page 2, section 3:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

Now, does not the provision "head of any other department or agency of the Government" include the R. F. C. or the Commerce Department or any other department of the Government?

General Wood. I should say so.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You were at one time, as I understood, called to Washington to be the special adviser of the Secretary of Commerce?

General Wood. For a very short period.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Would you not consider that the language "or the head of any other department or agency of the Government" would include the R. F. C. or the Home Owners' Loan Corporation or any other agency which he might see fit to use?

General Wood. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri (reading):

(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction—

That is very clear—

or otherwise procure, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

Now, General, do you see any escape from the proposition that that provision, taken in connection with the terms "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law," would authorize the President of the United States to set aside the Walsh-Healey Act or the Wagner National Labor Relations Act or the Wage-Hour Act, or any other law which he might consider in conflict with his plans for the manufacture of these articles?

General Wood. Certainly, I do think so, and I think that is the wording that worries the people.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It is certainly what worries me.

General Wood. I think the people want to aid the defense program and do everything they can. Nobody wants to stand up here and obstruct anything, but this bill, I think, has got the people all over the country worried and upset as to what it does mean, and it seems to me that it could be made specific. It could be made understandable.

I think that the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law" alone has got men all over this country worried about the implications of this bill.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Let me go a little bit further, General, and I repeat the first phrase of the section:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law—
the President has the authority—

to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article.

Dropping down just a paragraph, which is to be read in the same connection:

The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory—

In his sole discretion—

and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind of property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

Under that provision would not the President have authority to give any nation in the world that he saw fit, in his sole discretion, any part of the United States Navy or any part of the United States Army with such considerations as that they would not again call us Uncle Shylock or the French would agree to put President Wilson's name back on a street which they took down? Do you see any limits to the President's discretion in this matter?

General WOOD. I see no limits.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The next provision is that the President shall have authority, in his sole discretion, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law:

To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order any defense article for any such government.

Now, that means that the ships of any foreign government, in the discretion of the President, of any belligerent actually engaged in the war, may be brought into our own ports for the facilities of either privately owned or Government-owned navy yards to any extent that the President might see fit? Is that the only construction that can be placed on that?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you have any doubt, General, that the effect of the use of our ports would be to bring the war right to our own doorstep, in contravention to our late convention with our friends to the south of us with regard to the neutral zone?

General WOOD. We have signed an agreement with the South American nations which this would contravene.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In effect, it abrogates our agreement with them?

General WOOD. It abrogates our agreement with them.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And our provision for the defense zone or the neutral zone outside the Americas to which we refuse the war to be brought; is that correct?

General WOOD. Exactly.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The next paragraph reads that the President has the power, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law:

To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

As an old, experienced Army officer, you do not have any doubt, do you, that if we transferred any military secrets, such as our bomb sight or our apparatus for ascertaining the approach of planes or any other military secret we might have, to one belligerent, it is only a question of time before the other belligerent gets it?

General Wood. They will be bound to catch up with it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. They are bound to do it if it is used in actual warfare?

General Wood. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. From your experience as Acting Quartermaster General of the Army, which, of course, is one of the great procurement agencies of the Army, is it not a fact that the control of the flow of munitions and the flow of supplies—and I take it, General, that you agree with me that under the definition of "defense articles" that includes—

General Wood. It includes everything.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It includes anything. Possibly a funeral may be left out, but I do not know whether it is or not. It includes food, it includes clothing, it includes shoes, and it includes every article that you can think of, as you found out in your capacity as Acting Quartermaster General of the Army?

General Wood. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Having in mind that experience, General, is it not a fact that the absolute control of the flow of munitions and supplies and food and clothing and everything of that sort really constitutes on the part of the person who is in that position a sort of super, super general staff?

General Wood. Well, it gives control, if it is on a sufficiently large scale, of the economy of the country.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is not this true? It is not only a matter of control of the economy of this country, let us assume, but the matter of the control of the flow of these items constitutes on the part of whoever holds that power a sort of super, super general staff on strategy as well as everything else?

General Wood. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. For instance, let us assume the case that the British would come to the President of the United States, assuming that this bill is enacted, and would say, "Well, if you will give us 500 airplanes we will start a drive on the old Gallipoli Peninsula. We will start a drive from Turkey to the Balkans."

Would it not be up to the President to determine, from a tactical and strategical standpoint, whether he thought that was a grant of supplies and munitions that was desirable and necessary?

General Wood. Well, in the present situation he would be the arbiter, if this bill passed.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He is bound by the arbiter, and if he is the arbiter of munitions, is he not in exactly the same position that Lloyd George was in when he was Minister of Munitions and superseded the opinions of the General Staff and military and naval authorities, whenever he pleased, through his control of munitions?

General Wood. Well, anyone who controls the flow of munitions and supplies in a modern war in a sense controls the war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. So what this bill does is that it constitutes the President of the United States a super, super general

staff, through his control of the great munitions power of the United States. Is that not your observation, as a great procurement officer during the war?

General WOOD. Particularly at this time when England has not the resources to supply herself.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If England was able to support herself, this question would not arise, but assuming that the United States is to be the arsenal of the whole world, the President, under this bill, is set up as really the super authority as to what armaments are necessary for this place, that place, and the other place?

General WOOD. Yes; he has got the lever to control things.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The other day the Secretary of State, in his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs—and I think that I do not violate any confidence at all in saying that in executive session before this committee he repeated that statement—kept referring to Great Britain and Greece as the only people who were involved in this proposed bill. Do you see any mention of Great Britain or Greece here?

General WOOD. I say there is no limit as to time, countries, or money. As I read the bill, these supplies could be sent to any country on the face of the globe.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, this is a measure without limitation as to time, space, substance, or amount, is it not?

General WOOD. I would put it: Time, countries, and money.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. There is nothing in this bill to prohibit the President, if in his discretion he saw fit, to start on an appeasement program toward Russia, is there?

General WOOD. You mean shipping supplies to Russia?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Well, send them machine tools, send them airplanes, and give them a couple of ships, if he wanted to.

General WOOD. He could.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It has been repeatedly mentioned in the newspapers, from the same sources that forecast the destroyer deal, that Great Britain is bringing great pressure to bear on the United States to have us make some gestures in the direction of appeasement to Russia, and we did actually release to them \$2,000,000 worth of machine tools, which we greatly needed ourselves.

If the President, in his sole discretion, saw fit to turn over any amount of munitions from the Army and the Navy, or anybody else, to Russia to protect Great Britain's position in the Orient, there is full authority in this bill to do it; is there not?

General WOOD. There is full authority, as I read the bill, to give these supplies or munitions to any nation in the world.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Well, some of these retired admirals, who are the principal propagandists for war, naming Admiral Yates Sterling for one, have been going around saying that we ought to pull our whole fleet out of the Pacific to convoy vessels in the war zone. I am not saying he would do this, but if he wanted to give Japan a couple of battleships to guarantee us that they would not jump us while we are out of the Pacific, he could do it?

General WOOD. As I read it; yes, he could.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Something was said to the effect that the President is not likely to do various things. You have read the

writings of Thomas Jefferson, who once lived in this country, I am sure, General?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you recall that at one time he said, in discussing powers to be granted, "It must be assumed that what might be done, under a grant of power, would be done"?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, he was simply discussing the grant of power?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And is that not the only safe rule that the Congress of the United States can follow in a broad grant of powers assuming that what can be done may be done under the power granted?

General WOOD. Certainly.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, we are not entitled to consider for ourselves the proposition of whether any particular individual who may at the moment occupy the Presidency of the United States is likely to do a particular thing? If we give him authority to do it, that power has gone from the Congress and it may be done; is that not correct?

General WOOD. Yes; with no limitation as to the possible illness or incapacity of the President.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is precisely what I was thinking about. You recall a period when the President of the United States in the last war was stricken, and for some time nobody knew who was the President, whether it was the Vice President, the President's wife, or the President's secretary, or who actually was exercising the executive authority.

Now, General, you said something a moment ago about an insurance company owned by English capital in the United States. As a matter of fact, there are a number of those companies, are there not, General?

General WOOD. Well, you see, they have to keep surpluses in this country.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I understand that all the assets of the company are not owned by the owners of the company, but I have been informed that there are several billion dollars of actual assets in this country owned by the stockholders of these British companies. Do you know anything about that?

General WOOD. Well, the memorandum I have is that the knock-down sale value of the American branches and American-owned subsidiaries of English fire and casualty insurance companies is \$381,000,000. Those are fire and casualty companies only. Now, I do not know whether there are others.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is about how much, General?

General WOOD. About \$400,000,000.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. General, you said something a while ago, in response to the question of Senator Reynolds, about the desirability of weakening a potential adversary as long as we do not weaken ourselves. I take it—and I have read a number of your speeches—that we ought not to attempt to weaken a potential adversary by giving anybody else anything that we might need eventually for our own defense?

General WOOD. As an ex-soldier, you understand that. That comes first.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, you would not, under any conditions whatever, want to transfer to Great Britain or Greece or anybody else, no matter how friendly we might be to them, any naval vessel, any tank, any airplane, any rifle, or anything else that, in the worst eventuality, we might actually need for our own defense?

General WOOD. Anything that would impair our own defense. I think there is room for argument in the statement that certainly our older models can go over there and perhaps we win out by letting them have the older model planes so that we can get the latest model planes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. This bill has been called a lend-lease bill. You do not think that any matériel, guns, or ships or airplanes or anything else that we sent to anybody would be worth anything to us if they returned the same?

General WOOD. Of course not. They would not be assets.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In your observation, a lot of the 75's that were carried through a hard engagement would not be worth a particle if they were returned?

General WOOD. No; and that is why I believe, Senator, that if we come to the point when we think it is national policy to extend credits when their resources are exhausted, I do not believe in calling it a loan, lease, or anything else.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is a fake. You and I are old soldiers. Let us use plain terms. That is a fake?

General WOOD. You either make a gift or, as Senator Reynolds suggests, you try to get quid pro quo. You might get a base in exchange for a half million dollars, or this or that, but do not call it a loan, because we know the loans will never be repaid and, as a matter of fact, you will get nothing but hard feelings, as we did in the last war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You would even suggest that we would not ever want them back at all?

General WOOD. Certainly; one thing we learned from the last war, if we, as I say, do come to that point, is that we do not call it a loan or lease. Let us make it either a gift or a purchase.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. General, just one other thing. It was testified here the other day by the Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury that our servicing charges—that is, the expense of servicing these loans that we made to Great Britain and other allies during the war, which have not been repaid—amounted to about \$7,000,000,000, which has been raised by the American people and must ultimately be raised by the American people. I afterwards got a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury in which he stated that the amount was above that, but there were further reductions to be made. Anyway, it was about \$7,000,000,000.

Is there anything in this bill that puts a limitation on the amount of money to be raised from the American people by taxation? Is there any limitation on the service or charges?

General WOOD. Nothing at all.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is there anything to prevent the complete underwriting of the war, as far as the British are concerned, which might last 8 or 10 years or longer, and run into thirty or forty

or fifty billion dollars, all of which money would have to be raised and paid by the American people?

General Wood. Well, Senator, of course, as I see it, if we enter the war as an active belligerent—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We will have to go through with it, of course.

General Wood. We should not fool ourselves. We will not only have to go through with it, but we will take the principal burden. In other words, we will bear the lion's share of the cost.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, we are underwriting now, by passing the bill, the war, without limit, are we not? Is there any escape from that proposition?

General Wood. Not if we enter the war. I am still hopeful. I do not believe the bill should be passed, but I am hopeful that the President will not involve us as an active belligerent. I am not so hopeful about some of his successors.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Whether we get into the war or not, under this bill do we not underwrite the whole British prosecution of the war?

General Wood. Well, that depends on the President. He might not necessarily underwrite all of it, but he could underwrite part of it, certainly, and there is no limit to that part. If he chooses to underwrite it all, he can.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We were referring to the ex-blacked-out William Allen White committee, and the professional propagandist of the committee to get the United States into war, Mr. Eichelberger. He made a speech Friday night in which he said this war must be continued until the United States and Great Britain could absolutely dictate the terms of peace. That is an organization which has had great influence in the various steps toward war which have been taken.

If that policy should be adopted, we are underwriting the whole expenses of the war, are we not?

General Wood. Substantially.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye, have you any questions?

Senator NYE. General, you have been up against a very difficult afternoon, and I am not going to prolong the few questions I want to ask. I really feel that I owe you an apology for asking any.

In the light of the very eminent part you played in the forces of the United States in winning the World War, do you think we played a material part in winning the war which started in 1914?

General Wood. Well, I think if we had not entered the war the Allies would have lost it. Our entrance into the war won the war for them, and afterward we did not get, as far as I could ever find out, one single bit of gratitude for it.

Senator NYE. I was about to ask you whether you had any knowledge of any expression of gratitude for what we had done.

General Wood. Senator, I was in a London banking house in 1933, and I had the banker tell me that we had not done a damned thing during the war.

Senator NYE. That was a rather common opinion of leading people in England, was it not?

General Wood. Yes.

Senator NYE. We were called by most of them, among other things, Uncle Shylock, were we not?

General WOOD. We certainly were.

Senator NYE. Do you suppose there would be a better reaction to our helping this time than there was last time?

General WOOD. I doubt it.

Senator NYE. General, allegedly in an interview Winston Churchill told an American newspaper correspondent this:

America's entrance into the war was disastrous, not only for your country but for the Allies as well, because had you stayed at home and minded your own business we would have made peace with the Central Powers in the spring of 1917, and then there would have been no collapse in Russia, followed by communism; no break-down in Italy, followed by fascism; and nazi-ism would not at present be enthroned in Germany. If America had stayed out of the war and minded her own business, none of these "isms" would today be sweeping the Continent of Europe and breaking down parliamentary government.

Now, knowing that you had an audience with Winston Churchill, are you impressed with the fact that he might have said that?

General WOOD. I think so, sir. As a matter of fact, I wrote to Mr. Griffin, who was the man that he gave the interview to, and he said that that statement was correct, though Churchill denied it.

I had a similar experience with Mr. Churchill myself, though again he and I were the only ones present and all I could give the Senators is my word as a gentleman.

Senator NYE. Will you tell us what was the result of your audience with Mr. Churchill? First, when was it?

General WOOD. Well, this was in November 1936. I was on a trip to London—and this has, in a way, no relation to the bill——

The CHAIRMAN. You need not mind about that, General. It is probably more appropriate if it is wholly disassociated from the bill.

General WOOD. Senator George, I had luncheon with Mr. Churchill in his flat in London.

The CHAIRMAN. You need not tell anything that you think socially you ought not to divulge.

General WOOD. This might be interesting to you. At that time in England there were two so-called parties. One party believed in a friendly attitude toward Germany, in letting them turn east and fight Russia, and Mr. Churchill was discussing that with me.

I cannot give all the conversation, but I remember particularly these words that he spoke: "Germany is getting too strong. We must smash her." Those words made a great impression on my mind at the time, because it seemed to me that if one of the leading English statesmen felt that way certainly war was inevitable sooner or later.

Other gentlemen in London that I talked to felt, as I say, in favor of what they called their eastern policy, letting Germany go east and eventually fight Russia.

Senator NYE. If that was the sentiment on the part of Mr. Churchill and others, did they impress upon you at that time that when that checking job came it was going to be our war that they were going to fight?

General WOOD. I would not say that, but I did notice, every place I went in London, at every dinner party that I went to, we were told that we ought to be their allies.

Senator NYE. In that kind of struggle?

General Wood. That we ought to help them. That, however, was 3 years before the war began.

Senator NYE. Another question, General. You have, of late months, been very close to public sentiment, I would be inclined to say, throughout the country. You find, of course, that people very largely are eager to help Britain?

General Wood. I think so, sir. I think the great question is where the aid should stop. On the one hand, I think—at least in the Middle West—there is an overwhelming sentiment against our getting into the war.

Senator NYE. I was about to ask, General, if you have encountered this overwhelming sentiment of keeping America out of that war. How much stronger do you find the sentiment to keep out of war than the sentiment to aid England?

General Wood. Well, it is difficult to tell, Senator. There is a great sentiment for aiding England; I think a good deal of it because the country has been scared to death, but whatever the reason, it is there. The overwhelming majority of the people, I believe, are in favor of aiding England, and the overwhelming majority of the people are against our going into the war.

On the other hand, it is difficult to tell how far they think the aid should go. Some think that the aid should be extended in the material aid we are giving now, sticking to our Neutrality Act and to Senator Johnson's act. Others think that we ought to go beyond that and begin to give them money as soon as they run out of money.

The one step, I think, people understand that does mean war is if we send our merchant vessels into the war zone. I think even the masses of people understand that step means war, and they do not want to take that step.

Senator NYE. People generally, you have already testified, have been called to look upon this bill as a bill to aid England?

General Wood. I did not catch that question.

Senator NYE. The American public has been given to understand that this lend-lease bill is a bill primarily for the purpose of aiding England, has it not?

General Wood. Well, I think it has been put up more as a defense bill, and, of course, the people are all in favor of defense. I do not care in what part of the country you are or what party you belong to or anything else. They are overwhelmingly in favor of defense, and its official title, as I understand is "A defense"—is "Lend-lease bill" the official title, Senator George?

The CHAIRMAN. It is, "Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes."

General Wood. Well, any bill, certainly, that is for defense, and I would say any bill that was for reasonable aid to England, would get the overwhelming support of everybody in this country; but it is because this bill has such implications of involvement in war, to which the people are, I believe, overwhelmingly opposed, that there is doubt as to the bill. It seems to me that doubt could be cleared up. I am not a parliamentarian, and I do not know how to word a bill.

Senator NYE. Do you feel that a considerable part of those who are urging enactment of this legislation understand what is in the bill?

General Wood. Well, I do not know who is urging the enactment of this legislation.

Senator NYE. Oh, there are letters pouring in upon the Congress these days, General, urging us to support the lend-lease bill.

General WOOD. Well, I do not think they do understand it. In fact, after I was questioned by Senator Connally I was not sure I understood it myself.

Senator NYE. One more question, General. You have stated that the America First Committee was organized to offset and combat the influence of the committee to aid the Allies, commonly referred to as the White committee?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The ex-White committee.

Senator NYE. The Senator from Missouri repeatedly refers to it as the ex-White committee.

So far as you know, no spokesman for that committee has made any plans to be heard during these hearings. Have you any knowledge as to why that might be, in light of the public urge behind this bill?

General WOOD. Not at all. I debated with him, as a matter of fact, in Chicago, but I do not know why he has not asked to be called.

Senator NYE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes, have you any questions?

Senator BYRNES. General, while I am in hearty disagreement with my good friend from Missouri about the power in this bill for the President either to spend or to contract to spend a dollar without an appropriation, I agree with you that you should not be expected, if we disagree, to be familiar with it, and I am not going to ask you about it.

General WOOD. Please do not.

Senator BYRNES. As my friend says, we are in professional disagreement. I want to ask you only whether you are still, after all this examination, of the opinion that we should aid Great Britain?

General WOOD. Yes; within the limits I set.

Senator BYRNES. You said "short of war"?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator BYRNES. Would you put any limitation upon the method in which that aid should be granted, such as demanding a mortgage upon some land or some transfer, such as of Newfoundland or other places, as has been suggested, or would you aid them for the reason that you previously gave?

General WOOD. First, I think there is no question about the aid within the limits of the Neutrality Act and the Johnson Act, which is the aid they are getting now. I mean, send them all the ships, planes, and everything they want that they can pay for.

Senator BYRNES. So far as the aid now being sent is concerned, it is being paid for and cash has been laid on the barrel.

General WOOD. Exactly.

Senator BYRNES. That is not any great aid to Great Britain other than furnishing the material that they could not buy elsewhere.

General WOOD. Yes, Senator; but of course, it is that aid that is keeping England going now.

Senator BYRNES. Is that the only aid you are in favor of, when they put cash on the barrel?

General WOOD. Now. When their resources are exhausted it will be a different situation. I am not sure in my mind and I cannot give you an answer. It seems to me that the one thing I am sure I would not do is to call anything you gave them a loan. I would not do that.

Senator BYRNES. Well, the basis on which this bill is presented, General, is that they have the assets which will enable them to pay for their contractual authorizations for a period of approximately a year and that they cannot enter into contracts for additional plant expansion at this time. If you were sure that that was true, would you then be willing to give them aid?

General WOOD. I would certainly consider it. Then I would say would come up the question, Are you going to give them a gift or are you going to ask for quid pro quo? Whatever you ask for, I would be specific.

Senator BYRNES. Therefore, the question that you first would want to fix in your mind is whether they have exhausted their assets?

General WOOD. Yes, Senator; and I think it would certainly pay the Senate to check it.

Senator BYRNES. As I understand you, General, you have not checked it and you have had no opportunity to check it?

General WOOD. Of course, no private citizen can.

Senator BYRNES. Well, the Secretary of the Treasury, before the committee, made the statement, which you doubtless have in mind, that it was doubtful whether a list of all the assets should be made public, but he is entirely willing to submit it to any member of the committee, if I recall his testimony.

You have made no inquiry of the Treasury?

General WOOD. Of course not.

Senator BYRNES. When you mention in your statement that you think that real estate should be included, would it make you feel better about it if you were advised that, before the committee, the Secretary of the Treasury testified that all real estate was included, in response to a question of the Senator from Missouri, naming specific individuals, and that every piece of property of the Astors or any other subjects in the United States must be sold for existing contracts? Would you feel better about it if you knew that to be the fact?

General WOOD. If I knew that to be the fact.

Senator BYRNES. The Secretary of the Treasury indicated a willingness to be advised by anyone of any holdings that anyone thought were not listed, in order that he might check those, stating that he was exerting every effort to check that list.

Would you mind setting forth what you know about these holdings that you believe are not listed?

General WOOD. Well, I simply say, as I told Senator Pepper, I believe they are not listed, because I got the impression that the Secretary of the Treasury only gave us listed securities. Now, I give you a number of what are called unlisted securities. The two most valuable companies unlisted are the American Viscose and the Lever Bros.

Senator BYRNES. The committee shares your views and will undertake to check it, and the Secretary of the Treasury wants to check it in any way possible. He told us they were included. My friend from Missouri disagrees. My understanding is, after reading the testimony today, that it is quite to the contrary. However, that does not change my question to you.

If you will, on a memorandum, set forth these unlisted securities, I shall be glad to receive it and ask the committee to send it to the Secretary to ascertain whether or not they are included.

General WOOD. I shall be very happy to send you a list of any unlisted property that I know of. Of course, I cannot say whether they are on the Secretary's list, but you can find out.

Senator BYRNES. That is what I am asking you for. That is all the Secretary wants to know to be assisted in checking. If you have it, I hope you will submit it.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds, did you say you wished to ask another question?

Senator REYNOLDS. General Wood, in pursuance of some questions in regard to participation in World War No. 2, do you believe that this bill will get us into war?

General WOOD. That is what I am afraid of.

Senator REYNOLDS. Well, if we get into that war and have some casualties—deaths, maimed persons, and injuries—those men of World War No. 2, that is to say, veterans of World War No. 2, will be entitled to benefits by way of pensions under the law, the same as benefits are participated in by the veterans of World War No. 1, will they not?

General WOOD. I assume so.

Senator REYNOLDS. And in view of the fact that this war will cost billions to the American people, is it not true that one may reasonably conclude that all the veterans of World War No. 1 who are now drawing pensions will have those pensions materially reduced? Would you not say that?

General WOOD. Why, I think so. As a matter of fact, Senator, I think that if we go into this war—

Senator REYNOLDS. During the World War we had actually killed on the spot only about 30,000 men, did we not? That is correct, is it not?

General WOOD. About 50,000, I thought.

Senator REYNOLDS. Twenty thousand more died as a result of wounds. That is correct, is it not?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Now, General, it has been practically a quarter of a century since the termination of the last war. I ask you if it is not true that today, 25 years after the last war, during which war we had killed only about 50,000 men and only about 200,000 wounded, we have not hospitals sufficiently large to provide beds for those men who are entitled to consideration. Is that not true?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. And is it not true that we have more men in hospitals today than we had killed in the World War?

General WOOD. I do not know, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. Twenty-five years afterward?

General WOOD. I do not know.

Senator REYNOLDS. Is it not reasonable to conclude that if we do unfortunately get into this war we shall certainly have to double our hospital facilities?

General WOOD. Why, Senator, the cost would be so colossal that there is no reckoning it. First, this mechanized war is tremendously more expensive than the other war. A fighting plane of today costs seven times what the fighting plane did in 1917 or 1918.

Your cost would be so colossal that your system would have to go under. I mean your present economic system would have to go under.

As I say, after 22 years out of the Army, I do not profess to be a military expert, but just from common sense——

Senator REYNOLDS. And it is reasonable to conclude that if we do get into this war the people who are going to be hurt the worst are those soldiers of World War No. 1 who are drawing pensions, because those pensions will be cut at least in two?

General WOOD. I do not know who will be hurt the worst, but I know everybody will be hurt.

Senator JOHNSON of California. We would not have any money.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator REYNOLDS. Just one question, if you please.

I was surprised to hear you state a moment ago that at a luncheon with Mr. Churchill in his town house he told you that Germany was getting too strong and that they ought to crush them and that he said we, the United States, ought to help crush them.

General WOOD. Oh, no. That is not correct.

Senator REYNOLDS. What was it he said?

General WOOD. He just made the first statement. He said, "Germany is getting too strong. We must smash her."

Senator REYNOLDS. "We must smash her." Whom did he mean by "we"?

General WOOD. He spoke only of his own country.

Senator REYNOLDS. He spoke only of his own country?

General WOOD. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Did he say we ought to help them?

General WOOD. No.

Senator REYNOLDS. He did not say that?

General WOOD. No.

Senator REYNOLDS. When was that statement made? What year?

General WOOD. That was in November 1936.

Senator REYNOLDS. That was 3 years before the war broke out.

In view of the fact that this bill provides the authority to manufacture articles—any defense article—for the government of any foreign country and to repair and recondition any defense article for any foreign country and to communicate to any such foreign government any defense information and to release for export any defense article to any such foreign government, and to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, munitions, and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any other foreign country, would you not say that this bill ought to be entitled "A bill for the defense of Great Britain at the expense of the American people?"

General WOOD. Well, it might be so entitled.

Senator REYNOLDS. It ought to be.

General WOOD. Well, I do not know.

Senator REYNOLDS. And if it is entitled as it is, "Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes," it is really for other purposes or mostly for other purposes; is that right?

General WOOD. That might be it.

Senator REYNOLDS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. You really do not believe that serious-minded men are proposing a bill here solely in the defense of Great Britain or even primarily in the defense of Great Britain?

General WOOD. Why, Senator, no.

The CHAIRMAN. I ask you the question frankly. You have read this bill, and now I want to ask you just a very few questions about it, not from a technical point of view, but from its plain language.

Everything the President is authorized to do under the bill springs from his finding that it is in the interest of our national defense; is not that true?

General WOOD. Well, it may be from his view, but he might be mistaken, you know.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, General. You assume that any President will act with some degree of reason, do you not?

General WOOD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, you do not assume, do you, that any President would construe this authority to aid any country that he might wish to aid, but only when, in the interest of our own national defense, he found and believed and concluded that the defense of the country to which he was extending aid was vital to our defense?

General WOOD. That part I would disagree with, Senator, because I cannot see, for instance, that the defense of Greece or the defense of China is vital to our defense. It might be helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the President might not think it vital. The point I am getting at is, is it not fair to assume that any President will exercise some degree of care and reason in concluding what country he would aid and that, under the very terms of the bill, he could extend no aid except when he found it to be in our national defense and in aid of some country the defense of which he deemed vital to our defense?

I do not say that any President would aid Greece or China. I ask you this now, General: You do believe that we should maintain the Monroe Doctrine?

General WOOD. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not abandon that?

General WOOD. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We could not afford to abandon it, could we?

General WOOD. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We could not limit aid, under this bill, to Great Britain, could we, with any degree of safety and leave exposed the whole question of whether we would thereby withdraw such aid as this bill authorizes the President to give to any South American country if it became necessary for us to defend it under the Monroe Doctrine? So you would not enumerate the countries, would you?

General WOOD. Right now I would just enumerate one.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, suppose you said, "The President is authorized to extend aid to Great Britain." Would not that exclude aid to any South American country?

General WOOD. Not if he brought it up to Congress afterward. I do not see, Senator, that in the history of the United States there has ever been given such broad authority.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not debating the general question with you now. I am asking you some simple questions on which you and I could agree. I can assure you that I no more want to see this country in war than you do, and I agree with your statement that the vast majority of our people do not want to go to war, and so long as they keep that state of mind we will not go to war.

I must think that any man who is in the Chief Executive's office and exercising his authority given under this bill must be mindful of all the pertinent and relevant facts.

I know very well that it may easily be said that the President may do so-and-so, that he may proceed under this bill without any restraints but I want to beg you to remember, because I think this is important, that I think this country is in danger from two sources, from the extremists on both sides; and I think on analysis you will agree with me. We are in danger from the extremists who want to go to war and who think we should go to war. I may say, with equal conviction, that we are in danger from the extremists who believe that any reasonable authority, even though it be broad authority, is necessarily bound to involve the country in war.

Between those two extremists, I do not wonder that many of our people are confused, and I take it that you and I both try to stay out of those classes, because your testimony has been very frank.

You have said that you could reason, as a military man, and based upon your experience, our aiding Britain without the sacrifice of the things necessary to our own defense?

General Wood. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have said that if you were convinced of the fact, which fact you have frankly stated that you are not convinced of, that Britain's resources were exhausted, you would consider granting her aid by way of gift, unless something in exchange that you might regard as beneficial might be given to us?

General Wood. That states my position.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no quarrel with you on that point, but I do beg you to remember that every authority given the President under the bill is based upon his finding and conclusion that the exercise of that power is in the interest of our national defense and the aid to be given to every country is to be given to a country the defense of which the President deems vital or finds to be vital in our own defense.

Under this bill, and without arguing the points, because you frankly said you were not familiar with the phraseology, the only means that are available to the President arise from these particular sources: First, he may transfer any defense articles—and I grant you that that is a broad term and embraces anything that may be used for defensive purposes—as defined in the bill, now on hand or in the process of manufacture. In that sense, he does not have to come to Congress.

But I ask you, as an experienced businessman and as a distinguished officer, if you would assume for a moment that the President would transfer anything that was essential to our defense, with the knowledge that he must in turn come back to Congress and ask Congress for an appropriation to replace it. That is the first source from which he can supply anything that he can give or transfer or sell or otherwise dispose of to any country. The second is such articles that may be made from appropriations under our defense program.

Now, is it not fair to assume that any man exercising only reasonable judgment would know that he could not come back to Congress and ask that articles manufactured with the money already appropriated for our own national defense be replaced without the certainty that Congress would question his acts?

There is one other source from which he may have money, under this bill, with which to execute his powers, and that is from such

repayments as these nations to which defense articles are furnished may make.

You have already answered, and I think you are entirely right, that in a great emergency advances made to a nation are really gifts, unless you presently get some consideration for what you are giving that nation. No reasonable person, I think, could for a moment imagine that any considerable sum of money or other things of value would be returned by any of these countries or any country to which the President would advance or loan or lease or transfer defense articles during the life of this bill.

Now, you come down to the one final thing, after all, and that is the appropriation from Congress. I do not want to argue the question that has been raised by some of my colleagues on the committee, but you never contracted, did you, General, for any supplies for the Army until you had the authority and the funds in hand to pay for those supplies?

General WOOD. Of course, we could not, but during the Great War you could get those very fast from the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you are coming down to it. You want to retain specific powers in Congress. If Congress is so weak and worthless as to grant any appropriation that the President may come to the Congress and ask for, what kind of protection are you going to get from Congress, anyhow? That is just a practical question. It is not legal or legalistic.

If, as has been intimated and strongly suggested, the President is going to assume that Congress will grant any sum that he wishes and may tentatively discuss contracts, without any authority having been given or any money having been given with which to do it, would there be any protection in reserving any power in the hands of that kind of Congress?

After all, is it not a question of the exercise of the best business judgment, with reasonable confidence in those who have been either elected or selected to administer our laws? If we are going to give any aid to Great Britain or to any other country, does it not necessarily follow that reasonable powers at least—let me say rather broad powers—must be given?

General WOOD. Are you asking me the question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General WOOD. I think reasonable powers, of course, must be given to any Executive, but I do think that the Executive should not be picking out any country in the world as vital to our defense. I cannot see any precedent for that in the history of the United States; and if there is a time, of course, when Mexico or Honduras or Guatemala is threatened by a foreign power we are going to assist them. However, Congress can give that power to the President at short notice.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not any power to assume, but I do assume that this bill will be limited in time; that is, a time limit will be set in which the powers may be exercised under the bill. There is some such amendment now that is in the House, and I agree with you that there should be a limitation as to time.

General WOOD. I think there should be as to countries and as to money.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there might be, General, but I would not for a moment suppose, if you yourself were being given the powers, that you would pick out any country to aid, under a bill which required a finding upon your part that the defense of that country was vital or in the interest of our national defense, if you want to use a less strong word than "vital." I would not assume that you would pick out any country in the world.

I ask you the question, Do you think that any Executive exercising even a reasonable degree of care would go around picking out countries to aid?

General Wood. Of course, he would not pick out just any country in any part of the world, but there might be some question as to whether Greece would be necessary to defend in defense of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that might be, and I might think it is not and you might think it is not, and others might think it is. I grant you that there may be questions of reasonable differences of opinion among honest men, but as a general proposition you would think that reasonable exercise of judgment and care would certainly protect the country against the extravagant ideas of an Executive who might just pick out any country, without reason and without reference to the importance of that country in our own defense, or strengthening our national defense.

General Wood. Well, I think that question ought to be reserved for Congress and should not be transferred to the Executive. I think the question of aid to England could be settled by a specific bill and there would not be any of this controversy.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am quite willing to concede that it could have been approached in a different way, but I do think it is important to bear in mind that if Congress is not going to limit the activities and the powers of the President under this bill, then you could not expect much aid from that kind of Congress whenever it was asked to do specific things.

We thank you for coming, and I again want to assure you that in your main objective there can be no difference between good Americans.

The committee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 5:30 p. m., an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Wednesday, February 5, 1941, at 10 a. m.)

TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1941

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Hon. Walter F. George presiding.

Present: Senators George (chairman), Harrison, Connally, Van Nuys, Murray, Pepper, Green, Barkley, Guffey, Gillette, Clark of Missouri, Byrnes, Glass, Johnson of California, Capper, La Follette, Vandenberg, White, and Nye.

The CHAIRMAN. The first witness this morning will be Dr. Valentine, of Rochester University.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman, before the witness starts, I should like to present a matter which is of deep interest to me. I should like to read one sentence into the record from Miss Dorothy Thompson's column in this morning's newspapers, as follows:

Our all-out aid to Britain is accompanied by definite commitments of Britain to us regarding the British fleet.

I merely wish to suggest that I greatly welcome any comment the State Department might desire to make upon that subject, because it could be of tremendous importance.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Are you suggesting that the State Department comment on it now?

Senator VANDENBERG. I do not wish to ask the recall of the Secretary of State for the purpose, but I suggest that a communication from the Department would be in order, in view of the categorical statement that there are some commitments, with which certainly I am not familiar, and I doubt that the committee is; and I raise the question whether there are any.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is agreeable to the committee, the Chairman would be pleased to ask the Secretary of State whether he has any comment to make upon the statement.

Senator VANDENBERG. That will be entirely satisfactory, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will please note the request by the committee, and transmit it to the Secretary of State.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALLEN VALENTINE, PRESIDENT OF ROCHESTER UNIVERSITY, ROCHESTER, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Valentine, I believe you are president of Rochester University at Rochester, N. Y.

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be pleased to have you proceed as you may elect. If you desire to submit a formal statement, postponing any questions until after the statement is finished, that will be quite agreeable to the committee.

Dr. VALENTINE. I should like to do that, with your permission.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Dr. VALENTINE. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am grateful to this committee for consulting the opinion of an ordinary American, who is not an expert in military affairs. Your generosity indicates your recognition that since the bill you are considering is of paramount importance to millions of average Americans, their point of view, which I represent, should be heard.

There are several brief statements I would like to make for the record. First, I am not by any reasonable definition an isolationist, for I believe that the future of America will be profoundly affected by what happens in the rest of the world. But I do not believe that America is so weak that it needs to rest its defense upon any foreign nation, or that America needs to follow European nations into any conflict they may create.

Nor am I what is called an appeaser. It is not for America to tell any foreign nation when or on what terms it should make peace. For the same reasons it is not for America to tell a foreign nation, or by the implications of our words or actions influence a foreign nation in deciding, how long and on what terms it shall continue fighting. I find some irony in the fact that anyone who advocates peace in Europe, or a hands-off-the-war policy, risks immediate name calling as disloyal, anti-British, or pro-Nazi. How long ago was it that this nation officially renounced war as an instrument of national policy?

Also for the record, I hope that if this war can be won by anyone, it will be won by the forces opposing Germany. But that does not mean that I think it is the paramount national interest of this country to go to war in Europe. Therefore, I believe that the defense of America and of the American way of life demands the rejection or amendment of bill S. 275 as it now stands.

We are all primarily concerned with the defense of America. We are all agreed that those defenses should be strengthened as thoroughly and rapidly as possible. Some 80 percent of the American people want our defenses strengthened so that no one will dare to attack us—that is, so we will not become involved in war. The real question is how, when and where we can best make our defenses effective. On that question, I do not impugn the motives of those who support this bill. Most of them sincerely believe that America's best defense lies in defending England, at no matter what cost. Greatly as I admire the courage and civilization of England, where I lived several years, I cannot put the defense of England, at no matter what cost to us, as the indispensable compulsion of our own national defense. Strong as we are, stronger as we will become, we are not and will not be strong enough to determine the future history of every nation in the world, and we have no moral mandate to do so if we could. If we put the defense of our own Nation first; if we concentrate first on those home defenses, we should be able to defend our Nation if and when attacked, whether the attack be military, economic, or ideological. But we are not and will not be strong enough to dissipate our forces,

military, economic or spiritual. We should help Britain, yes; but only to the extent that such help does not weaken our own self-defense.

Those who support this bill have done their utmost, by every form of propaganda, to convince you and the American people that, at whatever cost to America, Britain must be aided to whatever extent is necessary to insure British victory. They have played upon our emotions—noble emotions like the support of a courageous friend, and low emotions like fear. They have tried to convince a peace-loving people that attack is imminent. Although many of them use the phrase "aid short of war," any intelligent person knows that the aid they recommend will lead to war. When this is pointed out to them, they say that in essence we are already at war. Already at war! Tell that to the citizens of London; tell it to the mothers of American sons still alive; they know the difference between America now and a nation at war.

No matter what many of these "aid short of war" supporters of this bill may say, we know that they would have us go to war. They pretend an appeal to reason, but their real appeal is emotional. Most of them know no more of military strategy than I do—which is little enough—but they have suddenly assumed the mantle of experts in military defense. They have succeeded in confusing and frightening the American people, and are fast pushing them over the brink into war. For the logical conclusion of their line of thought is active American participation in a war in Europe.

Let us look at their logic and see where it leads. They oppose a negotiated peace between England and Germany. England should fight on until Germany is defeated. America must help England to the extent necessary to defeat Germany—"short of war." But can we give British sufficient aid short of war to enable Britain to win its war? If a negotiated peace is ruled out, the only alternative is a German defeat. It is stated by experts that a German defeat could be achieved only by an invasion of the continent, and that Britain alone could not successfully invade the continent. If we go forward logically from the conviction that Britain must win, it means that we must give Britain sufficient aid to conquer Germany on the continent of Europe. Such aid will not be "short of war;" it means that America would be involved in active military efforts in a long and destructive war in Europe and probably in Asia as well. This is what "all necessary aid short of war" logically leads to. This is what the use of the powers requested in bill S. 275 would logically imply if those powers are granted and used. If they are not to be used, why should they be granted?

My objections to the bill are simple. The bill delegates to one man full power to control completely the industrial life of America down to the smallest factory, for it authorizes full control of the manufacture of all defense materials, and defines defense materials so broadly that they include anything that floats or flies or could be used to injure an enemy, or anything that could contribute to the manufacture of any of these. This amounts to the abnegation of Congress, the nullification of property rights, the centering of complete economic power in one man. Is the emergency so great that the President needs all this power? If he intends to use it, he kills the fundamentals of democratic procedure. If he does not intend to use it, why should he have it?

That bill, if its words mean what they say, places in the hands of one man full power to dispose of, in any way which he pleases, to any foreign nation he pleases, anything belonging to this Nation, that floats or flies or can be used to injure any enemy, with or without payment, return, or explanation to Congress or this Nation. Is the emergency so great that the President needs all this power? If he uses it, he removes the fundamentals of the democratic tradition. If he does not intend to use it, why should he have it?

Section 9 of this bill permits the President, under guise of carrying out his powers, to write and enforce any regulation dealing with almost any aspect of our political and economic life. If and so long as this bill is in effect, no single individual could have greater power over the destinies of 130,000,000 Americans. But the President does not intend to use this power to impair the sovereign rights of Americans. With dictatorial powers he will protect democracy. The only difference between a good dictator and a bad one is a matter of time.

The only argument for such centralized powers is that the present emergency demands them. The British have not yet granted such complete powers to any man. Is our present emergency greater than theirs? The Federal Government that asks for these powers has not yet found the emergency great enough to centralize in one man the direction of our defense commission. The President has not yet found the emergency great enough to take into effective consultation or confidence the accredited leaders of the opposition party. How great, therefore, is the present emergency?

So unprecedented a request for centralized power places the proposers of this bill under the obligation of convincing the American people that such centralization is now needed. The burden of proof lies with the affirmative. Have the proposers presented convincing reasons why our President needs greater powers than Mr. Churchill? Certainly the case should be clear enough to be clearly stated by these honorable men, if it is clear enough to justify the removal of democratic procedure with so clean a sweep.

The supporters of this bill have had full opportunity to present their reasons. They have given us scare headlines, but few facts and no reasons. They have offered prophecies of mass air attacks at 45,000 feet, of gas bombing, of planes based on Newfoundland and bombing Detroit, of economic collapse in this hemisphere if England is defeated. They have built up a strong and perhaps accurate estimate of England's danger and of America's need for defense. We grant both, but both are irrelevant to the real issue at stake in this bill. On the single pertinent question they have not spoken clearly or convincingly. That question is: "What in our present defense needs necessitates giving such unprecedented power to a single man at this time?" Here are some of the questions to which they owe us specific answers:

1. If our defense program is progressing as favorably as Government authorities report, why does that defense program require such complete control by one man of our whole industrial system?

2. Or, if our defense program is such a failure that such complete control by one man is needed to advance it, why has the public not been told of this failure, and told what men or groups of men are to blame?

3. If our aid to England is now less great than it should be, in what way will this concentration of economic power make it greater? Can more power to the President of itself build more planes, tanks, or ships?

4. Should not the judgment of one man in such close issues of war and defense, be subject to advance consultation both with military experts and with Congress, which represents the people? No single man should have the full responsibility for the lives and welfare of 130,000,000 others. If the President intends to use his powers only after consultation, why should not the requirement for consultation be written into the bill?

5. Is it in the interests of speedy action that these powers are to be concentrated? If so, is the gain of a few hours more important than the risk of the safety of America through a mistaken decision by one man; is the gain of a few hours more important than the loss of democratic procedure?

6. Do not the powers conceded in this bill make it possible for one man to take steps which will make our active entry into the war inevitable?

7. If it can be demonstrated that the emergency justifies this concentration of power, should not the duration of the grant be strictly limited, since it can always be renewed if Congress wishes?

The argument that America may be ultimately invaded rests upon a series of hypotheses. If any one of those hypotheses is unrealized, then the chain of their logic collapses. The danger of invasion is an assumption; it is a possibility, no more. We must take every step toward defense because of that possibility. But it is a new thing for Americans to tremble at possibilities, or to yield their democratic system so readily to such an "iffy" question. I do not believe the American people are so frightened that they will approve the implications of this bill.

The bill can be rejected or amended. Amendment should be so drastic that it would seem to me to be simpler and quicker to write a new bill. I therefore favor the rejection of bill S. 275, and the prompt presentation of other legislation which will—

1. Further implement and speed national defense while ensuring the continuance of the American tradition of government and the American way of life; and

2. Give financial and material assistance to Great Britain provided such aid is in each instance formally approved by Congress thus preserving the right of the people, through Congress, to determine whether each step is in their opinion in the national interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson, have you any questions to ask?

Senator JOHNSON of California. In order that we may have some background of yourself, Doctor, if you will pardon me, how long have you been in your present position?

Dr. VALENTINE. This is my sixth year.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Do you follow any particular course of studies there?

Dr. VALENTINE. Do you mean does our university follow a particular course of studies, or do I?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Do you?

Dr. VALENTINE. My work is administrative, Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Before this 6 years, what was your occupation?

Dr. VALENTINE. I was director of admissions and master of Pierson College, at Yale University, for 3 years.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I presume I had better not go back further, had I?

Dr. VALENTINE. If you like.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I did not think you were old enough. What were you doing before that time?

Dr. VALENTINE. Suppose I start with college and go forward from there, if you would like. I attended Swarthmore College and graduated, and taught for a year in the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, at the University of Pennsylvania. I then spent three and a half years of study at Oxford University in England. At the end of that period I took work in England with the Oxford University Press, partly in this country and partly in England. In 1928 I accepted a position as assistant professor of English and assistant American secretary to the Rhodes trustees under President Aydelotte, of Swarthmore College, where I later became dean of men at that college, until I went to New Haven, in 1931 or 1932. That, I think, is perhaps what you want.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green, have you any questions to ask?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper?

Senator CAPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. On page 2 of your statement, President Valentine, you state:

Strong as we are, stronger as we will become, we are not and will not be strong enough to determine the future history of every nation in the world, and we have no moral mandate to do so if we could.

Is that statement predicated upon the four freedoms outlined in the President's annual message?

Dr. VALENTINE. I could not say, Senator La Follette, that it was predicated upon that. It is simply predicated upon my own conviction, what seems to me the essential background for my conclusions.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Did you or did you not take into consideration the fact that we have not completed the job of making democracy work in a modern industrial society in our own country as yet?

Dr. VALENTINE. I took that very much into consideration because it is a point upon which I feel strongly, and if given an opportunity, will dilate for hours.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. We have it upon the highest authority, have we not, that one-third of the people of this country are ill-clothed, ill-housed, and ill-fed?

Dr. VALENTINE. Most of this discussion of course must involve opinions, but it seems to me we can take it that that is fact, and consequently fact is high authority.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Living in the most luxuriant economic environment in the world, and having, after many years of strenuous effort, been unable to solve our own problems, do you think we are in

a position to solve the problems of the teeming millions of China, where famine often carries off two or three million people at a time?

Dr. VALENTINE. I do not think we are in such a position. I do not think we could if we would. I question whether we have either the moral or the physical ability to do so.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Would you say that the same situation applied to the Balkans?

Dr. VALENTINE. I would.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions. I merely wish to compliment Dr. Valentine upon an exceptionally fine and concise statement.

Dr. VALENTINE. I thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. Dr. Valentine, I take it you feel that if our foreign policy stems from the proposition that England must win for our sakes, we are drawn into a chain of circumstances regardless of our own desire or design which may take us far beyond the limitations which we now set upon our actions.

Dr. VALENTINE. That is precisely my feeling, and you have expressed it better than I have.

Senator VANDENBERG. Would you agree to the corollary proposition that our foreign policy should stem from the position that America is going to survive no matter what happens in Europe, Asia, or Africa?

Dr. VALENTINE. I do believe that, yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. If we pursue the other policy, and are drawn beyond the point short of war which we like to think is to limit our prospectus, and we confront the ultimate necessity for going to war in order to achieve the victory and we then draw back, have we not invited a final calamity which unites the entire world against us?

Dr. VALENTINE. It seems to me so, and, if I may add, it seems to me we have also encouraged other nations beyond the extent to which we are justified in encouraging them, if we later plan to go back.

Senator VANDENBERG. Now I should like to call attention to the sixth question which you very appropriately asked on page 6 of your manuscript:

Do not the powers conceded in this bill make it possible for one man to take steps which will make our active entry into the war inevitable?

How would you like to answer that question yourself?

Dr. VALENTINE. My answer would be that the powers conceded in the bill do make it possible for one man to take steps which one by one might seem acceptable to the American people, although there might be grave doubts about each step, but cumulatively would lead us to a point where it would be either inevitable for us to engage actively in war, or would so build up the emotions of the American people that they would think they actually wanted to go to war. It seems to me quite possible that the prolongation of the policy now asked, if it is prolonged under the powers given under this bill, would make it more likely than ever that that would be the conclusion of the course of events.

Senator VANDENBERG. Would you care to outline some of the steps which you have in mind which might eventuate?

Dr. VALENTINE. I should explain that I am not only not a military authority but not an authority on international affairs, but I read

the papers. It seems to me that some of the steps proposed, for example, the possibility of American ships convoying across the Atlantic, or the possibility of sending our ships carrying goods into the foreign area, would almost inevitably lead to the very kind of results which I, and I think the rest of us, fear. Those are two steps, for example, which seem to me inevitable. If I may add, it seems to me the only purpose of convoying is to protect the ships convoyed. If those ships are attacked, the convoys will have to spring into defense. I also think that would happen if some of our naval vessels fired on, or were fired on by, German submarines.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys, any questions?

Senator VAN NUYS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White?

Senator WHITE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions any of the Senators now desire to ask the witness before he is excused?

Senator Johnson, do you desire to ask any questions?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish to ask you one or two questions, Dr. Valentine.

Of course, you are aware of the fact that the Congress, insofar as the Congress could reasonably do so, has engaged in an extraordinary national-defense program. Am I correct in saying that you approve it, from what you have said here?

Dr. VALENTINE. I certainly approve the effort to strengthen our defenses as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And to an extraordinarily high degree?

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I assume that that is based upon the conviction or the thought that an extraordinary condition exists in the world today.

Dr. VALENTINE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. One which is not comparable to an ordinary European war or an ordinary conflict between two or more nations.

Dr. VALENTINE. As long as you are asking me to comment, I think I agree with the substance of what you say. I am not really clear on the difference between an extraordinary and what is not an extraordinary European war. It seems to me any European war in these days has extraordinary implications. But that is a matter of splitting hairs.

The CHAIRMAN. The point I was getting at is that you do realize, as I think most other Americans do, that a situation which can be described as extraordinary, or perhaps unparalleled, exists today in the world.

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Hence there is at least seeming justification for a degree of preparation for national defense which we have never undertaken in peacetime, and scarcely even in wartime. I believe you finally come to the conclusion that material or even financial aid, as you express it, would be justified to Great Britain?

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes, sir; to whatever extent seems to those best qualified to determine, which, in my opinion, is 130,000,000 American citizens—to whatever extent that aid can be given without on the one hand leading us, by an inevitable course of events, into war, or upon the other hand taking away from us more of the traditional procedures of our democracy and our American way of life than is absolutely essential to the emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and your last suggestion is that aid be specifically given Great Britain, if given.

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes; within those two reservations which I have stated.

The CHAIRMAN. Within those two reservations?

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that each specific grant of aid be a matter of congressional approval?

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is not that a rather slow process, if an extraordinary condition is existing in the world calling for a degree of national defense to which we have not hitherto dreamed of committing ourselves?

Dr. VALENTINE. It would seem to me that if the Members of our Congress were wholly in support of the measure suggested by the President in that particular case it need not be a slow measure. Such measures are slow only when there is considerable disagreement among the Members of the House or the Senate. I fail to see that our immediate emergency needs are so great that the President does not at present have sufficient authority to move along our definite program, in which he has had the full cooperation of the Congress. It seems to me that system could continue effectively, with such added grants as could be given without involving us in the dangers of war and without asking us to put to one side what seems to me a large proportion of democratic self-government.

The CHAIRMAN. You would hardly expect Congress to be unanimous on any proposal when you consider the different viewpoints and the cleavage in public opinion on essentially vital international relationships.

Dr. VALENTINE. We pay a certain price for the preservation of our democratic procedure. I think we can pay that price and still forward our defense program without great loss. If we discard that democratic procedure, I am not quite so sure exactly what would be the merits of our acting to defend ourselves, because we would not then be so keen about defending ourselves, if we did not have a system which we loved.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you would find no disagreement among the members of the committee or generally in the Congress in your broad statements, and I think you would find no disagreement certainly on the part of those of us who are charged with some direct responsibility with your statement, made and emphasized, in response to questions submitted by Senator La Follette; that is to say, that it is hardly within our power, even if we desired, and if it seemed even wise, to undertake the general reformation of all people, or the care of all people throughout the world. I must assume that it is your final conclusion that specific aid, as you say, and under the safeguards

which you set out, should be granted to Great Britain in this time, on the theory that it is better under the principles which have seemed to dominate and actuate the aggressor nations, not to permit them to overwhelm us, and that we have the legitimate right to make use of conditions as they exist in the world in our own defense; that is, in the interest of our own security.

Dr. VALENTINE. May I perhaps express what you have to say in a slightly different way? It seems to me our chief purpose at the moment in this extremely difficult world is to insure our own defenses and our own way of life first. It then becomes a question to what extent assistance should go to other nations who stand, roughly, for some of the same principles we do, either because they stand for those principles or because they constitute an outer bulwark of attack against an aggressor rather than an outer bulwark of our own defenses—it then becomes a question how far we can go in that procedure without risking our own primary national interests, namely, avoidance of war, and preservation and development of our own economic and social system which we call democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with your first premise, and I also think that should be the premise straight through to the end, that what we do must be done, should be done, for the purpose of strengthening our own national defense.

You have been asked, and other witnesses have been asked, whether we had completely done the job in our own country of making democracy work and making it function in the way we all want to see it function. We certainly would not have any better chance if the doctrine of aggression which has moved Germany repeatedly becomes the dominant force and doctrine of the whole world, would we?

Dr. VALENTINE. We certainly would not, but I point out that there is an "if" there, a hypothesis. If Germany, in substance, conquers this country—

The CHAIRMAN. I did not say if she conquers this country. I said if her aggressions are maintained.

Dr. VALENTINE. If Germany's aggressions are maintained?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; whether we would be better off.

Dr. VALENTINE. If this country places itself in a position to defend itself internally and externally that seems to me a preferable state to what seems to be the inevitable conclusion of our present course, which is, being actively involved in European and possible Asiatic warfare, and I think the chances of preserving and developing further our own democracy would be greater under the first of those two than under the second, granted we would have to tighten our belts if Germany's successes in Europe resulted in an economic squeeze in this country; and Americans have tightened their belts in the past for their principles.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no quarrel that our primary duty, our first duty, our real duty, is to provide for our own peace and security through the building up of such defense as is necessary; but the question I tried to put was this: If the doctrines and the principles and practices upon which Germany under Mr. Hitler has proceeded should prevail, would it not be more difficult for us to finally realize in the United States all the benefits of democratic life which we have thus far failed to fully realize?

Dr. VALENTINE. Would you permit me for just a moment to try to answer your question on that by presenting my own point of view? I think we are all agreed that our defense of this Nation comes first. The next question, however, is the extent to which we can afford to assist another friendly nation fighting against Germany without robbing ourselves of defenses we may need now or later in that process. That is a question of judgment, partly a question of military judgment, partly a question of economic judgment, and so forth. It is a question of judgment. I for one remain to be convinced that our Government displays a policy in that matter sufficiently clear cut to enable us to play with that dangerous semiwarfare without getting involved actively in European war.

The second question of judgment and necessity is this: To what extent is it necessary to give up our democratic forms and procedures of government in order to strengthen our own defense? As I tried to point out in my document, I do not see that very much evidence has been produced by the supporters of the bill as to why the successful prosecution of our defense program makes necessary this perfectly extraordinary grant of powers which I am told by several authorities places more power in the hands of one man in this country than is in the hands of Mr. Churchill or any single member of the British Government. If they have not yet found it necessary, in their extraordinary coping with their emergency, to do it, then I wonder if our emergency is any greater.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, naturally, there would be a difference as to the acuteness of the emergency. I do not think there would be any difference of viewpoint on the extent of our aid; that is to say, a limit upon that aid. Certainly it should not interfere with the actual, or what I might say the irreducible, minimum of our own national defense efforts.

Dr. VALENTINE. I am very glad to hear you say that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly; and I do not think you mean to say that everyone who supports this bill intends to go into war.

Dr. VALENTINE. No, sir. I do not think I said that. I said "many."

The CHAIRMAN. You did not say that.

Dr. VALENTINE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally, have you any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. I shall not take up much time, Mr. Chairman. Doctor, you supported the repeal of the arms-embargo bill, I suppose, last year?

Dr. VALENTINE. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You were against that?

Dr. VALENTINE. I took no position directly on that issue.

Senator CONNALLY. What was your position? You had a position, did you not?

Dr. VALENTINE. With regard to that issue then?

Senator CONNALLY. Yes.

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes; I had a position.

Senator CONNALLY. What was it?

Dr. VALENTINE. It was that that matter should be discussed so that every point of view would be presented in the House and the Senate in order that democratic procedure should be preserved.

Senator CONNALLY. It was thoroughly discussed.

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes, sir. For some time I was not sure it would be.

Senator CONNALLY. But it was, and after a thorough discussion what was your attitude?

Dr. VALENTINE. My attitude was one of hopeful waiting to see what would happen.

Senator CONNALLY. Did you not have a view on it? Were you for or against it or neutral?

Dr. VALENTINE. My attitude was one of hopeful and optimistic waiting.

Senator CONNALLY. Are you still waiting?

Dr. VALENTINE. I am watching what is happening, but what I mean is that I cannot say to all questions "Yes" or "No."

Senator CONNALLY. You are here advising us how to vote. If you had been in Congress a year ago, when we had the Neutrality Act up for action, and after all the discussion, you would have had to vote or duck. What is your view? If you have not a view, all right.

Dr. VALENTINE. If I may say so, the reason why I am here now is that I feel so strongly on this issue. I was not here then, nor did I come down to present my view, because my opinion was not wholly formed. I felt very strongly that the democratic procedure should be preserved. It was. My opinion, once the bill had been passed, as to whether it was wise or not, was one of suspended judgment. I think my attitude toward that is still one of suspended judgment.

Senator CONNALLY. After all that debate and free and full discussion—you are an educated man and the head of a great institution and a leader of opinion—you did not have any views?

Dr. VALENTINE. Certainly I had views, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. What are they? Did you favor the bill or were you against it?

Dr. VALENTINE. I favored democratic discussion of the bill.

Senator CONNALLY. We had that.

Dr. VALENTINE. Presenting every form of opinion.

Senator CONNALLY. You have admitted that we already had that, so you were satisfied on that.

Dr. VALENTINE. At the end of that time it looked to me as though the matter had been presented in conformity with democratic procedure. Meantime I was busy cultivating my own garden.

Senator CONNALLY. Your garden is in the big national garden.

Dr. VALENTINE. I have a little homework to do, too, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. The reason why I asked you that question is that in considering your views now, the weight to be attached to your views is somewhat dependent on your consideration and views of other public questions.

Dr. VALENTINE. That is true.

Senator CONNALLY. After full and complete democratic process and full and complete debate. Now, we had that when that bill was up, and after it was all over you did not know whether you were for or against it?

Dr. VALENTINE. I did not say that.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, were you?

Dr. VALENTINE. I said my attitude was one of suspended judgment.

Senator CONNALLY. That is no answer. As a professor and the head of a college, do you think that is an answer?

Dr. VALENTINE. As a professor and the head of a college, I am not going to be induced to make a flat "Yes" or "No" answer to a question on which I do not think I could give a "Yes" or "No" answer.

Senator CONNALLY. That is an answer. If you do not know where you are, you can say that.

Dr. VALENTINE. I know where I am. I wish I could make it clear to you.

Senator CONNALLY. I shall give you all day to do it. You say you know where you stand on the neutrality and arms embargo repeal. Where did you stand? You may not be able to make it clear to me, because I am dumb, but these other Senators are not dumb. Make it clear to them.

Dr. VALENTINE. If the committee would like to take the time, I shall try to explain that. It is a rather complicated matter.

Senator CONNALLY. I do not want to take too much time, but it seems to be complicated.

Dr. VALENTINE. I shall be glad to say that.

Senator CONNALLY. Can you say whether you favored the repeal of the arms embargo or whether you did not favor it?

Dr. VALENTINE. Not with "Yes" or "No." I can, perhaps, in 3 minutes.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, I shall be glad to give him the 3 minutes and take it out of my time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Doctor.

Dr. VALENTINE. I had been greatly interested in the discussions which had taken place in Congress and elsewhere for some years before the present emergency arose so strikingly. It seemed to me that at that time the Members of Congress and the Nation as a whole were studying how they could take advantage of the experience gained from the last war in protecting against involvement in another war if that war might come.

It seemed to me that discussions which took place in Congress at that time were upon a very high plane and were in an attitude of detachment and in a position of detachment, rather extraordinary for such discussions. In other words, no immediate crisis was before us. We were endeavoring to profit by our experiences of the past.

At that time Congress passed certain legislation to endeavor to protect us from involvement in a future war.

I felt that that was done in an unemotional period and consequently was likely to be sound logic. When the crisis increased, the emergency increased, and the question of the revision of that legislation came before us, it seemed to me that we were in a less detached and more emotional state as a nation than we were before.

The first question that faced me, therefore, was this: To what extent are we showing unwisdom because of increased emotion, or to what extent, on the other hand, is this an extremely unusual situation whereby we should pass special legislation removing that which we have done before in order to deal with that situation? In other words, have we learned from the past or have we not learned from the past? Is this an extraordinary situation which makes us overrule our experience of the past or not? That attitude I read in the approaching discussions on the bill.

From what I read in the newspapers, which is not always correct, I began to fear that that bill might be so hurriedly acted upon that the various points of view might not be adequately expressed in Congress and the press. It seemed to me that the preservation of democratic procedure at that point was extremely important.

I did not, therefore, advocate either one position or the other with regard to the bill. I did, however, advocate that there be full and frank and free discussion of that bill in Congress.

I read as much as I could of that discussion on both sides. When the bill was passed, my attitude was that whatever was done, probably a good thing had been done, but I am not sure, because I too may be emotional. Maybe our judgment was better a few years ago, when we passed the original legislation, and I am still not sure.

Perhaps as a professor or president I should be sure, but one of the things we try to teach our students is to suspend judgment and take a clear-cut position on a subject only when they form very definite opinions.

I am not trying to dodge your question, but I assume that answers the question. I hope it is satisfactory.

Senator CONNALLY. I thank you for making it very, very, very clear. I think even I understand it.

Now, on page 2 of your formal statement, to which I did not have the pleasure of listening when you read it, you say, at the end of the first paragraph:

We should help Britain; yes; but only to the extent that such help does not weaken our own self-defense.

That is your view, is it not?

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes, sir; that is my view.

Senator CONNALLY. What kind of help would that be? How far do you think we should go?

Dr. VALENTINE. I think, before you came in, I stressed at the beginning, and I said informally, that I do not regard myself as a military expert or as a strategist. I feel that those in our Government are extremely well qualified to make those decisions. I do not feel that there is a single person in our Government in whom I would want to entrust that whole authority for a decision for the Nation, regardless of how competent that person may be.

I have not yet had light thrown on the subject, from what I have read in the newspapers, as to what precisely the opinions of our greatest experts in that matter are.

Senator CONNALLY. I am not talking about the experts. I am talking about your views. You say we should help Britain, but only to the extent that such help does not weaken our own defense. Do you mean you favor loans to Britain?

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes, sir; loans or gifts.

Senator CONNALLY. Loans or gifts of money alone, or would you favor giving them weapons or arms or ships or munitions?

Dr. VALENTINE. One seems to me the same as the other. One is translated into the other.

Senator CONNALLY. You are in favor of helping Britain by giving her arms or munitions or money, whichever she needs the most?

Dr. VALENTINE. Under the reservation that I tried to state in this statement.

Senator CONNALLY. What is the reservation?

Dr. VALENTINE. I have tried to state it in this entire document. I cannot give you a "Yes" or "No" answer to that, either.

Senator CONNALLY. If this bill had an amendment, which I understand the House may put in the bill, to the effect that arms and supplies shall not be supplied except upon the certification of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff that they can be spared and that they will not impair our national defense, would you be in favor of giving them those arms and munitions?

Dr. VALENTINE. I would regard such a reservation as an improvement in the bill. I would not be happy about the bill as a whole.

Senator CONNALLY. You said you would leave it to the experts. You admit that the Chief of Staff is supposed to be a military expert?

Dr. VALENTINE. Very much so.

Senator CONNALLY. If you were going to entrust a military problem to anybody, you would entrust it to the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War?

Dr. VALENTINE. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. You say you are in favor of sending them arms, munitions, and supplies if it does not weaken our national defense?

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. And if the man in charge of national defense says it won't, would you still say you do not want to send them?

Dr. VALENTINE. I said in such matters I would prefer not to have that decision rest in the hands of any one individual, particularly if that one individual is a subordinate in our Army of some other individual and is naturally affected by his opinions.

Senator CONNALLY. Will you point out somebody to whom you would entrust it?

Dr. VALENTINE. I have tried to point out that I would not want to entrust it to any one person.

Senator CONNALLY. I give you a dozen people. Pick them out.

Dr. VALENTINE. I think both the House and the Senate have or can have committees which would be highly competent to work with our military authorities in such a matter.

Senator CONNALLY. You would trust, then, a committee of the House and Senate?

Dr. VALENTINE. I would.

Senator CONNALLY. If they said it was not going to hurt our national defense, you would say, "Send them arms, munitions, supplies, ships, and everything we can spare to Britain"?

Dr. VALENTINE. To whatever extent they come within the reservation I have tried to state, to start with.

Senator CONNALLY. I have named the reservation: If in the view of this committee it would not hurt the national defense. Is that your reservation?

Dr. VALENTINE. On that point, with regard to sending planes to England, I would say so.

Senator CONNALLY. You are in favor of helping them. We have got down to that.

Dr. VALENTINE. I have stated that.

Senator CONNALLY. In naval matters there would be three persons who would have to come to an agreement: The Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, and the President. That

would not be only a single man. Would you trust them in naval matters?

Dr. VALENTINE. I would prefer to have a House and Senate committee.

Senatory CONNALLY. What committee would you trust?

Dr. VALENTINE. I think I would defer to your judgment on that. I would trust any committee which the House and the Senate considered competent.

Senator CONNALLY. I thank you very much. I think it is a great compliment to us that you would not trust the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy or the President, but that you would trust a committee of Congress. I congratulate you. You are one man who appreciates the Congress.

Dr. VALENTINE. I thank you for thanking me.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, I think I had better stop there.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question. I was late and I did not hear all of the statement made by Dr. Valentine. I have been trying to glance over his formal statement here.

I see that on page 2, talking about the supporters of this bill, he stated:

The real question is how, when, and where we can best make our defense effective. On that question I do not impugn the motives of those who support this bill. Most of them sincerely believe that America's best defense lies in defending England, at no matter what cost.

Later on you have underscored that price on the same page.

You disclaim any intention of impugning the motives of those who support the bill, but you say they are willing to help England at no matter what cost. What do you mean by that phrase?

Dr. VALENTINE. I have acquaintances and friends who, whether they have appeared before this committee or not, are ardent supporters of this bill. They have certainly been ardent supporters of the committee which used to be called the White Committee for the Defense of England.

In personal conversations with them, in order to derive their point of view, I found that four out of five or five out of six of those persons with whom I have conversed, and one or two definite leaders of that group, at least privately feel—and I cannot give you their names, because it is a matter of confidence—that in the last analysis England must be supported by us, at no matter what cost to us, in our own interests, and they mean well by it.

Senator BARKLEY. How many such people have you talked to?

Dr. VALENTINE. Perhaps 20.

Senator BARKLEY. So that from those 20, 5 out of 6 of whom you think want us to help England no matter at what cost, which is a very indefinite and confidential qualification, you say that everybody else who is supporting this bill, including the President and those Members of Congress who vote for it and everybody else in the United States among the 130,000,000 are definitely, in your opinion, supporting this because they want to help England, no matter at what cost, which would mean not only financially but economically and morally and spiritually, which would, of course, comprehend a declaration of war and our active entry into the war and everything else, without regard to the cost, if that would help England.

Is that your view of the supporters of this bill?

Dr. VALENTINE. I think that we all feel that the national polls, such as the Gallup poll, are interesting and that they indicate a somewhat productive and somewhat valid sampling of public opinion. That system, of course, is based upon a sampling of public opinion. I can only say that my own sampling in this matter has given me an opinion, and I admit it is an opinion rather than fact, that a good many, and I think most, taking the eastern area, in which I operate, as a testing ground, of those who support this bill are consciously or unconsciously feeling that England should be defended at no matter what cost to us.

Senator BARKLEY. Has the Gallup poll submitted any questions to the American people along the line you have suggested: "Are you in favor of helping England at no matter what cost?"

Dr. VALENTINE. Not that I am aware of. I am simply pointing out that the method of the Gallup poll, which is a sampling of public opinion, is indicative. My own method is a sampling method, assuming, of course—I can only assume—that it is indicative of a large number.

Senator BARKLEY. Further on in your statement on page 2, you say:

Those who support this bill have done their utmost, by every form of propaganda, to convince you and the American people that, at whatever cost to America—

Still underscored by you—

Britain must be aided to whatever extent is necessary to insure British victory.

You make no distinction there among those who support this bill.

You have made reference to the so-called William Allen White committee, with which I have no affiliation and of which I know no more than I know about the America First Committee or the Keep Us Out of War Committee or the propaganda organization at 17 Battery Place, New York, and other organizations that are indulging in propaganda; but I think that you covered entirely too much territory there when you say "Those who support this bill."

That means all of them. You do not say some of those who support it, you do not say a part of those, but you include everybody. You say that those who support this bill are trying, by all forms of propaganda, to convince the American people that this bill ought to pass and that we ought to get into war against Germany and do everything to aid England to win, regardless of the cost to the United States.

Do you think that is a fair statement?

Dr. VALENTINE. I think that is a very valid criticism that you have offered me, and I think that is a dangerous generalization, and I am sorry I phrased it so that it looks like all who support the bill are included. I became convinced that a large number, a larger number than you and I realize, feels that that is the ultimate position. But I think you have pointed out a valid criticism. I should not have stated it that way. I tried to make it as brief as possible in a generalization, and I should not have done it that way.

Senator BARKLEY. You say, "They have played upon our emotions"—still talking about those who support this bill—"noble emotions like the support of a courageous friend, and low emotions like fear."

You are still talking about the supporters of this bill. [Reading.]

They have tried to convince a peace-loving people that attack is imminent. Although many of them use the phrase "aid short of war," any intelligent person knows that the aid they recommend will lead to war.

In other words, according to your definition of intelligence, all of those people who support this bill, partly because they think it will keep us out of war, are not intelligent and they are not qualified to pass on the subject, because you have put all intelligent persons in the category of those who believe it will lead to war.

Dr. VALENTINE. This is my opinion. It is opinion and not fact.

Senator BARKLEY. You do not state it as opinion. You state it as a fact that all intelligent people know it will lead to war.

Dr. VALENTINE. I think I stated, before you came in, that it is opinion, not fact, and I will stick by it.

Senator BARKLEY. You qualify it by saying it is not a fact, but is your opinion. Is it still your opinion that everybody, including the President of the United States who has recommended this bill, and including the Members of Congress, and including me, having introduced this bill, knows, if we are intelligent people, that this bill is going to lead to war and that we are undertaking to impress upon a peace-loving nation that an attack is imminent in order to pass this bill? If you think that, I think your testimony is of no value and has made no contribution whatever to this hearing.

Senator JOHNSON of California. A comment of that sort is utterly improper.

Senator BARKLEY. I do not ask the Senator from California to pass on the propriety of my comment. When a witness comes here and accuses me and everybody else in such a manner, I am going to comment on him.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I am going to comment upon the Senator's statement here.

Senator BARKLEY. All right. You may comment to your heart's content.

Senator JOHNSON of California. All right. I will do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green, did you wish to ask questions?

Senator GREEN. At the conclusion of Senator Connally's questioning he asked you whether you are willing to abide by the decision of some committee of Congress, or did you volunteer that? I think you volunteered it and that Senator Connally congratulated Congress for having competence. That was the nature of the colloquy, was it not?

Dr. VALENTINE. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. I think you said you would be willing to abide by the decisions of any committee of Congress, and he asked you what committee. I want to ask whether that includes the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate. If they should decide that the passage of this bill was in the interest of the defense of this country, would you include them?

Dr. VALENTINE. I think I can make my statement perhaps more clear on that. My fundamental objection is to placing such a question of extremely important judgment in the hands of any one individual.

In many respects I have a very great respect—and I hope this won't seem humorous to any of you—for our President, our Vice

President, Members of the Senate, Members of the House, and so forth.

It seems to me a very dangerous policy to place so much authority and such great power of judgment in the hands of any one man, or in the hands of one man and a group of men who are in a literal sense subordinates, whether in the Army or the Cabinet, because they naturally feel loyal to him. Therefore, I feel there should be some form of check upon the decisions of one man, or one man and what amounts to—and I hope I am not using indiscreet or undiplomatic language—his advisors or subordinates.

It would seem to me that that form of advice falls appropriately on Members of the Senate and the House, who in a real sense are the accredited representatives of the people.

With regard to your second question as to whether or not I would gladly leave the decision in such matters to this committee, why not leave this decision to them? This decision is left to them and you are proceeding in a wholly parliamentary and democratic way.

If this bill is acted on in a way not satisfactory to me, I shall certainly defer to the democratic procedure of this committee.

However, I do feel that there is a difference between a grant by this committee, if this committee approves it and it goes on to the House and the Senate, of all-inclusive general powers as outlined in this bill and the individual approval of individual acts which brings it back for check by a committee by the exercise of some democratic procedure, rather than a long-term grant to do what he would please.

Senator GREEN. But if the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House and the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate should decide that, in their opinion, this was desirable from the point of view of the defense of this country, would you claim that they were unintelligent and not defer your own private views to theirs, democratic procedure, on which you lay stress, having been followed?

Dr. VALENTINE. No, sir. I might personally happen to differ with the judgment of this committee as a whole, and, of course, I might be quite wrong. If this committee came to a certain conclusion and made a decision with which I disagreed, it would hardly be fair or wise or courteous to call them unintelligent. Certainly not. I would feel that they knew much more about it than I did and would hope that they had been rightly guided to their decision.

Senator GREEN. Then, you modify your original statement somewhat as to the lack of intelligence on the part of those who differed with you?

Dr. VALENTINE. My difficulty was that in the beginning of that sentence I made too broad a generalization. I would modify that to "many who support this bill," and I told the Senator, when he first raised the point, that I regarded that as being a generalization that was too broad. I said I tried to compress a great deal in a short time so as not to take the time of the committee. I compressed it too much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes, have you any questions?

Senator BYRNES. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White?

Senator WHITE. In answer to a question, did you make some reference to convoying ships under the authority of this bill?

Dr. VALENTINE. Not with direct reference to this bill. Someone asked me what I would regard as dangerous acts which might lead us toward war.

Senator WHITE. Did you refer to the authority given by this bill?

Dr. VALENTINE. No.

Senator WHITE. I misunderstood you.

Dr. VALENTINE. I am not aware whether that authority is or is not granted by that bill. I have studied it very carefully, and in some respects I find it a little difficult to make out precisely the meaning of the words.

Senator WHITE. Would you point out the language in the bill which you think might grant that authority?

Dr. VALENTINE. It seems to me that the bill divides itself roughly into three very important parts. The first part is concerned with manufacture, which gives extremely broad powers, as I interpret it, to the President. The second is concerned with the exchange or leasing or sending of defense articles to England or to any foreign country which the President may select. However, section 9 permits the promulgation of rules and regulations which may be proper and necessary to carry out this act, which seems to me to open up a very wide variety of opportunities.

Senator WHITE. I am asking your opinion in order to aid me in an understanding of the legislation, but I think that authority in section 9 would be limited to the making of rules and regulations carrying out the specific powers that are granted in the bill and that it did not extend beyond implementing the precise powers that are given by the bill. Now, do you have a different understanding of that section 9?

Dr. VALENTINE. I think that is correct, but it seems to me that that still leaves a great deal undefined as to how far that implementation may go, because the bill itself is broad. For instance, paragraph (5) under section 3 allows him: "To release for export any defense article to any such government."

Included in "defense articles" are any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, machinery, boats, and so forth.

Senator WHITE. Do you suggest that subparagraph (5), which reads, "To release for export any defense article to any such government," gives the power to convoy, with our warships, merchant vessels of our own or of other nations? Do you think it could be stretched to include that power of convoy?

Dr. VALENTINE. I have not had a legal training. I am not in the habit of reading bills.

Senator WHITE. Perhaps you are better able to judge the meaning of words.

Dr. VALENTINE. If these words mean what I think they mean, what they normally mean in English, it seems to me this bill gives a very extraordinary grant of powers to the President all along the line; but the language is of a vagueness which makes it difficult for me, when I discuss it with other people, as to the precise meaning of the bill, to get any meaning from that as to how far the powers go.

Senator WHITE. I agree that there are ample powers given to the President by this bill, but I thought there was a public interpretation which goes far beyond the grant actually given by this bill, and I think there is in the public mind a very general belief that this gives the

power to convoy, with out warships, either our own merchant vessels or those of other countries. I confess I have not been able to find in the bill any authority for such an act.

Dr. VALENTINE. I find no such specific authority, but I remain with a general concern. I can only say that when I read the bill carefully for the first time my reaction was the opposite. I felt that it authorized more general powers than I had been aware of simply as a reader of newspapers up to that time.

Senator WHITE. Of course, there are powers which may be found in the Neutrality Act and other legislation that we do not know of, but I have been under the impression that some of the powers which have been talked about, and specifically this power of convoy, which it is said has been given or will be given by the bill, are not given by the bill.

Dr. VALENTINE. I think that Senator La Follette did not ask me with regard to the bill, but asked me what acts on the part of America would lead us into danger of bringing us into war and I mentioned that as one of them.

Senator WHITE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

If not, Doctor, you may be excused. The committee thanks you for coming here.

Dr. VALENTINE. May I thank you, sir, and all of you, for this opportunity to present a point of view, and for your courtesy in hearing it.

STATEMENT OF JAMES S. KEMPER, PRESIDENT, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kemper, you are president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is your place of residence?

Mr. KEMPER. Winnetka, Ill.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Kemper.

Mr. KEMPER. I appreciate the cordial invitation extended by your distinguished chairman, Senator George, to appear before your committee in connection with your consideration of Senate bill 275. I accepted the invitation in the hope that I might be able to contribute something to your consideration of what probably is the most important measure ever presented to the Congress.

I should like to say, in the beginning, that, as president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, I should and shall confine my remarks to policies adopted by the chamber.

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States is a federation of State and local chambers of commerce and trade and industrial associations, numbering fifteen hundred and sixty-three. These constituent members of the chamber have a membership of some seven hundred thousand individuals, firms, and corporations.

Chamber policies are determined by the membership. Thereafter, the board of directors and officers are charged with the responsibility of making those policies effective.

For many years the chamber has stood for adequate national defense. It has believed that America should be made impregnable against attack by any foreign power or combination of powers.

Since 1933 we have had a national-defense committee, devoting itself entirely to the consideration of this important national question. It has been our privilege to have as exofficio members of that committee high ranking officers of the Army and the Navy. The relationship between the members of our committee and the officers of the two services has been most cordial.

While believing in full defense, the chamber has taken these positions: First, that every effort should be made to prevent the involvement of this country in any foreign war; and, second, that, contrary to some challenges that have been made in the past, business not only does not embrace war as an opportunity for profit, but definitely is opposed to profiteering on the manufacture of war material.

At its meeting in September 1939 the board of directors called attention to its long-time position in support of all efforts for the preservation of peace.

I should like to read the last two paragraphs of that statement:

The American people desire above all things the maintenance of a just peace both at home and abroad. The Congress, as the representative body of the American people with the sole power to declare war, should by law and resolution emphasize its determination to keep the United States free of foreign entanglements and out of war unless our own Nation should be attacked.

In the final analysis, an America at peace will endure as the great stronghold of representative democratic government in a world torn with dissension and distraught with suffering. As such, it undoubtedly could play a potent part in the solution of the world problems that will follow in the wake of this war.

At the annual meeting of the chamber in May, 1940 the members again expressed themselves on the subject. I include the full statement as a part of this document, but at this time quote briefly from the declaration, as follows [reading]:

The most important question in the United States today is national defense.

* * * * *

Our Government must be prepared to defend our country and our people against any aggressor.

As representative of all of our people, and with the sole power to declare war, Congress should reaffirm its determination to keep the United States out of war, unless our Nation is endangered.

The bill now before your committee was carefully studied and analyzed by the national policy council of the chamber. Thereafter its recommendations were presented to the board of directors, which, without a dissenting vote, expressed the conviction that the enactment of this legislation would not contribute to the defense of the United States and that under the circumstances the bill should not, in its present form at least, become the law of the land.

The board, also without a dissenting vote, and subject to certain expressed limitations, favored the enactment by Congress, after full hearing and debate, of laws designed to accomplish the following [reading]:

(1) To sell, lease, or give such military properties as now or hereafter may belong to the United States, as may have the express approval either of the Congress or any bipartisan committee thereof, to the British Empire and other democracies now or hereafter fighting aggressors, without committing any recognized act of war.

(2) To give the British Empire and other democracies defending themselves from aggressor nations such credit or cash as the Congress may specifically approve.

(3) To give to such democracies such further and additional aid as may be possible, consistent with our own defense requirements, subject to the following express limitations:

(a) That in so doing no recognized act of war be committed;

(b) That no ship owned by the United States or flying its flag be sent into the war zone as defined by the Neutrality Act, except with the prior express approval of the Congress;

(c) That no soldiers, sailors, or other representative of the armed forces of the United States other than high ranking officers be sent into the war zone, except with the prior approval of the Congress.

Among the several objections recorded by the board to the enactment of S. 275 are the following:

(a) The President is specifically excluded from the restraining influence of any law;

(b) The President can, without the knowledge of the Congress, and over the objection of our Army, Naval, and Air experts, deliver not only to the British Empire but to other unnamed countries, all or a part of our Navy, all or a part of our airplanes, all or a part of our tanks, guns and other military equipment;

(c) While the bill is not clear in this respect, it is fairly debatable whether the President can, regardless of law, seize the private property of a military character, or susceptible of military uses, of any individual, firm, or corporation, regardless of the wishes and welfare of the owner, regardless of the knowledge of the Congress, and regardless of the views of our own military experts, and turn such properties over to unnamed countries;

(d) The President can spend public funds or incur, or have incurred, on behalf of the Government of the United States financial obligations not limited in amount, not only without the consent but without the prior knowledge of the Congress;

(e) The vast powers proposed to be vested in the President, whoever he may be, by this bill have no limit as to time.

Commenting upon the legislation recommended and the limitations proposed and also with reference to the objections to this legislation, the board made the following statement:

This proposed lend-lease bill would confer upon the Chief Executive such powers as have never heretofore been granted to any President, even when the country was at war. We are not at war, and without doubt the earnest wish of the vast majority of the people is to keep this country out of war. This bill, if enacted into law, by the very power it proposes to grant, creates the possibility of this nation entering into this war without further action by the Congress.

Such sweeping powers to the Chief Executive are unnecessary and unwise. Congress constantly in session and alert to the necessities of the Nation can promptly enact laws to meet any situation not taken care of in the recommendations herein first provided.

As Americans, our first concern should be for America; to insure that it is protected and defended, to keep it at peace, and especially to preserve the freedom of individuals.

This bill should be viewed dispassionately and calmly in the light of our national necessities; and whatever law, or laws, the Congress in its wisdom may enact on this and related subjects should be after full and free discussion, with the Congress as the direct representative of the people of this country neither abdicating its constitutional powers nor shirking its constitutional responsibilities.

The whole situation can be summarized briefly by repeating that, in the opinion of the board of directors of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, this legislation is not necessary for the defense of America. If certain things should be done in the interest of national defense, for which legislation has not previously been enacted, it is the opinion of the chamber that such legislation should be specific with respect to each particular subject proposed that is not now authorized by law.

The Congress is in session. Our view last year was that it should remain in session then, and we adhere to that view now. In our opinion, this is a time of all times when the Congress should function in accordance with its constitutional powers and its constitutional obligations to the citizens of America.

The following is a resolution adopted at the Twenty-eighth Annual Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States at Washington, D. C., May 2, 1940.

National defense: The most important question in the United States today is national defense. Events across both oceans indicate that no unprepared nation, however peaceful its people, has any assurance of security. We have seen inadequately prepared nations invaded and their defenseless cities bombed. Our defense today is inadequate.

Our Government must be prepared to defend our country and our people against any aggressor. Adequate armament for national safety must be our first concern. We commend the steps thus far taken to strengthen the Army, the Navy and the air forces. We urge that further armament be expedited. We must have an army of adequate size and training provided with the most modern arms and equipment, a navy sufficient to protect the interests of the United States, and an air force with superior personnel and equipped with planes of the latest types.

The National Guard and all other branches of defense should be adequately trained and completely equipped. Businessmen are urged to cooperate in this training by granting leave with pay to men in the National Guard while in training. The availability of trained men and the best of material for defense must be assured.

Financial preparedness is just as necessary as military preparedness. Only if we are strong financially can we expect to carry the burden of any prolonged struggle. Unbalanced budgets and further increases in the public debt can not continue if we are to retain the financial strength necessary for any proper defense. We should carry our national defense on a pay-as-we-go basis. We believe that substantial economies can be effected in the operations of the Government and that such economies should be made at once in the interest of national safety. With these economies we believe that any additional burden necessary for our safety will be assumed readily by businessmen and all other citizens.

We are a peaceful nation. The national chamber has long voiced its opposition to war, its support of the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations, and the importance of the limitation of armaments. But under present world conditions we must be prepared to defend our country—prepared with a defense of such strength that any potential aggressor, however powerful and ambitious, will be fearful to attack us.

It is imperative that preparations go forward promptly and speedily to protect our people and our country that we may continue to live a free people. Congress should discharge fully its responsibilities as to the national defense which we are so strongly urging. As representative of all of our people, and with the sole power to declare war, Congress should reaffirm its determination to keep the United States out of war unless our Nation is endangered.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally, have you any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Kemper, I understand you are appearing this morning, of course, purely in your representative capacity and not expressing your individual view?

Mr. KEMPER. That is absolutely correct.

Senator CONNALLY. These resolutions that you quoted were passed by the board of directors of the United States Chamber of Commerce?

Mr. KEMPER. And the membership.

Senator CONNALLY. I thought you said that after the membership elected the board the board functioned for the membership.

Mr. KEMPER. No; I am sorry, Senator. Perhaps my language was not very clear. The members decide the policy, and the board's job and the officers' job is to make that policy effective. That is what I tried to say.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, did you conduct a referendum among your membership on those specific propositions?

Mr. KEMPER. We either do that or the members act on the amendment when they are assembled in annual meeting.

Senator CONNALLY. When were the resolutions adopted?

Mr. KEMPER. One was adopted at the annual meeting in May, and the statement based upon that was adopted by the board at a meeting held in January.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, that is what I am getting at. You have not had any annual meeting since May, have you?

Mr. KEMPER. That is correct.

Senator CONNALLY. This present bill was not pending at that time?

Mr. KEMPER. I do not think so.

Senator CONNALLY. All right. The board, then, recently undertook to interpret what the whole chamber did in May on the question of national defense. I see you have attached a copy of a resolution here which your full chamber adopted May 2, 1940, entitled "National Defense."

Now, in interpreting that resolution, the board and not the membership adopted these recent resolutions as to this particular bill; is that correct?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes; that is right.

Senator CONNALLY. So, after all, the membership has not passed on the question of the lend-lease bill.

Mr. KEMPER. Obviously. If we have not had a meeting, they could not.

Senator CONNALLY. I asked you, in the beginning of your statement, whether or not the board had adopted these resolutions and whether they were the view of the board. You said they were the view of the membership.

Mr. KEMPER. I will ask the secretary to read the record. I do not think I said that at all.

Senator CONNALLY. If you did not say that, I beg your pardon. I do not want to say you said something which you did not say, but that is the way I understood you to say it. What did you say?

Mr. KEMPER. Why don't you have the record read?

Senator CONNALLY. I thought we would save time by your repeating it.

Mr. KEMPER. Let the secretary read it.

Senator CONNALLY. When I began the cross-examination I thought the first question I asked was, Mr. Chairman, was he here in his representative capacity. And he said he was. And I asked him were the views that he expressed those of the board or those of his membership. I understood him to say that they were those of the membership.

If I was in error, I apologize.

Mr. KEMPER. I think you will find the statement perfectly clear as to just what was what.

(The following was read by the reporter:)

Senator CONNALLY. I thought you said that after the membership elected the board the board functioned for the membership.

Mr. KEMPER. No; I am sorry, Senator. Perhaps my language was not clear. The members decide the policy, and the board's job and the officers' job is to make that policy effective. That is what I tried to say.

Senator CONNALLY. Then I will ask you again this question: The resolutions as to this bill were passed by the board of directors, were they?

Mr. KEMPER. That is correct.

Senator CONNALLY. They were not submitted to the general membership?

Mr. KEMPER. That is correct.

Senator CONNALLY. So we will not have any dispute about that. How many members are there on the board of directors?

Mr. KEMPER. Fifty-six.

Senator CONNALLY. Have you a list of those directors?

Mr. KEMPER. I have it in the portfolio that I was going to bring this afternoon. I am sorry I am a little bit short-handed because of this 40 minutes' notice that I got, and I do not have it here.

Senator CONNALLY. Will you supply that?

Mr. KEMPER. I shall be very happy to do so.

Senator CONNALLY. When were these resolutions passed by the board? On what date were they passed?

Mr. KEMPER. January 24, I believe. It was a week ago Friday.

Senator CONNALLY. Where was the meeting of the board?

Mr. KEMPER. It was held in Chicago.

Senator CONNALLY. How many were present?

Mr. KEMPER. There were 38.

Senator CONNALLY. Out of how many?

Mr. KEMPER. There are 48 regular, and then there are some ex officio. There were 38 present, as I remember it. I should like to reserve the right to correct that, because, again, I haven't the document.

Senator CONNALLY. That will be all right. Was the board called for this specific purpose, or was it a regular meeting of the board?

Mr. KEMPER. I think that question has some implications that I do not particularly like.

Senator CONNALLY. What are the implications? I simply asked you a plain question. If you do not want to answer it, just don't answer it.

Mr. KEMPER. In the first place, the board was advised that the National Policy Council would consider this subject and that it would probably be before the board. I don't think there was in the notice for the board meeting specific reference to the fact that this matter would be up.

Senator CONNALLY. That National Council is a part of your organization?

Mr. KEMPER. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. You say there was knowledge that it was going to consider it?

Mr. KEMPER. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. Then you are not prepared to say that the board was called for the purpose of considering this matter?

Mr. KEMPER. I am not prepared to say that. That is correct. The date of this meeting was fixed last June.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, that explains it. You had other matters in addition to this, I assume?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes; I assume so.

Senator CONNALLY. You say in your objections here on page 5:

Among the several objections recorded by the board to the enactment of S. 275 are the following:

"The President is specifically excluded from the restraining influence of any law."

Will you take the bill and point out that particular clause that authorizes the President to do what he pleases without any law restraining him at all?

Mr. KEMPER. May I say first that this language is not my language but the language of the board.

Senator CONNALLY. I know; but you represent the board. You are representing the board here.

Mr. KEMPER. I shall endeavor to interpret it as well as I can. I assume that the background for that statement was the reference in the bill on page 2, line 14, the clause "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law."

Senator CONNALLY. After "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law" the bill then proceeds to say what the President can do, does it not?

Mr. KEMPER. How is that?

Senator CONNALLY. After "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law" the bill says the President may do these things? Isn't that true?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes. But there is some loose language.

Senator CONNALLY. All right. We will get to the loose language in just a moment.

Do you mean to say that predicated upon that, Mr. Kemper, that the President can do whatever he wants to do under this bill without the restraining influence of any law?

Mr. KEMPER. Well, the bill says, "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law." Would you like it better if they said "provisions" instead of "restraining influence"? I assume the provisions of the law might be a restraining influence under certain conditions?

Senator CONNALLY. I will read the language of section 3, on page 2:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

To do the things so enumerated in those five subsections—manufacture, sell, transfer, test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, communicate to any such government any defense information, and so forth.

Mr. KEMPER. Perhaps I could qualify the situation in your mind, if it is not clear, by saying that this relates to Senate bill 275.

Senator CONNALLY. That is what I am talking about.

Mr. KEMPER. So far as this bill is concerned, the interpretation very obviously was that in the opinion of the board the President is specifically excluded from the restraining influence of any other law, so far as this bill was concerned. This whole document relates to this bill and not to something that the President might do that is entirely outside of this bill.

Senator CONNALLY. This is the bill that we are talking about. You say the President is specifically excluded from the restraining influence

of any law. In other words, he could come and take your property without any compensation, could he?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't think that is a fair question. I think my answer is responsive, and properly responsive, to the question that you asked me before.

Senator CONNALLY. All right. If you don't want to answer it you don't have to.

Mr. KEMPER. I don't see any point to it.

Senator CONNALLY. You say "any law." This bill authorizes the President to do certain things.

Mr. KEMPER. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law.

Senator CONNALLY. Of any other existing law, of course.

Mr. KEMPER. Then, what are we talking about?

Senator CONNALLY. That is the case in connection with any new act that Congress passes; it becomes effective irrespective of any existing law, doesn't it?

Mr. KEMPER. Senator, I am not sure what you are trying to develop. I haven't any idea. I have tried to answer your question, but you keep rephrasing it differently. Why, I don't know.

Senator CONNALLY. The reason I have to rephrase it is because you do not answer it.

Mr. KEMPER. I have tried to.

Senator CONNALLY. All right. I don't want to get into any quarrel.

Mr. KEMPER. Perhaps Senator George will be good enough to tell me wherein my answer has not been responsive. I wished to be responsive.

Senator CONNALLY. Now we will get down to the next point.

Mr. KEMPER. Incidentally, Senator, I don't think I am on trial here either. I am trying to be helpful.

Senator CONNALLY. I am trying to help you.

Mr. KEMPER. That is very reassuring. Thank you.

Senator CONNALLY. It is sort of a mutual helpful arrangement.

Mr. KEMPER. That is fine.

Senator CONNALLY. But you have not given me much help yet.

Mr. KEMPER. I have done the best I could.

Senator CONNALLY. If you want to help, you would better get busy.

Now, let's go on with the first objection—The President is specifically excluded from the restraining influence of any law—

(b) The President can, without the knowledge of the Congress, and over the objection of our army, naval, and air experts, deliver not only to the British Empire but to other unnamed countries—

And so forth. I understand that in the House they are going to adopt an amendment to this measure providing that the President, in the exercise of any of these powers, shall consult or get the recommendation of the Army Chief of Staff or the Naval Chief of Operations.

Mr. KEMPER. Is that so? I did not know that. I thought the bill was still being debated.

Senator CONNALLY. It is.

Mr. KEMPER. I thought you said that it had been adopted?

Senator CONNALLY. Oh no. I said I understand the House is going to adopt it.

Mr. KEMPER. I misunderstood you, Senator.

Senator CONNALLY. If that kind of an amendment were adopted would that meet your objection?

Mr. KEMPER. I have not read the amendment, and I would prefer not to comment on it without reading it.

Senator CONNALLY. I shall be glad to submit it to you.

Mr. KEMPER. Thank you.

Senator CONNALLY. You say:

(c) While the bill is not clear in this respect, it is fairly debatable whether the President can, regardless of law, seize the private property of a military character, or susceptible of military uses, of any individual, firm or corporation, regardless of the wishes and welfare of the owner, regardless of the knowledge of Congress and regardless of the views of our own military experts, and turn such properties over to unnamed countries.

Is that the view of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States?

Mr. KEMPER. That was the opinion of the technical committee that studied the law.

Senator CONNALLY. I would like to have you take the bill and point out where there is anything that authorizes the President to seize the property of any citizen and to confiscate it.

Mr. KEMPER. You have some pretty loose language here, Senator. For instance, will you turn to page 2, section 3 (a), and tell me what you mean in line 20 by "or otherwise procure"?

Senator CONNALLY. It means just what it says—otherwise procure.

Mr. KEMPER. How might that be done?

Senator CONNALLY. He could buy it. The Constitution prohibits the Government from taking any private property without just compensation. You know that, don't you?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes, I do.

Senator CONNALLY. If he gets it he could buy it, or if he commands it, under existing laws he would have to pay for it. A jury would pass upon the value under condemnation proceedings in the Federal court.

Mr. KEMPER. I should be very happy if the lawyers on the board who are responsible for this were here to answer your questions.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you have a counsel for your Board?

Mr. KEMPER. They are directors.

Senator CONNALLY. Were they present at this meeting?

Mr. KEMPER. Oh, yes.

Senator CONNALLY. Had they read the bill?

Mr. KEMPER. I should hope so.

Senator CONNALLY. I hope so too. Would you mind putting into the record the names of the eminent lawyers who are on the board who sanctioned this?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't know whether I should do that without their permission.

Senator CONNALLY. All right. I thought by the use of the word "eminent" they would not mind having their names associated with it.

Well, that is not true—just for your own information. If you have lawyers out there for the chamber of commerce advising you that that is the law, that is, in your section (c), I think you should examine it a little further or get some new counsel.

Mr. KEMPER. That is reassuring, anyway.

Senator CONNALLY. You say in (d)—

The President can spend public funds or incur, or have incurred, on behalf of the Government of the United States financial obligations not limited in amount, not only without the consent, but without the prior knowledge of the Congress.

Do you stand on that statement?

Mr. KEMPER. That falls in the same category as the others.

Senator CONNALLY. No; it does not. It is different.

Mr. KEMPER. I mean from the standpoint of the origin of it.

Senator CONNALLY. Point out in the bill where it does that.

Mr. KEMPER. The President is authorized, for instance, to dispose of any defense article.

Senator CONNALLY. Now, wait a minute. We are talking about public funds now. You said "public funds."

Mr. KEMPER. All right. I raise the question as to whether money is not more or less an important item of defense.

Senator CONNALLY. It is. That is what I am talking about. You say the President can spend public funds.

Mr. KEMPER. I don't know what this "article of defense" means. After you name everything you say "article of defense" or "defense article." That might be money. It seems to be a pretty important article of defense.

Senator CONNALLY. All right; include money. Now, where does it say he can spend "not limited in amount," without the action or knowledge of Congress?

Mr. KEMPER. As I understand the technical set-up here, the authority in this bill to disregard existing laws probably would permit him to disregard the provision—I think I have it here some place. It is title 31, section 665 of the code, which specifically prohibits the involvement of the Government in contracts in excess of appropriations, except as expressly allowed.

In other words, if this "notwithstanding any other law" is applicable—and it seems to be applicable to the whole shooting match, then under this bill the Government could be involved in obligations to an unlimited extent.

Senator CONNALLY. You are analyzing an existing law. Turn over to page 4 of this bill and look at section 6.

Mr. KEMPER. On what page, Senator?

Senator CONNALLY. Page 4 of the bill. Now read that and tell us what it means?

Mr. KEMPER. Read what?

Senator CONNALLY. Read section 6 (a). "There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time—"

Mr. KEMPER. Well, that is all right.

Senator CONNALLY. That is all right.

Mr. KEMPER. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. Fine. Now, don't you know that under that section 6 (a),

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.

Don't you know that under that the President cannot take a dollar out of the United States Treasury until Congress, irrespective of this law, comes along and appropriates that money?

Mr. KEMPER. There are a lot of ways of "beating the devil around the bush."

Senator CONNALLY. There may be with the chamber of commerce, but not with the Congress.

Mr. KEMPER. Well, I am not so sure. That is fine. I hope it is true.

Senator CONNALLY. You have just read the law there where no contracts could be made unless they were first authorized, and you read something about appropriations, didn't you?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes. But you have a provision in here that "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law."

Senator CONNALLY. Notwithstanding, section 6 (a) controls that absolutely.

Mr. KEMPER. Do you think so?

Senator CONNALLY. What did we put it in there for, if it does not?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't know.

Senator CONNALLY. There is a lot you don't know.

Mr. KEMPER. I am doing the best I can. I am still not on trial.

Senator CONNALLY. I am asking you, Mr. Kemper, don't you know what that means and what is the purpose of it?

Mr. KEMPER. I might read it.

Senator CONNALLY. Sometimes it is necessary to do something more than read it. Go right ahead. Or will you accept my statement that that is the purpose of that particular section 6 (a) so far as public funds are concerned, that the President under this bill cannot spend a single dollar out of the Treasury until Congress appropriates it? I am just telling you that. You don't need to believe it.

Now, you say, "not limited in amount, not only without the consent, but without the prior knowledge of the Congress." Of course, that cannot be true if Congress has to know it before it appropriates and has to act.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I don't care to ask any further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, you came in late. Have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

Senator CONNALLY. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Connally.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not care to express your own private views, as I understand it.

Mr. KEMPER. That is correct. I prefer not to have any confusion.

Senator CONNALLY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper, have you any questions?

Senator CAPPER. Mr. Kemper, have you received any protests or objections expressing disapproval on the part of State or local chambers of commerce at the action taken by your board?

Mr. KEMPER. No, sir.

Senator CAPPER. You think that is generally the feeling of your organization?

Mr. KEMPER. I should assume so from the fact that the comments of the chambers and trade associations which are members are entirely favorable.

Senator CAPPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey, have you any questions?

Senator GUFFEY. Mr. Kemper, will you furnish this afternoon a list of the directors?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes.

Senator GUFFEY. And what chambers of commerce they represent?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes, sir.

Senator GUFFEY. And how many are on the board from Pennsylvania?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes.

Senator GUFFEY. I am getting a great many letters from the Pennsylvania Chambers of Commerce, and I should like to know who are on that board.

Mr. KEMPER. I shall be very glad to see that you get it, Senator Guffey.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. Mr. Kemper, I understand that you have 1,563 affiliated chambers in the country.

Mr. KEMPER. Yes; and trade and industrial associations.

Senator MURRAY. Have they directly passed upon this statement that you are making?

Mr. KEMPER. They either have or have not. Some of them have acted upon it, after they got it from us.

Senator MURRAY. Do they hold full meetings of their chambers to pass on actions of this character?

Mr. KEMPER. Sometimes they do; sometimes they do not. It depends upon the nature of their organization.

Senator MURRAY. It depends upon the nature of their organization?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes; and their bylaws and general procedure.

Senator MURRAY. Isn't it true that a great many of those affiliated chambers are controlled by corporations which have their headquarters in New York?

Mr. KEMPER. That is news to me, if it is so.

Senator MURRAY. Don't you know the practice of affiliated memberships in the local chambers?

Mr. KEMPER. I know that the local chambers have felt that they have lacked support from national organizations in many cases, and they have felt that they should have it. Your indication that they are getting it now to a higher degree than perhaps they are getting locally is news to me. I do not believe it is quite representative of the situation.

Senator MURRAY. You don't know that there is a practice of big corporations having multiple memberships in the local chambers, that control and dominate?

Mr. KEMPER. No; I do not know that.

Senator MURRAY. Don't you know it is the practice of the local chambers not to hold meetings; that everything is handled through the officers who are elected through the influence and control of these corporations?

Mr. KEMPER. I do not know that; and I don't believe it.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Kemper, I want to refer again to these four paragraphs on page 5 in your statement, concerning which you were quizzed by the distinguished Senator from Texas. I think I

would be forced to agree that in some aspects you may have taken in a little too much territory. But I am wondering if under examination the major premise which you submit is not justified.

Now, let's take paragraph (b)—

The President can, without the knowledge of the Congress, and over the objection of our Army, naval, and air experts, deliver not only to the British Empire but to other unnamed countries, all or a part of our Navy, all or a part of our airplanes, all or a part of our tanks, guns, and other military equipment.

Now, I do not believe it can be gainsaid but that that is literally possible under the terms of the bill as it stands. I think that is a fact.

The Senator from Texas asked you whether it would remove your objection if the bill is amended, as may be contemplated in the House, to require the President to consult with his Army and Navy chiefs before he did any of these things. Well, if he consulted with his Army and Navy chiefs it would not remove your objection that he can do it without the knowledge of Congress, would it?

Mr. KEMPER. It would not change that.

Senator VANDENBERG. Furthermore, what does consultation with Army and Navy chiefs do to assure a decision which does not override the objection of our Army and Navy and air experts? Are not the Army and Navy chiefs under the direct and complete command of the Commander in Chief himself? And I am not complaining about that, because they have to be. But since they are, even that consultation, or the provision for it, would not remove your objection, would it, that these things could be done over the objection of our Army, Navy and air experts?

Mr. KEMPER. It would not meet our view that the Congress should have something to say about it.

Senator VANDENBERG. Now we will go down to paragraph (d)—

The President can spend public funds or incur, or have incurred, on behalf of the Government of the United States financial obligations not limited in amount, not only without the consent, but without the prior knowledge of the Congress.

And your attention is drawn to section 6 of the bill, which requires appropriations by Congress in respect to future expenditures. But I call your attention to the fact that there is nothing in the bill which applies this restriction to any appropriations heretofore made, which include probably \$15,000,000,000 dollars of defense appropriations, and that there is nothing in this provision which includes any protection against the lending, leasing, or giving away of any equipment already in existence or thus far contracted for. And I am asking you whether that does not substantially sustain the statement, at least in respect to perhaps \$15,000,000,000 and the entire defense equipment of today, and whether that does not reasonably justify a complaint that this bill permits the President to spend public funds without the consent and prior knowledge of Congress.

Mr. KEMPER. I should think so, in large measure, at least.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. At the bottom of page 3 of your statement you say:

The board, also without a dissenting vote, and subject to certain expressed limitations, favored the enactment by Congress, after full hearing and debate, of laws designed to accomplish the following:

"(1) To sell, lease, or give such military properties as now or hereafter may belong to the United States as may have the express approval either of the Con-

gress or any bipartisan committee thereof, to the British Empire and other democracies now or hereafter fighting aggressors, without committing any recognized act of war."

Do you know exactly what your counsel would interpret that language to mean; that is, that Congress could itself set up a committee to perform executive and ministerial duties? Is it that Congress, each time an airplane or tank or batch of munitions were to be sold, leased, or given to England or to these other democracies, would have to specify and set out in the act just exactly what is being lent, or leased or given, and the terms under which it is to be done?

Mr. KEMPER. This does not suggest the whole Congress necessarily. It suggests a committee as a check. I think the feeling there was that as the matter stands the country has very little information as to what is being sent and what is being kept.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think that such widespread information should be disseminated with regard to that as not only would inform the people of our country of every detail but would also inform the enemy?

Mr. KEMPER. My guess is that the enemy probably knows more about it than the people of the country. And I don't think that is the way that it should be in a democracy.

Senator BARKLEY. You are guessing now. Do you know whether the enemy knows how many airplanes England is getting now?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't know.

Senator BARKLEY. You are still guessing. You have a suspicion that the enemy has agencies in this country that find out?

Mr. KEMPER. That is usually true in war. There is nothing unique about that.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think that Congress could usually function by absolutely selling itself the supplies that you mention there in subsection (1)?

Mr. KEMPER. I would take a chance on it.

Senator BARKLEY. You would rather risk Congress, in other words, than the President? That is your real attitude, isn't it?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes. I would rather have a check.

Senator BARKLEY. That is the real meat in your objection to this bill, and that of your organization?

Mr. KEMPER. No; I don't think that is entirely so. We do not think that the situation has gotten to the point where the Congress should abdicate and go home, or abdicate and stay here.

Senator BARKLEY. Nobody is abdicating and going home.

Mr. KEMPER. Or abdicate and stay here.

Senator BARKLEY. What do you call abdicating? Do you mean that when Congress provides that something shall be done, and that it is an executive matter and that somebody should do it, that that is abdicating?

Mr. KEMPER. The answer to that question would be misunderstood from the standpoint of our position here. I say our position is reasonable. I don't think that an answer to that question would assist any in making the position clear.

Senator BARKLEY. I myself doubt whether it would.

Now, No. 2: Your board passed a resolution recommending that Congress give the British Empire and other democracies defending themselves from aggressor nations such credit or cash as the Congress may specifically approve. In other words, under that recommenda-

tion you think that Congress ought to appropriate any given amount out of the Treasury as a gift or as a loan to the British Empire and others, and let them do it themselves?

Mr. KEMPER. I think that is a "when, if, and as" proposition.

Senator BARKLEY. What do you mean by a "when, if, and as" proposition?

Mr. KEMPER. The statement I think is reasonably clear. My thought is that aid to England is all right provided we do not deplete our own protective equipment more than we should.

Senator BARKLEY. When are you going to know whether we are?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't know.

Senator BARKLEY. Don't you have to trust those in charge of that equipment, the Army and the Navy of the United States?

Mr. KEMPER. Well, I would still like to know something about it.

Senator BARKLEY. All of us have curiosity. We would like to know a lot of things. But the question is, Mr. Kemper, is it wise for everything to be known in time of war regardless of our desire to know it; and how would you know anything more about it if you simply give England \$2,000,000,000 or \$3,000,000,000 than you would know if the President is authorized to exercise the authority to lend or lease specific articles?

Mr. KEMPER. Those are two different things, Senator.

Senator BARKLEY. I know they are two different things. But how would you know any more about what is going on and about the amount of supplies or the character of supplies that England, Greece, China, or any other country gets?

Mr. KEMPER. All that I am trying to say to you is that if I knew the picture I could give you a better answer.

Senator BARKLEY. I will not require you to draw the picture in order to give me a better answer.

Now—

To give to such democracies such further and additional aid as may be possible consistent with our own defense requirements, subject to the following express limitations:

"(a) That in so doing no recognized act of war be committed."

Are you in position, or is your board in position, or are your eminent lawyers on that board who have discussed the legal questions with you, Mr. Kemper, in position to advise this committee what is or what is not an act of war?

Mr. KEMPER. Well, I don't know that that is our job.

Senator BARKLEY. But you say you are willing to do certain things provided an act of war is not committed. It might be helpful if we got some idea as to what your board regards as an act of war.

Mr. KEMPER. I think the laws of the country should govern that.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think it is an act of war to sell an airplane or a warship or a tank to a belligerent?

Mr. KEMPER. By whom?

Senator BARKLEY. By the United States.

Mr. KEMPER. By the Government?

Senator BARKLEY. Yes.

Mr. KEMPER. I should say it was, under the Neutrality Act.

Senator BARKLEY. Then you would not want, under that paragraph 3, subsection (a), to do what you recommend up here in subsection (1), that is, to sell, lease, or give?

Mr. KEMPER. What are you talking about? Is it a situation after this legislation is enacted, or the present one?

Senator BARKLEY. I am talking about a situation after the legislation which you recommend here is enacted.

Mr. KEMPER. All right. That is another matter.

Senator BARKLEY. Would you recommend that Congress sell, lease, or give all of these things to Britain or to any other democracy defending itself? Don't you say you don't want us to do anything that is an act of war? You say what we would do under your No. 1 is an act of war.

Mr. KEMPER. No; I say under the present law, as I understand the present law, it would be an act of war.

Senator BARKLEY. It may be questionable whether it is or whether it is not.

Mr. KEMPER. Perhaps it is. I do not pose at all as an authority.

Senator BARKLEY. The Neutrality Act not only affects the Government of the United States but it affects all private industry of the country. They are prohibited from selling any of these things you have in mind here to any belligerent without the payment of cash, and the ships of our country are prohibited from carrying these things to a belligerent country through belligerent waters. This does not affect it in any way, and it would still remain the law if this bill passed. But would the law authorizing the Congress to lend or give these things away instead of the President, change the situation as to whether the selling or giving would be an act of war?

Mr. KEMPER. No; I should not think so.

Senator BARKLEY. Well, I agree to that.

Subsections (b) and (c) of your recommendations apply to the ships flying the flag of the United States. I realize that you are not a lawyer, Mr. Kemper, but you are here speaking for your organization. Do you think that Congress under the Constitution can pass any law that abridges the power of the President to control the Army and Navy as Commander in Chief?

Mr. KEMPER. I do not think I should be asked to answer that question.

Senator BARKLEY. You do not feel competent to answer a constitutional question?

Mr. KEMPER. No. I do not think I should attempt to.

Senator BARKLEY. I don't want to ask any further questions. In view of the general attitude of the United States Chamber of Commerce toward the acts of Congress in recent years it is refreshing to know that they have at last revised their views as to confidence in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White, have you any questions?

Senator WHITE. Mr. Kemper, your first major objection stated on page 5 is: "The President is specifically excluded from the restraining influence of any law." In answer to Senator Connally's question I think you said the justification for that statement of objection was found in section 3 (a) in the language "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law." Now, does that language mean any more than as we sometimes express it, that any provision of law in conflict with the act is repealed? Are you doing anything more by that language than repealing any provision of law which is in conflict with the provision of the law here?

Mr. KEMPER. What do you say?

Senator WHITE. I think it means expressly what I am now indicating, that it is not a blanket authority for the President to proceed anywhere and in any direction and to any extent he sees fit; but it does mean that we are repealing any provision of law which is in conflict with the express powers we are hereby granting, and it means nothing beyond that. That is my opinion about it.

In (b) you state as your second objection that the President can, without the knowledge of the Congress, and over the objection of our Army, naval, and air experts, deliver not only to the British Empire but to other unnamed countries, or to a foreign country, guns, planes, ships, and tanks. We have been doing that, haven't we?

Mr. KEMPER. I understood that the Government had not, except the trade they made for the destroyers.

Senator WHITE. We have turned over destroyers and we have turned over airplanes, haven't we?

Mr. KEMPER. The Government?

Senator WHITE. Yes.

Mr. KEMPER. I did not know that.

Senator WHITE. Let us assume for the moment that we have. I think the committee knows that we have turned over rifles—haven't we?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't think that is a matter of public record. I don't know that it is. Do you mean from Government arsenals directly to belligerents?

Senator WHITE. I don't know that I want to put into the record anything that has been stated in executive session, but I thought it was generally assumed that we have been aiding Britain by turning over various munitions of war, and that the Government had been doing it. I do not make that as an assertion. But if that is a fact, it has been done under some other provision of law. And this grants a new or additional power, doesn't it?

Mr. KEMPER. That is pretty much of a "round robin" question, Senator. If you know about these other things and can't disclose them, you put me into a rather difficult position to answer your question.

Senator WHITE. I will not pursue the question, because possibly I am infringing upon matters that are not public knowledge. I don't know whether I am or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further questions, Senator White?

Senator WHITE. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Just one question. Pursuing this one step further, or pursuing one step further the interrogations of the Senator from Maine, if those powers now exist to transfer to any other country any of our munitions, or ships, or supplies, upon any terms, there would be little need for this type of legislation, would there not?

Mr. KEMPER. I should certainly assume so.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye is not present.

Senator Pepper has now come in. Have you any questions?

Senator PEPPER. May I ask what is your profession?

Mr. KEMPER. Insurance.

Senator PEPPER. Where do you reside?

Mr. KEMPER. Winnetka, Ill.

Senator PEPPER. How long have you been president of the United States Chamber of Commerce?

Mr. KEMPER. Since last May.

Senator PEPPER. Had you been a member of the board of directors?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Have you been a member of their national-policy committee?

Mr. KEMPER. I have not.

Senator PEPPER. Have you been a member of their national-defense committee?

Mr. KEMPER. I have not, except as president. I am an ex officio member of all committees.

Senator PEPPER. Your chamber functions through resolutions by the board and through its various committees?

Mr. KEMPER. Or referenda.

Senator PEPPER. Now, looking at your statement, which I have read, although I did not have the good fortune to hear all of your testimony orally, I know that it is divided into certain statements which emanate from the membership itself and certain statements which comes from the committees of the chamber. That is true, isn't it?

Mr. KEMPER. From the board, not the committees.

Senator PEPPER. On page 2 you have the following language:

While believing in full defense, the chamber has taken these positions:

First. That every effort should be made to prevent the involvement of this country in any foreign war;

Second. That, contrary to some challenges that have been made in the past, business not only does not embrace war as an opportunity for profit, but definitely is opposed to profiteering on the manufacture of war material.

Do those sentiments emanate from the membership or the board of directors or from a committee?

Mr. KEMPER. All three.

Senator PEPPER. Do you know of any attitude on the part of the President of the United States that is contrary to the first proposition, that every effort should be made to prevent the involvement of this country in any foreign war?

Mr. KEMPER. Did I suggest that it was contrary to the views of the President of the United States?

Senator PEPPER. Will the reporter read the question, please?

(The last question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. KEMPER. No, sir. The President has repeatedly said that we would not send ships, or planes, or men; that our boys were going into training to make the country so strong that by that very fact the threat of war would be kept far away from our shores. I see no challenge here to the President.

Senator PEPPER. And you don't know of any action on the part of Congress or this committee that is contrary to that provision, do you?

Mr. KEMPER. No; I don't.

Senator PEPPER. The second proposition, that business not only does not embrace war as an opportunity for profit but definitely is opposed to profiteering on the manufacture of war material, must come as a very heartening statement from you to the people of the United States. What would you take to be the distinction between profit and profiteering in the mind of the president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, in speaking for that body?

Mr. KEMPER. I should say that profit is a reasonable profit, and profiteering is an excessive profit.

Senator PEPPER. What has been the consensus of business, as expressed to the United States Chamber of Commerce, as to what would be a fair profit for business engaged in the defense of America, Mr. Kemper, to charge for the work that it does to defend America?

Mr. KEMPER. There has been no expression on that point.

Senator PEPPER. Do you mean that there has been no discussion of the subject?

Mr. KEMPER. There may have been discussion, but there has been no formal action by the chamber or by the chamber's membership. I am not qualified to answer the question. You were not here when I started, but I made the point then in my testimony that I would have to limit myself to actions and policies of the chamber.

Senator PEPPER. As a citizen you have heard a lot of charges about profiteering by industry in the last war, have you not?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes; I have.

Senator PEPPER. And wasn't that one of the great abuses in the last war—business profiteering on the country's need and necessities?

Mr. KEMPER. Wasn't that what?

Senator PEPPER. Wasn't that one of the great abuses in the last war—business profiteering on the country's need and necessities? Was it or was it not?

Mr. KEMPER. I am not inclined to discuss that.

Senator PEPPER. Will you please answer the question "yes" or "no"?

Mr. KEMPER. I am not inclined to discuss that because there is no chamber policy on it. And that gets into the range of my personal views or recollection, and I would much prefer, if you please, not to go into that.

Senator PEPPER. You do not mean that the United States Chamber of Commerce is ignorant of the fact, Mr. Kemper, that business generally—well, I will not say business generally, but some business engaged in war work in the last war profiteered on their own country in a time of need?

Mr. KEMPER. I have already answered the question by the general observation that I would prefer not to go into it, Senator.

Senator PEPPER. What I am interested in is whether or not the Chamber of Commerce, speaking for the business of America, as I presume you are qualified to do and desire to do, has taken any steps to protect their country from profiteering in any other emergency which may confront their country.

Mr. KEMPER. I think the businessmen of America have cooperated whole-heartedly in the present defense program, without reference to profits and with the possibility of substantial losses.

Senator PEPPER. Have any additional firms, to your knowledge, offered to manufacture munitions at cost or at cost plus 1 percent profit?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't see what this has to do with the bill, Senator.

Senator PEPPER. Well, suppose I do. And if I ask you the question would you be willing to answer it?

Mr. KEMPER. Then I will just say that I am not going to answer it.

Senator PEPPER. That is your privilege. But you did not leave this subject out of your statement on page 2, did you?

Mr. KEMPER. I didn't what?

Senator PEPPER. But you did not leave this subject out of your statement on page 2, did you? You said on page 2—

Second: That, contrary to some challenges that have been made in the past, business not only does not embrace war as an opportunity for profit, but definitely is opposed to profiteering on the manufacture of war material.

Mr. KEMPER. I stand on that statement.

Senator PEPPER. And you lay down the standard of profit as distinguished from profiteering.

Mr. KEMPER. On any basis that anyone would agree is fair. I don't know what your object is. I don't see why you go back to question me again about the last war. I was not the president of the Chamber of Commerce then.

Senator PEPPER. I am very vitally concerned about what steps, if any, the United States Chamber of Commerce has taken to avoid a repetition of some of the scandals that occurred in the last war.

Mr. KEMPER. My guess is that you will find that business country-wide—I think also you will find the Defense Commission and the fellows in the service will tell you that every effort has been made to cooperate whole-heartedly without reference to profits, and at considerable inconvenience and with possible loss.

Senator PEPPER. Somehow that has not been one of the things that the United States Chamber of Commerce has considered within the proper scope of its effort to help the country in its time of crisis.

Mr. KEMPER. I would not say that at all. I don't think specific action has been taken.

Senator PEPPER. You say that they have done nothing to legislate on the subject?

Mr. KEMPER. No; because we do not think it has been necessary. If it appears to be necessary, then, Senator, we will act on it.

Senator PEPPER. At what point will it appear to be necessary?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't think it is going to be necessary, Senator.

Senator PEPPER. To legislate against profiteering?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't think there is going to be profiteering.

Senator PEPPER. You don't think any of the profits now being charged by business engaged in war work amounts to profiteering? It is all profits, you say?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't know. I have not examined the contracts. But I say that by and large business is doing a swell job; and that the people in the service and in the Defense Commission will testify to that. Why don't you ask them about that.

Senator PEPPER. And, so far as you know, business is being well paid for it in American money, isn't it?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't know.

Senator PEPPER. Business is being paid for what it does at the present time?

Mr. KEMPER. I should assume so. You can't meet wages with promises.

Senator PEPPER. And you can't meet profits, or you can't make profits with promises either.

Now, on page 2 you also make the statement:

The American people desire above all things the maintenance of a just peace both at home and abroad.

You don't know anything contrary to that that has been said or done by the President or by the Congress, do you?

Mr. KEMPER. I have not said that. The statement does not suggest it.

Senator PEPPER. I thought you came here to offer counsel, and perhaps you had seen something to indicate that counsel was advisable.

Mr. KEMPER. No; I came at the request of your chairman to contribute what I could, if anything, to your deliberations on this subject.

Senator PEPPER. At the bottom of page 3 appears the following:

The bill now before your committee was carefully studied and analyzed by the national policy council of the chamber. Thereafter, its recommendations were presented to the board of directors which, without a dissenting vote, expressed the conviction that the enactment of this legislation would not contribute to the defense of the United States and that, under the circumstances, the bill should not, in its present form at least, become the law of the land.

That is your statement, is it not?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Do you mean to tell this committee that in the solemn and careful determination by your national policy council and your board of directors that this bill would not contribute to the defense of the United States of America?

Mr. KEMPER. That is correct.

Senator PEPPER. Did you hear or did you read about the testimony of the Cabinet officers who came here and said that one of the great contributions of this bill would be to enable this country to buy time by helping England to hold out so that we can prepare?

Mr. KEMPER. May I suggest that perhaps the Senator has not read the entire report on page 4, where we suggest some other things?

Senator PEPPER. I have read the report; and I am asking you a question. You did not hear or did not read about the testimony of those Cabinet officers? If this bill should aid England to hold out longer, would it not contribute to the defense of America by giving us an opportunity to prepare ourselves?

Mr. KEMPER. From the discussion here and the questions of the Senator a little while ago, you are already giving England—I intimated, at least—everything you wish to. I don't think you need this bill to help England. I think you can legislate specifically on that subject.

Senator PEPPER. But the question is whether this bill will contribute.

Mr. KEMPER. As a matter of fact, there is no reference to England in the bill that I have found.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think the bill is designed to aid England?

Mr. KEMPER. I do not say that.

Senator PEPPER. You said there is no reference to England in the bill.

Mr. KEMPER. That is right.

Senator PEPPER. Do you doubt that the bill was intended, and is so phrased, to apply to England?

Mr. KEMPER. I think the bill is phrased so that it can apply to anyone anywhere, any country anywhere, at any time.

Senator PEPPER. Under all circumstances?

Mr. KEMPER. Well, provided it meets these two requirements—in the sole discretion of the President.

Senator PEPPER. Those provisos are limitations, are they not?

Mr. KEMPER. Do you think they are?

Senator PEPPER. I am asking you a question. Don't you think they are restrictions?

Mr. KEMPER. No, sir. You asked what do I think about it. It is a one-man proposition.

Senator PEPPER. I asked you a very simple question. In your opinion are those restrictive words, or are they not?

Mr. KEMPER. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Now then, Mr. Kemper, you still adhere, do you, to the statement that you made at the bottom of page 3, that this bill would not contribute to the defense of the United States?

Mr. KEMPER. That is right.

Senator PEPPER. If it did aid England to hold out, would that be a contribution to the defense of the United States, in your opinion?

Mr. KEMPER. Probably.

Senator PEPPER. Then, in that sense it would contribute to the defense of the United States, would it not?

Mr. KEMPER. And it might do a lot of other things. The bill is full of loose language under which you can do any number of things. As I say, there is no limitation to Britain.

Senator PEPPER. You mean it might do some good; but there are some bad features in it? Is that what you mean?

Mr. KEMPER. I don't care to add anything to the statement with respect to our views regarding the bill.

Senator PEPPER. The statement was that the bill would not contribute, that is, would not make any contribution to the defense of the United States. And you told us that that is the solemn decision of your board of directors and your national policy council of the United States Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. KEMPER. We do not think the bill is necessary to the defense of the United States.

Senator PEPPER. You did not say that. You said you do not think the bill would contribute or that it had any value to the defense of the United States of America. Now, I want to know if you adhere to that as the solemn statement of your board of directors and your national policy council.

Mr. KEMPER. Subject to the whole statement.

Senator PEPPER. You did not make any qualification in that statement.

Mr. KEMPER. Oh, yes; we did. Senator, I think you are being technical. We go ahead and express our views with respect to specific legislation that might be enacted, that is, on page 4. There is all of the help you need for England, we think.

Senator PEPPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes, have you any questions?

Senator BYRNES. No questions.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator Green.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Kemper, in respect to the action of the board or the chamber in stating that it is definitely opposed to profiteering in the manufacturing of war material, I would like to have some definite statement with reference to the action taken by the chamber in stating that it was definitely opposed to profiteering in the manufacture of war material. I would like to ask whether the chamber has

taken any action whatever on that matter except to express its pious attitude.

Mr. KEMPER. We have no powers of compulsion, Senator, upon our membership. Our powers are purely advisory.

Senator GREEN. Have you recommended to anyone any action which would prevent profiteering in the manufacture of war materials?

Mr. KEMPER. It has taken a position against it; that is all. We have no power of compulsion.

Senator GREEN. But had you recommended any definite legislation by the Congress?

Mr. KEMPER. Not that I am aware of.

Senator GREEN. Or action by the Executive?

Mr. KEMPER. Not that I am aware of. The Executive has some authority on that point now. In any event, no specific legislation has been proposed.

Senator GREEN. Would the chamber object to legislation preventing profiteering?

Mr. KEMPER. I think the feeling has been that the excess-profits tax would do that job, either in its present form or in some revised form.

Senator GREEN. Do you think it would do it in its present form?

Mr. KEMPER. The limited discussion that I have had with respect to that bill with some people who know much more about it than I do leads me to believe that no layman should express an opinion as to what the bill will do, Senator.

Senator GREEN. As to what the bill will do. But you just expressed an opinion that you thought the present bill might.

Mr. KEMPER. That it was designed to take care of excess profits; in other words, profiteering.

Senator GREEN. Would you regard the two terms as being synonymous?

Mr. KEMPER. Not quite. But the excess-profits tax normally would be designed to absorb excess profits or to tax excess profits and to form some sort of a ceiling on profits.

Senator GREEN. Do you know anything about the laws in other countries, such as England and Germany, as to profiteering or excess profits on war material?

Mr. KEMPER. Not to the extent that I wish to discuss it before this distinguished committee.

Senator GREEN. Do you know whether or not they are allowed to take any excess profits in the sense of profiteering?

Mr. KEMPER. I wouldn't say in the sense of profiteering. I think perhaps we have had a little confusion of words there.

Senator GREEN. What would be your idea as to the distinction between excess profits and profiteering—just roughly. What is your view?

Mr. KEMPER. What is your view? I think that profiteering is evidenced by excess profits.

Senator GREEN. Suppose a given corporation manufacturing war materials were making, after it received Government contracts, a 100 percent more than it made before; would that be profiteering?

Mr. KEMPER. It might not be, if the previous results had been in the red.

Senator GREEN. I don't mean that the deficit was a hundred percent greater. I mean if the profits were a hundred percent greater.

Mr. KEMPER. If you add a hundred percent to a bad deficit it would still mean no profit and might not represent profiteering.

Senator GREEN. What would be some basis for determining it?

Mr. KEMPER. I should rather not express an opinion on that. After all, that is a legislative matter for the Congress. And when they have this legislation under consideration, our appropriate committees and staffs are very glad to express their opinions, for whatever they may be worth.

Senator GREEN. From your knowledge of the opinions of the Members of the Chamber, don't you think they would favor some legislation preventing profiteering?

Mr. KEMPER. Really, Senator, I don't imagine they would oppose it. I have made no particular study of it beyond a very cursory one, that is, of the excess-profits tax legislation.

Senator GREEN. You are familiar with the fact that in such labor troubles as we have had, strikes and threats of strikes, since this emergency arose, the employees raised the point as to why labor should make the sacrifices for the so-called benefit of the country when the advantages really inure not to the benefit of the country but to the benefit of their employers. You are familiar with that fact, are you not?

Mr. KEMPER. I can imagine that it might happen. I don't specifically recall it.

Senator GREEN. Is there any way of answering that point except by legislation to make sure that the additional profits resulting from these sacrifices of labor do inure to the benefit of the country and do not inure to the benefit of private employers?

Mr. KEMPER. You are asking me?

Senator GREEN. Yes.

Mr. KEMPER. I think the position of the chamber has always been one—at least while I have been connected with it—of putting the public interest first. And I think that any legislation that is in the public interest would have our support.

Senator GREEN. I am glad to hear you say that. But that does not answer my question. I asked you if you know of any other way of meeting that point which is raised by labor except by legislation which would prevent the profits going to the employer rather than to the country?

Mr. KEMPER. I think whatever type of legislation is necessary in order to achieve equity and fairness of the type you suggest, Senator, business would favor.

Senator GREEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, have you any questions?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No questions.

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one or two other questions before the witness departs.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Pepper. But our time for recessing has arrived.

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Kemper, can you tell us whether or not the United States Chamber of Commerce opposed or favored the Russell-Overton selective service law amendment?

MR. KEMPER. Again, Senator, I do not have my file with me because of my 40-minute notice, and I cannot tell you.

Senator PEPPER. You will remember, Mr. Kemper, that was the amendment which provided that if the Government and a manufacturer of essential materials for the country's defense were unable to agree upon terms for that manufacture that it would be possible for the Government to take over, by prescribed procedure, that manufacturing plant. Some people took an active attitude for or against that amending proposal. I wonder if the United States Chamber of Commerce or you personally expressed your attitude toward that proposal.

MR. KEMPER. I did not personally.

Senator PEPPER. Did you say you did?

MR. KEMPER. I did not. I have already answered your question with respect to the chamber, so far as I know.

Senator PEPPER. But you don't know whether the chamber did or did not oppose that proposal?

MR. KEMPER. That is all I have to say.

Senator PEPPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kemper, we thank you for coming here before the committee.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened, at the conclusion of the recess, at 2 p. m.

STATEMENT OF DR. HERBERT WRIGHT, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wright, you have been invited to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations this afternoon. You may proceed in your own way. If you desire to submit your formal statement without questioning until you have finished it, you may do so. First, please give your connections and address, and such background statement as you wish to make.

Dr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, since 1930 I have been professor of international law at the Catholic University of America. I have been a member of the American Society of International Law for nearly 20 years, having served on its executive council. I have been a member of the International Law Association for 9 years, having served as a vice president of its American branch. I served in the Department of State for 2 years, attending the London Naval Conference of 1930 as editor of International Conferences for the Department of State.

Needless to say, in my appearance here I do not in any way represent or speak for the Catholic University of America or for any institution or organization with which I have been or am now privileged to be connected. What I have attempted to prepare and what you have been gracious enough to allow me to present represents the mature opinion of one who ardently desires the peace and security of

the United States and who has given that subject serious and careful consideration over a period of years.

Perhaps I should begin by stating that I am absolutely in favor of President Roosevelt's policy of quick rearmament and his avowed policy of keeping out of war. Two years ago, when I had the privilege of appearing before this committee, I advocated a two-ocean navy as one of the means of attaining these two objectives. With regard to the present war in Europe, my sympathies are entirely with the people of Great Britain. I know of no other country in which I would prefer to live, if I could not live in the United States. I am absolutely opposed to all forms of state absolutism, whether it be nazi-ism, fascism, or communistic sovietism. Consequently, I am in favor of all possible aid to Great Britain which does not involve (1) weakening of our democratic institutions; (2) likelihood of our involvement in war; and (3) a violation of international law.

I. I am opposed to aid which would involve weakening our democratic institutions. The ostensible purpose of S. 275 is to facilitate aid to Britain, although section 3 (a), paragraph 1, refers to "the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States." Under the authority of this bill, the President might dispose of any defense article whatsoever, not only to Great Britain, but to any nation anywhere in the world. For instance, to China. However much one might be inclined to sympathize with the Chinese in their struggle against Japanese aggression, it is doubtful whether the people of the United States are desirous of committing themselves to the possibility of engaging in an "all-out" war with Japan even to save China or whether it would be to the best interests of the people of the United States to become thus committed to perpetual involvement in the affairs of the Far East.

Under the authority of this bill, the President might, with the best of intentions, dispose of any defense article whatsoever to the U. S. S. R., as was foreshadowed in the recent lifting of the "moral embargo" against the U. S. S. R. But we have seen how trustworthy the U. S. S. R. is as a potential friend or ally; (1) it has not fulfilled the conditions upon which recognition was accorded in 1933; (2) it failed to fulfill its pledge to France when Poland was invaded; (3) it failed to fulfill its pledge to Finland and the Baltic states; (4) it has a quasi-alliance with Germany; (5) its entire philosophy of foreign policy seems to be to let the other nations of the world war each other in economic and social conditions suitable for the adoption of sovietism without itself participating in war.

Under the authority of this bill, the President might dispose of any defense article whatsoever to Greece, with the possible continued involvement of the United States in the affairs of the Mediterranean and the Balkan area.

All of these important steps, fraught with such potential implications for the security of the United States, can be taken by the President without the consent or approval of the Congress in the instant case. The sole test is whether "he deems it in the interest of national defense." The exercise of these enormous powers is left entirely to the President's discretion, powers which have never before been granted to a President, even in time of war, in spite of the fact that the Congress could be in session in an emergency to grant such powers as are necessary when and if they are actually needed. Moreover, under

section 9, the President may delegate the exercise of these powers to the head of any Government agency. Would not the combined judgment of the elected legislative representatives of the people be a safer guide in such important matters than the judgment of a single individual, no matter how wise and sincere he might be?

Section 3 (a), paragraph 2, would authorize the outright gift of any defense article or its exchange for some benefit, the President to have sole discretion as to the terms, if any, for such transfer. The "direct or indirect benefit" to be received by the United States as the consideration for such transfer might be simply the good will of some foreign nation or the notion that its welfare would be a benefit to the United States. The powers granted by this and other sections of the bill are so extensive in their implications and possibilities that it virtually amounts to the transfer, as Judge John Bassett Moore says, of "the war-making power from the Congress, where the Constitution lodges it, to the Executive."

Moreover, it is extremely doubtful whether such a wide delegation of power does not contravene article IV, section 3, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, which gives to the Congress the "power to dispose of * * * property belonging to the United States" and the power to "make all needful rules and regulations" respecting it. The concentration of such enormous power in the hands of the Chief Executive, if not a violation of this provision of the Constitution, is certainly a step in the direction of State absolutism at variance with our democratic traditions.

II. I am opposed to aid which would involve us in war. The United States does not possess a two-ocean navy and therefore is unable to protect her interests in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, if challenged simultaneously in both oceans. If "to speak softly and carry a big stick" would insure the respect of other nations and keep the United States out of war, is it not the part of wisdom not to speak too loudly or to invite a challenge until we actually carry a big stick? Present plans should give us a two-ocean navy within a few years, if we do not interfere with or retard this program by making other disposition on the theory that it might save time. If the United States becomes embroiled in Europe, she thereby leaves the way open for Japan to exercise a free hand in breaking down the open-door policy and the status quo in the Far East. If she speaks too harshly to Japan—without sufficient force to back it up, if necessary—she paves the way for war with Japan and thereby removes herself as a deterrent to the unbridled action of the dictators of Europe. It is obvious that, in either case, it would be far better for Great Britain, as well as for the United States, if the United States would keep at peace with the nations across both oceans.

The U. S. S. R., which bridges Europe and Asia, is pursuing her consistent policy of world revolution by encouraging the capitalistic nations of Europe to war against each other until these countries sink into such a low economic, political, and social condition that they will be ripe for succumbing to communism. The United States can do more good for herself, as well as for the rest of the world, in stemming the really great menace of the rising tide of communism by remaining aloof from the European conflagration, so that she may be able to conserve her resources and thereby be in a better position herself to withstand the onslaught of communism after the war and

assist in the rehabilitation of trade that must come after the world has returned to some sort of normalcy.

"But," it is alleged, "Europe is the first line of our defense. If Hitler wins the battle of Britain, we will be next." It is extremely probable that at the end of the war both sides will be so exhausted that they can only with difficulty rise to their knees within a generation afterward. Moreover, if Great Britain, France, and the host of nations which constituted the League of Nations could not prevent the small and homogeneous people of the reduced Germany—that is, many nations with only a single nation of smoldering resentment to watch—from doing the extremely difficult task of arising within slightly less than a generation, it would be much more difficult and therefore more improbable for the single nation of Germany, if Hitler should win, which now appears extremely doubtful, to keep in check Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, dismembered Czechoslovakia and Poland, and other dominated nations of Europe—that is, one nation with eight or more nations of smoldering resentment to watch—from rising up and throwing off their unwilling yoke. An evidence of this smoldering resentment is reported in an article in PM for January 31, 1941, to the effect that 97½ percent of the 8,000,000 people of the Netherlands are extremely anti-Nazi.

Even if Hitler should win, would not his hands be so extremely busy in consolidating his conquests that he would have scarce opportunity to even consider bringing the war to our shores? Moreover, if the 20 miles of the English Channel have up to now proved such a hard nut for him to crack, do you not suppose that he would think twice and then twice more before tackling the 3,000-mile expanse of the Atlantic? Meanwhile, if our present defense plans are speeded through to completion without diminution, we will have been amply prepared to repel any attempts on his part to attack us.

Moreover, does anyone believe that the three totalitarian states of Germany, Italy, and the U. S. S. R. can long maintain their marriage of convenience? Will not the conflict that must sooner or later arise among them eventually bring about the downfall of all? Certainly the larger the area attempted to be controlled by Germany, the more difficult will the maintenance of that control be. Even now events in the Near East point unmistakably in that direction.

The underlying philosophy of the line of argument presumably behind this bill seems to be that it is less dangerous to incur the probability of war with Germany in the near future, in order to avoid the possibility of war with Germany in the more remote future. This reminds me of the epigram of the Latin poet, Martial:

Fannius took his life away
In order to avoid the fray;
What folly this, I ask, to die,
Forsooth, in order not to die!

III. I am opposed to aid which would involve a violation of international law. The attitude of a state toward foreign states in time of war may be one of two positions: (1) It may join forces with one of the belligerents against the other and become a participant in the war; or (2) it may refuse to take sides in the war and remain neutral. It cannot, like some international Janus, face both directions at the same time. Assuming that the United States does not desire to participate in any foreign war unless absolutely and directly impelled

thereto by actual necessity of self-defense, the only alternative is to remain neutral. The rights of a neutral state under international law are in general the same rights which it has in time of peace insofar as they do not contravene an admitted belligerent right. For instance, it has the right to permit its nationals to engage at their own risk in arms traffic with a belligerent country, although the Government itself may not engage in the arms traffic, because, as will be pointed out later, that would violate its neutrality. Most states, therefore, pass legislation making provision for the enforcement of their neutrality.

There is nothing in international law, however, to prevent a neutral state, by domestic legislation, from temporarily waiving the exercise of some of its admitted neutral rights to make more remote the possibility of being drawn into a foreign war. Belligerent states, in proportion as their conflict becomes fiercer, are inclined to interpret neutral rights more stringently and their own belligerent rights with greater latitude. It was precisely to prevent the United States from becoming involved in foreign wars in defense of its neutral rights that the so-called "neutrality" laws of 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939 and the Spanish Embargo Act of 1937 were enacted. The primary purpose of the act of 1935 was, to quote the words of President Roosevelt when he signed that act, "to avoid any action which might involve us in war." The primary purpose of the act of 1937 was, as stated by Green H. Hackworth, legal advisor of the Department of State, "to keep us out of future wars." I have called these "so-called neutrality laws," therefore, because they are certainly not neutrality laws in the sense that they are necessary to define and maintain our neutral rights under international law. Rather are they attempts to provide for the waiving of the exercise of admitted neutral rights—in a manner which cannot justly be complained of by belligerents as unneutral or illegal under international law—for the purpose of avoiding as far as possible the involvement of the United States in the wars of other nations.

Section 3 (a), paragraph 2, of S. 275 provides that the President might dispose of any defense article whatsoever "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law." This is a complete reversal of the policy of the past 6 years. The laws enumerated above were adopted for the precise purpose of preventing our hearts from running away with our heads when some other section of the world should become engulfed in war. Their purpose was to prevent a repetition of the events of 1917-18. They were passed when a calmer, cooler judgment was possible on what was to the best interests of the United States. They were passed envisaging precisely the events which subsequently came to pass, but at a more detached distance. Should these measures be junked or superseded in a wave of hysteria? If so, it seems clear that history will repeat itself.

Section 3 (a) of S. 275 authorizes the exercise of the powers enumerated in the bill, when the President deems it "in the interest of national defense." Under international law, a distinct menace to its self-defense permits a nation to take one or both of two courses of action: (1) increase its army and navy to meet the threat; (2) go to war. It does not authorize it to enjoy the advantages of both neutrality and belligerency simultaneously while refusing to accept the disadvantages of either. It does not authorize it to persistently violate its neutral

obligations. Moreover, a remote threat to its self-defense does not authorize it to go to war. This is the philosophy of power politics (*Machtpolitik*): A nation may here and now take hostile measures against another nation from which it does not expect attack in the immediate future in order to prevent the possibility of such attack in the more remote future. This is the *raison d'être* of continuous warfare and conquest. On this basis it might be argued that the United States might forthwith go to war against Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, or Argentina, because at some future date they may desire and be strong enough to menace the Panama Canal and the security of the United States. This is the philosophy of Hitler.

It has been alleged that we are entitled to take hostile measures against Germany under the Briand-Kellogg Pact. But it should be remembered that this pact consists of only two articles: (1) Renouncing war as an instrument of national policy; and (2) agreeing that the settlement of disputes shall never be sought except by pacific means. It is not self-executory any more than the eighteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States was self-executory. The latter was implemented by the Volstead Act and various State acts. The Briand-Kellogg Pact is implemented by the various multilateral and bilateral treaties providing for arbitration and conciliation. Reference has been made to the so-called Budapest Articles of Interpretation (House Majority Report, p. 5), in an attempt to outline the supposed rights and obligations assumed by the parties to the pact.

The popular misconception about the nature and significance of the Budapest Articles warrants a few words about their genesis. The International Law Association, founded in 1873, is an unofficial group of persons "interested in the improvement of international relations." At the thirty-eighth conference of the association, held in Budapest in 1934, a draft report was rendered by its committee on conciliation between nations on the interpretation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Of the 10 members comprising this committee, 7 were presumably British nationals residing in London, Oxford, or Cambridge, 1 was an Egyptian residing in Paris, 1 was an Italian residing in London, and 1 was an American residing in London.

It is obvious that, all except one being nationals of members of the League of Nations, the members of the committee must have been conscious of their obligations under the Covenant during their deliberations and this is corroborated from the proceedings of the conference itself, which was presided over by Prof. Manley O. Hudson, the great American protagonist of the League and now judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice. For instance, in opening the discussion of the conference on the draft report, Professor Hudson stated that one of the two "great objectives of our generation" was "enshrined in Art. 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations," which he believed meant—

that a war anywhere is a matter of concern to people everywhere. * * *
I do not say we have established it; I do say that it is the aspiration of our time.

An American member—

thought that the conference was not competent to decide questions of law by way of resolution. * * * It must be remembered that no nation is represented here by accredited delegates.

He stated that he knew of—

no rules of international law in the construction of treaties * * * that would justify these resolutions—

quoting a statement made in New York in 1932 by Secretary Stimson that—

The Briand-Kellogg Pact provides for no sanction of force. It does not require any signatory to intervene with measures of force in case the Pact is violated. Instead, it rests upon the sanction of public opinion, which can be made one of the most potent sanctions of the world.

After the close of general discussion on the draft report as a whole, the conference proceeded to a consideration of the articles seriatim. The draft report would have had the conference "recognise" the statements made in the articles of the draft. In order to be more "precise," this was modified in the conference to "agree upon the following preliminary Articles of Interpretation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, to be known as the Budapest Articles of Interpretation." This change shows that the conference itself was conscious of the fact that it was not "recognizing" principles inherent in and immediately deducible from the Pact, but "agreeing" upon additional principles by which they thought it ought to be interpreted.

I would be the last person to attempt to discredit the splendid work that the International Law Association has been doing in clearing the ground for conventional agreement between the nations, but I resent the implication that its resolutions can take the place of conventional agreements. It is obvious from the proceedings of the conference that the "Articles of Interpretation" were by no means unanimously adopted, that many members felt they went beyond the terms of the Pact and laid down rules desirable to be adopted by the signatories but not at all obligatory upon them, and that many members were thinking more of obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations than under the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Certainly the Budapest Articles have no binding force on the signatories of the Pact, although some of the members of the conference desired it to have that effect.

Section 3 (a), paragraph 2, of S. 275 authorizes the transfer by the Government of the United States of any defense article to a belligerent. This is absolutely contrary to article 6 of Hague Convention XIII of 1907 (36 Stat. 2415), which categorically states:

The supply in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of warships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is forbidden.

It has been said (House Majority Report, p. 6) that Hague Convention XIII is not operative in the present war because article 28 specifically provides that it shall not apply unless "all the belligerents are parties to the convention" and Great Britain and Italy as a matter of fact are not parties to the convention. But it should be pointed out that that convention contained two classes of rules: (1) Those declaratory of existing international law, and (2) those stipulatory of new rules of international law. The fact that article 6 of Hague Convention XIII was declaratory of international law as it existed in 1907, rather than stipulatory of a new rule, is evidenced by the fact that at no stage in the evolution of article 3 of the British proposals at that conference into article 6 of Convention XIII was the slightest opposition or question expressed as to the article on the part of any

delegation, and also by the fact that the reporter in charge of drafting this convention, Louis Renault, in commenting on this article, declared:

It goes without saying that a neutral State cannot furnish warships, arms, etc., to a belligerent in any manner.

The United States has consistently adopted this attitude in practice, long before the adoption of Hague Convention XIII. For instance, Secretary of State Day wrote to Ambassador John Hay in London, June 25, 1898, as follows:

It is a grave offense against the law of nations for a neutral government to sell a man-of-war to a belligerent.

Moreover, Oppenheim (International Law, vol. 2, 5th ed., sec. 321) states:

If a State remains neutral, it violates the impartiality by furnishing a belligerent with troops or men-of-war.

This is so commonplace as hardly to require corroboration, were it not challenged by the present bill. For instance, George Grafton Wilson (International Law, 9th ed., New York, 1935, p. 328) says:

The neutral state may not furnish to a belligerent any assistance in military forces, supplies of war, loans of money, or in any similar manner.

In other words, while a private citizen of a neutral state, in the absence of municipal law to the contrary, is free to engage in the trade in munitions at his own risk, a neutral state itself may never engage in such trade with a belligerent.

Section 3 (a), paragraph 3, of S. 275 authorizes the Government of the United States virtually to provide naval bases for a belligerent, which is contrary to international law. As far back as 1871, the Case of the United States in the Geneva Arbitration declared:

The repairs that humanity demands can be given, but no repairs should add to the strength or efficiency of a vessel beyond what is absolutely necessary to gain the nearest of its own ports.

This is still good international law, even where the Hague Conventions are not operative.

It has been intimated (Congressional Record, February 3, 1941, p. 530, col. 3) that these acts, which are violatory of international law, are not apt to involve us in war, because Germany "isn't going to engage us in combat * * * unless she thinks that it is in her best interests to do so." This line of argument involves the very nullification of law. It is the philosophy of the gangster and racketeer, who believes that he is entitled to violate law without scruple because he knows the police are unable or unwilling to interfere. It is with bad grace that a nation execrates a violator of international law while at the same time itself offers a bad example of law-observance.

IV. In summary, therefore, I am opposed to the passage of S. 275 as it now stands as being an unwarranted, unnecessary and excessive delegation of power by the Congress to the Executive, the exercise of which might very easily involve us in war or a violation of international law or both. The aid which it ostensibly is designed to give could be adjusted to the defense program by the Office of Production Management and by the exchange of credit for some tangible benefit approved by the Congress.

If, however, the Senate should see fit to pass this bill, it certainly should be amended in many vital particulars. The Congress, by

means of a special nonpartisan committee or otherwise, should retain some measure of control over these important matters. Such power as is finally granted to the Executive ought to have a definite time limit, both as to the exercise of the power and the acts performed under it, especially since the Congress must be in session at least once a year and there is nothing to prevent it from being kept in continuous session if the emergency warrants. Some reasonable limit should be set to the amount of money to be authorized in the transfers permitted under the bill; this could be extended if, as and when the need arises. The categories of materials and the countries which may be beneficiaries ought to be specified; this could be extended if, as and when the need arises.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions you desire to ask, Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. Just a brief question. Dr. Wright, I was not present when you first began your statement and I was not privileged to hear the first two pages. You appeared before this committee when we were considering the Neutrality Act, did you not?

Dr. WRIGHT. Two years ago.

Senator CONNALLY. Did you favor the repeal of the arms embargo?

Dr. WRIGHT. No, sir; I did not, for the same reasons I have given here.

Senator CONNALLY. The Arms Embargo Act, which we repealed, prohibited the shipment by a citizen of a neutral country of war materials and munitions to a belligerent, did it not?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is correct.

Senator CONNALLY. In repealing that, we did not violate any international law, did we?

Dr. WRIGHT. No, except that we changed the rules of the game during the process of the game.

Senator CONNALLY. It was not a rule of anybody but our own.

Dr. WRIGHT. It was a rule which we ourselves imposed upon ourselves.

Senator CONNALLY. That did not have any relation whatever to international law, did it?

Dr. WRIGHT. And we are at perfect liberty under international law to change those rules for our own benefit, but not for the benefit of or for the purpose of aiding one of the belligerents.

Senator CONNALLY. If we had a right not to have had the bill at all ever, which was a perfect right of ours, if we had a right never to have passed it, we would not have violated any international law, would we?

Dr. WRIGHT. No.

Senator CONNALLY. Then when we repealed it, we did not violate international law, did we?

Dr. WRIGHT. Not if we did it primarily for our own domestic benefit.

Senator CONNALLY. What difference does it make why we do it, if we have a right to do it?

Dr. WRIGHT. Because if it is done for the purpose of giving aid to one of the belligerents, then it is an unneutral act.

Senator CONNALLY. Suppose it is done for the purpose of seeking to give aid to one of the belligerents, by keeping arms and ammunition from them?

Dr. WRIGHT. The same thing would apply.

Senator CONNALLY. So you think we had a perfect right to do it if we had done it one day before the war broke out?

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. But if we did it one day after the war broke out, we would not have had the right?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is correct.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you distinguish between moral and legal right?

Dr. WRIGHT. No, not here; I base my statement on legal right.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not, as a lawyer, contend that the repeal of the arms embargo was a violation of international law, do you?

Dr. WRIGHT. I do.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not quote anything along that line in your statement.

Dr. WRIGHT. I tried to confine my discussion to the bill that was before us.

Senator CONNALLY. My reason for asking you this is that you refer in your statement to your appearing here last year.

Dr. WRIGHT. I just referred to the fact that at that time I advocated a two-ocean navy for the United States.

Senator CONNALLY. You say you are strongly in sympathy with the people of Great Britain.

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir. I have a great many friends there. I spent 4 very happy months there at the time of the London Naval Conference.

Senator CONNALLY. You prefer that they win the war?

Dr. WRIGHT. Of course.

Senator CONNALLY. But you oppose giving them any aid on the part of this Government?

Dr. WRIGHT. No, sir; I oppose giving them aid to the extent that would involve us in the war. I am in favor of giving them all aid that does not violate law.

Senator CONNALLY. We are getting down to the point. You start out by saying you want to give them aid, that you want the Government to give them aid.

Dr. WRIGHT. I distinguish there. I do not want the Government to give them aid if it violates international law.

Senator CONNALLY. You are desirous, however, if we can without getting into war, of our giving them aid?

Dr. WRIGHT. Without getting into war or violating international law.

Senator CONNALLY. I accept that condition. The beginning of the whole process is that you want the Government of the United States to give England aid if it does not involve us in war?

Dr. WRIGHT. Or violate international law.

Senator CONNALLY. Tell us how to do that. We should be very glad if you would give us a plan which we could follow. You want to aid England, and help her win the war.

Dr. WRIGHT. Under the law as it exists now, Great Britain is free to buy any war material in this country from private organizations.

Senator CONNALLY. You said we violated international law when we passed the law permitting her to do that.

Dr. WRIGHT. But that law is now on our books. I am talking about the law of the United States as it now exists.

Senator CONNALLY. Go ahead.

Dr. WRIGHT. They can acquire any war materials, any defense materials, from any private, nongovernmental agency.

Senator CONNALLY. That is correct.

Dr. WRIGHT. The only way I see in which we can help them to continue that, after their dollar exchange becomes exhausted, is by perhaps extending credit—

Senator CONNALLY. Let us not have any "perhaps." We are asking you for your plan.

Dr. WRIGHT. I have not elaborated a complete plan. I have just been talking about the bill that is here. I have not elaborated a complete plan at all.

I repeat, the only way I see for us to help them to continue, after their dollar exchange becomes exhausted, is by perhaps extending credit in a permissible fashion, such as in exchange for some benefit that is of use to us domestically. In that way we can say that we are extending this credit, not to help her win the war, but because it is to the domestic interest of the United States, for instance, if we should acquire some naval bases, or something of that character.

Senator CONNALLY. You favored, then, the acquisition of the naval bases, in exchange for destroyers?

Dr. WRIGHT. I favored the acquisition of the naval bases, but I was opposed to the disposal of the destroyers as against international law.

Senator CONNALLY. We would have made a fine trade if we had gotten the naval bases and kept the destroyers. We could not do that.

Dr. WRIGHT. I think it was to Great Britain's interest to give us those bases outright, because it absolved her from the necessity of maintaining them in this part of the world.

Senator CONNALLY. Is that how you want us to help Great Britain, to have her give us something free?

Dr. WRIGHT. No; but I think for her benefit she should have been willing to give them to us.

Senator CONNALLY. You are in favor of the Government extending credit to Great Britain when her dollar exchange is exhausted?

Dr. WRIGHT. If it can be done in some way I have suggested, or indicated, without violating international law. I said that if it can be done in exchange for some benefit to us domestically.

Senator CONNALLY. What is that?

Dr. WRIGHT. And not with the primary object of helping her win the war.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you mind indicating how? There are many ways of doing it.

Dr. WRIGHT. I have not gone into all that.

Senator CONNALLY. You could not go into that?

Dr. WRIGHT. Not today. In fact, I did not expect to appear here until Friday, but at 4 o'clock Monday afternoon I was asked to appear today, and I was a little rushed getting ready to appear today.

Senator CONNALLY. You think we should help them, but you do not see any way of doing it?

Dr. WRIGHT. I want to help them, but I want to keep the United States out of war more than I want to help them, and I want to keep

the United States record of observance of international law more than I want to help them.

Senator CONNALLY. You spoke further in your statement about the fact that we could not furnish supplies to a nation in war without getting involved in the war, committing a violation of international law. That happened in the case of Spain, did it not? Did not Germany and Italy send supplies and arms?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. On what page is that?

Dr. WRIGHT. Where I spoke about article 6 of Hague Convention XIII.

Senator CONNALLY. You said this in your statement.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I have just got the copy of the statement.

Senator CONNALLY. I did not have my finger on it.

Dr. WRIGHT. It is at the bottom of page 11.

Senator CONNALLY. Page 8 is the one about which I am speaking. It refers to—

Section 3 (a) of S. 275 authorizes the exercise of the powers enumerated in the bill, when the President deems it "in the interest of national defense."

Then you sum up by saying:

Under international law, a distinct menace to its self-defense permits a nation to take one or both of two courses of action.

Dr. WRIGHT. I think you have more specific reference to page 11, about four lines from the top.

Senator CONNALLY. At any rate, in the case of the Spanish War, did not Italy furnish arms and armies and munitions and so on to one side in the Spanish War?

Dr. WRIGHT. The U. S. S. R., too.

Senator CONNALLY. And did not Germany pursue the same course?

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. If they can do it without regard to international law, is there any reason why other nations could not do the same?

Dr. WRIGHT. If they can violate international law, we can violate international law? I do not subscribe to that.

Senator CONNALLY. If they have disregarded international law, and have done so all along, does it lie in their mouths to say that some other country is violating international law?

Dr. WRIGHT. I do not subscribe to the doctrine that the violation of international law by one state warrants another state violating international law.

Senator CONNALLY. They have not observed international law very scrupulously in the present war, have they?

Dr. WRIGHT. In some cases they have, and in some cases they have not.

Senator CONNALLY. Take the case of Denmark. Did they observe international law in the case of Denmark?

Dr. WRIGHT. I would say, just my personal opinion—and of course I do not know what the motives of the Germans may have been—I would say they had violated it.

Senator CONNALLY. Take the case of Norway. They did not proceed into Norway strictly in accordance with international law, did they?

Dr. WRIGHT. I am not so sure in that case, because the Germans' defense is that mines had been placed in Norwegian waters contrary to international law, and the Norwegian Government had not been able to prevent it.

Senator CONNALLY. If England violated international law, that did not warrant Germany violating it, did it?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is true, but self-defense is the first law, and enables a nation to take measures of that character where there is an immediate possibility of a state forestalling them.

Senator CONNALLY. How about the Netherlands, Holland; did the Germans violate international law in that case?

Dr. WRIGHT. I would say it was a violation of international law, although I have not examined all the documents, inasmuch as there was a pledge on the part of Germany not to violate the neutrality of the Netherlands.

Senator CONNALLY. Whether there was a pledge or not, she did not have any right to go in there and take them when they were not doing anything, did she? You mentioned a pledge.

Dr. WRIGHT. An agreement.

Senator CONNALLY. Without any pledge, under international law, did Germany have any right to go in and take Holland over?

Dr. WRIGHT. That would depend on the circumstances, and whether you consider that Germany is fighting a war of self-defense, as she alleges.

Senator CONNALLY. Is there one international law for a nation fighting in so-called self-defense, and another international law for somebody else?

Dr. WRIGHT. Where its self-defense is immediately and directly endangered, it may take some acts which ordinarily would not be permitted under international law.

Senator CONNALLY. What are they, for instance? Tell us some of them.

Dr. WRIGHT. I would say if a revolution in Mexico assumed such proportions that it endangered the United States, might come over into the United States, the United States might be warranted in going into Mexico to the extent necessary to prevent that revolution spreading into the United States.

Senator CONNALLY. Fine. Was there such a revolution in Holland that was threatening to spill over into Germany?

Dr. WRIGHT. No. You just asked for an example, and I gave you one.

Senator CONNALLY. You are using it as a justification for what Germany did in Holland.

Dr. WRIGHT. That is because I do not know all the reasons which Germany might have had. I would have to examine all the documents. I can conceive where it might be possible.

Senator CONNALLY. You are for the Monroe Doctrine and its maintenance, are you not?

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You are in favor of the United States maintaining that doctrine against all comers with its army and its navy?

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. In the event of a German victory in Europe, if the Nazis and the Fascist and all similar people should infiltrate

into Central and South America and start up such a revolution as you have talked about in Mexico, would you not feel that the United States was justified in employing its army and navy in going down and straightening them out?

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir; to that extent.

Senator CONNALLY. And ousting them?

Dr. WRIGHT. I think it would be much better, though, to take precautionary measures before that happens in those particular areas.

Senator CONNALLY. We are undertaking to do that under international law the best we can.

Dr. WRIGHT. I mean persuade the other American nations that it is to their benefit, as well as ours, that they stifle these "third columns," and so forth.

Senator CONNALLY. It would be delightful if we could prevent it, but I am talking about if we do not prevent it, and it happens; you are in favor of going in with the Army and Navy and putting them out?

Dr. RIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You are for a two-ocean Navy, I am glad to hear.

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You are for the program of preparedness, of course?

Dr. WRIGHT. Absolutely, the faster the better. I would go so far as to say that it would be more to our advantage to complete our program than it would be to give aid to Great Britain.

Senator CONNALLY. If we had to do one or the other——

Dr. WRIGHT. If we had to sacrifice one to the other, I would prefer sacrificing aid to Great Britain.

Senator CONNALLY. Some of us want to do both. It is going to cost us something.

Dr. WRIGHT. I do not know whether we are doing both if, when we need ships badly, we give them away.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you think we would be helped any in our national defense by the destruction of the British fleet? Do you think that would be in the interest of our national defense, to see the British fleet destroyed?

Dr. WRIGHT. No; I do not think it would be, but I cannot visualize, if the British are such great friends of ours, and have such a common interest as ours, that they would allow that to happen.

Senator CONNALLY. They are trying to keep it from happening, but perhaps it might happen without their consent.

Dr. WRIGHT. I imagine there are many parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations which could act as havens for the British Fleet in case Hitler should win the Battle of Britain, which, I say, I do not think it is at all likely he will.

Senator CONNALLY. You believe in the Army, preparedness for the Army, and strengthening the Army?

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. But you of course want that preparation simply for self-defense?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is correct.

Senator CONNALLY. You want to wait until they attack us?

Dr. WRIGHT. No; I want to prevent their attacking us by being ready.

Senator CONNALLY. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask, Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas is not present, nor is Senator Van Nuys. Senator Murray, do you desire to ask any questions?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. Dr. Wright, I understand you claim that we have already committed acts of war against Germany. Is that correct?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is correct.

Senator GREEN. Germany has not recognized them as such, has she?

Dr. WRIGHT. A nation is not obliged to fight every time its rights under international law are violated. It always weighs whether it is more desirable to simply overlook the violation or to go to war.

Senator GREEN. Then acts of war may have two different meanings. One is an act which precipitates war, and the other is an act which potentially may be the occasion for war.

Dr. WRIGHT. That is correct.

Senator GREEN. In which sense do you use it?

Dr. WRIGHT. I use it in both senses.

Senator GREEN. Sometimes one and sometimes the other?

Dr. WRIGHT. No; I think under this bill both of those kinds of acts might result.

Senator GREEN. Is there any more reason to suppose that acts of war in the future will precipitate an act of war, than the acts of war in the past?

Dr. WRIGHT. Oh, decidedly. For instance, suppose the ships of the United States are used to convoy ships to Britain. That would very probably lead to an attack on an American ship, and to my mind that would very quickly lead to an outright declaration of war, or at least to war itself, without a declaration.

Senator GREEN. On our part, or on Germany's part?

Dr. WRIGHT. On both parts.

Senator GREEN. Both spoiling to get in as quickly as possible?

Dr. WRIGHT. What is that?

Senator GREEN. Both eager to get in as quickly as possible. I want to get your idea.

Dr. WRIGHT. I would not say they were both eager to get in as quickly as possible, but they would be faced by the possibility of misinterpretation of their position as weakness if they did not follow through.

Senator GREEN. In view of the fact that Germany has not recognized a potential act of war on our part as such, may we not come to the conclusion that she does not intend to see war precipitated until she is good and ready?

Dr. WRIGHT. I mentioned that in my statement—that argument.

Senator GREEN. And that when she is good and ready, she will precipitate war without regard to our acts. Is that the case, in your opinion?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is true, but the results are different in two cases. If we give her cause to declare war, that is one case. If she declares war when she is ready, whether we give her cause or not, that is another case. So far as war breaking out is concerned, it makes little

difference, it is war, but after the war is over, and when the German-American Mixed Claims Commission—and I have no doubt there will be such a commission if we get into a war—starts to decide cases, then if the United States has not given ground for war, we will have a much stronger case under law than if we do give cause.

Senator GREEN. Have you much confidence in the result if disputes between Germany and the countries of Europe on the one hand and the United States on the other hand are left to an international court to decide? Is your confidence in international law as strong as all that?

Dr. WRIGHT. It absolutely is. It may seem to be overclouded for the time being, just as some time ago in this country we had a wave of "racketeering" and "bootlegging," and so on, but eventually it was caught up with.

Senator GREEN. I merely wish to get your idea.

Dr. WRIGHT. That is my idea.

Senator GREEN. You have much confidence in the reign of law and in the present world attitude toward it?

Dr. WRIGHT. There have been wars before, and there have been the same claims before, that there is no such thing as international law; but it has always resurged.

Senator GREEN. In the questions you answered concerning Norway, in which you justified or possibly justified Germany's action in invading Norway on the ground that Great Britain had been guilty of an act of war in sowing mine fields along the Norwegian coast, I understood your position was that Germany might have been justified because that was an act of war and therefore she was at liberty herself to commit an act of war.

Dr. WRIGHT. My position was just a little different from that. This is all speaking from the point of view of Germany. It was that Great Britain had violated the neutral rights of Norway and that Norway had not been effective in maintaining her own neutral rights, and that therefore that warranted Germany's taking some action to prevent that situation from continuing.

Senator GREEN. On the ground, as I understood you to say, that the right of self-defense was more important than international law?

Dr. WRIGHT. Than the normal rules of international law, yes; but self-defense has to be immediate and direct and not just cooked up.

Senator GREEN. That is your limitation?

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes.

Senator GREEN. And the word "immediate" is relative?

Dr. WRIGHT. Well, no; I think "immediate" is not so. You can have "more remote," but when it is "immediate" I think it is immediate.

Senator GREEN. Yes. We all agree on that.

Is that not the same argument that Secretary Hull used justifying acts of war on our part? Did he not say also, as you have, that the law of self-defense was a higher law than international law, and therefore that we were justified in committing some breach of international law if we regarded our national safety as pertinent? Was that not his argument?

Dr. WRIGHT. That was his argument, I think—that the right of self-defense is a right under international law where the threat to security is immediate.

Senator GREEN. Then, those of us who may regard the threat from Germany, in the possibility of the defeat of England, as immediate and real would be justified in looking to the law of self-defense rather than to international law, would we not?

Dr. WRIGHT. I doubt whether any claims commission sitting 10 years from now would consider that our security is so immediately threatened as to allow us to contravene all the normal rights of international law.

Senator GREEN. How would you yourself feel if you were sitting on such a claims commission?

Dr. WRIGHT. I would feel just as I have just said.

Senator GREEN. That we are not justified?

Dr. WRIGHT. That you are not justified, that the threat is not immediate.

Senator GREEN. We would have to wait until there is invasion?

Dr. WRIGHT. No; wait until there is a threat of invasion.

Senator GREEN. There is already a threat of invasion, is there not?

Dr. WRIGHT. I fail to see it in this country. I tried to point out in my statement that there is little, if any, immediate threat to this country.

Senator GREEN. There again "immediate" is a word for which, we agreed, there is no definite definition.

Dr. WRIGHT. A very important word.

Senator GREEN. You recited in your statement a long list of breaches of faith on the part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Dr. WRIGHT. That is right.

Senator GREEN. But you did not give any recital of the breach of faith on the part of Germany, did you?

Dr. WRIGHT. No; because I was thinking that under the bill the President could dispose of any defense article to the U. S. S. R. I do not imagine he would even think of disposing of them to Germany, so I did not even take that into consideration; but I thought it might be possible that he would think of giving some to the U. S. S. R. I noticed one of the Senators yesterday, or the day before yesterday, remarked about a shipment of tin that had left the Pacific coast, when we were supposed to be in need of tin, bound for the U. S. S. R.

Senator GREEN. Was that a Government action or private action? Was that not a private enterprise?

Dr. WRIGHT. I did not notice.

Senator GREEN. I think you will find it was.

Dr. WRIGHT. But even if it was a private enterprise, if the United States is enjoying, shall I say, a scarcity of such article, then it would be perfectly justified in preventing the exportation of it even by a private enterprise.

Senator GREEN. I asked it only because I wondered why you picked out that nation alone.

Dr. WRIGHT. I could have gone through the whole catalog of nations and picked out anyone. I just picked that one.

Senator GREEN. That was just my point. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I just want to ask the doctor one question.

Senator Connally asked you, Doctor, whether or not you were in sympathy with the Monroe Doctrine.

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You replied that you were.

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine?

Now, was not the very heart of the Monroe Doctrine that we should not only resist any colonization by foreign powers or European powers in this hemisphere or should act in intervention against such powers trying to subdue the republics to the south of us who had declared their independence, but also that we would refrain from interference in the quarrels in the other hemisphere?

Dr. WRIGHT. Well, as I see it, the Monroe Doctrine covered the first part of what you said directly; the second part by implication.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It was a very explicit statement in President Monroe's message that we had not interfered and did not intend to interfere in the affairs of the other hemisphere.

Dr. WRIGHT. We could hardly expect other nations to observe our policy of regarding them as hostile if they interfered here, if we were going to exercise some sort of privilege of interfering there.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. President Monroe's message would have to be considered altogether—that we would keep out of the affairs of the other hemisphere, as well as resist invasion on this hemisphere?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. So if we are going to adhere to the Monroe Doctrine, we are going to have to adhere to both sides of it?

Dr. WRIGHT. I am in favor of it.

Senator BARKLEY. May I ask you this, following that question? Did the United States violate the spirit of that indirect implication to which you refer when it sent part of its United States forces to the Barbary States and sent also some of our forces to the Boxer trouble, and then sent our Army to Europe in the World War?

Dr. WRIGHT. First, with regard to the Tripoli pirates, piracy is a crime under international law, and any nation is entitled to put down pirates.

Senator BARKLEY. Well, check that off as no violation.

Dr. WRIGHT. The Boxer Rebellion involves a question of intervention which does not come up in the present bill, because the present bill simply speaks about doing certain things "when he deems it vital to national defense"—not to help other nations, not for humanitarian reasons, but when he deems it in the interest of national defense.

Senator BARKLEY. I understand, but you were speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, and under questioning from the Senator from Missouri, you suggested that while we propose to keep other nations out of the Western Hemisphere, by implication we intend to stay out of their territory and out of their quarrels, and I wondered if we violated that by sending forces to China.

Dr. WRIGHT. No; not to prevent a state of affairs which existed there and which could not be controlled.

Senator BARKLEY. They were sent there to protect certain interests in which we were involved and other nations were involved.

You would not think that the Monroe Doctrine, under the second implication, would have been violated by what happened in the World War, when we accepted a state of war and sent our forces to fight the enemy where it could be found, which was in the other hemisphere?

Dr. WRIGHT. We were justified in fighting in the World War because our neutral rights were violated. We did not go over there looking for trouble, but our rights were violated, and we reached a stage where if we did not take some action against it, it would be a sign of weakness, so we went in to prevent further violation of our neutral rights.

Senator BARKLEY. So the second part of the Monroe Doctrine, if it is part of it, is not an absolute doctrine from which you cannot deviate in any circumstances?

Dr. WRIGHT. It is just a policy. But I should like to point out the difference between the World War and this second war. In the World War our neutral rights were violated, and we had a right to go to war when we decided that things had gone too far. In the present war I do not see how our rights have been violated except, for instance, by examining mail at Bermuda.

Senator BARKLEY. That is probably due to the fact that we ourselves withdrew from the exercise of rights which had been recognized for a long time under international law—that is, to fly our flag and to engage in commerce and travel—in order to prevent the occurrence of incidents similar to those which threw us into the World War. We have made it unlawful under our own law.

Dr. WRIGHT. Under our own law, yes; and to that extent it has been successful in keeping us out.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes?

Senator BYRNES. No questions.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, may I ask another question, in view of what Senator Barkley said?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Doctor, is there any contradiction whatever between the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, which said that in the quarrels of the other hemisphere we had not interfered and would not interfere, and the enforcement of our rights against a lot of pirates who were holding up our ships on the high seas, demanding tribute from the United States, and against whom President Jefferson sent a squadron of vessels over there to show the pirates we would not stand for it? Is that any violation of the Monroe Doctrine?

Dr. WRIGHT. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Or President Monroe's declaration, although it had not been made?

Dr. WRIGHT. I would not call it such.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. So far as the Boxer Rebellion is concerned and the engagement of our troops in China in that instance, our troops were in China in pursuance to treaty rights; is that not true?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And when a movement attempting to overturn the lawful government of China, with which we had treaty rights, undertook to run our troops out of China, we resisted it?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is that in violation of the Monroe Doctrine as enunciated by President Monroe?

Dr. WRIGHT. I would not say so; no, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. There may be a lot of dispute as to the basic grounds for our entering into the World War. Certainly the ground of the United States Government's entry at that time was a violation of our rights on the high seas?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That was the ostensible ground, at least, for our entrance into the World War; is not that true?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is correct, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Incidentally, do you recall whether the matter of the freedom of the seas was mentioned in the Peace Conference?

Dr. WRIGHT. Of course not; it was in President Wilson's fourteen points, but it was forgotten by the time the Peace Conference met.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Have you heard of any violations of our rights by any of the belligerents at all in this war except, as you suggest, the rifling of our mail at Bermuda and the taking of our ships into British ports?

Dr. WRIGHT. No.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. With reference to the questions of Senator Barkley, none of our actions in any of those wars was in the least contradictory to the dictum of President Monroe that we had not interfered and did not intend to interfere in the affairs of the other hemisphere.

Dr. WRIGHT. Senator, may I pursue what you said a little further? In 1915, when Great Britain was interfering with our neutral rights by taking ships into port, and so on, for examination, President Wilson asked the Joint Neutrality Board to draw up what forceful measures short of war he could take to make Great Britain comply with our neutral rights. It so happened that two of the officers on the Board drew up a plan, but the civilian member discovered that we had one of the Bryan "cooling-off" treaties, which prevented either nation from engaging in hostilities until a commission of inquiry had investigated the matter, and this commission of inquiry could exhaust a whole year before it made its report. When this was brought to the attention of the President, no further action was taken. Later, when we were alarmed at the violation of our rights by Germany, the same thing could have happened if we had had such a treaty with Germany, but we did not have one. We have one now, but we did not have any then.

So we might have gone into the war, if we pursued these measures, on the side of Germany against Britain, if we had not had that treaty.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Certainly we are not in the situation now where our ships have been attacked on the high seas by pirates or in which treaty rights to maintain troops in foreign countries were violated—and I may say that I deplore the fact that we have that

right, but our troops on foreign land were attacked when we had that treaty—nor do we have the situation that we had in the World War, when American commerce was being attacked on the high seas. We do not have any of those instances referred to by Senator Barkley.

Dr. WRIGHT. I do not know of any rights of the United States that have been violated by Germany in the present war.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you regard the invasion of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium as a violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact?

Dr. WRIGHT. Well, it is a violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, of course. It is resorting to the settlement of an international difficulty by other than pacific means.

Senator BARKLEY. The same would be true of the invasion of Poland, would it not?

Dr. WRIGHT. That is right; but Germany has not violated the Briand-Kellogg Pact so far as our rights under the Briand-Kellogg Pact are concerned.

Senator BARKLEY. That is true in a limited sense, unless you say that a violation of any pact to which a number of nations are parties is a violation to all those nations.

Dr. WRIGHT. Well, that brings into question the matter of intervention for humanitarian reasons, and I did not go into that because I did not think that was mentioned in the bill. The bill says, "Whenever the President deems it vital for national defense," so I did not go into the question of intervention for humanitarian reasons.

Senator BARKLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette.

Senator GILLETTE. Whatever may have been the implication or the provocation for the Barbary States expedition against the pirates, that antedated by many years the enunciation or the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine as a national policy, did it not?

Dr. WRIGHT. Yes, sir; but I think we had that policy in practice, although we may not have been conscious of it, before that time.

Senator GILLETTE. But it was not formulated or announced until many years later?

Dr. WRIGHT. Oh, no; half a dozen years, perhaps.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes.

Senator BYRNES. I desire to submit a request to the chairman when the witness is through, but not until he is through.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Perhaps this has nothing to do with the discussion under way, but I want to call your attention to the classical example of the violation of the Monroe Doctrine from our standpoint. I have listened here day after day to a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, and that has never been mentioned. It was the Venezuela incident, where it was clearcut, and where President Cleveland, the Democratic President, wrote that famous message of his. I can remember it as if it were written yesterday, and I fear I am getting old, because nobody else seems to have recalled it; but when Cleveland wrote that message, with a British warship in Venezuela's port, and our warships there, he said, "However great a calamity it would be for the two great peace-loving nations to be engaged in warfare, it might be necessary under certain circumstances," and he did not hesitate at all.

Do you recall that incident?

Dr. WRIGHT. Absolutely. The matter was subsequently settled by arbitration as a result of his action, and it was very satisfactorily settled, too.

Senator JOHNSON of California. The other incident that has been mentioned once, when the Monroe Doctrine has been discussed, was during President Lincoln's time, or just after his assassination, when Britain and France were attempting to colonize Mexico, and he said that it could not be, and the Army was prepared to march into Mexico at that time.

Now, in that case Britain was one of the violators of the Monroe Doctrine, and it was Britain who violated the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuela incident, and yet we had Presidents who were brave enough at that time to say it should not be and that we should not tolerate it. So we need have no fear of saying that we are in favor of the Monroe Doctrine.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. May I ask one further question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Since the matter of the historic application of the Monroe Doctrine has come up, may I ask this question? Is it not a fact that it was under President Polk's administration that the original Monroe Doctrine was extended to the proposition that the United States would not regard as anything except an unfriendly act even the friendly cession of an American republic in this hemisphere or of territory by a European power?

In an instance before the Mexican War Great Britain was undertaking to take southern California for some of the debts owed by Mexico, and at that time the President said that the United States would regard as an unfriendly act on the part of any European power even a friendly annexation to extend their possessions in this hemisphere.

Dr. WRIGHT. It was during President Polk's administration, also, that a British proposal to acquire canal rights across the Isthmus of Panama was attempted and thwarted, and the rights were acquired by Benjamin Alden Bidlack for the United States in the treaty of 1846.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Wright.

Dr. WRIGHT. Thank you very much for your courtesy in hearing me.

Senator BYRNES. Mr. Chairman, yesterday General Wood testified:

If we are to throw open the doors of our Treasury to Britain, it seems only fair that all British resources in this country be liquidated. Large companies, unlisted, like Lever Bros., the American Viscose Corporation, the Dunlop Tire Co. plant, insurance companies, cotton plantations, cattle ranches, other real estate, evidently did not appear in Secretary Morgenthau's figures.

This morning I wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury, quoting that language, and asking him to advise me whether or not it was correct.

In response, I have received a letter stating:

I am glad to answer your question about yesterday's testimony by Gen. Robert E. Wood, who told your committee that "large companies, unlisted, like Lever Bros., the American Viscose Corporation, the Dunlop Tire Co. plant, cotton plantations, cattle ranches, other real estate, evidently did not appear in Secretary Morgenthau's figures."

General Wood's statement on this point is completely incorrect.

Your committee may wish to know that the Treasury has made a careful recheck of its figures in the light of General Wood's assertions. This recheck shows that every one of the individual companies named by General Wood was included in Secretary Morgenthau's estimate, already given to your committee, of \$900,000,000 in British direct investments in this country. Similarly, the Secretary's estimate included all British-owned properties in this country such as cotton plantations, cattle ranches, and other real estate. The Treasury is confident that the figure of \$900,000,000 represented the value of all such assets in this country, owned by British citizens, which can be converted into dollars.

I ask that my letter to the Secretary and his reply be incorporated into the record.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Of course, I have no intention of objecting to this, but I would like to ask Senator Byrnes if he knows whether the admitted assets above the liabilities of insurance companies, either British or American insurance companies—that is, the equity—are included in that exhibit.

Senator BYRNES. Mr. Chairman, I have no information other than that contained in the Secretary's letter, in which he refers to all British-owned properties of whatever character and description.

As I stated to General Wood, Secretary Morgenthau had indicated a desire that any member of the committee who wished to inquire as to any properties should submit the request to him.

I requested General Wood if he would give me any memorandum of any property that he thought was not included, so that it might be checked, and the committee would have that information before them.

I have not submitted to the Secretary the question of the Senator from Missouri; in fact, I have not submitted to him anything other than what I have read, which was the testimony before this committee.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Well, Mr. Chairman, I, of course, have no intention of objecting to the request of the Senator from South Carolina. I may say that I am today submitting to the Secretary of the Treasury an inquiry along the line of the inquiry of the Senator from South Carolina. I hope I may have a speedier answer than I did from the Secretary of the Treasury as to the gathering of information on the carrying charges on these former Allied debts, which took me about 10 days to get.

In addition, I ask unanimous consent of the committee to have inserted into the record the letter that I got from Secretary Morgenthau in response to my inquiry previous to testimony here. It was received after the appearance of Secretary Morgenthau and Undersecretary Bell. I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted at the appropriate place in the record, after the testimony of Secretary Morgenthau and Undersecretary Bell.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be inserted; and, without objection, the correspondence between Senator Byrnes and the Secretary of the Treasury will be inserted in the record.

(The correspondence between Senator Byrnes and Secretary Morgenthau is as follows:)

FEBRUARY 5, 1941.

HON. HENRY MORGENTHAU,
Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Gen. R. E. Wood, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on yesterday, stated:

"If we are to throw open the doors of our Treasury to Britain, it seems only fair that all British resources in this country be liquidated. Large companies, unlisted, like Lever Bros., the American Viscose Corporation, the Dunlop Tire

Co. plant, insurance companies, cotton plantations, cattle ranches, other real estate, evidently did not appear in Secretary Morgenthau's figures."

I wish you would advise me whether or not General Wood's statement is correct.

• Very truly yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES.

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, February 5, 1941.

Hon. JAMES F. BYRNES,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I am glad to answer your question about yesterday's testimony by Gen. Robert E. Wood, who told your committee that "large companies, unlisted, like Lever Bros., the American Viscose Corporation, the Dunlop Tire Co. plant, cotton plantations, cattle ranches, other real estate, evidently did not appear in Secretary Morgenthau's figures."

General Wood's statement on this point is completely incorrect.

Your committee may wish to know that the Treasury has made a careful recheck of its figures in the light of General Wood's assertions. This recheck shows that every one of the individual companies named by General Wood was included in Secretary Morgenthau's estimate, already given to your committee, of \$900,000,000 in British direct investments in this country. Similarly, the Secretary's estimate included all British-owned properties in this country such as cotton plantations, cattle ranches, and other real estate. The Treasury is confident that the figure of \$900,000,000 represented the value of all such assets in this country, owned by British citizens, which can be converted into dollars.

Very truly yours,

HERBERT E. GASTON,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Simply because I received it and not because I know anything about the facts, I submit that I had a letter the day before yesterday in which it was asserted that very large borax deposits in Kern County were owned by the British. Now, I do not know a thing about it, and I make no charge respecting it at all. Some day, when you are in conversation with the Secretary of the Treasury, ask him if there is any such thing.

Senator BYRNES. In justice to General Wood, I should say that after inquiries were made of him he stated he had never seen the list and made no inquiries about it. He just assumed, from newspaper articles, that these unlisted securities and real estate were not included. That was the explanation of General Wood.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It is also only fair to say that no member of this committee had ever seen this list, either.

Senator BYRNES. There was no question about that, but no member of the committee said what General Wood had said, that these evidently were not included. That was the only statement that prompted the interrogatories from committee members. General Wood said evidently they were not included.

STATEMENT OF GERALD L. K. SMITH, NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Gerald Smith.

Mr. Smith, will you state for the record for whom and on behalf of whom you appear; that is, whether your appearance is personal or is representative of any organization?

Mr. SMITH. Senator George, my statement includes the answer to that question, and is divided into two divisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, then. You may proceed with your statement.

Mr. SMITH. We herewith present certifications, affidavits, and other evidence to establish the fact that about 2,000,000 people have signed our petition appealing to the Congress of the United States to build our national defense second to none and keep America out of foreign

I believe the presentation of this petition is to be pertinent at this time because it is our conviction that House Resolution 1776, and S. 275, if passed, will, for all practical purposes, transfer the power to declare war, or make war, from the Congress to the President.

My appearance before this committee is authorized by a resolution signed by 1,921 leaders of our committee, whose constituents are in 38 States. I present the resolution herewith. May I say concerning these insertions, Mr. Chairman, they are properly prepared and will be offered without taking any time to read them before the committee. Individuals signing our petitions are from 38 States. It will be recalled that on July 25, 1940, the senior Senator from Michigan, Mr. Arthur Vandenberg, presented the certification of our first 1,000,000 names.

What I am about to say is based on the careful and conservative interpretation of sentiments expressed in more than 100,000 personal letters received by me since the issue now being discussed by this committee came to the foreground.

Our committee respects expert testimony having to do with military science, international law, the production and use of defense equipment. Your witness does not pose as an expert in any of these realms of endeavor. I pose only as an expert in the interpretation of the thinking of my constituency, which I believe to be thoroughly and typically American.

The importance of our testimony is further emphasized in the fact that although our following is concentrated in the areas between St. Louis and Pittsburgh, inclusive, and Louisville and Detroit, inclusive, it is to be noted that in Michigan, the State which is carrying the major load in the production of important defense equipment, we have more than 321,000 people affiliated with our national organization.

Therefore, it seems reasonable that the people who live and have their being in these centers of great production responsibility should be well satisfied that our democracy is to be in no way imperiled by the current emergency.

To illustrate: It is our conviction that ordinary industrial workers in such cities as Detroit, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, many of whom are constituents of our organization, cannot throw themselves into the production of defense equipment with the abandon and enthusiasm and sacrifice which is needed, if they have any fear whatsoever that the democracy which they are being asked to defend by hard work, and perhaps military service, is in any way imperiled in the seat of government.

I speak over the radio twice each week. This radio broadcast covers a population area of approximately 25,000,000 people. Expert surveys which have been made of this broadcast estimate that our listening audience is about 1,000,000 per week. In every broadcast I discuss

current issues which I believe to be related to the ideals for which our committee stands. These ideals are summarized in an insert which I beg to have placed in the permanent record of this committee, which I need not take time to read.

Our mail is very heavy, which requires from 20 to 40 people to handle, work, and answer and file.

Some weeks ago I devoted one entire radio manuscript to H. R. 1776 and have discussed it consistently since that time. I have discussed practically every other important debate in Congress, but no discussion has ever brought the flood of letters that have been coming to our national headquarters concerning House Resolution 1776.

These letters represent people who have disagreed with me on other issues. They indicate great apprehension, fear—almost panic. Whether their fears are well-founded or not, these letters indicate that my constituents actually believe that behind the obvious purposes of this bill is a definite plan to get us into this war.

Time does not permit me to summarize all of the main objections which have been raised in this correspondence, but below are a few. Before naming these reasons for which our people oppose this resolution, I insert this comment. Our people are overwhelmingly in favor of humanitarian aid to Britain, but they have taken the words originated by our President, "short of war," very literally, and they want the words "short of war" to mean just exactly what they are defined as meaning in the dictionary.

A composite of reasons given for the opposition that our people offer to this proposed legislation, based on the interpretation of their letters, is about as follows:

1. It grants too much power to the President.
2. It seems to repeal the spirit of the Neutrality Act.
3. Granting that the President is entitled to certain extraordinary powers, this bill does not limit the time for the exercise of that power. Even so, we would not favor the granting of this much power to the President for any period of time, whether it be 6 days, 6 months, or 6 years.
4. The bill, for all practical purposes, would repeal the Johnson Act. This act is extremely popular among our people, as is the author.
5. Our people are suspicious of the manifestation of impatience which the President seems to show with legitimate and extended debate on this important measure.

It is our conviction that when authority is transferred from one department of government to the other the consideration of this transfer should not be hurried and the due processes of government should not be imperiled.

6. Our people are disturbed over the fact that whereas the President and Adolph Hitler came to power the same year, they did not receive information concerning our defense situation until the summer of 1940. They get the impression that we have practically no defense equipment comparable to our Western Hemisphere commitments, and simultaneously we are about to ask Congress to surrender its authority to the President who, in turn, is to be permitted to give away or loan a high percentage of even the small defense equipment which we now possess.

7. We believe that this bill will repeal and forever abandon the Monroe Doctrine, making us a copartner with England in fighting

Europe's wars and making England copartner with us in Western Hemisphere imperialism.

For the record I take a brief quotation from the Monroe Doctrine, which reads as follows:

Our policy in regard to Europe * * * is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers * * * In the wars of European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. * * *

8. Our people are suspicious of all European politicians, including the British. We do not believe Britain would do for us what we are being asked to do for her. Inasmuch as British capital financed the building of the Hitler military machine in its early days, we believe that there is a strong leadership in Britain which would readily make a deal with Germany or anyone else, regardless of America, if they thought such a treaty or such a deal or such a compromise would extend the borders of the British Empire.

9. Our people observe that most of the witnesses and columnists and editors and propagandists who favor the passage of this bill have at some other time expressed a desire to see this country involved in war. Mr. Gerard, Miss Dorothy Tompson, and others illustrate this point.

10. We agree with Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy that this is England's war, therefore England is not our first line of defense.

Inasmuch as Ambassador Kennedy is every inch an American and inasmuch as he was appointed to be our Ambassador in order that he might give us intelligent testimony concerning just such a crisis as this, our mail suggests that our people would rather trust Mr. Kennedy than all the counts and lords and princesses and dukes and duchesses that can be sent over here to testify otherwise.

11. Our constituents constantly refer in their correspondence to the treatment the British Empire gave us following the last war as relating to their debt to America. We believe that the statement Mr. Winston Churchill made in an interview to the eminent newspaper publisher, Mr. William Griffin, of New York, is typical of the British attitude since the last war, which statement reads in part as follows:

Legally we owe this debt to the United States, but logically we don't, and this is because America should have minded her own business and stayed out of the World War. If she had done so, the Allies would have made peace with Germany in the spring of 1917, thus saving over a million British, French, American, and other lives and preventing the subsequent rise of fascism and nazi-ism * * *.

12. This bill grants to the President discretionary powers in the lending and leasing of equipment vital to our national defense.

Inasmuch as thousands of our followers come from the great industrial centers where the Catholic religion is very strong, I find that thousands of my letters from Catholics manifest great apprehension because of the President's semifriendly attitude toward the Soviet Union, the arch enemy of the Christian religion.

I see no way for this legislation, if passed, to win the confidence of such constituents, who are both Catholic and Protestant, as long as there is any thought that the passing of such legislation would give the President the power to contribute directly or indirectly to the military strength of Soviet Russia.

Our mail in the last 10 days has been filled with letters manifesting alarm over the lifting of the so-called moral embargo. Rightly or

wrongly, our people actually fear that the lifting of this embargo presages a secret alliance between Britain, Russia, and America. Unless this impression is corrected it will not only divide our country but I fear that it will absolutely imperil the national unity which is needed in order to build an adequate national defense.

Our people do not resent any rough treatment which Hitler and Mussolini may get in Washington, but they cannot understand the gentle treatment which is accorded to the emissaries of atheistic, communistic Soviet Russia.

13. Our people believe that the passing of this bill would give the President the authority to bankrupt our Nation. Even if we were to assume that the President has a superintelligence, we do not believe that there is one single brain in America qualified to solve the economic and fiscal emergencies that will arise in the days that are ahead without the authoritative aid of the legislative department of our Government.

I pause here for comment concerning the correspondence that comes to me. Most Americans stand in awe of a President and practically no American within the range of my acquaintance would dare to write a letter containing positive criticism to the President. Thus, when he makes a radio address, those who are in rank disagreement with what he says do not write; those who are in agreement frequently praise him so effervescently that the interpreters of his correspondence would have him believe that the whole Nation is in agreement with his policy.

This makes an interpretation of correspondence such as we receive important to this debate.

14. This brings me to the next point. The President in his address to Congress on the state of the Nation in January, left the impression in the minds of our people that he was going to reform and purify the whole world.

Our people do not believe that we can hire the British Army to do that for us even though they might have the cooperation of the Greeks and the Chinese, and that if we are to accomplish what the President promised in his address to Congress, if it is possible at all, it will take American manpower on foreign battlefields. And when I say that our people actually "fear" that that is what is about to happen I express it mildly. It is worse than fear—it is panic.

Such panic is very dangerous and unless relieved may produce reactions the effects of which cannot be foreseen.

15. Our people recognize the rational value of military secrets but they do not like the idea of political secrets involving legislative measures. Symbolic of this apprehension is their comment concerning Mr. Welles' mysterious visit to Europe, the obvious attempts to silence Mr. Kennedy, the paradoxical reports concerning the activities of Mr. Bullitt, the unofficial (?) travels of Col. "Wild Bill" Donovan, Mr. Harry Hopkins, the Honorable Wendell Willkie, and others.

Although the President sent Mr. Taylor to the Vatican and although we know that His Holiness Pope Pius is one of the most constructive friends of peace, we have received no report from Mr. Taylor concerning the prayer and program of Pope Pius for peace.

I raise this question: Do the smear agencies which are attempting to discredit all of us who want peace and who want to keep America out of foreign war—do these agencies dare refer to the head of Christianity's largest single unit as an "appeaser"? If I am an appeaser,

though I be a Protestant, I am willing to be branded the same kind of an appeaser as the Vicar of Christ who sits in Rome.

This legislation must be considered from three viewpoints: First, the nature of the bill literally; second, the nature of the President; and, third, the nature of the President's possible successor.

I beg of the proponents of the bill who sit on this committee to hear me carefully because any criticism which I voice concerning the President in the next few moments will be illustrated by references to one of the three best personal friends I ever had on this earth.

It is granted that this bill, if passed, will confer upon the President unusual powers. If passed, he will be the most powerful man on earth. He will sit upon the treasury of the world and personally decide how much shall go to this nation or that nation. First, he will be the economic dictator not only of the United States but of the nations of the earth. Even Britain cannot plan her military strategy without first ascertaining how much or how little Mr. Roosevelt will be willing to grant for certain campaigns, engagements, or military undertaking.

I contend that it is dangerous to our democracy, regardless of this emergency and regardless of any emergency, to confer that much power on any human being on this earth. Cynical foes insist on questioning the motives of the President. For the sake of this argument only, we will grant that the President is the most intelligent, the noblest, and the most highly qualified public official on earth. It must be granted further, however, that the President has a passion for power.

If the President's attitude toward our democratic institutions during his term of office thus far had been similar to that of the Great Commoner, William Jennings Bryan; the Great Progressive, the late Robert M. La Follette; or the Great Emancipator, Abraham Lincoln, I believe that the attitude of our people would be entirely different toward the passage of this bill.

The President heretofore has shown no disposition to surrender powers thus far granted to him in the name of emergency. He gained unusual powers based on the banking emergency, based on the unemployment emergency, based on the agricultural emergency, based on the industrial emergency. He gained further powers based on the passion of labor to organize and bargain collectively, based on the determination of the American people to establish social security for themselves.

I ask the proponents of this bill, which, if any, of these emergency powers has the President voluntarily relinquished? Our people are apprehensive of this bill not only because of its literal nature but because of the nature of the President as illustrated in three outstanding events in his Presidential career thus far.

First, his determination to fill the Supreme Court with men who would interpret his legislative proposals in harmony with his ambitions. Second, his determination to bring more than 100 independent departments under the personal direction of the Chief Executive; and, third, his passionate determination to purge the Members of the United States Senate who contributed in making these two bold bids for power unsuccessful.

In fact, I believe that the experience of the chairman of this committee illustrates that point better than anything that could be said on the subject.

Who among the proponents of this legislation can guarantee that Mr. Roosevelt will be alive in 30 days, or 1 year, or 10 days? The Providence of God and the mystery of events assure no man a duration of life. Since Mr. Roosevelt became the President many of his most intimate friends and valued advisers have been taken in death by accidental and natural causes. Among them are such men as the late Senator Robinson, Senator Walsh, Secretary Woodin, his own intimate secretary, Mr. Howe. No living man dare make any claims in the future more than these men made. The absence of Mr. Bankhead from the Congress and the very recent demise of Mr. McAdoo merely emphasizes the danger a nation faces when it trusts too much of its destiny in the hands of one man.

This subject brings me to a very personal account of a very personal experience which I hesitate to describe, and I am tempted to relate to it merely because of my high respect for the importance of this debate.

Mr. Chairman, may I insert at this point a brief extemporaneous comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may proceed.

Mr. SMITH. May I say that perhaps I knew and loved Huey Long as well as any man on earth. Because of the fact that he was taken out of his public career in the middle of his life, it has been necessary for some of us who were close to him to underwrite millions of lies of unfavorable publicity; but today for the first time since his death I criticize him as my sacrifice to demonstrate that I am not a bitter critic of the President, but that I am willing to move toward the criticism of the President through the heart of the man I loved more than any man I have ever known.

I have been faced with newspaper interviews, persecuting questions, men who said, "But for your association with Huey Long we would go with you."

Even when their criticisms were correct, I refused to endorse them, because I was the last man he touched on this earth, and it was his widow who asked me to speak the last word over his grave.

I was the close, intimate companion of Huey P. Long, who rose to power on the stepping stone of emergency. He saw a feudal State, buried in mud, divided by unbridged rivers, crucified with poverty, drained of its natural resources by unscrupulous corporate exploiters wallowing in disease, the most illiterate State in the Nation, one-half of the children not in school, public buildings a disgrace, and "the last stand of the feudal lords of America"—quoting Huey Long.

He promised the people if they would give him the power so to do that he would correct these evils, and in the face of great opposition and persecution and misunderstanding he corrected these evils and was given virtual command over the legislative, executive, and judicial destiny of an entire State.

Many of us at times, who loved this man for his courage and dramatic and intellectual ability, just as many of you love the President, were apprehensive when these new powers were granted to him. But we said, "Look at the good that is being done. If all this good must be delayed until the slow and cumbersome legislative processes have been unwound it will be too late to accomplish the greater good."

But one day, on Sunday night, I walked with my friend through the vestibule of the State Capitol, which in its beautiful appointments is a monument to his progressive impulses and to his determined ambi-

tions for the people. A man stepped out as if to shake his hand and shot him through the abdomen. I was with him when he breathed his last. I held his hand as his last breath went out of his bosom.

I stood beside the grave and spoke the oration as his body was lowered into the ground. In the days that followed I saw this crown of unusual authority which had rested upon the brow of a man who knew how to handle it, pass to a man and to a set of men unworthy and unprepared. The misuse of that power, the corruption of that power, and the chaotic confusion which the abuse of that power produced in this beautiful State is now a matter of public record and the unworthy heir of that crown of power is today on his way to the Federal Penitentiary, where he, in my opinion, belongs.

And although Huey P. Long to the day of his assassination enjoyed the confidence of his constituents, just as the President now enjoys the confidence of his constituents, the powers which we who loved and believed in Huey Long granted him, when inherited by another became the curse of even those of us who granted them.

Therefore, just as Richard W. Loche proved to be the true personification of the results of this dissipation of legislative authority in Louisiana, we must consider this proposed legislation not only in terms of its literal content, the nature of the President, but also in terms of the nature of the Vice President, or his successor.

Therefore, I make as my contribution to the further debate which the gentlemen of the Senate will carry on having to do with this bill, the raising of this question: How would his legislation look if Henry Wallace were the President and Mr. Barkley were Vice President?

Gentlemen, this concludes my statement. By going into the secret chambers of my own experience concerning my best and most intimate friend in public life, now dead at the hand of an assassin, I believe I have demonstrated that this statement is sincere and that my convictions represent not partisan opinion but my genuine love for my country.

Knowing that we cannot anticipate the events of the immediate future, I speak this last paragraph for the permanent record:

Regardless of what the future may hold and though sophisticated intellectuals these days seem to take unusual pleasure in discrediting axioms of our people, this committee and all public officials connected with our Government can always depend on my sincere appreciation for the philosophy of Stephen Decatur, who said: "My country, may she always be right; but my country, right or wrong."

THE CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Harrison?

Senator HARRISON. I have no questions.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. I have no questions.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I have no questions.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No questions.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. No questions.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, have you any questions?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. As I understand your statement, Mr. Smith, it was that formerly you were something of an addict of dictatorship, but you "done got cured." Is that correct?

Mr. SMITH. Senator, I am willing to admit reluctantly that I was a part, and an enthusiastic part, of the organization which built perhaps one of the most efficient organizations ever built in any State. In fact, I can remember this committee duplicated. But before I say that, things here do not look strange. In fact, I can remember this committee duplicated in the passing of much legislation in Louisiana. I can remember how Mr. Ellender, now United States Senator from Louisiana, engineered Huey Long laws through the legislature, just as Mr. Barkley engineers the Roosevelt bills through the Senate. I understand the treasure of good works when it comes to the temptations involved to destroy our legislative processes.

I hope Senator La Follette will forgive me if I make a personal reference to his illustrious father. I grew up in Wisconsin as the son of a man who was a Bob La Follette man. I presume the progressive impulses of my father caused me to be influenced by the progressive impulses of Mr. Long, who came to power in my adopted State.

I recall saying to Senator Long in the heyday of his power, "Senator, you have all of the vision and ability and capacity necessary to make a tremendous mark in the history of our Nation, which, of course, you are making anyway. But I wish you would make a careful study of the life of Robert M. La Follette, Sr., to see how he had the courage to restrain himself long enough to wait for the legislative processes necessary to improve the welfare of his people."

Naturally, the State of Louisiana was different than the State of Wisconsin. Huey Long was very impatient. He said, "Why should we wait on legislators that have been corrupt for hundreds of years by the Standard Oil Co. and the planters and the Power Trust, to build a hospital?"

He was just as passionate about a hospital as some people are about getting us into this war. And the events that followed interpret his attitude as contrasted with the attitude of Mr. La Follette.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Senator George and gentlemen of the committee.

(The following was presented by Mr. Smith to be entered into the record:)

JANUARY 20, 1941.

RESOLUTION

At a meeting of 1,000 leaders of the Committee of 1,000,000 who were called together in an emergency meeting by the national chairman, the following resolution was adopted:

Whereas we of the Committee of 1,000,000 represent a recruited following in 38 of the 48 States; and,

Whereas our national chairman, Gerald L. K. Smith, has been invited to appear before the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Lower and Upper House of Congress to express his opinion concerning H. R. 1776 and S. 275;

Be it resolved, That, this assembly of about 1,000 leaders go on record as approving the statement to be made by Gerald L. K. Smith before the congressional committees.

PRINCIPLES OF THE "COMMITTEE OF 1,000,000"

Gerald L. K. Smith, National Chairman, National Headquarters, Detroit, Mich.

The spirit of the Committee of 1,000,000 is defined in the seven principles of action covering the entire sphere of our national life. These principles are as follows:

1. To rebuild the spirit of America.
 2. To wipe out to the last vestige, communism, nazi-ism, and fa-cism in all forms.
 3. To redefine the American national character.
 4. To instill a new spirit in American youth, dedicated intellectually and physically to the maintenance of American institutions.
 5. To issue a call to farmers and laborers to resist what is now known to be an international plot to make them part of a world revolution.
 6. To rededicate the citizenry of America to the family altar and to the spirit of the church.
 7. To secure the maintenance of a well-defined standard of American living.
- Emergency crusade.*—Keep America out of foreign wars! Build a national defense second to none!

FEBRUARY 6, 1941.

Attached is a copy of an affidavit which was furnished the committee of the lower House.

Although Mr. Bloom asked for this affidavit he failed to insert it in the permanent record of the committee hearings.

On February 4, I requested that the original affidavit be returned and was informed that it was filed beyond our reach.

Therefore, for the benefit of the Senate committee, the original is in the hands of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the lower House, the Honorable Sol Bloom, chairman.

DETROIT, MICH., January 20, 1940.

We, the undersigned aides, assistants, and office workers of the Committee of 1,000,000, have to do with the opening of mail, the handling of petitions, and filing of same in the national headquarters of the Committee of 1,000,000.

We have read the statements of Mr. Gerald L. K. Smith, our national chairman, having to do with petitions on file and the expression of opinion contained in the letters received. We certify that, according to our best understanding, the statements of Mr. Smith are correct.

BERNARD DOMAN,
Office Manager.

JULIA KING,
In charge of reading mail.

PHYLLIS CHANDLER,
Keeper of important records.

WALLACE GAMBER,
Office aide.

ANNE GRUNER,
In charge of filing petitions.

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

County of Wayne, ss:

On this 20th day of January 1941 before me, Kathryn L. Tice, a notary public in and for said county, personally appeared Bernard Doman, Julia King, Phyllis Chandler, Wallace Gamber, and Anne Gruner, to me known to be the same persons described in and who executed the within instrument, who duly individually acknowledged same to be true to their best knowledge and belief.

[SEAL]

KATHRYN L. TICE,
Notary Public, Wayne County, Mich.

My commission expires January 18, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. We have no other witnesses this afternoon who are ready to go on.

I wish to request the committee to remain for a brief executive session. There is a matter that I wish to bring to the attention of the committee.

I will ask the audience to retire as quickly as possible.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, February 6, 1941, at 10 a. m.)

TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1941

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Hon. Walter F. George presiding.

Present, Senators George (chairman), Harrison, Connally, Thomas of Utah, Van Nuys, Murray, Pepper, Green, Barkley, Reynolds, Guffey, Gillette, Clark of Missouri, Glass, Byrnes, Johnson of California, Capper, La Follette, Vandenberg, White, Shipstead, and Nye.

STATEMENT OF COL. ROBERT R. McCORMICK, OF CHICAGO, ILL., PUBLISHER OF THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE

The CHAIRMAN. Before the committee this morning is Col. Robert R. McCormick, of Chicago, publisher of the Chicago Tribune.

Colonel McCormick, if you have a prepared statement and desire to complete the statement before any questions are asked, you may do so.

Colonel McCORMICK. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed as you desire.

Colonel McCORMICK. My only excuse for intruding upon your time is that I happen to have some personal knowledge of the country over which an attack upon this continent would have to pass. Of course, we all know France pretty well. I have been across Spain twice. During the Moroccan War I went into Morocco. I went into Algiers, I went into the Sahara Desert, and I was very much interested in it. I sent an expedition across the Sahara Desert to Dakar.

From this distance I cannot see the figures on the wall map behind you, and will have to read them from the one before me. It is 500 miles from the German frontier to the boundary between Spain and France, and 500 miles from that frontier to Cadiz. The roads in Spain were bad then, and they are much worse since the war. It is impossible to move large bodies of troops over them.

The Atlas Mountains are exceedingly rough and mountainous. There were some small railroads when I was there, and the French were building roads for the small armies they were using against the Moroccans.

From Morocco to Dakar was 3,300 miles by desert and by a jungle railroad. You clearly see, therefore, there being no food to be obtained in the desert, in Spain, or in France, that it is utterly impossible to transport or maintain an army at Dakar.

If the question were merely one of maintaining an aviation base at Dakar, you still have the grave problem of transport of materials to

that point over that enormous distance, badly supplied with roads. But assuming an aviation base were established at Dakar, just a few miles away from the Cape Verde Islands, shown on the Navy chart, it can be much more easily supplied by water than a base at Dakar supplied overland or by air. So that an aerial squadron at the Cape Verde Islands could very easily destroy the squadron at Dakar.

But assuming those islands were not occupied, from Dakar to Natal, on the South American coast, is 1,620 miles. From Natal to Georgetown, our farthest southern flying base, is 2,000 miles over the Brazilian equatorial jungle. To reach Georgetown the German air force would have to travel 7,900 miles to meet our own air force, amply supplied with line of communications through the Gulf of Mexico to the Caribbean Sea, protected by our West Indies bases. Our pilots would be completely rested, and their engines unharmed. I cannot conceive of any one having the slightest fear of an invasion via South America, if he had any respect for our air force; and I have high respect for it.

If America were to be invaded, therefore, or if an attempt were to be made to invade it, it would have to be made by the North Atlantic. Allow me to say I spent many years in eastern Canada. I know Newfoundland and Labrador. If the attack were to be attempted by the North Atlantic, the route would be Iceland, 850 miles; Newfoundland, 1,650 miles more; and Canada, another 800 miles, a total distance of 3,300 miles.

Iceland is now held by Canadian troops, so that route is blocked at first base. If Iceland were lost, southern Greenland and Labrador would be of no use to an invader because of their rough character. On Newfoundland is a great Canadian-British air base, and our own soldiers have already landed on the island. Supplies would easily reach Newfoundland for our troops by the St. Lawrence River, immune from any interruption, while an assailant crossing the ocean would be subject to attack from the air, on the water, and from submarines. It seems to me that only a hysterical imagination can dream of our being driven out of Newfoundland. But if we were, the enemy would find no supplies in that barren land. There would be Cabot Strait to cross. Nova Scotia is a peninsula with a narrow neck, and to New Brunswick largely forest and muskeg. Would anyone dream of an enemy forcing his way through that country opposed by an army of Americans and Canadians of one or two million men?

On the other side, in the Pacific, we have our bases in the Aleutian Islands, 2,200 miles from Tokio; at Pearl Harbor, 3,800 miles from Tokio, and Samoa 4,000 miles from Tokio. If we need any other island bases to protect our coasts, we have the means of taking them, and the knowledge that we will be welcomed by their inhabitants.

Behind these outposts we have the Panama Canal, so that we can move our fleet from ocean to ocean, which makes even a one-ocean navy strategically equal to two navies denied the use of the Panama Canal. It is fantastic to suggest that we are in any danger of attack.

But even if we did not have these overwhelming strategical advantages, this panic over possible German attack would not be justified. We went overseas 23 years ago to attack the German Army and we were not overwhelmed. Our victory, however, was won at bitter cost. The two divisions which were the most heavily engaged lost three men in killed, wounded, and broken by hardships for every man they contained on their mustering day. Many of these ruined men

are still in the hospitals or are suffering on their modest Government compensation. Nobody ever gives a ball or a cocktail party for them.

There are young men of the same stripe today who, if forced to war abroad, will fight as the old army fought, and suffer as the old army is suffering today.

The experiences of the Athenians at Syracuse, the Romans in Germany, Napoleon in Egypt, the Russians in Manchuria show that the greatest catastrophes come to navies, armies, and nations when they embark on distant military adventures. I pray to God that hysteria, propaganda, and ambition will not become strong enough to immolate our present generation of young men.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished your general statement, Colonel?
Colonel McCORMICK. I have finished.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. You were in the last war, Colonel, were you not?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. In what arm of the forces did you serve?

Colonel McCORMICK. I was first on the staff, and afterwards in the field artillery, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How long were you across the water?

Colonel McCORMICK. Sixteen months.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You therefore have some first-hand knowledge of warfare, as well as this knowledge derived from the geographical conditions, have you not?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You do not think there is any danger of immediate attack on this country?

Colonel McCORMICK. No danger from immediate attack, Senator. Senator JOHNSON of California. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally, have you any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. Colonel McCORMICK, on your map, on which you point out the distances from Germany around through Africa, and then over to South America, you show how difficult it would be for an air attack to come over that route. That would not necessarily be true if the attacking power had naval power so as to be able to establish bases in South America, would it? You are presupposing a purely land and air attack, are you not?

Colonel McCORMICK. I think I put a star on the Azores. Our base in the Azores would cut Dakar off. We should have a base at the Azores.

Senator CONNALLY. We have not, have we?

Colonel McCORMICK. I cannot answer that. We certainly have commercial aviation flying to the Azores, and the British have control of the Azores. Undoubtedly we could make an arrangement with them like the one made for the other bases.

Senator CONNALLY. We probably could do that, but I do not understand that we have done so yet. What I am getting at is that your hypothesis is based upon the assumption that that would be a land and air attack, without naval power. Is that true?

Colonel McCormick. No; we could stop the naval occupation of Dakar.

Senator Connally. If they had naval power, they would not have to be bothered with Dakar, would they? They could go over to South America if they had a sufficient navy?

Colonel McCormick. They would have to meet our air force and our Navy.

Senator Connally. Exactly; of course they would.

Colonel McCormick. We have these bases, thank Heaven.

Senator Connally. They could give us a great deal of trouble if they had the British Fleet—could they not?

Colonel McCormick. Senator, I have known Winston Churchill for 25 years. A more thoroughly honorable man never lived. He would not have made that promise if he had not intended to keep it.

Senator Connally. I am sure of that. I am sure of his good faith, but Mr. Churchill might be bombed, he might be killed, or he might be captured, if England should fall. Are you hinging the whole safety of the United States on the good faith of Mr. Churchill and his ability to keep that faith?

Colonel McCormick. No indeed; certainly not. We could stop the fleet anyway.

Senator Connally. Now we are getting down to the point. So that if there were a power with a fleet and an air force, we would have to have a fleet that was superior to their navy, would we not?

Colonel McCormick. No.

Senator Connally. We would not?

Colonel McCormick. No.

Senator Connally. Why not?

Colonel McCormick. An invader needs a distinctly larger force than a defender.

Senator Connally. Suppose they meet out on the high seas.

Colonel McCormick. So far as that goes, we have it anyway. I do not waive the point, but we have it anyway.

Senator Connally. You are in favor of a big Navy, are you not?

Colonel McCormick. My first ambition was to be a naval officer.

Senator Connally. I am sure you would have made a good one, Colonel. You are in favor of a two-ocean Navy, are you not?

Colonel McCormick. I do not think it is a military necessity.

Senator Connally. You said awhile ago that with the Panama Canal a one-ocean Navy was in fact a two-ocean Navy, did you not?

Colonel McCormick. Not exactly. I could not say one is two; but I said it was as effective. A one-ocean Navy, using the Panama Canal, is as effective as two Navies which have not the use of it—what they call the principle of economy of forces.

Senator Connally. Suppose two navies were attacking us, one out on the Pacific and one in the Atlantic.

Colonel McCormick. We would defend on one side and attack on the other.

Senator Connally. We could not have the Navy on both sides at the same time. We would have to divide it, would we not?

Colonel McCormick. Oh, no; stand on the defensive with our outposts in one ocean, and fight with the Navy in the other ocean.

Senator Connally. I hope you can demonstrate to the Navy that one navy is just as strong as two navies, because we will save a lot of money.

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Colonel McCORMICK. I did not say that.

Senator CONNALLY. You said, though, that if we had the Panama Canal and were attacked in the Atlantic by one hostile navy, and in the Pacific by another hostile navy, we could defend one and attack the other with the same Navy, by shuffling them back and forth, I suppose.

Colonel McCORMICK. History is full of illustrations of that kind.

Senator CONNALLY. What is that?

Colonel McCORMICK. History is full of illustrations of that kind.

Senator CONNALLY. I was sure you had a basis for your assumption, of course, but some of us are not as familiar with history as you are, and of course it is hard for us to envisage these things.

You do not express any opinion on the bill as such, I understand?

Colonel McCORMICK. No; I do not.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not care to?

Colonel McCORMICK. No; I do not care to.

Senator CONNALLY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper is not present yet. Senator Thomas, have you any questions?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No questions, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys?

Senator VAN NUYS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. Colonel, I wanted to ask you just this one further question. In assessing the possibility of attack upon us by a victorious Germany, is there not a further factor to which you have not alluded? Would not a victorious Germany find at her back a mass of sullen millions of resentful, subjugated peoples who would make it exceedingly difficult for her to proceed at all in our direction?

Colonel McCORMICK. I think that is very true; yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. Colonel McCormick, what would be your attitude as to the policy of this country if Hitler should conquer England and proceed to take over and occupy the British bases in what is regarded as this hemisphere?

Colonel McCORMICK. I would not let him do it.

Senator PEPPER. What would you do to prevent it?

Colonel McCORMICK. Attack him.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose that Hitler were to get Laval into the position of Premier of France and were to order the French fleet, through him, to come and occupy French bases in this hemisphere and proceed to carry out ostensibly French, but actually Hitler, policy in those bases?

Colonel McCORMICK. I would not let him.

Senator PEPPER. You would recommend that your country's Navy attack those bases?

Colonel McCORMICK. My policy would be to acquire them in advance, all the foreign-owned islands in this hemisphere.

Senator PEPPER. By what method?

Colonel McCORMICK. Purchase.

Senator PEPPER. By purchase?

Colonel McCORMICK. Purchase.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose Laval, acting upon the impulse of his mentor from Berlin said, "No, thank you; I do not care to sell the French bases and the French colonies in the Western Hemisphere." Then what would you do?

Colonel McCORMICK. I would follow out General Grant's policy in which he said that on account of the Alabama claims, if necessary he would take possession of British territory on this continent in payment for them.

Senator PEPPER. You would just go and occupy by force, then?

Colonel McCORMICK. I certainly would.

Senator PEPPER. What would be the effect of such an action on the part of this Government upon Hitler?

Colonel McCORMICK. I could not tell you.

Senator PEPPER. You would not be interested in what his reaction was?

Colonel McCORMICK. Not a bit.

Senator PEPPER. Let us assume then that the same answer applies to the Bermudas, if Hitler were to conquer England and proceed to occupy, through the guise of a puppet British government, the Bermudas.

Colonel McCORMICK. We already have occupied Bermuda, thank Heaven.

Senator PEPPER. We have a base in process of construction there, but we have not occupied the whole island, have we?

Colonel McCORMICK. I think not.

Senator PEPPER. To whom do the Azores belong?

Colonel McCORMICK. To Portugal.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose Hitler should capture and occupy Portugal, and set up a puppet government in Portugal. What would you recommend this country to do about the Azores?

Colonel McCORMICK. I would get there first.

Senator PEPPER. You think that would be a policy calculated to keep the peace of the United States?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes, I think so.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think that if the United States Navy and Army should occupy the Azores and make an American base of it, Hitler would do anything to resist?

Colonel McCORMICK. I think England will make an arrangement with us to occupy the Azores. You understand that England has the right.

Senator PEPPER. Let us suppose that Hitler should conquer England as he has conquered France. Let us also suppose that he should conquer Portugal as he has conquered France, and that he set up puppet governments in both Portugal and England as he may in France. Then suppose those puppet governments, one of them owning the Azores and the other having the controlling fleet, decided that that would be a Hitler base at the Azores. Then what would you recommend that we do?

Colonel McCORMICK. Get there first.

Senator PEPPER. That would mean what?

Colonel McCORMICK. Just as General Jackson did in Florida. I would go right in and take them. That is how we got Florida.

Senator PEPPER. Having a little faith myself in the policy of an affirmative defense, I am wondering whether you are committed yourself to that doctrine. Is it your idea, then, that what America needs to do to defend itself is to defend itself wherever its interests are? Is that correct?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Is that your policy?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes. So that if you thought there was a real danger, or a great likelihood that the Axis Powers were about to occupy the Azores as their base, you would recommend that our Navy get there first and occupy that as a base?

Colonel McCORMICK. Precisely.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose Hitler declared war on us for doing that.

Colonel McCORMICK. Then we would have a fight. These Germans are not so tough. I have been up against them, and there is no use being scared of them.

Senator PEPPER. I am somewhat encouraged by your testimony. Do I understand you to say, then, that you would protect American interests wherever you thought American interests were, whether Hitler liked it or not?

Colonel McCORMICK. I would.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, suppose the Axis Powers, acting in conjunction with a servile navy, which might be either the navy which once belonged to France or Britain, or both, were in the process of occupying Dakar, and it was known that they were headed in that direction for that purpose, what would be your recommendation to your country and your Government in that case?

Colonel McCORMICK. That is a hard question to answer, Senator, because on getting farther away from home, it is harder to hold those positions. Dakar might be too far away for us to hold.

Senator PEPPER. Let us suppose that the Axis Powers could do the thing we once would have held unthinkable, but now which might be within the realm of speculation and possibility. Suppose the Axis Powers set up puppet governments in Britain, France, and Portugal, and they therefore had the naval power of Italy, France, Germany, and Britain, and they proposed to establish themselves in bases at the Cape Verde Islands. If they succeeded in that purpose and established a strong base there, then they would, by that very act, would be within 1,620 miles of the eastern boundary of the Western Hemisphere, would they not?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. And if they had the undisputed mastery of the sea on the other side—

Colonel McCORMICK. We did not assume that, did we? I did not assume that.

Senator PEPPER. I supposed they had the fleets of Italy, France, Britain, and Germany, and that would accord to them the mastery of the sea at Dakar.

Colonel McCORMACK. I do not believe your naval advisers will say that the fleets of Britain and Italy and France are stronger than ours.

Senator PEPPER. Have you made any recent comparison of those figures?

Colonel McCORMICK. I have not; no. We do not know how many of them are still floating. There have been a good many sunk.

Senator PEPPER. It has been generally supposed, has it not, that the British and French and the German and Italian Fleets all together, and the Japanese, if we might add them, would be able to concentrate at one point a larger force, particularly if it is on the other side of the water, a larger force than the United States could assemble?

Colonel McCORMICK. I could hardly assume that the Japanese would send their fleet to the Atlantic.

Senator PEPPER. I did not suppose the Japanese would do that. Has it not generally been assumed that the British Navy is comparable in size to the American Navy?

Colonel McCORMICK. I understand not.

Senator PEPPER. Not approximately the same size?

Colonel McCORMICK. Not approximately as strong, I am told.

Senator PEPPER. You understand that the French still have something like 100 warships of their own?

Colonel McCORMICK. I could not tell you. I do not know.

Senator PEPPER. And that the Italians have a considerable naval force?

Colonel McCORMICK. The Italian force is mostly on the bottom.

Senator PEPPER. You mean all those they have been able to catch do you not, Colonel?

Colonel McCORMICK. That is what I mean and bomb. They torpedoed several in the harbor. The pictures show unquestionably they are under water.

Senator PEPPER. Did you understand that Mussolini promised Hitler "all the aid short of war"?

Colonel McCORMICK. I heard the Italians have a "new, secret weapon"—it is the Germany army. [Laughter.]

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, if we might make the hypothesis—you have been very kind in your consideration of these possibilities—if we might assume the hypothesis that a combination of the British, French, Italian, and German Navies would be strong enough to occupy and to establish bases in the Cape Verde Islands, and you knew that was in prospect, what would you recommend that the Government of your country do in the face of such a possible event?

Colonel McCORMICK. Then I guess we would have to act on the defensive.

Senator PEPPER. We would have to act on what?

Colonel McCORMICK. On the defensive.

Senator PEPPER. We would have to act on the defensive?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. You mean, wait for them to attack, and not try to break up the establishment of such base, there?

Colonel McCORMICK. If they had all those navies down there, and we did not—what about the Azores; are we supposed to have the Azores, or not? [Laughter.]

Senator, I assure you I am not trying to wisecrack; I am merely trying to be as clear as I can.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, I would ask you on the assumption that we made, that the British, French, Italian, and German Navies would be acting in concert. Let me ask you whether you think we would have the Azores, or not?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. You think we would, in the face of that combination?

Colonel McCORMICK. We ought to get them first.

Senator PEPPER. How far is it from the coast of the United States to the Azores, Colonel?

Colonel McCORMICK. Do you have my map?

Senator PEPPER. I have a copy, here, which indicates it is 1,936 miles from the Azores to Boston; 1,821 miles from Bermuda to the Azores; and 770 miles more, which would make about 2,500 miles, from Charleston, S. C., to the Azores. Which do you think would be stronger at the Azores, the combination or our forces?

Colonel McCORMICK. If we got there first and fortified them, we would be stronger.

Senator PEPPER. You think we would be able to maintain that base, then, 2,500 miles away from Charleston, S. C., and 1,936 miles away from Boston, in the face of the combined naval strength of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, do you?

Colonel McCORMICK. I believe so.

Senator PEPPER. Let me turn the question around, then: It is 786 miles from the Azores to Lisbon and we will say something like a thousand miles from the Azores to Britain and a little less mileage than that from the Azores to France. If the United States Navy could establish and successfully defend itself in the occupation of the Azores, close to the European and African Continents, you would not say then that the combined navies of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany would be able to succeed in the establishment and maintenance of bases in Bermuda?

Colonel McCORMICK. They would never get held of Bermuda.

Senator PEPPER. Oh, you assume we would not let them get hold of Bermuda, but they would let us get first to the Azores?

Colonel McCORMICK. Well, supposing we go tomorrow? We can get first to the Azores now very easily. If we wait for a number of things which may happen, why then we may not do so well.

Senator PEPPER. You say you think we could get first to the Azores?

Colonel McCORMICK. I would like to go to the Azores right away.

Senator PEPPER. I thought you said the British were already there.

Colonel McCORMICK. They would be glad to have us.

Senator PEPPER. But suppose Hitler had conquered Britain and had another Laval in Churchill's place?

Colonel McCORMICK. Well, they are not going to conquer Britain.

Senator PEPPER. I beg pardon?

Colonel McCORMICK. They are not going to conquer Britain.

Senator PEPPER. I am glad to have your assurance on that.

Colonel McCORMICK. Even if you want to assume, let us get the base before they conquer Britain, then.

Senator PEPPER. You mean, get the Azores?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Do you know just how we might get the Azores? Have you any suggestions?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. What, Colonel?

Colonel McCORMICK. Get them from the British.

Senator PEPPER. The British do not own them, do they?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes; they have a right to occupy them.

Senator PEPPER. Does that mean they have a right to give us a base there?

Colonel McCORMICK. They did 23 years ago.

Senator PEPPER. They gave us a base in the Azores?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes. We based our Navy on the Azores in the war of 1917-18.

Senator PEPPER. With British authority, or with Portuguese authority?

Colonel McCORMICK. British, of course.

Senator PEPPER. Have you any documents to establish that fact?

Colonel McCORMICK. I haven't got any in my pocket. [Laughter.]

Senator PEPPER. Do you know any facts that justify that?

Colonel McCORMICK. I know as a matter of fact that Britain does as she wants to with Portugal.

Senator PEPPER. Do you really mean that? Britain has a treaty with Portugal that they have had for some several hundreds of years, have they not?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. They do not own Portugal, do they?

Colonel McCORMICK. Practically.

Senator PEPPER. Do they own Spain?

Colonel McCORMICK. No.

Senator PEPPER. You do not know of Britain's giving us any naval bases in any territory except that over which they have sovereignty, do you, Colonel?

Colonel McCORMICK. Certainly; they gave us naval bases in the Azores.

Senator PEPPER. You predicate your answer then on the British giving us bases in the Azores?

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Colonel, you said England was not going to be conquered, and I for one at least was very glad to hear you say that. You mean they have the means to defend themselves successfully against Hitler's attack, do you?

Colonel McCORMICK. England's defeating him?

Senator PEPPER. Yes.

Colonel McCORMICK. Yes; I certainly do.

Senator PEPPER. Do you think that England has the means of producing enough materials of war to continue to defend herself against Hitler without aid from this country?

Colonel McCORMICK. I am certain of it.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think Britain then needs to buy or to acquire any more war materials from the United States in order to defend herself?

Colonel McCORMICK. Senator, if Britain were in any serious danger of invasion, can you imagine her sending a huge motorized army corps to Lybia? Would she not keep those machines in England? That is the evidence to me.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, the question we put to you was, Do you think it is necessary for Britain, to be able to continue her defense, to be able to continue to acquire war materials from the United States?

Colonel McCORMICK. No; I do not.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think she needs it?

Colonel McCORMICK. Not for defense.

Senator PEPPER. So it would be all right in your opinion for us to cut now the arteries of supply of war materials to England, and you would still be confident she would win this war, that is, be able to defend herself?

Colonel McCORMICK. If there is to be an invasion of the Continent she will need many munitions from this country and several million men—and I am against that. To protect herself, I am very sympathetic.

Senator PEPPER. You are not willing then for us to continue to furnish materials of war to Britain for her own defense?

Colonel McCORMICK. I am very willing to furnish material to Britain for her own defense but not to carry a great and terrible war on to the Continent of Europe.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, how do you propose that we should get those materials to her? I mean in what way? Do you suppose she is going to be able to purchase those materials from us unless some new arrangements are made?

Colonel McCORMICK. I do not know.

Senator PEPPER. You have not concerned yourself about that?

Colonel McCORMICK. I have not made any investigation into it.

Senator PEPPER. Have you heard the testimony that England will have exhausted her dollar exchange value when she pays for the orders she has already placed in the United States?

Colonel McCORMICK. I have heard statements on that subject both ways.

Senator PEPPER. Assuming that is true just for the purpose of discussion, assuming it to be true, then when her dollar exchange runs out what would you propose that we do? Let her have goods on credit? Or let her have no goods at all? Or what?

Colonel McCORMICK. I have no suggestion to make. I have no suggestion to make.

Senator PEPPER. But you are willing for us to let Britain continue to have supplies?

Colonel McCORMICK. Whatever she needs for defense—and I do not think she needs anything.

Senator PEPPER. Would you put your judgment as a criterion on that matter or would you take the British idea of their own need as the criterion on the matter?

Colonel McCORMICK. I would use my own judgment. [Applause.] (The chairman admonished the spectators to observe order.)

Senator PEPPER. Have you advised the Government as to what your judgment is?

Colonel McCORMICK. No.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, do you favor the repeal of the Johnson Act?

Colonel McCORMICK. I haven't given the matter any consideration.

Senator PEPPER. So you have not disturbed yourself about how Britain is going to continue to acquire these materials?

Colonel McCORMICK. No; I have not.

Senator PEPPER. Very well. Thank you, Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White?

Senator WHITE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. Colonel McCormick, a copy of the map which is on the wall is before me. You have shown no direct line on your map from Gibraltar to Dakar. You show a distance from Gibraltar to Dakar of 3,300 miles. Do you have any information before you as to what the air-line distance is?

Colonel McCormick. It is 1,620 miles from Natal to Dakar on the map, do you notice, across the Atlantic, and it is about the same distance from Dakar to Gibraltar. It would be about 1,600 miles.

Senator NYE. Why is it not feasible to afford a supply line by water from Gibraltar to Dakar?

Colonel McCormick. The stronger navy would prevail. At the present time of course the sea is denied to the Germans.

Senator NYE. You have no doubt in your own mind relative to the accuracy of your figures relative to the distance between Gibraltar and Dakar?

Colonel McCormick. No; not at all.

Senator NYE. By road or by air?

Colonel McCormick. I have no doubt at all.

Senator NYE. I was eager about that because the Navy Department obviously has another map that they are using at this time. When the Secretary of the Navy was asked the other day how far it was from Gibraltar to Dakar he turned to two experts sitting behind him and returned to the committee with the information that it was 300, 400, or 500 miles. You are quite confident it is at least 1,600 miles?

Colonel McCormick. I am sure of it.

Senator NYE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds?

Senator REYNOLDS. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman.

Colonel, the Senator from Florida asked you several hypothetical questions. The first of his questions were based on what action you would suggest, or inquiries as to what action you would suggest, on the assumption that Germany was attempting to establish bases somewhere in this hemisphere, were they not?

Colonel McCormick. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. And his inquiry was as to what you would suggest as action to follow such a situation. We have in this country and have had for over a century a well-defined policy, subscribed to universally, have we not, as to what we would do?

Colonel McCormick. The Monroe Doctrine.

Senator GILLETTE. The Monroe Doctrine. And that policy has not been changed in any way so far as you know?

Colonel McCormick. No, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. So regardless of what your opinion is the course of the United States would be determined, to defend this hemisphere against such action?

Colonel McCormick. That is correct.

Senator GILLETTE. And in your opinion would our ability to repel such attempt be fostered or improved by dissipating any of our resources at the present time?

Colonel McCORMICK. No; it would not.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Colonel, when you were being questioned by Senator Pepper, there was some discussion about the occupation of the Azores. You did not mean, or did you mean, to leave the impression that the defense of the United States was dependent or contingent upon our occupation of the Azores?

Colonel McCORMICK. No. It would be improved, that is all.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It might be improved, but you have no doubt of the ability of the United States to defend itself, its own shores, whether we occupy the Azores or not, do you?

Colonel McCORMICK. No; I do not doubt it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Now, Colonel, something was said by Senator Pepper and others about the matter of bases in these islands off the coast of the Americas. In view of the fact that the British owed us over \$5,000,000,000 when this war started, do you not think it would be only a matter of fairness for the British to turn those islands over to us without asking for a half or other part of our Navy as compensation for it?

Colonel McCORMICK. I think it would be very nice if they would.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In the event of any danger coming to the United States through failure of Great Britain, and in view of the complete victory over France, would you say we were in much better position to attack those islands than anybody else that could come over here to them?

Colonel McCORMICK. We should take them very quickly.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you not think we ought to do that in the event contingencies develop in any such fashion as that?

Colonel McCORMICK. I would not want to take them from England by force; no.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Suppose England were to be overrun by Hitler, a picture that is being painted here every day—suppose England were overrun by Germany, would we not be justified in going down to take these islands?

Colonel McCORMICK. Then we would have to do it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Of course—to take Martinique and any other French possessions?

Colonel McCORMICK. Absolutely. We would have to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glass?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Just one other question. As a matter of fact, Colonel, exactly that procedure is contemplated in the Panama Convention, is it not, that was entered into between the various American powers?

Colonel McCORMICK. I am afraid I am not familiar enough with it to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Senator Glass?

Senator GLASS. No. I think if things are as serene as Colonel McCormick imagines, the Congress ought to pass the normal appropriations and go home.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes?

Senator BYRNES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we thank you for coming.

Colonel McCORMICK. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your appearance at this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Lindbergh will now appear before the committee.

STATEMENT OF COL. CHARLES A. LINDBERGH, LLOYD NECK, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Lindbergh, you have been invited to appear before the committee this morning. If you have a prepared statement and desire to complete the statement before any questions are asked, you may do so.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, in the hope that it will save time and add to clarity, I have attempted to outline briefly my reasons for opposition to this bill. In general, I have two. I oppose it, first, because I believe it is a step away from the system of government in which most of us in this country believe. Secondly, I oppose it because I think it represents a policy which will weaken rather than strengthen our Nation.

The first point is simply my opinion as an American citizen. The second is closely connected with the development of aviation as a factor in modern warfare. It is this second point, if you will permit me, that I would like to discuss. I shall have to speak with the utmost frankness in order to make my position clear. If my discussion seems materialistic, it is because war is materialistic, and must be met, at least for the moment, with material measures. No one deplors this fact more than I. Possibly if our outlook had been more spiritual during the years of peace, it would not have to be so material today.

And here I would like to say that I have never taken the stand that it makes no difference to us who wins this war in Europe. It does make a difference to us, a great difference. But I do not believe that it is either possible or desirable for us in America to control the outcome of European wars. When I am asked which side I would like to have win, it would be very easy for me to say "the English." But, gentlemen, an English victory, if it were possible at all, would necessitate years of war and an invasion of the Continent of Europe. I believe this would create prostration, famine, and disease in Europe -- and probably in America -- such as the world has never experienced before. This is why I say that I prefer a negotiated peace to a complete victory by either side.

This bill is obviously the most recent step in a policy which attempts to obtain security for America by controlling internal conditions in Europe. The policy of depleting our own forces to aid England is based upon the assumption that England will win this war. Personally, I do not believe that England is in a position to win the war. If she does not win, or unless our aid is used in negotiating a better peace than could otherwise be obtained, we will be responsible for futilely prolonging the war and adding to the bloodshed and devastation in Europe, particularly among the democracies. In that case, the only advantage we can gain by our action lies in whatever additional time we obtain to prepare ourselves for defense. But instead of consolidating our own defensive position in America, we are sending a large portion of our armament, production abroad. In the case of aviation, for instance, we have sent most of it, yet our own air forces are in deplorable condition for lack of modern equipment. The

majority of the planes we now have are obsolescent on the standards of modern warfare.

This bill even authorizes the transfer of the equipment that our air forces now possess. From the standpoint of aviation, at least, I believe this policy weakens our security in America rather than strengthens it. In order to make this point clear, I would like to touch briefly upon the aviation situation in Europe.

During the study I made of European aviation in 1936, 1937, and 1938, I was forced to the conclusion that Germany was the natural air power of Europe, just as England is the natural sea power. I based this conclusion upon a combination of factors including geographical and meteorological conditions; national psychology; ability in the design, manufacture, and operation of aircraft; and upon a comparison of existing European air forces and manufacturing facilities. I concluded that the United States of America was the only nation in the world capable of equaling or excelling Germany in aviation. But since we in America had specialized in commercial aviation, it was obvious to me that Germany has a lead in military aviation which could not be overcome in less than several years. I believe that the campaigns and developments of the war have borne out these conclusions.

At the present moment, Germany controls air bases on the continent of Europe which extend almost in a semicircle around the British Isles. From these bases she can converge upon the relatively centralized industry and aviation establishments of England. This fact alone gives the German air force great advantage. Even if the British and German air forces were equal in strength, Germany would have the advantage geographically. Her air bases are now much closer to the British objectives than the English air bases are to the German objectives. The German bomber can carry extra bombs while the English bomber must carry extra fuel. And the Germans have longer warning of an attack than the English have because of the greater distances that must be flown over the Continent before important objectives can be reached. In support of these facts, I cite the ease with which London can be bombed, in comparison to the difficulty involved in bombing Berlin. And in addition to Germany's advantage geographically, she has the additional asset of a much stronger air force and far greater aircraft manufacturing facilities than exist in England.

In view of these factors alone, I believe it is obvious that England cannot obtain an air strength equal to Germany's without great assistance from the United States; and my personal opinion is that, regardless of how much assistance we send, it will not be possible for American and British aviation concentrated in the small area of the British Isles, to equal the strength of German aviation, with unlimited bases throughout the Continent of Europe. We would have a disadvantageous geographical position from which to fight, and an ocean to cross with aircraft, men, fuel, and supplies, while our ships would be constantly subjected to the bombs and torpedoes of our enemy.

With this picture of Europe in mind, I now return to my statement that, from the standpoint of aviation, the attempt to gain supremacy of the air in Europe weakens our security in America. If we follow the policy represented by this bill, we will find ourselves with England as a bridgehead in Europe; and, one might say, with the American

neck stretched clear across the Atlantic Ocean. If we establish such a bridgehead, we must make every effort to maintain it. In that, as I say, I do not see how we can be successful. If England is able to hold out for several years, and if we devote our maximum wartime effort to the production of aircraft, we can almost certainly equal or exceed the air strength of Germany. But then we would be confronted with the problem of transporting that air strength to the British Isles. In doing this, we would have to rely largely on surface ships. We might be able to fly many of our aircraft to England, but the fuel and supplies to maintain them would have to go by sea. Thus we would place ourselves in the position of having our aviation in England dependent upon sea lanes within easy bombing range of our enemy's aircraft.

It is also essential to take into consideration the fact that we have another island bridgehead in the Philippines; so that if we follow out the policy represented by this bill, we will have to maintain and protect supply lines which stretch two-thirds of the way around the earth, and which end in positions exposed to attack by the most powerful nations of both Europe and Asia.

This would be an audacious undertaking even if our nation were fully prepared for war. But we are not prepared for war, and the attempt to hold control of island positions off the coasts of Europe and Asia, at the same time, would necessitate depleting even the small defense forces that we now have, as the terms of this bill clearly show.

What we are doing in following our present policy, is giving up an ideal defensive position in America for a very precarious offensive position in Europe. I would be opposed to our entering the internal wars of Europe under any circumstances. But it is an established fact today, that our army and our air force are but poorly equipped on modern standards, and even our Navy is in urgent need of new equipment. If we deplete our forces still further, as this bill indicates we may, and if England should lose this war, then, gentlemen, I think we may be in danger of invasion, although I do not believe we are today. If we ever are invaded in America, the responsibility will lie upon those who send our arms abroad.

I advocate building strength in America because I believe we can be successful in this hemisphere. I oppose placing our security in an English victory because I believe that such a victory is extremely doubtful.

I am opposed to this bill because I believe it endorses a policy that will lead to failure in war, and to conditions in our own country as bad as or worse than those we now desire to overthrow in Nazi Germany.

I do not believe that the danger to America lies in an invasion from abroad. I believe it lies here at home in our own midst, and that it is exemplified by the terms of this bill—the placing of our security in the success of foreign armies, and the removal of power from the Representatives of the people in our own land.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. I have no questions.

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Would you amplify your statement that you do not believe that there is any danger of invasion at present?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir. I believe, sir, that the difficulty of transporting a large force, a force large enough to invade this country, across the Atlantic Ocean is so difficult that even with reasonable defense forces in this country an actual invasion would be impossible.

In that connection, sir, I believe that aviation strengthens our position in America, because the nation whose shores are approached by a hostile fleet has the advantage of being able to bomb that fleet by its own aircraft. I believe that has been clearly shown by the incident or the incidents encountered by the British Fleet off the coast of Norway, in the North Sea, and in at least one instance in the Mediterranean. In the north, that is, in the semi-Arctic areas, the difficulties of climate and terrain, I believe, make an invasion more difficult than it would be in crossing either of the oceans. So far as South America is concerned. I believe we could harass enemy communications to an extent that it would make it impracticable for them to invade South America; and if the country were invaded, over a period of time we could throw out any European or Asiatic force in South America.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. Colonel, before I ask you any questions I want to express my personal admiration for your achievements in the field of aviation and for your willingness to come before this committee and express your views, regardless of their reception by the country or the committee. That is one of our United States possessions, that is, freedom of opinion and freedom of speech. And I honor you for your opinions and daring to express them.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I agree with you perfectly in that.

Senator CONNALLY. I thank you for one time agreeing with me, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I thought it was so novel that you would be glad to hear it.

The CHAIRMAN. You gentlemen will have ample time to exchange views later on.

Senator CONNALLY. I do not propose to exchange them. I am going to keep my own.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You ought not change those views which you just expressed and with which I agreed.

Senator CONNALLY. Oh, no. We will not fuss over that.

Colonel Lindbergh, as I understand you, you are opposed to the passage of this bill?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Of course, the passage of this bill seeks to carry out the policy of aid to Great Britain. That is the objective, isn't it? That is the general objective of the bill—to extend aid to Great Britain?

Colonel LINDBERGH. My general objection to it and my primary objection to it would be that I believe it is a step away from our system of government in this country.

Senator CONNALLY. I got that. But for those of us who do not agree with that particular view, the objective is to grant aid to Great Britain. Is that true?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That would be my secondary objection.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you favor not giving Britain any aid?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe it was a mistake to repeal the arms embargo a year ago last fall.

Senator CONNALLY. We all know that you appeared before the committees and opposed that. But now do you favor giving aid to Britain or not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, I personally thought our action in that respect was a mistake. I believe now that this country has committed itself to a degree; and I believe when we make a commitment we must carry it out.

Senator CONNALLY. I had understood that as being your position. In other words, while you thought we had made an initial mistake in repealing the arms embargo and had made another mistake in agreeing to extend aid to Britain, you favor continuing that aid?

Colonel LINDBERGH. But not increasing it; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Not increasing it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. And I do not favor an indefinite continuance of that aid. I believe that we should throw our force behind a negotiated peace.

Senator CONNALLY. I understand that. Unfortunately, we are not in control of European diplomacy. But you favor continuing some aid that we are giving England now?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I personally, sir, favor carrying out our commitments, the commitments that we have already made. And, beyond that, I believe that the force of this country should be thrown behind a negotiated peace, at least to the extent of being receptive to it here.

Senator CONNALLY. We haven't quite gotten to a negotiated peace. We will get to that a little later. I would like to stick to this, if you don't mind.

What particular aid do you understand we are now giving England? She is paying cash for every airplane and every gun that she gets here, isn't she?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I understand that is the case. I am not sure whether she is paying cash or paying for the cost of setting up factories that manufacture that equipment. And, of course, that is really a portion of the cost of the equipment.

Senator CONNALLY. But the Government itself is not contributing any money for war supplies to England, is it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. So far as I know, the Government is not directly.

Senator CONNALLY. So you are in favor of the aid to Britain by letting her continue to finance her own operations and to get her own weapons in this country, if she can?

Colonel LINDBERGH. And to the extent of our commitments.

Senator CONNALLY. I believe you appeared before the House committee on this bill.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. You have not changed your views in the main that you entertained then?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. So I might refer to that testimony. Mr. Eaton, of New Jersey, asked you this question:

So that logically you would be willing now to drop all aid to England and let the devil take the hindmost?

Colonel LINDBERGH. This country having taken a stand that aid would be given to England, I do not believe we can justify simply dropping the position we have taken. I do believe that we should endeavor to bring peace to Europe and not encourage war in Europe. I believe that is possible for us to do, if we desire it.

That is still your view, is it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Pardon me, Senator?

Senator CONNALLY. I say those are still your views?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. In that same hearing Congressman Kee asked you [reading]:

Colonel, I would like to ask you, are you in favor of the United States at the present time giving any aid to Great Britain in her fight?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Our people have taken a stand on that, sir, which I personally think was a mistake. And I do not believe we can reverse a stand that this country has taken, or a promise that has been made. But I believe it is vital to us and to them, for us to attempt to bring about the end of this war as rapidly as possible. And I say that, sir, to be perfectly frank, because I do not believe it is possible, aside from something unforeseen, for England to invade the continent of Europe and win the war.

That is correct, is it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You favor a negotiated peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. How would you get it? How would you go about it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not suggest, sir, that this country go to Europe and attempt to negotiate a peace. I do suggest that our attitude in this country be receptive to a negotiated peace. I believe the actual negotiations must be carried on by Europe.

Senator CONNALLY. If we take no part and are not involved in any way, they might not consult us.

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. They might go ahead and negotiate their own peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe that is most likely.

Senator CONNALLY. So, after all, while you hope for a negotiated peace there is not much that you can do about it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I think there is a great deal to do.

Senator CONNALLY. What?

Colonel LINDBERGH. To stop encouraging this war.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you think we are encouraging the war now?

Colonel LINDBERGH. From the beginning; yes.

Senator CONNALLY. From the beginning?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I do, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you think we had anything to do with starting the war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think our encouragement had a great deal to do with the war starting.

Senator CONNALLY. To what particular action of the United States do you refer?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am now thinking of the attitude that I encountered in Europe, both in France and in England when I was there in 1937 and 1938 particularly, when I should say most of the people I spoke to felt that this country would eventually enter the war if they declared it.

Senator CONNALLY. I am not speaking of that. I am asking you about what the Government of the United States did about it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The Government of the United States, through its representatives in Europe, has been in very close contact, of course, with those Governments; and I believe, sir, that there has been at least indirect encouragement in that way in regard to the war. And I believe that the attitude of our newspapers in this country encouraged England and France to declare war; and I believe our attitude since war was declared has had a tendency to force that war to continue.

Senator CONNALLY. Those are your beliefs?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. Have you any proof that any of the diplomats in Europe directly encouraged and stimulated the war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Of course, you are aware that under international law any neutral has a right to sell arms and munitions and supplies to any belligerent, do you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I understand that is so.

Senator CONNALLY. And that the repeal of the arms embargo was merely the repeal of a domestic statute which had been passed to restrain the shipment of such supplies to belligerents?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am not sure of the legal status. I made my statement that I thought it was a mistake, from other viewpoints.

Senator CONNALLY. I understand. What I am getting at is that under international law they had a perfect right to pass the repeal of the arms embargo.

Colonel LINDBERGH. So far as I know, that is correct.

Senator CONNALLY. But you still opposed the repeal of that statute?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes. I think it is proved to have added to bloodshed in Europe and not to have affected the trend of the war.

Senator CONNALLY. Isn't it true that the continuance of the embargo, irrespective of its legality, in effect was aiding Germany by withholding from France and England at that time arms and supplies which they had a right to buy in this country under international law?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That might be argued from one standpoint, sir. But I am inclined to believe that in the end it will probably have done more damage to England, and I think it has done more damage to France, sir, than if we had maintained the arms embargo.

Senator CONNALLY. If we had kept the arms embargo, do you think it would have saved France?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe if England and France had not expected aid, and probably eventually troops from this country, that the war would not have started—at least at this time.

Senator CONNALLY. I am speaking about the arms embargo now, which was passed after the war had begun, as I recall it.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe they expected it to be repealed before the war began, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You say you think if we had not repealed the arms embargo it would probably have been a different situation as to France. Do you think the Germans would not have invaded France and conquered France if we had not passed the arms embargo?

Colonel LINDBERGH. After all, France and England declared war on Germany. I myself believe that it is doubtful that Germany would have turned west if they had not declared war. And, even if she had planned on turning west then it seems to me very clear today that France and England would have had a better opportunity to prepare, if the war had not started when it did.

Senator CONNALLY. I am asking you about something that happened after war had been declared. War had already been declared when we passed the Arms Embargo Act. I am trying to get your views on the effect that the repeal of the arms embargo had on the war. If we had kept the arms embargo you think that France would have been better off?

Colonel LINDBERGH. If we had held to the arms embargo I think it is quite likely that a peace would be under negotiation now in Europe. And, as I say, sir, I believe both England and France expected the repeal of the arms embargo at the time they declared war.

Senator CONNALLY. You realize, of course, that at the time of the passage of the arms embargo Germany had recourse to practically the whole continent of Europe for supplies and munitions, and that England and France were practically cut off from those sources, do you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I don't know that—that was the case at the time of the repeal of the arms embargo.

Senator CONNALLY. I don't mean that Germany had conquered those countries; but she was geographically so situated that she could draw supplies from the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Denmark, and all of the Balkans, and Czechoslovakia, and all of those territories.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, at that time she was not so situated, without the conquest which came afterward.

Senator CONNALLY. But it was impossible for England and France to get supplies across Germany from any of those countries whereas Germany could, by purchase or otherwise, get all of the supplies she needed? Isn't that true?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think that is somewhat misleading in principle, sir. There were certain countries in Europe cut off from England and France—not all. But that is not the point that I made in opposing the repeal of the embargo.

Senator CONNALLY. You are in favor of a negotiated peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Let's see what you would have in that peace settlement. Would you restore Denmark?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would not attempt to set the terms. I think that is for the European nations to do. I am in favor of an attitude in America receptive to a negotiated peace.

Senator CONNALLY. Then you do not have any views as to what you would do with Denmark? Would you restore Belgium?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would not attempt to suggest the settlement in Europe. I think that is something that depends upon the present condition of the war and upon the attitude of those countries in Europe.

Senator CONNALLY. The attitude of those countries in Europe now is pretty flat. They wouldn't have much to say about a negotiated peace right now, would they? Norway, for instance?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In a negotiated peace the negotiation comes from both sides. And that there is a possibility of discussion on both sides, as I say, is obvious from the negotiations going on recently in Europe. But my stand has been constantly only that the attitude of America should be receptive to a negotiated peace and that we should stop encouraging the continuance of the war. I do not suggest what settlement should be made in Europe, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Are you indifferent to what the settlement would be?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. If you are not indifferent, what are your views?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not believe I am in position to suggest what the terms of peace should be. The situation changes from week to week; and it depends a great deal upon the status of the war.

Senator CONNALLY. Don't you think that Norway ought to be restored—that is, its independence restored—in a negotiated peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It would be very easy for me to state or to say what I think would be right in Europe. But, after all, throughout history success in warfare is one of the elements of settlement after the war. And I do not believe I am in position to say what should be done in Europe.

Senator CONNALLY. All right, then; we will assume that. War is determinative of peace? Is that what you mean?

Colonel LINDBERGH. To an extent.

Senator CONNALLY. So right now if we had a negotiated peace in Europe don't you believe that the probabilities are that none of the sovereignties of these countries that I have mentioned would be restored, with Mr. Hitler in control of Europe with an overwhelming army? If you negotiated peace right now isn't the probability that these countries would be lost, on your basis that the result of a war determines the peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not believe, sir, that it is possible to tell what can be done without an attempt at negotiation. But I do believe this, that a better peace could be obtained today than can be obtained next month, or next year.

Senator CONNALLY. That is based upon your view that England cannot win the war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. When you say she cannot win the war, do you mean that Britain cannot defend herself successfully or cannot go onto the Continent of Europe and overwhelm Hitler?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would say first——

Senator CONNALLY. Let's divide this up.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I can see no way, and I have seen no plan advanced that shows how Britain, even with our aid, could successfully invade the continent of Europe unless a collapse came first on the continent. So far as an invasion of England is concerned, sir, I believe it would be extremely costly. Whether it is possible or not I don't know.

Senator CONNALLY. You don't care to express your views on the probability of the outcome of the defense of Britain, forgetting the continent for the moment?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am sorry, Senator, but I did not understand you.

Senator CONNALLY. I said forgetting the continent for the moment, you are not prepared to express a view as to whether you think England can resist and preserve her own integrity?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I am not sure.

Senator CONNALLY. But you are sure of the other?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Practically.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you favor increasing aid to Britain on the hypothesis that it be confined to the defense of the British Isles, or would you still be opposed? I am talking about defense, disassociated from any prospective campaign on the continent.

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, I think that our taking part in this war in Europe will eventually prove to have prolonged the war, to have not materially affected the trend of the war. And I am inclined to believe that every nation over there will accuse us of this after the war is over.

Now, as I say, we have a practical question. We have committed ourselves to some extent to aid England. That commitment has been made with the clear understanding of our people that what aid we give is to be short of war. And I shall say that one limitation should be very definitely that that aid be, without question, short of war.

The other limitation, sir, is that I believe we should send nothing abroad that we need for our own defense. And I believe we have been sending a great deal abroad that we do need for our own defense.

Senator CONNALLY. Then you don't believe in sending anything more?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not if we need it.

Senator CONNALLY. Now, let's forget about "if's." There are too many "if's" in here. You say that we are already committed to giving aid to Britain and we can't recede.

Colonel LINDBERGH. To some extent.

Senator CONNALLY. I have narrowed that down to giving aid to Britain to defend herself, that is, Great Britain. You know whether you favor that kind of aid or whether you do not. Do you think your other answer was quite responsive to my question?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I do.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you know?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't believe that is a question that can be answered yes or no without giving a false impression.

Senator CONNALLY. I don't want a false impression.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think it is very important for England not to be beaten in this war. I don't believe that is within American control. As I say, I don't believe we have been effective in the aid that we have sent, and I think it is our encouragement that has carried on the war. I believe we should carry out our commitments but be very hesitant about increasing them, because these steps short of war, if they are carried on, will lead us into the war without doubt, in my mind.

Senator CONNALLY. Then you think by sending any aid at all that we would be encouraging a continuance of the war? Is that right?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. By sending any aid at all we have encouraged the continuance of the war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should say our attitude has encouraged this war from the beginning.

Senator CONNALLY. Yet you say, on the other hand, that we have committed ourselves to giving aid and we should continue?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't think this country should go back on a promise once given.

Senator CONNALLY. Then you favor continuing aid to Great Britain?

Colonel LINDBERGH. So far as our commitments now go. But we should attempt to build an attitude in America receptive to a negotiated peace.

Senator CONNALLY. And by attempting to give aid, such as we have committed ourselves to give, whatever that may be, we would be continuing to encourage the continuance of the war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes. I think it will eventually prove that our aid has encouraged the war and prolonged it and added to the bloodshed in Europe. And I would cite France as an example of that.

Senator CONNALLY. You think we are in no danger of invasion from abroad?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not at the moment, and not in the future if we do not send our own arms abroad to too great an extent.

Senator CONNALLY. Yet I think you made the statement earlier that we have now a very small defensive force.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. And even with that small defensive force you think there is no danger of invasion from abroad?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not if we stop sending everything there.

Senator CONNALLY. We have been sending everything abroad, have we?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Almost; a great deal. Almost all in our Air Corps, almost all of the new airplanes we have built here we have been sending abroad.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you know what the percentage is? Where did you get that information?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I take that from the testimony in the Times, for instance, of the Naval authorities and the Army authorities.

Senator CONNALLY. I think you are in error on that. I attended a meeting down at the War Department a few days ago.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I feel quite certain of that, sir, that most of our new production aircraft that we have built in the last year in America have gone abroad.

Senator CONNALLY. A large percentage is.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I will add, a great majority of it. And our own air force today is in a deplorable state.

Senator CONNALLY. You were on active duty with the Air Corps, weren't you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; over a year ago.

Senator CONNALLY. You have been out of the active service about a year?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I left about September 1939.

Senator CONNALLY. What about our production facilities for airplanes? Are they being increased here?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; they are being increased.

Senator CONNALLY. And if production facilities increase, of course, we will produce more airplanes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. We have been, sir; and we have been sending most of them abroad.

Senator CONNALLY. But we don't need them over here because we are not in any danger of invasion?

Colonel LINDBERGH. We do need them. We are not in any danger of invasion under present conditions.

Senator CONNALLY. You said a little while ago, with our small defensive force and with a large majority of our airplanes sent abroad, and you have said repeatedly, that we are not in danger of invasion from abroad.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't think we are today. But at the present time there is a war in Europe, and it will take some time, even though there is a desire to invade America, to get the forces ready. Now, if we send our new production abroad, as we are doing, then I say if that continues long enough we might be in danger of invasion. But if we keep our production here and make our air force modern, which it is not today, then there is no danger of invasion, in my opinion.

Senator CONNALLY. You say the air force is not modern. Of course, airplane manufacture and development changes very rapidly. I mean the change of types or models and instruments and gadgets is a very rapid change.

Colonel LINDBERGH. The change is rapid.

Senator CONNALLY. In other words, a plane that is built this year will be more or less out of date or obsolete next year.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would not say to that extent.

Senator CONNALLY. I use that merely as an illustration.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Over a period of 2 or 3 years, at least, it becomes obsolescent.

Senator CONNALLY. That is right. And that happens in other countries as well as in this country, doesn't it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. So, as to new planes and new models coming along, that same condition exists in foreign countries as well as in the United States?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes. But on existing standards our air force is in a deplorable condition today in America.

Senator CONNALLY. You are not prepared with statistics on that, of course?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No; but they could very easily be obtained.

Senator CONNALLY. We have obtained some of them in secret hearings before the committee since the hearings started.

I believe that is all, Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. May I inquire, Senator Barkley, if the Senate is in session?

Senator BARKLEY. It is meeting today, but I do not think it will be in session very long. There is nothing of any very great importance on the calendar.

The CHAIRMAN. Since Senator Barkley has to go to the floor, without objection, I will ask him if he has some questions that he would like to ask at this time, or whether he would like to come back later?

Senator BARKLEY. Unless the colonel will be on after lunch, perhaps I would better go on now and ask him what I want to ask. If he is going to return after lunch, I would rather wait until that time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot answer that question.

Senator BARKLEY. Then, I will ask the colonel one or two questions now.

I gather from your statement of a little while ago, Colonel, that you do not think we are in any immediate danger of invasion from any source.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not.

Senator BARKLEY. You think the danger of invasion in the future, within 5 years or 10 years, might be determined by the identity of the victor in the European war now?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; that is possible. And I think it will be determined primarily by the strength of our own country.

Senator BARKLEY. That will undoubtedly contribute to that situation. Do you think if Great Britain should win the war that we would be in danger of invasion from Great Britain or by Great Britain?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No.

Senator BARKLEY. Then, against whom would we have to prepare against invasion in the event of victory?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should say that in this period, as in all others, that we should prepare against invasion by the strongest nations of either Europe or Asia.

Senator BARKLEY. So if Great Britain should win the war you do not think we are in danger of invasion from her, but if her enemies win the war we might be in danger of invasion?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In this period; yes. And I would like to point out, if I may, that during a period of not very many generations we have either been invaded or have been in danger of invasion by practically every nation in Europe.

Senator BARKLEY. Of course, that is an attenuated danger, not a practical danger. But there is always a potential danger. Would it be a practical danger?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The Capitol was burned by Britain in the last century.

Senator BARKLEY. That was a hundred years ago.

Colonel LINDBERGH. There was the Maximilian expedition which entered Mexico in our Civil War or shortly before.

Senator BARKLEY. Could another expedition from Europe get into Mexico now?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not believe so at the present time; not if we were adequately prepared.

Senator BARKLEY. You don't think of anything that Mexico could do to be prepared today to prevent it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No; but I think we could prevent that invasion, working with Mexico.

Senator BARKLEY. Have you visualized the possibility of the concentration of all the shipbuilding facilities of Europe and all of the navies of Europe in the event of a victory by Hitler, that is, the concentration of all those facilities to such an extent that they would be superior to our own within the next few years?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think that is extremely improbable. In the first place, if it were possible to unite the world against us, it is pretty

bad diplomacy on our part. It has never happened historically that the entire world has been united before. I don't believe it will happen now. But, if so, then I think the cost and the difficulty of invading this continent would be so great that it is very improbable that it would be attempted.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think when there is danger of a united world against us we should be indifferent as to what goes on in the rest of the world and not take any steps, by negotiation or otherwise, or by protest against what goes on, to hold that situation or guide it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No; I think it is very important to us as to what happens in other sections of the world. But I don't think we can control what happens in the rest of the world.

Senator BARKLEY. You said a little while ago that we encouraged the war and are still encouraging it.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I believe so.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think anything done in this country encouraged Hitler to go into Czechoslovakia?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes. I should say that would be true to some extent.

Senator BARKLEY. What did our people do to encourage Hitler to go into Czechoslovakia?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would have to go back in that case to President Wilson, to the Treaty of Versailles, and the surrounding episodes.

Senator BARKLEY. You think the Treaty of Versailles undertaking to create a nation in Czechoslovakia, with two or three million Germans constituting a minority of the Czechoslovakia Republic, was responsible for Hitler's going in?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think that is one of the elements.

Senator BARKLEY. Well, admitting that for the sake of argument, are we responsible or were we responsible as a government for their taking the rest of Czechoslovakia? Did we encourage that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Only to the extent that it was perfectly obvious in Europe that some adjustment had to come. I was in hopes that it could be made peaceably.

Senator BARKLEY. If it has not been brought about peaceably, do you excuse the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Hitler?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I do not excuse it, but I know historically those things happen.

Senator BARKLEY. You do not think we encouraged Hitler, leaving out the Versailles Treaty, to go into Czechoslovakia?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think, to a certain extent, our general attitude has encouraged it.

Senator BARKLEY. We were not sympathetic with it and said so, and yet you think we encouraged it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I think our blindness to the conditions that existed, economic and otherwise, was responsible to a certain extent.

Senator BARKLEY. What was it our duty to do as a nation to prevent it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know that it was our duty here in America to do anything. I should state that as——

Senator BARKLEY. Well, now——

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I insist that the witness be permitted to answer the question.

Senator BARKLEY. I think the witness has had plenty of opportunity to answer it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He has been cut off two or three answers.

Senator BARKLEY. All right. Let the witness finish.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Could I have the last question, sir?

Senator BARKLEY. I asked you a moment ago, what was it our duty to do to have prevented the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Hitler?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It is very difficult to place my finger on exactly what it was our duty to do. As I say, our attitude of encouraging the war, I believe, was to quite an extent responsible for bringing it on, and I think our general attitude on European affairs in the same way encouraged the chaotic conditions that now exist in Europe. It was not entirely responsible for them, but was one of the elements that encouraged them.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think that the attitude of our Government and our people had anything to do with Hitler's taking over Austria, violating all of his pledges previously made to the Austrian people?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not directly, sir; but I do say that our interference in the last war and after the last war had considerable effect.

Senator BARKLEY. You think that anything we did or said as a government or people had anything to do with Hitler's going into Poland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, that is after we had been fairly active over there in Europe, through our representatives, and I am not sure—there are conflicting reports about that, as you know sir—but I do say that in general our attitude has added to the problems and to the chaotic conditions that now exist there.

Senator BARKLEY. The attitude of our Government and of our people has for a long time been at least morally opposed to aggression and to brutality and to the invasion of the rights of other people.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am very much opposed to them myself.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think it was possible for our people to look upon a situation like that without having any views or without even expressing any views with regard to it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not question the views. I question encouraging the war, as I think was done.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think we encouraged Italy to try to invade Greece by way of Albania?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In that instance I do not think we did, but I think we encouraged conditions ----

Senator BARKLEY. You do not think we ought to help Greece in any way to resist that aggression?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Militarily; no, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. Well, that is the only help we are talking about and that is the only help this bill envisages—some sort of military supplies that will enable people to defend themselves, on the theory that their defense, either immediately or ultimately, is vital to our own defense.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, in that respect I would like to bring out that, as far as I know, every nation that has depended on some other nation for its own defense has failed.

Senator BARKLEY. Nobody is contending here, as far as I know, that our ability to defend ourselves depends totally on the victory of any nation, but if it makes a substantial contribution to our defense by postponing the day when we will have to defend our own institutions and our own defense—

Colonel LINDBERGH. In the case of our air force I think we are weakening our position by endeavoring to aid England.

Senator BARKLEY. That is where you differ with our military authorities, and you have a perfect right to do that.

Mr. Chairman, I have got to go over to the Senate floor. If the colonel is still on deck when we meet here again, I may have some other questions. Thank you, sir.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper.

Senator CAPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Colonel, I am desirous of having you explain how we contributed to the downfall of France. You hinted at that.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe the statement I made, sir, was in regard to the feeling that existed in Europe, which I encountered in Europe, that we would eventually come into this war if it were declared by France and England. I should say that most of the people that I talked to in France and in England expected America to enter the war eventually, and I think that if they had not expected us to enter the war they would probably not have declared war at the time they did, which I think was disastrous.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. You do not think that the German Army had anything to do with the downfall of France, then?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Of course, but I think the German Army was headed in the other direction at that time.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. You think that the German Army went into France because we were going to take aid to France and England?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir. I think it is the other way around. I think that France and England would not have declared war, as I say, at that time if they had not expected aid and eventually troops from us, and I think that was a very disadvantageous time in which to declare war; that it would have been to the advantage of France and England to let more time pass if it were necessary to go to war at all.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Could it have been to the advantage of France and England to let more time pass if Hitler was ready to move into France?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I question that the Germans intended to go west at that time, but whether or not they did, sir—and that I do not know—it seems obvious to me that conditions could not have been any worse in Europe than they are today from the standpoint of France and England.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. The Germans have gone west in rectification of this terrible treaty which you think is the cause of all the troubles?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I do not say that that was the cause of all the troubles, sir. I say that was one of the causes. I do not think I understand what you mean by saying "gone west."

Senator THOMAS of Utah. The Germans had actually gone west in rectification of the treaty.

Colonel LINDBERGH. When was this?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Did they not go into the Rhineland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. And did they not go into the Saar?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; but I look at this from a somewhat different standpoint, sir. After the Siegfried line was built, then I think it was no longer a question of whether or not England and France desired to have certain moves made in eastern Europe. That line—that is, the Siegfried line, together with the Maginot line—divided Europe and made it practically impossible for England and France to control what happened east of that line.

Now, if they had intended to control anything east of the Maginot and Siegfried lines, then I think their last chance passed when those lines were built.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. When was the Siegfried line built?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The Siegfried line was built over a period of time——

Senator THOMAS of Utah. When? What was the period of time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I understand that it was finished about the latter part of 1938 or 1939, probably.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. What had Germany done before she started to build the Siegfried line?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, I am not sure that I understand what you mean.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Where is the Siegfried line?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Where is the Siegfried line?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Yes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. It extends along the German-French border and there is an extension along the Belgian-Dutch border some distance inside Germany.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. But what had Germany done before she started building that line? When did she start building it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am not sure of the date that it was started. I should say about 1937, but some of the emplacements may have been put in before.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. What had happened before 1937?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not understand your question, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Had not the Germans been kept from building a Siegfried line by the treaty?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That was part of the Versailles Treaty, I understand; yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. How did they get into the situation where they decided to build the Siegfried line?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am not sure that I understand your question, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, had the Germans marched into the Rhineland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Was that in accordance with the treaty?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Why did they march into the Rhineland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I can't answer that question, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, what did they do after they marched into the Rhineland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. They started to build the Siegfried line, did they not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right. That is one of the things.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, now, were we responsible for their marching into the Rhineland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should say the Treaty of Versailles was somewhat responsible for that.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. The Treaty of Versailles?

Colonel LINDBERGH. To quite an extent.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. And we were responsible for the Treaty of Versailles?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Partially; yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. In what way?

Colonel LINDBERGH. We took part in those negotiations, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, we had been in the war, had we not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Whom did we fight?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am not sure that I understand your questioning, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, with whom were we at war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The Central Powers, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Yes. Well, was it wrong for us to make a treaty that we thought was to our advantage? Let us assume that we are responsible all the way through after the war.

Colonel LINDBERGH. We had the perfect right militarily; yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I would like you to carry out your logic, Colonel, in regard to our encouraging war in Europe. You start in 1937, because that is when you started interviewing people. Carrying your logic back to 1935, were we encouraging war in Europe then?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I can't answer as to the year, sir, but I think we have encouraged war in Europe through our actions since the last war.

Could I enlarge on that, sir? I believe after the last war—and this is my own personal opinion, sir. This is really not what I came to testify to. I would be glad to state it, if you care to have it. After we won the last war, together with our Allies, I think there were two policies that could have been successful at least for a time. One was to place Germany back on her feet as an important nation; and possibly at the time she was a republic that could have been done. The other was to hold her down by military force.

Now, sir; we did not follow either of those policies. We came back to America, and England and France vacillated back and forth between the two

My point is that if they were going to hold Germany down by force, that force had to be exerted before the Siegfried line was built. Whether or not what has happened after that line was built is right—and I think a great deal done was not right—afterward it was beyond their control and our control, and I believe it is beyond our control today.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, then, you would have favored, I suppose, armed opposition to the Germans going into the Rhineland, would you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think at that time, sir, it was necessary for what you might call the Allied groups to take a stand and decide whether or not they were going to attempt to hold down German action by force. If they made the decision that they were, then I think that was the time for the military movement into Germany.

I doubt that I would have favored that, sir, because personally I am inclined to believe that the future of Europe will be decided by such elements as the birth rate in the various countries there rather than by the use of military force at this time, or say, in 1935. But I do say that if military force was to have been used by England and France, then it should have been used prior to the time the Siegfried Line was built.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. But they did not use it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. They did not use it, either, against Italy, did they, when Italy went into Abyssinia?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is correct.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Did we make a mistake there?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It depends on your viewpoint, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Did we contribute to that mistake?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, I do not know of any way in which we contributed to the Abyssinia episode except, I believe, by interfering with European affairs in the last war we contributed to conditions that brought on this war.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. We interfered with European affairs in 1776. Have we been responsible for the wars since that day?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would not say that, sir. I am very much in favor of what we did in 1776.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. We all are, and I think we have been responsible for much of the unrest in the world as a result of 1776. But if we accept your logic, must not we carry it to a logical conclusion and go back and back and back?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am more inclined, sir, to base our action on what we can do than on what we should do, and I think that is not always a question of consecutive logic.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. What can we suggest now by this bill—those who are in favor of the bill—so that we can help England by the bill? You do not think we can, do you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I doubt that very much, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. That is, you think the general forces of such things as birth control and the economic conditions and the pressure of populations and all those great things will have the controlling influence in the end?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Over a long period of time; but, sir, my point now is primarily that the opportunity to have stopped what is now happening in Europe passed with the construction of the Siegfried line and the German rearmament. That is the immediate factor.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. You assume nothing can stop Hitler except his downfall by internal means?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I say that I can see no way of stopping Hitler directly at this time by an invasion of the continent. Now, when you project forward for a generation what might be done to stop this movement, that brings in many factors which cannot be seen.

I should say, sir, that one of the things that we are doing by throwing our weight into this war is binding together such groups or such nations

as Germany and Italy and Russia and Japan. For instance, I think that Italy was unnecessarily thrown into German arms at the time of Abyssinia, and that Russia was forced together with Germany later, and that we in America have been responsible for pushing Japan into that alliance or that group.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Just one more idea connected with your type of interpretation of history. Germany came into the League of Nations in 1926, did she not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know the year, sir; about that time.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. That was 7 or 8 years, at the most, after the end of the war. Do you know of any time in the history of the world when a vanquished nation within 7 or 8 years was given actual, equal, absolute rights with the conquering nations?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I know nothing parallel to the League of Nations in the history of the world.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Oh, yes, you do. You have read history. It is not exactly parallel, because we have the time element and it could not be parallel, but leagues have been attempted before.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; but not like the League of Nations.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, I do not know about that. It would not be exactly alike, because, as Dr. Beard says, history never repeats itself, so nothing is very much like it. But assuming that there has never been anything like it, in the treatment of a vanquished nation by a victorious group, has there ever been a time in history when the treatment was quite as well and quite as good as that afforded Germany by giving her equal place and an equal seat in the League within 7 years of the war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should doubt that very much, sir. I think you are probably right. I am not well acquainted with such elements, and it really has nothing to do with or very little to do with the stand I take.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Do you think that the rise of Hitler in Germany has anything to do with the present war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. You have studied what he started to contend, have you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not in detail, but to some extent.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Once Hitler was in power, he entered into a 10-year agreement with Poland, did he not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, he did. Did he keep that agreement?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should doubt it, sir. I think there have been very few agreements kept.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, then, probably there are other factors besides the attitude of the United States that encouraged this war.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Oh, yes. I should say that our encouragement was only one factor.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. And if we get that factor down to proportion, it must be a very, very, very, very, very small factor, must it not, sir?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir. I do not agree with that.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. A large factor?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Quite a large factor in this war; yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Did we add anything to cause Hitler to change his mind in regard to Poland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know about that, sir. As I say, sir, I believe that our primary encouragement came in the attitude we built up or allowed to be built up in England and France, where the peoples of those nations expected America to enter this war as we did the last.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. You mean that in 1937 the people of France and England had planned out this war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. They were looking forward to the probability of war in 1937 and 1938.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. The probability of war; but a war like we have got now?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not think they foresaw that; sir. If they had, I do not think they would have declared it.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Do you not think the agreement between Germany and Russia had something to do with the precipitation of this war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know; sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Well, do you not know that the breaking of the agreement between Germany and Poland had something to do with the beginning of this war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Undoubtedly, sir; but how much I do not know; sir. Those elements are not what I take into consideration when I advise against our entry.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I am more interested in your history, because, you see, you have implied that the United States by her action has aided in the starting of the present war in Europe.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Now, what action did we take in 1935, when war started in Abyssinia?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I have cited the exact instances that I had in mind—

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Yes; but what action did we take?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I have not used that at all; sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. But you said you were opposed to the repeal of the arms embargo.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. What action did we take in 1935 in regard to an arms embargo?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. We passed the arms embargo, did we not, at the time of Italy's entering into Abyssinia?

Colonel LINDBERGH. At the time of Abyssinia, yes.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. We did not have anything to do with the passing of the arms embargo, with the starting of the war there?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I have not made any such statement, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Do you think we did?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I have not considered it. I would like to have time to turn that over in my mind.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. When we were modifying the arms embargo in 1936 was that an encouragement for Italy to go into Abyssinia?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Those are not the statements I made; sir, and they have very little to do with what I have said, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. You say that the repeal of the arms embargo caused war.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I did not say it caused war, sir. I said it encouraged war, I believe. I would like to have the statement read.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I am not expecting exact statements, Colonel. I am really trying to get at your logic of history.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I have outlined, sir, exactly what I meant when I said that. As I say, the attitude in England and France that I encountered in 1937 and 1938 was one which looked forward to the United States assisting and entering the war eventually, as we entered the last war, and I think that attitude and that expectancy had a great deal to do with the declaration of war in September 1939.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. But you know that the declaration of war in September 1939 did not come until after Hitler had gone into Poland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is right, but I think it would not have come at that time, in September 1939, if England and France had not expected our assistance; and, as I say, I think it is obvious now that, certainly for France, it was a mistake.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I still cannot understand what we have got to do with that, Colonel.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I can't make it any plainer, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I think that is not very plain, because you say you talked with certain people who expected that if war came we would be on the side of England and France.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think the majority of people in England and France expected that, and that we allowed that impression to arise.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. You surely do not think that England and France had anything to do with Hitler's going into Poland, do you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I think they may have, but I would rather not argue that point because—

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Do you think they encouraged Hitler's going into Poland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; and I am very much opposed to what happened in the German invasion of Poland, but I do not think you can separate the action of England and France and what happened in Europe. I think you have to go back to Versailles, as I say, and to other things. Versailles is only one element. But those are not the points I made, sir.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys?

Senator VAN NUYS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Colonel, in view of the questions asked you by Senator Thomas, as I understand your position—and if I do not, I wish you would correct me—it is your opinion that the general expectation in both Britain and France that if war came in Europe we would participate in it influenced their decision to declare war and to make the issue upon Hitler's invasion of Poland; is that correct?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; I think that is true.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray.

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg.

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, I want to reiterate the sentiment that was expressed by Senator Connally, that I personally have the greatest admiration for you and for your remarkable career in aviation. The questions I shall ask you will have no relation whatever to that. I do think it is interesting, in view of the fact that your testimony and your opinion carries such very great weight, that the sources of your convictions be made thoroughly understood to the American people.

Now, Colonel, when did you first go to Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. 1927, sir.

[Prolonged applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask the audience to refrain from such demonstrations, because it is interfering with the business of the committee, and if the request is not observed the Chair will exercise the authority to clear the room. Now, reasonable manifestations of approval or disapproval may be all right, but we are not carrying on a sideshow here. The committee will not be interrupted again in its deliberations. If you desire to stay—and you are here by our courtesy—you may stay, and I want you to stay, but we do expect you to respect our prerogatives in the interest of carrying on an inquiry that may be of help to the committee.

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me to say so, I rather sympathize with and approve the response of the audience, because the event the colonel referred to which raised such a clamor has received the attention of the whole world, not just the people in this room. I would like to add my own applause to the applause of these people and the people in the rest of the world for the magnificent thing you performed in 1927.

When was the second time, Colonel?

Colonel LINDBERGH. 1933, sir.

Senator PEPPER. 1933?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. How long were you there at that time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In 1933, I should say approximately 2 months, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Where did you spend your time then?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In Denmark, Sweden, Russia, Norway, Scotland, England, Ireland, France, Holland, Switzerland, and Spain, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Now, what was the occasion of that visit?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That was a survey flight that I was making of transatlantic air bases.

Senator PEPPER. Was that a Government mission or private mission?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Private, sir. That was my own flight, my own survey.

Senator PEPPER. When did you subsequently visit Europe after that, Colonel?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In 1935, sir.

Senator PEPPER. How long were you there then?

Colonel LINDBERGH. For about 2 years, sir.

Senator PEPPER. What visits did you make during that time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, now, I would rather put together the trips I made in 1936, 1937, and 1938, because I went to Europe in

December 1935 and came back the last time in April 1939; so if it is permissible, I would like to put the 3 years together to save time.

Senator PEPPER. You were in Europe a great part of the time during that 3-year period?

Colonel LINDBERGH. A little more than 2 out of the 3.

Senator PEPPER. How much of that time did you spend in Germany?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In Germany? I made seven or eight trips to Germany, sir, and I should say altogether probably 2 or 3 months.

Senator PEPPER. While you were there did you have access to information that the ordinary visitor did not have access to, in your opinion?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, I was invited to go there to see the German air force and the German aviation activities.

Senator PEPPER. Who invited you there?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That invitation came from General Goering.

Senator PEPPER. How much were you associated with General Goering?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe I have had either three or four conversations with the general, sir, in the years I was there.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Colonel, you know it is commonly reported in the press or magazines that you received some sort of decoration. Will you be good enough to explain the nature and the occasion of that award?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; I will be very glad to, sir. I was requested by the American Ambassador in Berlin to attend a dinner in the American Embassy for the purpose of creating closer relationships between the American Embassy and the German Government. I told the Ambassador I would be very glad to attend that dinner.

When I was there and when General Goering arrived he handed me this decoration.

Senator PEPPER. What did it purport to bespeak on behalf of General Goering or the German Government?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I did not understand.

Senator PEPPER. I say, what was the significance of the decoration? Did it belong to some particular order of merit that they possess, or what was the nature of it and what was the intended significance of it on the part of General Goering or the German Government?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The decoration, I believe, is called the German Eagle. General Goering simply handed me the box containing it at the American Embassy on that occasion.

Senator PEPPER. Without explaining what it was?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes. As I recall, sir, he said—in German, of course, and through a translator—that he was giving me the Order of the German Eagle. I believe those are the words he used, but I do not recall at this time, sir, exactly.

Senator PEPPER. Is that a German order of a certain class and has it a certain significance in that country?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know, sir. I imagine it has, but the details of it I do not know.

Senator PEPPER. You discovered at that time that it was a decoration and you later came to view it when you opened the box?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Later came to what, sir?

Senator PEPPER. I say, you were told at that time by the translator that it was some kind of decoration, some kind of award, from General Goering?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator PEPPER. And you later opened the box and observed the decoration itself?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Have you retained it since that time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir. I still have it, in storage.

Senator PEPPER. When was the last time you saw or communicated with General Goering?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It was at or within a few days of the scientific meeting in Germany, which is called the Lillienthal Conference, in 1938, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Do you remember about what time of the year it was?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That was in October, and the last time I was in Germany was in January 1939 to get a plane which I had left there; and at that time, on my last trip, I did not see General Goering. I saw some of the other air force officers.

Senator PEPPER. Now, the visit in 1938, in October, was after Munich, was it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Now, in asking you about what conversations may have occurred between the German leaders and some of the other Government leaders, understand, I do so subject to your own entire reservation as to what would be appropriate and proper for you to disclose.

Did General Goering, in that October conference in 1938, indicate to you, or did he at any previous time indicate to you, what was the general policy of the German Government toward what we call aggression? Did he indicate to you at any time that they expected to do more than to assure the autonomy of the 3,000,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; not to me. And our conferences, as I say, through a translator, were primarily technical. I do not now recall—and I am quite sure I would—of General Goering ever discussing what their plans were, but I think it was perfectly obvious, sir.

Senator PEPPER. It was perfectly obvious. Now, Colonel, dropping back to your visits to England prior to the Munich crisis, did you visit England in the era just preceding Munich?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir. I went to England at the time of Munich in response to a cable from Ambassador Kennedy.

Senator PEPPER. While you were in England did you have interviews with some of the high British officials?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; I saw several.

Senator PEPPER. Including a Mr. Chamberlain?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir. I saw Mr. Chamberlain one evening—as I recall now, it was after Munich—but I had no technical conversation with him at that time.

Senator PEPPER. Now, if I recall correctly, it has been commonly rumored, if not reported in the press, that you carried to England news to the British Government about the strength of the German

air force and communicated certain facts to them. With the same reservations I indicated a minute ago, is that true or not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not believe, sir, I have any reservations. If anything comes up—

Senator PEPPER. I just want you to know that I am not trying to ask you to say anything that is improper for you to say.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Thank you, sir; but I know of nothing that I would not be glad to go into.

Senator PEPPER. Is it or is it not a fact that you communicated certain information to the British Government relative to the strength of the German air force in the nature of, if not having the effect of, a discouragement to the British people resisting German aggression by telling them of the strength of the German air force?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would like to say, first, while I have constantly taken the stand that it was a mistake to declare war when it was declared and that it would lead to disaster, I have made no attempt to discourage any action that was taken by France or England. I have in a number of cases told officials there, at their request, what my own estimate was of the European air situation.

Now, if I might, sir, enlarge on exactly what happened when I went to England at the time of Munich, I shall be glad to do it.

I received a telegram from Ambassador Kennedy asking if I would come to England as soon as possible. This was just before Munich or during Munich, you might say.

When I arrived he asked me to give him my estimate of the military aviation situation in Europe.

I did that, and later confirmed it in writing. I understand that that report was cabled to the State Department in the United States.

While I was in England, at the request of various Englishmen, I discussed with certain officials there my estimate, the same estimate, of the aviation situation in Europe.

Does that cover your question, sir?

Senator PEPPER. Yes. Well, now, as to the content of that information and estimate, did you give the information that the German air power was, in your opinion, superior to that of England and France?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir. My statement at that time was, to be exact, that the German air force, in my opinion, was stronger than any combination of air forces that could be brought against it.

Senator PEPPER. And that was communicated to this Government, you have reason to believe, prior to Munich?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Or about the time of Munich, yes; prior to the settlement of Munich, yes.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel you say you observed such a preparation in the way of aviation development in Germany as to give you a pretty clear idea as to what the purposes of the German Government were, did you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In general; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Were those peaceable or warlike purposes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Undoubtedly they had expansion in mind.

Senator PEPPER. By "expansion" you mean conquests?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You mean a bursting out of the borders that had been recognized as German borders, and the occupation of other territories in Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, you have had an unusual background, therefore, with which to interpret the subsequent declarations that have been made by the leaders of the totalitarian states, have you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I do not know about that, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You have heard nothing inconsistent with the concepts that you formed at that time of their intentions in the subsequent statements of Goering or Hitler or Mussolini, have you, sir?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is a rather complicated question.

Senator PEPPER. I did not intend it to be. I meant to ask whether the subsequent statements of Hitler as to the aims of the German Government have been consistent with the things that you have just described as being your impression of German objectives at that time, in 1938.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I have read only a very few of Hitler's statements. The general trend of the war, I should say, was in confirmation with my observation at that time, except that I personally questioned that they desired to turn westward, at least at that time. Whether they did later, or not, I do not know.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, in an article in the Atlantic Monthly, written I believe in 1940, between January and June, in describing something of the nature of this struggle, you used these words, did you not? "It is a struggle by the German people to gain territory and power."

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am not sure of the exact words, but I believe I did. If you will read them, I will rest on that.

Senator PEPPER. Well, I was reading from page 306 of the Atlantic Monthly.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think that is true.

Senator PEPPER. You do think that is true?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Colonel, when do you think their efforts to gain these objectives are going to stop?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I should say that that depends entirely on the strength on the other side. They will stop when it becomes unprofitable to go further.

Senator PEPPER. So then, the world is faced with an aggressive and warlike Germany determined to continue its struggle for territory and power until that effort is brought to equilibrium or a standstill by at least an equal force in the other direction?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, by force in the other direction and by circumstances which make it unprofitable to go further. That would be my estimate. Maybe it is not that bad, but I think we should consider it is.

Senator PEPPER. If those are the objectives of the German Government—and they are not recently determined objectives but have been adhered to for a long time—how do you think that kind of effort can be stopped by the peaceful means of negotiation?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, as far as this country is concerned, I see no reason for us to negotiate. If there is any attempt to come

over here, I believe in war to the utmost, but I take this stand: That as long as this war continues in Europe I think the possibilities of negotiating for England will be worse, and I took that same stand, sir, if I may say so, before the war started, in regard to France, and I think it is borne out in regard to France.

Senator PEPPER. Let us make a brief résumé of the efforts that have been made to appease and negotiate with Hitler prior to the beginning of this war. After the Treaty of Versailles he eventually marched into the Rhineland and rearmed the Rhineland in violation of the Versailles Treaty.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator PEPPER. What do you suppose the reason for England and France not going to war at that time really was?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I can't give that reason, sir. I think that was their last opportunity to go to war, and many people in England and France, particularly military people, wanted to go to war at that time. They were stopped.

Senator PEPPER. And other people who did not want to go to war adopted what has since been regarded as an appeasement policy. They thought, "This is German soil. The German Government is sovereign. They have a right to rearm it in spite of the Versailles Treaty."

That was the reasoning of England and France.

Colonel LINDBERGH. That was part of the reasoning. I should say more of the reasoning lay in the European military situation.

Senator PEPPER. There is no doubt that England and France were far superior in force to Germany at that time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. At that time they were, yes, sir; but I think Britain was pretty much asleep and that France was not able to gather her forces together in an agreement.

Senator PEPPER. You mean not her military forces but her other forces?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Her political forces; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Is it not a possible theory that it was this very doctrine of appeasement and negotiation that led them not to hurl a superior military force at Germany at the time Hitler entered the Rhineland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am against appeasement, sir; but I am more strongly against an unsuccessful war.

Senator PEPPER. You are against appeasement, but you are not against negotiation.

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; because I believe the people——

Senator PEPPER. Let me ask——

Colonel LINDBERGH. May I finish, sir? I believe the people with whom we are in general agreement can obtain a better peace now by negotiation than they can later by continuing the war. But I am not for appeasement in America whatever.

Senator PEPPER. We shall get to that in a moment. Under the Treaty of Versailles the Germans were forbidden to have a navy, were they not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. There was a limitation.

Senator PEPPER. But the British Government voluntarily permitted, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the German Government to have a navy one-third the size of their own?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is what I understand.

Senator PEPPER. Do you think that might be attributable on the part of the British Government, to a desire to get along with Germany and live with her in some sort of fraternity?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I have lived long enough in Europe to know things are not done as obviously as that and as much on the surface as that. There are many elements underneath. There undoubtedly were other advantages for the British Government.

Senator PEPPER. What is known as the Allied side was faced with two courses: One, to hold Germany under strict and military subjugation; or two, to let her expand reasonably, take her back into the family of nations, and try to get on with her in the world?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think that is true.

Senator PEPPER. Was not this allowing Germany to have a navy one-third the size of the British Navy consistent with an honest policy of wanting to get on with Germany in the world, rather than to keep a military heel on her neck?

Colonel LINDBERGH. My main criticism of what has been done over there is that the policy has vacillated. At one time they were trying to put Germany back on her feet. At another time they wanted to prevent the German-Austrian customs union.

Senator PEPPER. Did not the British and the American people lend Germany colossal sums of money for her rehabilitation?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; there was reconstruction.

Senator PEPPER. Little, if any, of which she has paid back?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is right.

Senator PEPPER. Is it not consistent with the theory that Britain was trying to get on with Germany that she let her have money to rehabilitate her industries and her commerce?

Colonel LINDBERGH. A large number of people in England, when I was there, favored an understanding with Germany.

Senator PEPPER. When you come on down through the successive steps that led to the occupation of the Rhineland, the rearmament of the Rhineland, the building of the German Fleet, and then the Allies allowing Germany to put into effect military conscription, was not that consistent with the theory of allowing her to come back into the family of nations?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, part of the time that was the attitude and part of the time it was not. I say the mistake was in the vacillating.

Senator PEPPER. The only difference in the policy was the Austrian customs union, which they temporarily forbade.

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I should say there were a good many other instances there, but I really do not feel in a position to go into that, and those are not the elements upon which I base my position.

Senator PEPPER. Let us come directly to the conclusion of that sequence, the Munich agreement. Did not the whole world understand that what was called by some people selling Czechoslovakia down the river by Chamberlain and Daladier was consistent with an honest willingness on their part to see this sacrifice, which their peoples were really opposed to, in the hope that the peace of Europe might be maintained?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Much as I am against what happened at and came after Munich, I think the Munich agreement was primarily

reached because of the position of the German Army and air force and the Siegfried line.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think that any of the influence of the British and French Governments in agreeing to Munich is attributable to their making a last effort to get on with Hitler in Europe and the world and to believe the statements that he made that he had no other aims for conquest in Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe that is true on the part of certain people in England and France, but, as I say, I think the primary consideration at the time of Munich was the knowledge of the German air force, the German Army, and the position of the Siegfried line.

Senator PEPPER. Do you believe the speech Chamberlain made during Munich week, on Wednesday night, in which he said that if he were convinced that any nation was determined to rule the world by force, England would resist and it would go to war? Do you remember substantially that statement?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I remember a substantially similar statement.

Senator PEPPER. After Munich and after Hitler did not stop at giving autonomy to the Sudeten area in Czechoslovakia, but went on and took the remainder of Czechoslovakia, and then took Austria, and continued his warlike preparations and his warlike declarations, has it not been the consensus since that time that it was impossible thereafter to deal with Hitler in his what you call struggle for territory and power except by interposing force for force against his own force?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think that is true. I think the only feasible way to have dealt with that situation was by building strength behind the Maginot line in France, and in England behind the British shore line and the British Fleet; and I have no criticism whatever of the attempt to stop German aggression on the Continent. My criticism lies in the failure to do so and in what to me was obviously going to be a failure.

Senator PEPPER. If you had been writing the foreign policy of England and France you not only would have let Hitler take the Sudetenland but such other territory in Europe, without protest or action on your part to prevent it, that he might desire to take?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; only to this extent: After the German air force was constructed, the German Army trained, and the Siegfried line built, then obviously, if England and France wanted to be successful in a war against Germany, they had to prepare for that war for many years, as Germany had done.

My criticism is that at the time war was declared there was not the slightest chance that England or France could help Poland, and I think very, very few military men thought they could; and my personal opinion was at that time that it would be for them a disastrous war. It has been for France, and I think it is now a disastrous thing for England. I am opposed to an unsuccessful war.

Senator PEPPER. You think England and France should have let him go ahead with the conquest and then go ahead with preparation, one independent of the other, until they were in a position to go to war successfully? Were England and France any stronger by letting Hitler take Czechoslovakia and taking their fine little Army, and taking their fortifications, and taking their munitions works, and adding them to his?

Colonel LINDBERGH. They were certainly so weak at the time of Munich that they could not do anything for Czechoslovakia. I would like to cite the position of the French air force. There was not one single pursuit plane in France at the time of Munich that could catch the German bomber that was then in production, and the French air force as a whole was in deplorable condition. The British air force was somewhat but not much better off.

Senator PEPPER. Were they in better position a year later?

Colonel LINDBERGH. A little.

Senator PEPPER. Therefore, by the sacrifice of Munich, they had a great deal of time to prepare themselves?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Some. But their preparation was very inadequate.

Senator PEPPER. Did you hear the testimony of Secretary Knox and some of the other Cabinet officers before this committee that one of the chief aspects of this bill and one of the chief reasons for the support of this bill was that it permitted us to buy time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In the first place, as an American, I am against buying time by spending English and French blood. Secondly if we are buying time, we should use it. What we are now doing is sending our air force to Europe.

Senator PEPPER. Does this bill have a provision for spending English and French blood?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not in those words.

Senator PEPPER. Would you be willing to spend American money and American materials in order to buy time to defend itself?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think, sir, if this is our war in Europe we should fight it. I do not think it is our war in Europe, and therefore I am against fighting it.

Senator PEPPER. Whether it is our war is not exactly the same question as whether we are interested in the outcome of the war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Did you not say in your testimony that it did make a great deal of difference as to which side won this war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; I think it does.

Senator PEPPER. England and France are not potentially invading the Western Hemisphere if they win this war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not at this time.

Senator PEPPER. We would not have to build a big fleet and a big army and send soldiers to the training camps and regiment our economy to a war economy if England and France win this war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. There is another picture to that, and that is what kind of prostration there will be in this world if this war is carried to a conclusion. I believe it is a mistake to think that if England and France win this war conditions will be the same in Europe and America as they were before.

Senator PEPPER. You think France and England constitute a potential military danger to this country if they win?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; but I think the prostration there will be in Europe if the war is carried to a conclusion will be a potential danger.

Senator PEPPER. If there is prostration in Europe that means there won't be one nation with a great army or a great air force.

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is right.

Senator PEPPER. If there is prostration 3,000 miles away from us instead of an armed giant in Germany, we will be much safer.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir. That is why I am for staying over here.

Senator PEPPER. If there is a revolution, even if they have a great army and air force, they cannot hurt us.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not if we stay over here.

Senator PEPPER. If there is prostration in Europe, as you contemplate, there will not be anybody over there who will be able to launch an attack over here.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not if we stay out of the war, but if we go into the war we may have prostration over here.

Senator PEPPER. We are talking about a military attack. I think a revolution is different.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think it is more serious.

Senator PEPPER. So if France and England win this war you do not contemplate any necessity for building a two-ocean navy and building up an army of perhaps one, two, three, or four million, and building an air force of ten, twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty thousand planes, do you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. If Germany wins this war, then what do you contemplate as a necessity for this country relative to its own arms?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think we should be fully armed.

Senator PEPPER. What do you mean by "fully armed"?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Fully armed to resist any invasion that any combination of foreign powers may attempt.

Senator PEPPER. Give us your idea of what would constitute full armament.

Colonel LINDBERGH. As far as aviation is concerned, I testified before the House committee that I felt an air force of 10,000 planes would be adequate, with reserves, for this hemisphere.

Senator PEPPER. All right; 10,000 planes. Are those pursuit planes or bombing planes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. All types; 10,000 combat planes.

Senator PEPPER. How many reserves?

Colonel LINDBERGH. One hundred percent.

Senator PEPPER. The same number of reserves?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. That is potentially 20,000 planes

Colonel LINDBERGH. And, say, 5,000 training planes.

Senator PEPPER. How many planes is Germany turning out a month?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know, sir. That would have to be an estimate.

Senator PEPPER. Did you not estimate before the House that it was 5,000 a month?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I said that my estimate in 1938 was that she had a potential capacity of about 20,000 a year, and I should be surprised if her capacity now—I do not mean her production, necessarily—is not 5,000 a month.

Senator PEPPER. If they are capable of making 5,000 a month, suppose they had an air force of forty or fifty thousand planes and suppose they had the port of Dakar and the Cape Verde Islands. Would our 10,000 planes that you contemplate be capable of defending any part of South America against the establishment of a base there if

the Germans had the naval power that was equal to or superior to our own?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In the case of South America, sir, I think that our policy should be to place ourselves in a position to harass any lines of communication that are established, and those lines of communication would be naval, because it is impossible for planes to carry fuel and supplies. Planes cannot carry enough.

My own position is that we should make the northern part of our hemisphere impregnable, have bases all around it, and be in a position to harass any enemy that attempts to establish a line of communication to South America.

Senator PEPPER. Do you take the position that we ought to defend all parts of North America and the Western Hemisphere?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think our position in North America should be impregnable.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper, we necessarily have to suspend until 2 o'clock.

Colonel, we shall have to ask you to come back.

(Thereupon, at 12:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened, at the conclusion of the recess, at 2 p. m.

STATEMENT OF COL. CHARLES A. LINDBERGH—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. When we recessed, Senator Pepper was questioning Colonel Lindbergh.

Senator Pepper, you may proceed.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, I think it only fair to say to you that a good many people have been puzzled by the absence of any indication on your part of any moral indignation at what they consider outrageous wrongs which have been perpetrated and are being perpetrated by the German Government. Do you care to make any comment on that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe very firmly that nothing is gained by publicly commenting on your feeling in regard to one side of a war in which your country is not taking part. For instance, I feel very strongly that the attitude of this country should be receptive to a negotiated peace. I have purposely attempted to avoid stating indignation publicly because I feel it would have no constructive result. I am not sure that I have been able to do this in each instance, but I have tried to.

As far as my attitude toward aggression is concerned, I personally would prefer not to see it happen ever again. However, I know that it always has taken place in history, and that unless conditions are created in the world or on the continents to prevent war, aggression will probably take place in the future.

Senator PEPPER. You mean by that that you have come to a point of a sort of reconciliation to that phenomenon, and you have ceased to be agitated about it when it makes its appearance?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; but I think we should look at the existing situation calmly, and I personally see no indication that war is a thing of the past. I think that we had an opportunity a number of years after the last war to make adjustments which would have at least postponed another. I say "we" in that case having in mind the

various nations of America and Europe, and I think we failed in that opportunity. Now I think it is very easy to say that the fault lies entirely on one side; probably at any particular period it lies mostly on one side, but I think that over a period of a generation or several generations it is pretty evenly divided.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, do I understand by one of the latter statements you have made that there have been times in the past when you think the United States should have participated in, had something to do with, European affairs, so as to make a better world?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I personally feel that it is better for us to let Europe work out her own affairs, and that we should under all circumstances stay out of European wars. I do believe that having taken part in the last war we either should have stayed in European politics permanently or else stayed out of them, and stayed in America permanently. I think that having refused to take permanent part in the peace conditions of Europe after the last war, it would have been advisable for us not to have attempted to interfere with conditions that brought on this war.

Senator PEPPER. You think we should have joined the League of Nations, or associated ourselves in some formal way with the other nations of the world in an effort to prevent a recurrence of such a situation as we now have?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe that there should be always negotiations between nations, but I personally feel that it was better for us not to join the League of Nations.

Senator PEPPER. Then in what way did you contemplate that we might have helped to keep Europe from getting to this chaotic condition?

Colonel LINDBERGH. We might have stayed in European politics after the last war, and taken part in a readjustment of the conditions that brought on this war.

Senator PEPPER. If we were not to be a member of the League of Nations, or a member of any formal association designed to accomplish that purpose, I suppose you mean that the only way we could have done it would have been by shifting the weight of our influence from time to time in favor of peace and against war, in favor of lawfulness and against lawlessness, in favor of negotiation for the adjustment of wrongs instead of violent aggression. Is that what you mean?

Colonel LINDBERGH. If we had decided to stay in European affairs instead of getting out of them, as we did, I think that is probably the case, but having decided not to go in the League of Nations, then I think we should have been consistent and left European affairs to Europe.

Senator PEPPER. Let us assume that we were going to do something affirmative. I understood you to say that one of the things we might have done would have been to have cooperated with the other nations of Europe in the adjustment of the wrongs which were then in existence and in possible efforts to solve the world's problems. If we were not to do that as a member of the League of Nations, or some other formal body, we would have had to do it then by privately throwing our influence one way or the other toward the accomplishment of those objectives. would we not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am in favor of the action we took in taking our forces back to America and not joining the League of Nations. That is my personal opinion.

Senator PEPPER. I had understood your answer about the League of Nations, but I am inquiring about the other phase of your answer. In what other way might we have favored and righteously influenced the course of Europe to the path of rectitude other than by being a member of the League of Nations or some other formal body?

Colonel LINDBERGH. If we intended to control European affairs, I believe we should have left whatever portion of our armed forces was necessary in Europe to take part in the occupation.

Senator PEPPER. By leaving the armed forces there?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; which I am against.

Senator PEPPER. Then there might have been three ways by which the United States, upon the conclusion that America was affected by the kind of world it was, might have endeavored to influence it to make it a better world, or keep it from being a worse world, first, by joining the League of Nations, or associating itself formally with the other nations toward that end; second, by keeping troops in Europe and using armed forces for the purpose of accomplishing its influence; or, third, to use its moral influence and its resources, perhaps its diplomacy, and such other peaceable means as it possessed, toward the accomplishment of those desirable purposes. If you are against the League of Nations, if you are against our having left armed forces over there, would you also have been against our pursuing the third course I have mentioned?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not if it did not involve us in war, or interfere unduly with European relationships.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose the United States and the people of this country said, "We want it to be a better world than it has been, we want to see these struggles for territory and power"—which you point out in your article—"stopped; we want to see peaceable adjustment of wrongs; we want to see negotiation as a means of settling friction, and we are going to stand up manfully and denounce by our moral influence anyone who pursues the antisocial course as we figure it. Not only are we going to do that, but we are going to let the nation beset by an aggressor, attacked by a conqueror, come and buy materials from us, and be a sort of an arsenal for democracy, using 'democracy' in the sense of freedom and liberty and fairness and justice for everybody." Would that, in your opinion, be an improper course for us to take?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not if it was intelligently followed; but I do not believe we have followed such a course intelligently. I think we have lost our opportunity, or a large part of our opportunity, to exercise a powerful influence for peace in Europe; and, as I say, I am thoroughly against putting ourselves in the position where we may be forced into a war in Europe.

Senator PEPPER. The principal spokesman of American foreign policy, at least for the past 8 years, has been Secretary of State Hull, has he not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. In your opinion, has Secretary Hull stood for lawfulness and fairness and justice, and negotiation, as you have described it, in foreign affairs, or has he not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am sure that has been the Secretary's intent.

Senator PEPPER. Has it or has it not been his effort to make that the policy of the United States of America?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I hesitate to enter into a discussion about the efforts of the Secretary of State. I would prefer not to put it on as personal a basis as that. I have great admiration for the Secretary of State. I do not agree with many of the policies he has followed.

Senator PEPPER. Has it not been one of the cardinal precepts of the Secretary's policy that we would not recognize conquest achieved by force, and we will not recognize even one of these struggles to which you refer in your article, as growing out of an increasing birth rate, and a larger share to which they might be entitled in the sun, because they become more powerful. Secretary Hull has been against that sort of thing, has he not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I understand so, and I wish the world were ideal enough to run it in that way.

Senator PEPPER. Do you advocate that the United States shall simply close its eyes to what is going on in the world, what wrongs are being perpetrated, what international aggressors are rising up, and not have a moral opinion about those things?

Colonel LINDBERGH. By no means, but I do not believe we should or can police the world.

Senator PEPPER. Let us assume that we can or cannot police the world; is there any salutary influence we can have to restrain aggressors in the world, and to make it a more lovely and a more peaceful world?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; I certainly believe there is.

Senator PEPPER. Then, if there are feasible means toward that end, you think they should be taken, do you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. You are proud of the democracy we have in this country, are you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator PEPPER. You want to see it live?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I want to see it live, particularly as it used to be in this country.

Colonel PEPPER. "As it used to be." Do you want to comment further on that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Only to this extent: I believe that the most ideal system of government I personally have seen or experienced or know anything about is the general system we followed during, I will say, the last 25 years. I believe the trends we are following today, and the trends particularly that are exemplified by this bill, are leading us away from that system of government, and I think these trends are more dangerous to this country and to our welfare than any danger of invasion from abroad. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. If there shall be a repetition of a demonstration, I will ask the police to have the audience leave. I dislike to do that, but obviously if it is started we cannot proceed in order. I admonish Senators, without any purpose to be hypercritical, that perhaps the forms in which many questions are put are provocative of outbursts by the audience.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, I take it from your last answer, and from your principal response this morning, that you are talking now about a domestic policy, about conferring power on our President. I believe you said that was the chief objection you had to the bill, that it was conferring certain powers on our President.

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is my primary objection; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. That relates, then, to a matter of domestic politics, does it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Domestic Government affairs?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Let us leave that to one side for a moment if we may. I believe I understood you to say that you favored the United States doing what it might do which did not get us into war, if you might want to add that, to discourage aggression in the world.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; provided it is done in such a way that it does not futilely add to the bloodshed in the world.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose this bill did not confer any power on the President at all except the prescribed statutory authority; suppose everything that is proposed under this bill was being proposed as an action of the Congress and not of the Executive; that we were passing a law whereby we said we are going to turn over 50 or 75 percent of the output of our factories to Britain, that we are going to give credit to Britain, that we are going to do all the things which might be done under this bill, except that Congress will specify what is to be done, and leaving no discretion in the bill. Would you oppose or favor the bill?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I understand Congress at the present has that discretion, but beyond that, what I particularly oppose is the stripping of our own air force and sending our modern equipment to Europe. I use that as an example.

Senator PEPPER. Let me orient that question. As I understand it, if what is proposed in the bill were being proposed as action of the Congress after full and free debate and after hearing, you would still oppose it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I understand that that is exactly as the statutes now are.

Senator PEPPER. Let us assume that the bill proposes to do through the Congress what it cannot do without new authority, but that everything contemplated here was specifically authorized by the Congress and no discretion were left to the President. In that case would you favor the bill or not favor it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would be opposed to the implication that we would continue to strip our forces.

Senator PEPPER. So you would oppose aid to England in the degree provided for here even if the question of Presidential discretion had nothing at all to do with it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I oppose aid to England which will carry us into the war, or will weaken our own forces in America; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Weaken us to what point?

Colonel LINDBERGH. For instance, by sending our new aircraft to Europe when our own forces are in deplorable condition.

Senator PEPPER. Let me start back a little earlier. Do you understand that it has been testified here that immediately after the retreat from Dunkerque certain equipment was furnished by this country, was sold by this Government, to Great Britain? Would you undo that if you had the power?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, I think the repeal of the arms embargo originally was a mistake.

Senator PEPPER. I am not asking about that. It has been testified here that there were certain rifles, certain ammunition, and certain machine guns, and certain other weapons, that were sold by this Government to Great Britain because they were stripped of means of defense, relatively, after the retreat from Dunkerque. Do you approve that or do you disapprove it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I have tried to answer that as definitely as I can. The answer, for instance, would depend upon a study which I have not made of that particular period, but I think it comes under this general rule very clearly: I oppose anything that will take us into war or that reduces the strength of our own forces in America.

Senator PEPPER. You mean reduces at all, in any degree, our forces in America?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In any appreciable degree, any practicable degree.

Senator PEPPER. If we sent several hundred thousand rifles, several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, and several hundred thousand machine guns and other weapons, would you say that should not have been done?

Colonel LINDBERGH. If we had committed ourselves, I should say we should follow out our commitment, but I think in the end it will prove to be a mistake.

Senator PEPPER. I am not speaking about that having been done pursuant to any commitment; I am assuming it was done as an initial action. If you had been in the White House, or had been counseling the President, would you have counseled him to do that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would have opposed the arms embargo repeal in the first place.

Senator PEPPER. You regard that as having been done under the authority that arose out of the repeal of the arms embargo law, so if you had been advising your Government, the arms embargo would not have been revised, and it would not have been legally possible for us to have sent England any materials of war, would it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am not sure that I understand that.

Senator PEPPER. You are assuming, I think, that such guns and ammunition and implements of war as we have sent to Great Britain have been sent under the authority of the revised neutrality act, are you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator PEPPER. Otherwise that would not have been possible. You opposed the revision of the neutrality act, did you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I opposed it; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. In other words, if your policy and your judgment had been followed, we never would have sent one machine gun, or one round of ammunition, or one rifle, or one airplane to England, would we?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe that is true.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, in your opinion, are we safer by having done that; is our own defense, of which you have been talking, better assured or less assured, in your opinion, from our having done that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think it is less assured.

Senator PEPPER. You think we are weaker?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; and I cite particularly the Air Corps in its present condition.

Senator PEPPER. Let us examine that. You said a while ago that England and France were stronger in September 1939 than they were in September 1938, did you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. They had a year in which to prepare?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. England, in the period immediately following Dunkerque, was probably at her lowest ebb insofar as her ability to defend herself was concerned. Do you not think so?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think that is probable.

Senator PEPPER. So that was the time when they were most vulnerable, and we went to their rescue probably at their most needy time, did we not, when we went to their aid at that time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Probably.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose, Colonel, that we just assume that being as weak as they were, Hitler might have thrown his full force against them and they might have fallen. Let us consider what the significance of that collapse of Britain might have meant, had it occurred, to the people of the United States. That was a year ago, was it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. About.

Senator PEPPER. We have made progress in the last year, have we not, in the development of our own defense?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not in our air force.

Senator PEPPER. What about our means of producing airplanes? Have we not developed means of producing airplanes in our factories to a very large degree in the last year?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should say that our facilities have increased on absolute standards. But on standards relative, for instance, to Germany, our air force strength has decreased because we have sent our equipment abroad.

Senator PEPPER. I am speaking of our ability to turn out airplanes as compared with our ability to turn out airplanes a year ago.

Colonel LINDBERGH. It has increased.

Senator PEPPER. For example, I have heard it said on the floor of the Senate—I think I remember Senator Mead, who is from New York State, saying it—that one of the factories in New York, before the arm's embargo was repealed, was turning out, I believe, one airplane perhaps a month, and later, with the impetus to our production that was given by Britain's buying airplanes from us, they finally got to where they turned out one a week, and I believe he said a little bit later they got to where they could turn out one every day. If that is relatively true, our capacity to produce has vastly expanded in the last 12 months.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I thoroughly agree with that; but I say our air force today is, on relative standards, probably weaker than it was when the war started.

Senator PEPPER. But not our ability to produce airplanes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As far as the future is concerned, our ability to produce airplanes has increased.

Senator PEPPER. Is not that the real criterion of our strength, our ability to turn out airplanes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It depends on when we consider the possibility of invasion. I think we should consider it possible at any time, and if we do not, we will be vulnerable.

Senator PEPPER. What would be more important, in connection with an invasion, than the collapse of England?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, I do not think there will be an invasion if we keep a reasonable strength.

Senator PEPPER. Let me ask you another question. Do you think there will be an invasion as long as England stands?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not in this particular era.

Senator PEPPER. You mean not at—

Colonel LINDBERGH. This generation. It has happened before, and may happen again, but not now.

Senator PEPPER. If you felt that England could stand and would stand, instead of having doubts about it, as you have indicated here today, would you not feel a good deal safer and feel better about our own security?

Colonel LINDBERGH. If England could stand as she has in the past; yes, sir; but where I differ is in my belief that regardless of who wins the war conditions in Europe and America are not going to be as we have known them in the past.

Senator PEPPER. Before I get off the main line, your answer is that if we keep England standing and keep England with comparable strength to Hitler, we are in no danger of invasion. That is your answer, is it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Of military invasion? I should say that is true, although I do not think we are in danger anyway if we use much intelligence. But if we continue to expend our arms and our money at the rate we are expending them at present, then I think we are in danger of a different type of condition in this country, which I think is more serious, an internal condition.

Senator PEPPER. Do you think that if England continues to stand and continues to increase her strength, nevertheless, if we continue to aid England, Hitler will attack us in some other way, in some other direction?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; but what I do mean is that if we continue to make expenditures at the rate of billions of dollars a year for rearming here and sending arms to Europe, then, if this war goes on for several years—which it must if England is going to invade the continent, if that is at all possible, then I think there will be prostration in Europe, and probably in America, such as we have never before seen.

Senator PEPPER. You think there will be an economic collapse, and we will have to stand up under more war preparation?

Colonel LINDBERGH. If we intend to support the war in Europe indefinitely.

Senator PEPPER. Still not getting away from the line I was pursuing a moment ago, suppose England falls and Hitler becomes the master of Europe; would not Hitler have the strongest nation that has ever been in control in Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe so; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. His economic and military strength would be greater than has ever been possessed in Europe by any other nation would it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe so.

Senator PEPPER. Would you not, with your fine background and your large experience, be the first one to urge us to make the effort, to make the expenditure of money, and if necessary impose the tax-

tion, in order to prepare ourselves against a victorious Hitler, in the circumstances?

Colonel LINDBERGH. If there is any indication of invasion; yes.

Senator PEPPER. In which case would we have to spend the more money and weaken our economic structure the most, to meet the danger of Hitler with England still living and still fighting, or with England collapsed?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am inclined to think that the best way in which we can weaken our economic structure is to continue on our present course.

Senator PEPPER. Is our present course of aiding England any worse strain on our economic structure than the course we would have to follow to combat Hitler, particularly to combat him if England fell?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; I think that if we put our entire effort into strengthening our own country, the cost would be less, and that it would be a better course over a period of time for us to pursue.

Senator PEPPER. Is it not true that the cost would not be more with England there fighting a common enemy with us, as England now is fighting the enemy alone?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think the greatest cost would be in continuing what we are doing now, making huge expenditures, billions a year, in an effort to carry on what will be probably an unsuccessful war.

Senator PEPPER. As I understood your answer a bit ago, you have no emotionalism in your attitude; it is just a cold question of whether or not the aid we give England is, from the military point of view, effective. Is that correct?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would say that at this time it is necessary to try to hold emotion in the background. I think that has been the danger in America, it has been the danger in France and England. War must be met by methods which are not emotional.

Senator PEPPER. You do not even favor our throwing our moral force against aggressor nations when they are doing what we regard as wrong?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am in favor of throwing our moral force in whatever direction--well, you might say in general terms, in whatever direction would heighten the civilization of the world; yes.

Senator PEPPER. Well, that involves what might be called an emotional attitude, does it not, to throw your moral force on one side and against another? Is not that what one might call an emotional attitude?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; but within bounds. It is the extreme of emotions that I think is our danger.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, Hitler's declarations and Mussolini's declarations have gone far outside England and France, and even the European continent, have they not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am not sure that I understand, sir.

Senator PEPPER. I mean, have not they declared objectives that go a great deal deeper than even becoming the masters of Europe? Have they not put it on an ideological basis? Have they not spoken about the "new order" as against the old?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I think that is true, undoubtedly; but after all, sir, that happened at the time of Napoleon, it has happened with democracy. Democracy has had the idea of spreading all over the earth. It has happened with communism. They have the idea of spreading all over the earth; and it has never worked.

Senator PEPPER. This is a belligerent and a militant philosophy that Hitler is seeking to spread all over the world, do you not think so?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Quite similar to that at the time of Napoleon.

Senator PEPPER. He is trying to spread it largely also in this hemisphere, is he not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As the Russians have done; yes.

Senator PEPPER. Well, he has had a great deal better success than the Russians have had, has he not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not in this hemisphere; no, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think the German propaganda has been any stronger in this country than Russian propaganda?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I do not.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think the danger from Hitler is any greater than the danger from Stalin, that we experience in this country?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not internally; and I think our internal danger is the greatest.

Senator PEPPER. You speak of our internal situation, Colonel. This is a public hearing that has been going on here for some time, is it not? You and other witnesses have been permitted to express their views openly and publicly?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I understand that most of the witnesses have been heard in public; yes.

Senator PEPPER. Yes; all but Secretary Hull, our Secretary of State, and a portion of the testimony of Secretary Stimson. You anticipate that there will be debate on the floor, do you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. And you have seen discussion of it in the press and in the magazines, and on the public forum and over the radio? We are trying to arrive at our conclusions here by what are called the democratic processes, are we not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator PEPPER. Now, you refer in one of your magazine articles—I believe in the Commentator—to “them haranguing us about democracy”?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I have never written an article for the Commentator, sir. I think that is a reproduction of my radio address.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, I apologize. I have here before me Scribner's Commentator for December 1940, page 69, an article headed “A Plea for American Independence,” by Col. Charles A. Lindbergh.

Colonel LINDBERGH. That, I believe, sir, is a reproduction of a radio address.

Senator PEPPER. In the course of that you use these words:

They are haranguing us about democracy—

democracy is in quotation—

yet they leave us with less knowledge of the direction in which we are heading than if we were citizens of a totalitarian state.

You really mean that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir. I was speaking about the administration, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Now, whom do you mean by “they”? Do you mean the Congress?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The administration.

Senator PEPPER. Who is "the administration," in your opinion?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Our present Government, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You mean the Congress.

Colonel LINDBERGH. What that includes is, I would say, our present Government in all forms.

Senator PEPPER. You mean Secretary of State Hull?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Including everyone in the Government; yes, sir. That is the best way I can state it.

Senator PEPPER. You mean President Roosevelt?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think to some extent, sir.

Senator PEPPER. To some extent?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, is it an accident or a coincidence that a great many of your radio speeches came within a few days after the President's speeches on foreign policy? Was that by coincidence or design?

Colonel LINDBERGH. There has been no connection, sir, so far as I am concerned.

Senator PEPPER. It was a coincidence?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir. There has been no connection.

Senator PEPPER. Now, I was saying that this decision we are trying to arrive at here relative to this bill is being arrived at by what you call the "democratic process," is it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Largely; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. It is conformable to your views on democratic institutions?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Have you heard of any proceedings like this being held in Germany or in Italy?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir. I think it is quite different.

Senator PEPPER. They do not have open hearings before the Reichstag and the Fascist Grand Council, do they?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is what I understand, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You understand they do or do not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I understand that they do not.

Senator PEPPER. That they do not? That is, except when Hitler makes a speech, generally speaking, the German people do not have very much information about his course, they do not have these hearings and these debates, as we have them here?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, I think the German people have had a clearer idea of where they were heading in regard to war than we have in America, sir.

Senator PEPPER. I understood you to say this morning that they had pretty well made up their mind upon world conquest when you were over there in 1938?

Colonel LINDBERGH. And the German people realized that.

Senator PEPPER. They realize that? They are bent upon that mission, in your opinion?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is what I believe, sir.

Senator PEPPER. What do you regard as the attitude of the American people toward this crisis, now, and what is your theory of what we should do about it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, I tried to outline my theory. As far as the attitude of the American people is concerned I have no

way of judging it except by such information as the polls that are taken, and people I talk to and hear from by mail and otherwise.

I gather from the polls that about 85 percent of the people in this country are opposed to our getting into the war; that a majority of the people, not so large as that, but a large majority, are in favor of aid to Britain short of war. But I believe there is some confusion between getting into war and "short of war," and I think it is essential to clarify that.

I believe, sir, that there are a great many people in this country who are using the phrase "short of war" to make us take steps that will inevitably lead us to war; and that, I oppose.

Senator PEPPER. I believe you said this morning that you understood, and you described in your magazine article, the present policy of the German Government as being a struggle for territory and power. In a struggle like that, does the aggressor nation pay any attention to the legal technicalities of the conduct of its intended victim?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Oh, I think very little.

Senator PEPPER. So whether we violate international law or do not violate international law is not going to have any influence over what Hitler does, is it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, it may have some, but I have never taken a stand on international law. I have taken a stand primarily on what we could do successfully and safely.

Senator PEPPER. Getting back to that question which we were discussing a moment ago, if England were to collapse, Colonel, the way France collapsed, and if a puppet government, unthinkable as it now is, were put in charge in England—

Colonel LINDBERGH. What government, sir?

Senator PEPPER. In England, a puppet government—another Laval put in Winston Churchill's place in England—with that condition in the world, would our condition over here be weaker or stronger than it now is?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I put it a little differently, sir. I should say it would be stronger than it would be if we attempted to interfere, and I say that (1) because I do not think we can interfere successfully, and (2) because I do not believe that any system that comes in Europe will come without opposition.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Colonel, what do you mean by "interfering"? You do not mean sending men, do you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, that would be interference.

Senator PEPPER. This bill does not propose to send men, does it? It does not authorize the President to send men, does it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No. But I would say this bill is a step in that direction, sir.

Senator PEPPER. But the point is it does not authorize the President or anybody else to send any men from the United States to Europe or anywhere else, does it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is my understanding, sir.

Senator PEPPER. On the contrary, the Democratic platform definitely declared against the sending of men outside the Americas, did it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. And so far as you know there has never been any statement contrary to that made by any responsible head of this Government, has there?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As far as the platform is concerned, sir, I refer back to the Democratic platform of 1932, which I do not believe was carried out very carefully.

Senator PEPPER. Well, the subsequent platforms of 1936 and 1940 at least have not been inconsistent with the idea of sending men, have they?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not as yet.

Senator PEPPER. So you are not able to tell this committee of any statement or declaration or act, on the part of the President or the responsible heads of this Government, which in this bill contemplate or authorizes the sending of men to participate in the war in Europe, or anywhere else, have you, outside of this hemisphere?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not in this bill, sir.

Senator PEPPER. All right.

Colonel LINDBERGH. But I have not very much confidence as to intent.

Senator PEPPER. But you are talking about this bill right now. You are opposing this bill, are you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. And when some other bill comes up, you will examine that and attitudinize yourself according to the content of that bill, will you not? This hearing is on this particular bill, is it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Colonel, do you not know as a matter of fact that Secretary Morgenthau came here and testified before this committee that the British Government had already committed itself to practically all the orders in this country that it could pay for in terms of dollar exchange; you know that he testified that, do you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; but I know that it has been questioned by other people.

Senator PEPPER. All right, that is a question of fact, is it not, as to whether the British have the money or do not? And I may add, Colonel, that I daresay that even you are not stronger in your resolve to make them pay in dollar exchange every dollar that they are able to pay than I am.

Now, I think that perhaps may represent the sentiment in this country, but that is a question of fact, and you and I do not know those figures, and we do not know those facts. Let us just assume that this bill is designed to make it possible for England to buy materials in this country when her dollar exchange gives out. If that be the principal purpose of it, why, have you objection to that general purpose?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, I think that we should consider very carefully the reasonableness of asking for some of the West Indian islands, which are worth a great deal more to us than they are to England, and which are in some ways vital to our defense.

Senator PEPPER. This bill simply provides:

The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

You would prefer that the Congress determine the consideration received in each case for the material sent, would you, rather than letting the President decide that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In each important case; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Now, that being the principal purpose of this bill, the idea was simply to facilitate the transfer of materials, and not to send the men, was it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In this bill?

Senator PEPPER. Yes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I understand so; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. All right. Now, whether that has some subsequent significance or not is a matter still to be determined, is it not? We are already sending materials?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, I understood that you raised the question, sir.

Senator PEPPER. I did. I asked if the sending of those materials was different in kind from the sort of thing we have been doing in the past. We have been sending them our materials, have we not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator PEPPER. And you said awhile ago, now, you would favor them continuing to get these materials as long as our commitments lasted. What did you mean by "commitments" in that case?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The promises we made, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Well, suppose we did not make any promises to furnish them any given quantities of material, or any materials over any given period of time; then you would favor quitting them, would you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, as I say, sir; I was opposed to starting.

Senator PEPPER. And that is entirely upon the premise that it is not a good thing from a military standpoint for us to try to keep England alive?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It is primarily on the premise that our interference in Europe has added to chaos and to loss of life in Europe.

Senator PEPPER. Well now, Colonel, I am sure you have changed your ground, there. I understood you to say that the reason you opposed our sending aid to England was not because you did not have some conviction on this matter, not because you did not think that Hitler was an aggressor bent upon conquest of the world, but you thought it was weakening the United States if we sent any of these materials outside of our hemisphere; therefore you were against it. Was not that what you said?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir, I did not say it in that way; and also I said that was one of my reasons, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Oh. Now, you have another reason besides that. What is that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would like to go back to the original testimony, if there is any question about it, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Well, your other point is that we are responsible for bloodshed and continued war; is that right?

Colonel LINDBERGH. One of them; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You think then that we would spare bloodshed and that we would improve the condition of the world by letting England collapse as soon as possible, so she would make a peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir. I think we have gotten ourselves into a very complicated position. I would say we would spare blood-

shed and add to the betterment of conditions in the world if we kept out of Europe's wars entirely.

Senator PEPPER. England would be weaker without our help than they would be with it, would they not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am inclined to think, sir, and I believe Mr. Churchill once said, that if we had not gone into the last war the peace would have lasted longer than it did.

Senator PEPPER. That indicates that if we do not furnish them materials they will collapse; is that right?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Under present conditions?

Senator PEPPER. Yes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Possibly, but I believe that now by furnishing materials we are simply prolonging the war, not changing the trend of it, and that we will be accused of this eventually.

Senator PEPPER. By "prolonging the war" you mean prolonging England's freedom and liberty?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I did not get the question.

Senator PEPPER. I say, by "prolonging the war" you mean we are prolonging England's resistance to Hitler's effort to conquer?

Colonel LINDBERGH. There is another side to that, sir. I think, as I said before, that we are not changing the trend of the war. We are prolonging the war, and consequently adding to the bloodshed in Europe.

Senator PEPPER. Well, the longer we prolong it, the longer England remains alive, is not that true?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; but I am not in favor of purchasing time with English blood.

Senator PEPPER. Now, I thought you were thinking primarily in your statement about the defense of America. Now you are putting it on an emotional attitude, about Englishmen's lives. You want us to let England fall, so that we will help England out; is that it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. And not to shed any more English blood?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I have not said anything like that, sir.

Senator PEPPER. I understood you said that by not sending any more materials we would weaken them, and by their being weaker it would discourage the prolongation of the war, and by "prolonging the war" I understood you to say you meant England's continuing her resistance; so you would spare English blood at the expense of English freedom, would you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I do not follow you on this; I am sorry.

Senator PEPPER. Well, it is the English you are sympathetic for, then, and not the United States that you are thinking about when you say that you would like to see this thing over as soon as possible?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think you can view it from several standpoints. I think we must first consider the welfare of our own country and the heritage that we pass on to the coming generations in this country.

Senator PEPPER. Yes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. But also I think it is very important to consider what we are responsible for in Europe.

Senator PEPPER. Yes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. And I say that I think we will be charged by England herself eventually with having added to the bloodshed in

Europe, without changing the trend of the war; and we have had some experience of that.

Senator PEPPER. You think we will be blamed by England for helping her hold out as long as she could?

Colonel LINDBERGH. We were blamed more or less for loaning them money in the last war, at least we were called various names for it, and I think that same type of thing will happen in regard to our encouragement of the present war, only I think in that case the responsibility we have will be very much greater.

Senator PEPPER. Now, if England comes to us through her responsible officials and asks us to let her have this opportunity to defend herself, to give her the means by which she can defend herself, are you going to deny that aid to her that she asks, on the ground that she may later change her mind about whether it is good for her?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I would first ask, sir, what her war aims are.

Senator PEPPER. Well, suppose she said, to keep Hitler from conquering England?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The war was declared on an entirely different basis, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You assume that to be an historical fact, that war was declared? Did England or France send any troops against the Siegfried line before Hitler indicated this policy of aggression that you described a while ago, which showed his purpose to conquer Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The war was declared, sir, after the German attack on Poland, and the point I make, sir, is that there has never been any question raised as to what would happen if England were simply defending herself, but the war aims that I have heard have involved a restoration of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and various other European countries.

Senator PEPPER. Do you think that the English Government was satisfied, from Hitler's prolonged course of conduct and eventually his taking the rest of Czechoslovakia after they had given him the Sudetenland at considerable moral sacrifice, indicated a determination on his part, the symptoms of which you saw with your own eyes in Germany in 1938, to conquer all he could conquer? Do you not think they were convinced that Hitler was out to conquer all he could conquer, when he marched into Poland, and that they had just as well start as soon as possible defending themselves?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think they were probably convinced of that, sir, but I think they chose a very inopportune time to declare war.

Senator PEPPER. Well, that is a matter of judgment?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I think that is a matter of experience.

Senator PEPPER. But, Colonel, suppose you were absolutely convinced that Hitler meant to conquer every nation he was able to conquer in the whole wide world; suppose he enumerated, "I am first going to conquer England. Then I am going to conquer Africa. Then I am going to take Dakar. Then I am going to move into South America. Then I am going to move up to Central America, then up to North America, and as soon as it lies within my power, I am going to become the conqueror of the earth." Suppose he made such purpose his declaration, and we saw him carrying out those declarations step by step, would you not think it was reasonable and legitimate self-defense to try to stop him somewhere along the line, when we had somebody else to help us?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, I have never heard an outline like that, sir, even in *Mein Kampf*. [Laughter.] At the same time, I believe that our primary effort should be to stop it by arming this hemisphere and this continent.

Senator PEPPER. You do not deny that he has designs on this hemisphere?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That he has what?

Senator PEPPER. That he has designs on this hemisphere.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I have no reason to think so, and I think they would be extremely difficult to carry out.

Senator PEPPER. You say you have no reason to think he has any designs on this hemisphere?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not militarily; no, sir; but I think that is a secondary consideration. I think we should make ourselves so strong that whether he has or not, he cannot carry them through, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You said in your article in the magazine to which I adverted that it is a struggle by the German people to gain territory and power, and you had some other things of similar character. You said this morning that it was obvious that they were bent upon a career of conquest. Now, why do you think he would stop right at the bounds of the continent of Europe and not go ahead, if he were able to?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, I think that undoubtedly they have over there more respect for the difficulty of invading this continent than we have ourselves.

Senator PEPPER. I am not speaking about his ability to achieve his aims. I am speaking about his aims. Do you think the Western Hemisphere is embraced in Hitler's aims and aspirations?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I doubt it very much, but I do not know.

Senator PEPPER. You doubt it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; I doubt it.

Senator PEPPER. Why do you think he has been sending propaganda and spies and saboteurs and fifth columnists over here? Just for the mental exercise?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know how many there are, and I do not know what their aims are, but that has been done by other countries, for instance Russia.

Senator PEPPER. Do you have any doubt they are here?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Some. It has been done by other countries, such as Russia, and it is up to us to stop that.

Senator PEPPER. And you want to stop that, you want to weed that out, of course?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator PEPPER. Have you seen any evidence in South America of Hitler's turning his eyes upon that country and that part of the continent?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Commercially, but not militarily. I see no evidence of a military character; no, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You have seen no evidence down there, where they have paid representatives of the German Government trying to foment trouble, to propagandize, and to stir up disturbances among those countries, amenable to German policies and German aims, and perhaps susceptible to German influence and pressure?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not doubt that for a minute, sir, but I think there is another way to handle it from our standpoint. I think

if we cannot hold South America diplomatically and commercially and militarily we are a pretty poor country—and I do not think we are.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Colonel, how are we going to hold South America? In what way? Are we to do that with your 10,000 airplanes that you say we ought to have?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should say 10,000 airplanes under present conditions would be sufficient.

Senator PEPPER. You think the 10,000 airplanes can protect the whole Western Hemisphere against any possible combination of powers against it, do you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should say it would protect the North American Continent, definitely; and that if we have an Army and Navy equivalent to the air force we would have with 10,000 service planes that would be sufficient to raid any lines of communication to South America; but I believe that if there is an obvious attempt to construct an army and a navy abroad to invade South America then we should increase our armaments, but I think that is going to be too costly to make it worth while on the other side.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Colonel, have you read Mr. Walter Lippmann's article or comments on what is called The Lindbergh Doctrine of United States Defense?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. That appeared in the Washington Post on January 30, 1941.

Colonel LINDBERGH. No; I have not read it.

Senator PEPPER. Well, if I may poorly interpret the part of it to you, Mr. Lippmann points out what he regards as the fallacy in your testimony before the House committee. He says that you say that we could defend the southern part of the Western Hemisphere against any attack that might be leveled against it from the Old World.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I said against any successful invasion, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Successful invasion?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Against any successful invasion of South America.

Senator PEPPER. Well, now, I started to say that he says you said that could be done by bases that we would have to establish in South America. He proceeded to point out that the only way we could service those bases would be by sea and not by land or by air, and that you had overlooked therefore in your reasoning the necessity of our being in charge of the sea, because the establishment of the very bases that you admitted we had to have to operate from was conditioned upon our having control of the sea, to establish those bases and to protect and maintain them. Now, have you any comment to make on Mr. Lippmann's comment?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I advocated the placing of air bases in the northern portion of South America at least, and that of course for the protection of the Panama Canal. Now, obviously the reason for putting those air bases in is to assist our Navy in holding command of the sea. If we lose command of the sea in the Caribbean and in the vicinity of the West Indian Islands, then we are in bad shape; but after all, that is why we want the air bases.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Colonel, you said, "If we lose command of the sea." Let me put to you a hypothetical case.

Suppose Laval becomes the Premier of France; is there any possibility in your opinion that he will operate the French Government and the French Fleet so as to collaborate with Hitler and his policies?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think we should take that into consideration.

Senator PEPPER. Is there a possibility in your opinion that he will do that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know, but I say I think we should consider that.

Senator PEPPER. That might be said to be a possibility, might it not, in view of his present attitude?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Considering it from a military standpoint, it might be.

Senator PEPPER. Now, about 2 years ago it would have seemed unthinkable that that condition would ever have existed in France, would it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. You knew enough about Franco to see that it might happen some time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir. I think that you could look forward to very great changes several years ago.

Senator PEPPER. Well, it would have seemed incongruous to most people to contemplate that within 2 years after the beginning of this war France would be an ally of Hitler against England, would it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It certainly would have seemed improbable that within 2 years that would happen.

Senator PEPPER. All right.

Colonel LINDBERGH. And it has not happened yet.

Senator PEPPER. Now, let us envision another improbability. Suppose, as you anticipate apparently from your testimony, particularly if we do not give England continued aid, that Hitler could conquer England.

Colonel LINDBERGH. It is possible; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. That is a possibility, is it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Possible; yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose he is to put a puppet Prime Minister in Winston Churchill's place, as has been indicated; perhaps, one that will be "reasonable," that will work with Hitler; by the same reasoning that might put the British people at the disposal of Hitler also, might it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Possible; but improbable, I should say.

Senator PEPPER. That is a possibility, is it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think it is pretty improbable that the British people would be turned over to the Germans.

Senator PEPPER. That is what a lot of people said about the French, too; is it not, Colonel?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, there is the British Empire; that is a good deal different from the French Empire.

Senator PEPPER. That is quite true, but if that did happen, and we take the hypothesis that that might happen in England, and Hitler, had at his command either directly or through these puppet governments of his the German Navy, the Italian Navy, the French Navy, and the British Navy, leaving out even the Japanese Navy, and leaving out any possible combination with Russia, as I understood your statement a few minutes ago, that would lose for us control of the seas, and we would be in pretty bad shape.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, in the first place that would be something entirely unique in history, of course. Nothing like that has ever happened before at any time. In the second place, that would not necessarily lose us the command of coastal waters or waters that are within bombing range of our shores, and that is why I say we should have air bases at least in the northern portion of South America.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Colonel, you have not forgotten—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Just a minute, Senator. Senator, the Chair would appreciate it if you could allow some of the other Senators to finish their questions, because we obviously cannot take quite so much time with each Senator.

Senator PEPPER. I would be very glad to terminate my questioning in just a few minutes, Mr. Chairman, if that is agreeable to the Chair.

Let me put it this way, Colonel. I was saying that you have not forgotten, have you, that in 1917-18 a combination of the American, British, and French, and also the Italian fleets made it possible for this country to land over 2,000,000 men on the Continent of Europe, did it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, it was a friendly continent, sir, where we landed.

Senator PEPPER. A friendly continent; yes. Now, you deem it impossible, if the British, French, Italian, and German Navies were all cooperating together, that they might be able to establish bases and perhaps even to land troops upon some portions of the southern part of the Western Hemisphere?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The southern part, sir? That is, in South America?

Senator PEPPER. Yes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I think it is perfectly possible that with a heavy combination of forces—which I think is improbable—

Senator PEPPER. Yes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That there might be an invasion of the southern portion of South America.

Senator PEPPER. Yes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Let us say below a line stretching through Venezuela, Colombia, and the Guianas. Now, I think that if that did happen we could harass the line of communications to a point where it would make that invasion impracticable over a period of time.

Senator PEPPER. Colonel, do you mean, just to follow a comparable improbability, that in the next year or two, before we have a chance to build our two-ocean Navy—

Colonel LINDBERGH (interposing). Oh, I do not think that is likely to happen in the next year or two.

Senator PEPPER. If England should fall in the next 6 months, that might happen in the next year or two, might it not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Europe is pretty chaotic to organize for an attack in this hemisphere within a year or two.

Senator PEPPER. Well, we will not have gone very far toward the completion of our two-ocean Navy in 2 years, let alone in 1 year, will we?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Right.

Senator PEPPER. All right. Now, the last question I was going to ask, Colonel, is this: Let us assume from the point of view of our country that there is a balancing of interests, there are dangers both

ways, there are risks both ways, but that the risk is greater, in money, in materials, to our peace, and to our men, by chancing that England shall fall and that all these things might happen that would follow in the wake or that could follow in the wake of England's fall, than for us to do what we can, even, in an effort on our part to keep England from falling, by the use of materials only, except that we do not get back dollar for dollar in exchange for all the materials that we send, and that we do to a degree weaken the defense that we have. If we balance those two risks, those two possibilities at least, it is not unreasonable for a man to come either to your point of view or to our point of view, is it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. They are both reasonable and logical courses, about which honest and reasonable men might have an honest and reasonable difference of opinion, are they not, and all of us be equally patriotic?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I disagree so much with your assumption that that it is very difficult to answer the question.

Senator PEPPER. With which of the assumptions do you differ?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Could you have the first part of it read?

Senator PEPPER. I say this, that faced with perhaps two risks, the risk of England falling and the risk to our peace, if one take our point of view that the greater risk is against our helping England or the greater danger is not in helping England, you will concede that one could take that point of view that the proponents of this bill take and still be patriotic and still be sincere, and still love America and still want to defend America, and still do the best they can to accomplish that purpose.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I think there are perfectly honest people on both sides, and people who have the interest of this country at heart on both sides. I agree with that thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green.

Senator GREEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White?

Senator WHITE. Colonel, how important do you consider the possession of Rumanian oil fields to Germany?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't know, sir, how important the oil fields are. I should think they are quite important. I know this, that there are very large synthetic factories in Germany for gasoline. I don't know the oil picture well enough to estimate the relative importance of the Rumanian oil fields.

Senator WHITE. Do you know the total of supplies that Germany is getting from Rumania?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir. I do not know what the German imports, production, or reserves of oil are. But the actual amount of fuel used by aircraft is not as great as is popularly supposed. If you figure out the planes that are flying and the flying hours, it does not take the amount of fuel that some people believe it does. But what the resources are I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds?

Senator REYNOLDS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead is not present.

Senator Gillette, have you any questions?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. Yes; Mr. Chairman; I have one or two questions.

Colonel Lindbergh, I think there has been a serious effort made to cause you to say—although you did not say it—that the existence of the neutrality laws of this country were a contributing factor to the undertaking to fulfill the ambitions of Mr. Hitler. Do you feel that the neutrality laws were an encouragement to any force in Europe in the last 6 or 8 years?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No; I imagine they were taken into consideration, but I should say that they were a very small factor in what has taken place in Europe.

Senator NYE. You have spoken of your deep feeling that there were factors contributed by America that caused France and England to feel that we could be counted upon in a rather large way in the event they did go to war. Of course, you are unable to put your finger upon any proof of any given act by any American representative to that end, are you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I have no proof to that end. I know what the feeling was when I was over there, and I think that feeling came somewhat from our press, somewhat from the general attitude of various American officials, and somewhat, I believe, from a desire on the part of the British and French Governments to allow that impression to exist.

Senator NYE. You have been asked to suggest what we might have done to contribute to the solution of those European problems and the avoidance of war. Do you feel that we might have made a contribution by refraining from being in the light of being ready to aid a given cause in Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think so very definitely; yes, sir.

Senator NYE. One more question. During those months when you were in Europe, and particularly in Germany, Colonel, what did you encounter, if anything, in the way of evidence of the use of British capital at work in the defense program that Germany was engaging in?

Colonel LINDBERGH. British capital in the defense program?

Senator NYE. Yes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't believe I encountered any. But the kind of work that I was doing at that time would not bring me into contact with it if it existed.

Senator NYE. At the time of your visit to Germany, Colonel, what was the general surmise as to where the war would be and who would be in it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The general attitude among the people to whom I talked in Germany was that the war would be in the east; and the inference was Russia. The general attitude was that it would not be in the west.

Senator NYE. That was the German attitude that you encountered?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I don't know how well informed it was. But I would say very definitely that that was the impression of a majority of the people to whom I talked in Germany.

Senator NYE. Then, there was not a preponderance of feeling that there was going to be a war in the west?

Colonel LINDBERGH. On the contrary, a number of people, including some officials, told me that they did not look for a war in the west, and that they did look for one in the east. It is very possible that it was for propaganda purposes. That I cannot tell. But the impression was that there would not be a war in the west.

Senator NYE. Thank you, Colonel.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Colonel, I think Senator Pepper, perhaps unintentionally, did both you and the country a great service this morning by going into the matter of that decoration which you received from the German Government. That is something that has been used in attempts to discredit every statement you have made and all testimony that you have given. If I understood you correctly this morning, Colonel, you stated that you had received this decoration from the German Government without any previous notice whatever.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; that is right. And I understand the American Ambassador did not know about it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. At a function to which you were invited by the American Ambassador?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Requested to attend.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In the American Embassy?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. At a time when you were being more or less employed in an attempt to bring about generally better relationships?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, in that instance; yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Let me ask you, Colonel, whether you ever received any other decorations from any other country, including a Congressional Medal of Honor from this country?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; in 1927, when I was flying in various countries in Europe and in America, and when flying was in its early days, in a number of instances I was given decorations.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. As a matter of fact, isn't it true that out in St. Louis where we live, Colonel, we have a room in the Jefferson Memorial that is almost as large as this room, that is filled up with Lindbergh decorations which you gave to the society?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I gave them to the society. I wouldn't say that they fill a room quite as big as this one.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. But it is a very large room.

Now, as to this information which you gave to the British, that was given by you to the American Ambassador to Great Britain, wasn't it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And, so far as you know, it was transmitted to the British at the request of the British Government?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't know; and I never asked whether it was transmitted to the British. It was cabled to the State Department in America.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I can say of my own knowledge that the substance of the information was transmitted to two committees of this Congress by our Ambassador to Great Britain and our Ambassador to France at the joint meeting of the two committees.

Ambassador Bullitt and Ambassador Kennedy transmitted the information.

So far as you are concerned, you transmitted this information to the American Ambassador for any proper purpose he might see fit to make of it, Colonel, for the purpose of information?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; and after that, at the request of some of the English officials, I gave a part of the information to various officials in England.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Colonel, something has been said about buying time. Buying time does not do us any good if we are worse off at the end of our preparation than we were before, does it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. How long does it take to train the crews of these planes? Take these big four-engine bombers.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Some of the crew can be trained much more quickly than others. I would say the pilot takes the longest time. I would like to see a pilot in a four-engine bomber—well, I was going to say with 3 years' experience. He may fly such a bomber with less experience than that, but even more is desirable.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You cannot train these crews without ships in which to train them, can you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If we pursue the policy of transferring to Great Britain or anybody else all of these bombers, Colonel, it is impossible for us to have trained crews to fly the bombers, if we have them—laying aside the question of productive capacity?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I think we are short of training planes today.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Not only the question of increase in productive capacity is an essential element in preparation but the training of adequate personnel to use this very complicated matériel.

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. While we are on the question of decorations, Colonel, it might be a good time to clear up another matter, a method that has been used to discredit you in this country. While it is well known that the employment of "ghost writers" is prevalent in Washington, from the highest officials down, apparently an effort has been made to discredit you after every radio speech you made or every appearance as a witness by suggesting that somebody else was writing the speeches for you and preparing your statement or collaborating with you. It was started by saying that Fulton Lewis had written the first broadcast, and then finally there was a very sinister implication on the part of some of my colleagues in this body over the radio as to who was writing your speeches and revising them. Do you mind telling whether you ever use any collaborators or "ghost writers" in the preparation of speeches or writings?

Colonel LINDBERGH. My wife assists me, but nobody else has taken any important part in the writing of my addresses. To be specific, I always like to have my wife look over them. But beyond that nobody has written a paragraph in all the addresses that I have given.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Colonel, it was after you had received this decoration from the German Government that you were called

into active service and you put in some months as an active technical adviser of the Air Force of the United States Army, wasn't it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You were called into active service after it was well known that you had received the decoration at the American Embassy, wasn't it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes. I think it was May 1939 when I entered active service.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In your original statement this morning you spoke of the present weakness of the American Air Force. Can you give any amplification on that statement?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Only in general, sir. I feel that it is better for me not to attempt to give details of the American Air Force, and that that should come from the Chief of the Air Corps. But it is well known in the industry that most of our production has been sent abroad; and it is well known that the planes that we have today are, in most cases, obsolescent planes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Three hundred of them were sold; and we couldn't even give them away.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I read this morning about their being refused by Greece.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. This was a case of the Greeks refusing gifts, wasn't it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In general, Colonel, what do you consider the state of our air force to be?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, I think it is in a deplorable condition. The only reason why we have any degree of safety is because we have an ideal position to defend. But the actual condition of our air force is that we have incredibly few modern aircraft.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We have been transferring the great bulk of our production of the more modern aircraft to Great Britain while retaining the old planes for ourselves?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Something was said about—Senator Pepper asked you about the policy of the bill. Don't you think it is a fair assumption in reading the bill that the bill, instead of being a bill to promote national defense, might be denominated "a bill to denude national defense"?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I said, I think it weakens our country rather than strengthens it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If I understood your statement correctly, Colonel, it was that you object to transferring to any foreign power anything that we need for our own defense.

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What would be our position if we put all of our ships on one card and transferred to Great Britain all of the weapons that we need for our own defense, and Great Britain were to fall? Wouldn't those very weapons be used against us?

Colonel LINDBERGH. They could very easily be; yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Isn't it a fact that after the fall of France, Colonel, airplanes that we had furnished to France were actually used against Great Britain?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is what I understand; yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And there is nothing to prevent a situation where the very destroyers that we have transferred to Great Britain, or anything else that might be transferred, might be used against us?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In an invasion or an attempted invasion of this country today I think you would find some American equipment being used against us. As I say, I think an invasion at the present time is out of the question.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glass, have you any questions?

Senator GLASS. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to get through with this business before we are in danger. But the present trend is such that we will be invaded and captured before we get through talking about it.

I think this committee would like to know—at least, I would—what personal contact with the various units of the Army you have had that enables you to give us expert advice?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir; I have purposely avoided close contact with the Air Corps since September 1939 because I did not want to have any question arise as to using confidential information. All I can say, sir, is that I gave my beliefs and my opinions here, with whatever background I have in aviation. I offer them only as opinions, and nothing else.

Senator GLASS. I accept your testimony as to aviation; that is, I accept them as far as I know anything about it.

But what artillery experience have you had?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Very little; sir.

Senator GLASS. What infantry experience have you had?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Slight. Most of my experience has been in aviation—commercial aviation.

Senator GLASS. In aviation?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator GLASS. You don't think the artillery and the infantry have any material part in a war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think they have a tremendous part, yes. They are inseparable from success.

Senator GLASS. I think so, too. But I understood from your testimony that you think only aviation decides the battles of an army.

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; not at all. I have confined my testimony to aviation because I believe that is the field I know best.

Senator GLASS. Because you know that best?

Colonel LINDBERGH. And I believe it would be futile to go into a war without infantry, artillery, the Navy, and all of the other branches.

Senator GLASS. Does England rely upon air power? Well, did you ever have any personal experience on battleships?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Practically none.

Senator GLASS. And auxiliary sea weapons?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Practically none. The only experience I have had relating to that, I would say, is as to the effect of the German Air Force off the coast of Norway and the reports that have come in about that, and about the engagements in the North Sea, and in the Mediterranean.

Senator GLASS. You were in Germany for several years, or you were in Germany from time to time during several years. Do you think they told you anything that they did not want you to know, or let you see anything that they did not want you to see?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I certainly do not.

Senator GLASS. Well, I don't either. You say you think this country encouraged the war in Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator GLASS. What did it ever do to encourage it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, as I say, the people in Europe very definitely had the impression that we would eventually enter the war. I think that came partly from what was in our newspapers in America, partly from representatives of our Government, and partly from American people who went to Europe. However it came about, there was that impression. And I can liken it somewhat to the obvious attitude here today which opposes any negotiated peace. I should say our attitude in America is well known in Europe. In some cases the spread of this knowledge is encouraged by European governments.

Senator GLASS. Suppose we have a negotiated peace; what assurance have you or what assurance has anybody else that Hitler would keep the peace? Hasn't he lied about every agreement that he has ever made since Munich down to the present time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The last thing in the world that I advocate is peace based upon promises. I advocate peace based upon realities. As I say, all that we can depend upon is our own strength.

Senator GLASS. From the testimony here the last day or two I think we might just as well surrender right away.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am opposed to that.

Senator GLASS. Why not? You say we can't win the war.

Colonel LINDBERGH. In Europe. But I think we can hold this hemisphere with great strength.

Senator GLASS. Are finances a great strength in a war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Undoubtedly. But I have heard so many prophecies about finances that I am skeptical about that. For instance, I might say that about 10 years ago I sat at a table in New York City with several of the leading bankers of the country. Those men were telling me how it would be impossible for Japan or Italy to last many more years—they said 2 or 3 years, to be exact—because there would be a financial collapse. That was 9 or 10 years ago.

Senator GLASS. Hasn't there been a financial collapse in Germany?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I said in Japan or Italy. They said Japan and Italy would collapse.

Senator GLASS. Well, I am talking about people who are fighting now. You can't wage war without money, can you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It seems to me that Germany has waged war without money. But I am not an economist and cannot enter into a discussion of that type.

Senator GLASS. But that element enters into the decision in a war, doesn't it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. But what concerns me as a layman and not an economist, and without experience in economics, is this: I heard these prophecies about what would happen in Italy and in Japan and in Germany, and Germany went through what seemed national bankruptcy, but she has emerged as the strongest military power in the

world. Now, I don't understand why on a financial basis; but I know that it has happened.

Senator GLASS. No; and I don't understand it from a financial basis, either. But Germany repudiated all of her indebtedness, even to her own people. That is the reason why she is able to conduct a war now. But that cannot continue forever, can it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No; but it has continued almost too long already.

Senator GLASS. And entirely too long. But, as I say, Germany cannot continue fighting a tremendous war with the balance of the world without any financial resources, can she?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I give way to you on the financial question.

Senator GLASS. That is an important question.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think the danger is obvious, regardless of finances. I don't know how long she can continue. But I have seen these things happen over a period of years, when the best financial people I have had acquaintance with said that it could not be.

Senator GLASS. I don't think it can be much longer. You said that we have encouraged war in Europe. Have you ever read a statement by the President of the United States that did not explicitly declare that he had no idea of doing anything that would cause us to send any of our boys to fight a war abroad?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; but I have watched what has taken place in this country since the so-called quarantine speech that the President gave in Chicago, and I feel that we have been moving closer and closer to war from that time on, and I am alarmed about the trend.

Senator GLASS. You think the President has changed his mind or might change his mind?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think it is possible.

Senator GLASS. Yes; and so do I. I don't mean to say, as would be inferred from the noise of this crowd, but I think he is going to. I think he might; but I hope he will not.

But have you ever heard of or have you ever seen anything that Congress has done that has not been opposed to sending our boys abroad in a war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is, as far as the actual issue is concerned. But these so-called steps short of war I believe will lead us to war if we continue to take them.

Senator GLASS. Will it lead us to war if the Congress of the United States—which alone is authorized by the Constitution to declare war—refuses to declare war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think it is possible that incidents of war can be created. That is how wars seem to start. It is possible that we will be thrown into the war by an incident without Congress having anything to do with it.

Senator GLASS. That happened in the first World War, didn't it—an incident, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and the declaration by Germany that she was going to sink ships regardless?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator GLASS. What reason have you for supposing that a nation that has violated every obligation that it had made at Munich, that

lied about the whole thing throughout down to the present time, would not violate a negotiated treaty if we should make one?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't make that supposition, sir. I say, in the first place, that I think the conditions of peace that can be obtained by a continuation of the war will be worse than those that can be obtained today. I do not advocate relying upon promises by any nation. I think that would be a great error. I advocate making a negotiated peace based upon such realities that there will be no attempt and no desire on the part of nations to break it. And I think it should be backed by military force.

Senator GLASS. If you think there is no danger of Hitler's attempting an invasion of the Western Hemisphere, why do you think Congress should sit here and appropriate billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money to prevent such a thing?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think there is no danger, sir; as I have said, provided we build and maintain reasonable armed forces. If we have no armed forces I think we might be in danger of invasion. But I think our strength is sufficient, with reasonable armed forces, to prevent it.

Senator GLASS. What do you mean by "reasonable armed forces"? Do you think Congress has been unreasonable in spending the billions of dollars?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think it would cost less than is now being appropriated, Senator, to maintain an adequate defense for this hemisphere. For instance, I think 10,000 in-line fighting planes would be adequate at this time for our safety. I think that is enough.

Senator GLASS. Do you think 10,000 American planes would be sufficient to defeat 40,000 German planes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In this hemisphere, I think so. I think 10,000 American planes would be sufficient to defeat more than 40,000 of the type that they now have on the other side, because there is the question of attack and defense. We have the advantage of defense.

Senator GLASS. Colonel, I have listened with a great deal of interest to what you have had to say. And there is but one thing that I want to say: I believe, like David Harum, in the Golden Rule—"Do unto others as they would do unto you. But do it first." And I would do it first. That is my view. I am the only person I know of who is in favor of war. I don't think this country has done a thing or said a thing to justify the statement that we encouraged the war in Europe.

And, moreover, Colonel, do you think that by going over to Europe from time to time over a period of 3 years that you could ascertain the real sentiment of the people of Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I was only expressing my opinion based upon the trips that I made. I tried to make that clear.

Senator GLASS. But I am asking you whether or not you think that was adequate information?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No; I think it is not adequate information. But I think we must put together the various sources of information that we have. And I believe I had certain experiences in Europe that can be of use. That is all that I offer.

Senator GLASS. And you feel qualified to come here as an expert and tell the United States what she shall do?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I came here by invitation of this committee, not by my request.

Senator GLASS. Yes; and I wanted you to come. I was very anxious that you should come. And I listened to your testimony with a great deal of interest, not only to you personally but to everybody who has appeared here. And I have not heard a single solitary thing that has changed my mind, and I don't expect to.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes?

Senator BYRNES. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead was absent a few minutes ago when his name was called. He says he has a few questions that he would like to ask.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Colonel, you visited many countries in Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Quite a number; yes, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I assume you have opportunities to see other countries than Germany and to inspect their aviation systems and production?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I saw some of the aviation in a number of countries there.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. What countries did you have opportunity to study?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In Germany, in France, to some extent in England, and in Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser degree in Italy.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. When you went to France how did you happen to go there and how did you have an opportunity to inspect their aviation?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In France I was requested to inspect some of their aviation and discuss the European aviation situation by the French Minister of Air.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. By the French Minister of Air?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Did you see our Ambassador over there, Mr. Bullitt?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. What arrangement did you make or did he make?

Colonel LINDBERGH. He told me that he would be glad for me to look at practically anything they had in France. For one reason, they were anxious to obtain a comparison between their aviation and the German aviation at that time. I went to a number of factories, and I discussed the European military aviation situation with various officials in France.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Did anybody accompany you?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In France?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Yes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. On some occasions they did in France and on some occasions I went alone. In most countries I went with the American military attaché or air attaché.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Were you accompanied by our military attaché in France?

Colonel LINDBERGH. On one or two occasions, yes. Less in France than any other country.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Did our military attaché accompany you on these inspection tours in Germany?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In Germany always, with one exception.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Always in Germany with one exception?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. When was that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That was when I went to the Air Force Experimental Station in Rechlein. I had been invited to go up there to see the newest German bomber, the Junkers 88. The German officials took the stand that if our air attaché went on that trip that they would have to invite the air attachés of various other nations, but if I went alone, it would not be necessary to do so. So on that trip I went alone.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That is the only time they showed you anything without your being accompanied by our military attaché?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I want to make a correction. It was not on the occasion when I saw the Junkers 88, but it was on an occasion previous to that when I went to Rechlein alone. It was the previous year.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Were you given opportunity to inspect the air force facilities of Russia?

Colonel LINDBERGH. To a lesser degree. They are very cautious in Russia. But I went to two factories in 1938 and to several of their other aviation establishments.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I believe you have stated that you went to England at the request of our American Ambassador in London?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Did anybody else ask you to come over to England?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not to come over. When I was there I was requested by some of the British officials to discuss the European aviation situation with them—and various people in England.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You told them what your observation had been?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As far as I could; yes. I had told every country I visited in Europe that I did not want to see anything that I could not communicate to this country, to the United States. And whenever I left a nation in Europe I usually asked what, if anything, they preferred that I not say to other European nations. There were very few restrictions, but there were some. And those I observed.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You spoke about the decoration that you got from Germany. You have had decorations from many other countries, have you not?

Colonel LINDBERGH. A number of others, particularly in 1927 and 1928 when I was flying internationally.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. When you were over there did you see decorations given to anybody else?

Colonel LINDBERGH. At that time; yes; that is, in the period 1927 and thereabouts.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. To whom did they give them?

Colonel LINDBERGH. From whom?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. To whom did they give them?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Oh, I misunderstood you, Senator. You mean in Germany?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Yes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. At that time they gave a similar decoration to the French Ambassador.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. The French Ambassador?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; but not the same evening.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. It is quite usual in foreign countries, is it not, to give decorations to distinguished visitors, and so on?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe so.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You were asked to go to this dinner; you went at the request of our American Ambassador?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, Senator.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. For the purpose of facilitating his invitation to officials of the German Government that he would like to meet?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe it was about at that time; yes. The request was, as I remember it, that I attend the dinner in order to create an opportunity to bring closer relationships between the American Embassy in Berlin and the German Government.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Do you know what the attitude was then?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Of course, that was shortly after Munich. The general attitude in Europe at that time seemed to be an attempt to smooth out international difficulties. There was a general trend in that direction.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. What was the occasion for your being in Germany at that time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. The occasion of my being in Germany at that time was to attend a scientific convention, which is called the Lillienthal Conference.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That had something to do with aviation?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; it had to do entirely with aviation.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. You met the aviation force of the German Government?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. The head?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. The occasion was when?

Colonel LINDBERGH. At the dinner at the Embassy. He was the guest of honor.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Did you consider that that "quarantine" speech made at Chicago in 1937 was a provoking speech?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; I do.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. The President said something about quarantining dictators?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is my recollection.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Our understanding of "quarantining" is that when we quarantine a house you put a notice on the door that people must keep out and people must not leave the house, and sometimes they put a policeman in front to see that nobody comes in or goes out. To quarantine a nation we would have to do the same thing with a nation, wouldn't we?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should think so; yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Wouldn't that be provocative of war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think it was. I think it was a step in the direction of war.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. A good many questions have been asked you, Colonel, about good morals and morality in international relations. Do you think it is easier to get morality in international affairs than in domestic affairs?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I shouldn't think so offhand. Of course I feel very strongly that our primary interest and our primary obligation is in domestic affairs.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. And this question of international morals has been brought in. In your opinion, there are a lot of sinful people in foreign countries as well as in our own.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Do you think it would be possible for us with our Navy and air force to try to abolish immorality and sin?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't see how it is possible for this country to impose our ideals upon the rest of the world. For instance we have a population of 130,000,000 people, England has a population in the British Empire of, let us say, roughly 70,000,000, and together we would have to go up against Germany with a population of 80 or 90 million, Russia with possibly 180,000,000, Italy with 40,000,000, and we don't know where France will stand in the future; and Japan has 70,000,000 or so. I don't see how it is possible for us to impose our ideology on those populations, particularly when every nation I have mentioned is more strongly armed than we are at the present time by quite a margin.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Lindbergh, the committee thanks you for coming down here.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Colonel, Senator Glass asked you if you thought your visits over to Germany over a period of about 6 years qualified you as an expert to come and face this committee on the state of general conditions in Germany. Are you acquainted with a great American public figure who for 6 days only has visited various pubs and places in a foreign country and is about to return here next Monday to testify as an expert on conditions in England?

I shall not insist upon an answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. Colonel, I understand that you are of the fixed opinion that Germany cannot be defeated except by an actual invasion of the continent.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think that it is improbable. Of course, there is the question of an economic collapse. I have qualified my statements in general by saying that I did not believe an invasion was possible unless a collapse came first. And I see no sign of that.

Senator MURRAY. You think the only way the war could end would be through the actual invasion of the continent?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should think so.

Senator MURRAY. Therefore, you are in favor of a negotiated peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is one of the reasons; yes, sir.

Senator MURRAY. Of course, a peace negotiated at this time would be equivalent to a peace based upon force?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, sir, I think peace negotiated now would be more advantageous for Britain than a peace after this war continues.

Senator MURRAY. That may be true. But, still, a peace negotiated at this time would not have any lasting effect?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It depends upon how much reality was behind it.

Senator MURRAY. What do you mean by "reality behind it"?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I should say that a peace negotiated, Senator, to be effective would have to carry terms that would make it undesirable for either side to break them.

Senator MURRAY. And that could not be expected in a peace that would be negotiated at this time, because Hitler would not agree to any such terms?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I don't know about that. As I say, I think the peace that could be negotiated now is better than any that can be obtained by a continuation of this war.

Senator MURRAY. Suppose by some assistance Great Britain were enabled to build up its air force so as to be able to contest the supremacy of the air with Hitler; wouldn't that in itself tend to bring the war to an end?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In the first place, I do not believe the British are in a position to do that geographically and from various other standpoints that I tried to outline in my statement.

Senator MURRAY. But if it were possible to do it through assistance from this country, to so strengthen themselves in the air as to make it possible for them to fight Germany to a standstill, without accomplishing a complete victory through invasion, wouldn't that be a better situation upon which to base peace on negotiation?

Colonel LINDBERGH. A large part of the base upon which I stand is that I do not believe that England geographically, industrially, and otherwise, even with American help, will be able to create an air strength in the small area of the British Isles that can equal, to say nothing of exceed, the German air strength based upon the continent of Europe. I think that is one of the important elements we should consider in deciding what is to be done.

Senator MURRAY. If England's air force should be so strengthened as to enable her to visit upon the people of Germany the same kind of punishment that the Germans are visiting on the British Isles at the present time, wouldn't that have a tendency to create a condition in Germany that would make them feel it desirable to have peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. It would, sir. But I believe that that is not possible.

Senator MURRAY. You do not think it is possible?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No; I think that even with our assistance it is practically impossible to build an air strength in the small area of the British Isles that equals the German air strength. As I say, anything that we send has to cross the ocean—not only the airplanes but the fuel and equipment for them. They would be concentrated in a small geographical area, which in itself is a great disadvantage. The German coast line and that under German control extends around England in practically a semicircle, and behind that there can be any number of bases.

In addition, Germany now has a much greater air force; and English aviation facilities, factories, and so on, are being bombed and have been bombed. I don't see how we could establish in England an air strength equal to the German air strength unless some miracle takes place and there is a collapse in Germany.

Senator MURRAY. Wouldn't the supply of gasoline have some bearing on that subject?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Certainly.

Senator MURRAY. If Germany should find itself menaced through the failure to get sufficient supplies of gasoline, wouldn't that offset the advantage which she has by the greater number of planes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. If that happened; yes, it would. But, on the other hand, the British must carry their gasoline to England in ships. The Germans do not have to do that. So far as gasoline is concerned, the amount that is used is less than the popular conception. There is not such a huge amount of gasoline used in these bombing raids.

Senator MURRAY. Then your view is that the situation is hopeless and that Great Britain might as well give in now and take what terms she can possibly get through a negotiated peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't believe that we in this country should dictate the terms of a peace to Britain or to anyone in Europe, whether or not we could. I do believe that our attitude over here should be a receptive one to a negotiated peace, because I think we are encouraging England to carry on the war, which I am persuaded she cannot win. And I say that not indicating that she is going to be invaded. I don't know about that. But I don't think England can invade the Continent of Europe successfully.

Senator MURRAY. I think a good many of us are in favor of a negotiated peace, a peace negotiated that would be based upon some elements of justice. But a peace that could be negotiated at the present time, it seems to me, would be an entirely one-sided proposition and would give no results whatever, and that it would be a fatal thing for the world to permit Britain to collapse now.

Colonel LINDBERGH. If I may cite an example, I heard exactly the same discussion and argument in France. And I agree with you that a peace could not be negotiated now that would be considered just on our standards in America. But I believe that England would be better off. And, as I say, I hesitate to suggest what England should do. I think that is up to England. But since we are considering it here in America, I believe England would be better off by negotiating peace now rather than continuing the war, just as I thought France would be better off by negotiating a peace or, rather, by not entering the war in the first place. Certainly France could not be much worse off than she is now. I took the same stand in France, so far as I had any right to, and I think that in the instance of France it is borne out now that her conditions could not have been worse if she had not declared war.

Senator MURRAY. Then if we give no help whatever to the British they will eventually be completely defeated and the peace that will result will be a peace based upon Hitler's desire.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I have not advocated giving no help. I say we should live up to the commitments we have made.

Senator MURRAY. Those commitments are exhausted or they will be exhausted shortly.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think we should be very cautious about making more commitments, because my personal opinion is that it will not change the trend of the war but will lead to additional bloodshed. If those commitments were to assist England to negotiate a better peace, I could see some possible constructive result. But up to the present time she has not even stated her war aims.

Senator MURRAY. That is what I am interested in. I am interested in a peace that will be based upon justice and not upon victory, because it seems to me that if Hitler succeeds in completely defeating Britain, then we will have nothing but a peace based totally upon force; and it would be very dangerous to us here in this country. For that reason it seems to me that we would be following the correct policy in rendering whatever aid we can to the British in order to enable them to withstand this threat on Hitler's part to invade England, that is, until she succeeds in getting herself into a position where she can negotiate a fair peace.

Colonel LINDBERGH. The last thing in the world that I want is to see England fall. That is one reason why I opposed this war, even before it started, in every way I could. I felt that way about England and about France.

I have suggested two guiding policies with regard to aid: First, that we should give no aid that would involve us in war. That has been the understanding of the people of this country. It is easy to violate it. It can be violated without going beyond the present laws. It is very easy to create an incident that will bring war.

Second, I think we should give no aid that would reduce the strength of our own country.

Senator MURRAY. Of course, the old saying that "While there is life there is hope" is true with reference to Great Britain. As long as she can hold out and develop and strengthen her air force, she feels that she would be better able to get terms that would be reasonable.

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, I don't think there is much possibility of the British air strength equalling the German air strength. But there is another way of looking at it. If we encourage England to do this thing, hoping for more help than has come—and she has hopes for more help than has come—then that may leave her in a worse position to negotiate peace than she would otherwise be in. And personally I believe that she would not have entered the war, as she did, if she had not expected more assistance from America than we have sent.

Senator MURRAY. In other words, you think we made a mistake as to the embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act? You think we make a mistake when we did that?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes; and before that, when we allowed the impression to grow up in Europe that we would send more assistance as time passed.

Senator GLASS. Who should begin the negotiated peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think that is entirely up to Europe. I only advocate in America a receptive attitude to a negotiated peace.

Senator GLASS. Have you any conception that Germany wants peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't know; but I don't think the question has been asked. So far as I know, no war aims have been stated.

Senator GLASS. Germany has stated her war aims pretty definitely.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't know what they are.

Senator GLASS. I don't know how much more definitely they could be stated. They took five or six helpless nations.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I agree that they have been enacted; but I don't believe the war aims have been stated by either side.

Senator GLASS. Have you any valid reason for believing Hitler would observe a negotiated peace, if one were made?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, I would be utterly opposed to relying upon promises.

Senator GLASS. How else are you going to negotiate, except by relying upon promises?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think peace should be negotiated with a background of realities, such as were not considered at the time of Versailles, for example. I don't think you can have a Polish corridor in any peace that is negotiated if it is to be successful. And it is doubtful if you can have minorities like in Czechoslovakia.

Senator GLASS. I have heard a good many of those things. But I don't think I could stop it, and I don't think you could. I don't think you are going to make peace; and I don't think Hitler is either. I don't think he wants any peace.

Would it be favorable to England or to Great Britain to propose a negotiated peace?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't think so. But I think if the war goes on the peace will be worse than it would be now. As an example of that I cite France.

Senator GLASS. The nation proposing a negotiated peace would show a weakness that the opposing nation would take advantage of.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Probably so. Again, take France as an example. I don't see how she could have been any worse by proposing a peace.

Senator GLASS. Do you think we ought to recommend the peace that France got? Don't you think it would be stupid to recommend the peace that France got?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't think so. But we are in an entirely different position than France was.

Senator GLASS. Do you think we ought to be as stupid as France was, and sit down and let Germany prepare for the war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. As I say, I am very thoroughly in favor of preparing ourselves and I think it is vital to this country to prepare for war, to prepare to resist invasion.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Lindbergh, you may be excused.

Senator BARKLEY. Colonel, a little while ago you said that following a negotiated peace you would not rely upon promises for the observance of the peace, but you would advocate and you believe in a military force sufficient to enforce that peace. Just what sort of military force, and under whose authority?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't believe I made myself clear there. I was not suggesting military force to enforce peace; what I was suggesting was, for instance, that in the United States and in America we have sufficient military force to prevent an attempted invasion.

Senator BARKLEY. That is different from a negotiated peace in Europe affecting only Europe. But I understood you to speak of peace in Europe not based upon promises but upon realities, which you have not made very clear; that is, whether you meant the status quo, or the present condition of Germany's conquest of practically all of Europe, or whether you meant something that may happen after the further waging of the war. I have not been able to get your idea very clearly as to what you mean by realities and what you mean by military power in the enforcement of peace.

Colonel LINDBERGH. The conditions over there change so rapidly during this war that I think I can make my point clearer by going back to the time when war started. I would say a peace based upon realities would have prevented France and England from declaring war at the time that Germany invaded Poland, because there was nothing they could do about it. Therefore, I think their policy at that time should have been defensive. I think they should have built their strength and safety behind the Maginot line and the British fleet whereas declaring war at the time Poland was invaded helped neither Poland nor France nor England.

Senator GLASS. Do you think that neither England nor France had any obligation to Poland?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I don't doubt that for a moment.

Senator GLASS. And in looking over the ground they could say, "We can't do anything about this; and we will let our obligations go by the board"?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think they could have done something about that in 1937, or before the Siegfried line was built. After that line was built I think they simply encouraged Poland to fight. They declared war but did not see their way clear to attack the Siegfried line. Obviously they realized that they could not break it.

Senator GLASS. You would not advocate that a nation that had any proper conception of a moral obligation should simply stand idly by and let an aggressor nation take possession of everything in sight, without doing something, would you? You would not feel that that is a good international situation, that is, to create the impression that whatever an aggressor does, nobody will do anything to prevent it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. At the time of the invasion of Poland, France, in my personal opinion, should have laid the cards on the table. They knew they could not help Poland. They gave the impression that they could. They had obligations, but I believe some of them were made within the last few weeks before war was declared.

I think it is a mistake for any nation to commit suicide, as France did at that time, and as they encouraged Poland to do. I think there was nothing gained by that.

Senator GLASS. Do you think that both France and Poland are now suicides so that there is no remedy?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I cannot foresee history.

Senator GLASS. No; but you used that example.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes. I think that was a suicidal act.

Senator GLASS. There is hardly every any revival of a man who has committed suicide. He is dead.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think it was a suicidal act. But after all, Poland has been partitioned before. I have great confidence in France. I think France may come back some day. But I think that it was a mistake.

Senator GLASS. Colonel, you advocated that we meet all of our commitments. Now, you think it was suicide for England and France to meet their commitments to Poland.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Well, I question even that they did meet their commitments. I think that France and England gave Poland the impression that they would go to war and aid Poland if Poland fought. They declared war, that is true, but there was not one single attack on the Siegfried line with any strength behind it.

Senator GLASS. Would not attacking the Siegfried line be committing suicide?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Surely, it would; but, as I say, I think they misled Poland at that time.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. They did not give Poland any aid after they encouraged it to go into war.

Colonel LINDBERGH. No. I do not think there was any attack on the Siegfried line that could be called an attack during 1939 or 1940.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. They did not make any attempt to meet their commitments to Czechoslovakia.

Colonel LINDBERGH. They did not.

Senator BARKLEY. In order to do that they would have had to violate treaties they had with other countries.

Colonel LINDBERGH. They gave Poland the impression that they would go through the Siegfried line. During the first 48 hours the claim came over the radio that the French had attacked and penetrated the Siegfried line in five places, as I remember.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Lindbergh, the Chair has excused you three times, and if you stay any longer I won't be responsible for how long you may stay here.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Thank you very much, sir.

(Prolonged applause.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair respectfully informs the audience that the remainder of the day will be in executive session unless the audience remains quiet.

STATEMENT OF HANFORD MacNIDER, MASON CITY, IOWA

Senator JOHNSON of California. Will you state your name, Mr. MacNider?

Mr. MACNIDER. Hanford MacNider.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Your residence?

Mr. MACNIDER. Mason City, Iowa.

Senator JOHNSON of California. What is your occupation?

Mr. MACNIDER. Manufacturer.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Did you ever hold an official position in the United States Government?

Mr. MACNIDER. An official position?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Yes.

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. What?

Mr. MACNIDER. I was the Assistant Secretary of War, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. When?

Mr. MACNIDER. 1925 to the first of 1928.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Have you examined the bill that is before us?

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Will you, in your own way, state your views on it?

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee practically every witness testified that they could not understand why under the guise

of aid to democracy abroad we were being called upon to give up democratic processes at home. I still do not understand, although I have listened to or read the testimony of all the proponents who have appeared before both the House and this committee.

Those who have addressed themselves to the bill at all have insisted that it does not mean what it seems to mean; that the extraordinary powers given the President and the cancelation of any laws which might conflict are not in the bill because they will be used, but because they will not be used.

Then why are they there? The happiest solution for the American people would be a straightforward bill that means what it says. Then the Congress, which is charged with the responsibility of deciding what legislation is good for America—and there can be no other test—can make it a law or reject it. The American people might then know what the future holds. Certainly no man can even guess where this kind of legislation may take us.

All of us who have testified on this bill have received many letters from all over the Nation. Those which came to me were unanimous in their opposition to the course which this bill lays down. Many expressed alarm over such a bid for war-time concentration of executive powers. Many saw an end of our form of government in its fantastic provisions. By far the majority were from men who had fought on the western front in the last World War. They wanted to know whether our war to end all wars had made no impression upon America, whether no one had learned the bitter lesson of the great crusade to save democracy—the utter futility of our intervention in European affairs.

On the streets of my home town—and its our home towns which are America—I have been stopped at every step by concerned citizens who were bewildered and perplexed as to what this bill is all about and demanded to know the purpose of its sweeping provisions, why it is necessary now, and why it is even being seriously considered. They asked would not its passage mean war; would it not mean that the President could by giving or withholding aid to other nations not only involve us in war ourselves, but in the underwriting and control of everyone else's wars as well, would not the use of the powers given in this bill be more than apt to bring such results, even though there was no such intention in their employment?

Certainly consideration of this bill should not be conducted in an atmosphere of manufactured fear. I have been amazed at the Orson Wellesian blitzkrieg of invasion scares which have been loosed on the American people, and even more so at its unhappy effect on many sections of this the greatest and strongest Nation on earth.

I have listened to the frightening prophecies from the members of the Cabinet, and their echoes from other proponents of this bill, but I have heard no accredited military authority who thinks that we are in imminent danger of invasion from anywhere.

Certainly Japan can be no menace while we have the largest and strongest Navy in the world. It can't be that fear of Italy is prompting these trembling voices. It must be Germany.

Mr. Hitler is very busy and is going to be busy for a long time to come. Like a great overhungry anaconda he is already bulging with an assortment of hastily devoured victims, including one or two uncomfortable porcupines and armadillos. Right now he is having

a bad time trying to decide how to stretch himself across water less than the width of an average Middle Western county.

As one of a million or so Americans who have had no contact with Germans except on the field of battle, I still have no fear of Germans or Germany, whether she loses, wins, or draws in the present conflict.

If there is a general officer of our defense forces, given a few combat divisions, a proper complement of planes, and say 50 destroyers—a pretty good one-ocean navy right in itself—who could not turn any possible hostile attempt to land on this continent into a first-class disaster for whomever tried it, he should be stripped of his stars. Propaganda about imminent invasion is worse than ridiculous. It is a vicious attempt to demoralize a great people into a break-down of free government. Coming from high places it cannot help but create hysteria and destroy sanity and reason in the effort for our own sound defense.

Ever since the first World War the Americans who served in it have cried for an impregnable defense for our country, so that just such situations as this could not arise. We have demanded a small but powerful army, fast on its feet and able to meet all comers; a navy and an air force second to none. We have usually won from the very people who now clamor loudest for our intervention in Europe's everlasting quarrels, the name of militarists, warmongers, or worse. We were then and we are now for an impregnable defense for these United States. One does not have to be a military expert to know that no foreign power nor even group of powers will ever dare attack a prepared America. Meantime, while we are at last aroused to prepare, we can be of no real help to anyone else unless and until we are strong and unafraid ourselves.

I have no quarrel with aid to Britain, or to Greece and China. They are fighting a gallant fight against great odds, and I pray that they win, not for our sakes but for their own. I begrudge them no help which we may give them within the framework of our present laws, and which is not at the expense of our own proper defense.

I am, however, unwilling to commit my sons or any American's sons to the policing of the rest of the world, or the maintenance of the British Empire, much as I hope that it may survive. Our fathers came to this land to leave all that behind them. Europe and Asia have been in constant battle over the balance of power for thousands of years. They will be at it long after all of us here are gone. If we put ourselves back into it now we shall lose this Republic.

We are committed to the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. That is, we are to keep out of Europe's affairs and they are to keep out of those of this hemisphere. Are we to enforce one part of it and forget the rest?

I do not believe any nation has ever fought our battles or is fighting them now. Nor should they be allowed to fight them. That would be cowardly and un-American. Either the wars overseas are our wars or they are not. If they are we should be in them now with everything we have. If they are not we should obey the laws upon our statute books, maintain our Constitution, under which we have become the greatest nation in history, and preserve America as a great citadel of enlightened democracy to which men and nations can repair for guidance and a return of civilization. That is the greatest contribution we can give this troubled world.

The first responsibility of every American is to his fellow Americans. The first responsibility of our Government is to the American people, not to the rest of the world, no matter how sorely beleaguered it may be.

That surely should guide the Congress in the consideration of this bill. First, the American people are entitled to know its full purpose, and why Congress is asked to surrender its constitutional mandates of making alliances and declaring war. The Congress under the Constitution has that responsibility, and, as one American citizen, I maintain has no right to abandon it.

Is there anything sought by this legislation which the Congress could not provide in the American way without abandoning their sworn obligations? The American people in electing a Congress have a right to rely upon the constitutional powers under which the Congress is to act.

This legislation commits America definitely to the very governmental procedure which it deplors in other and less fortunate lands. It undermines our heritage as free men in an attempt to save it for others. It is not for America first, and no other kind of legislation belongs on the statute books of this Nation.

This bill gives the President powers, which he says he does not want, to do things which he says he will not do. Then why are they there, and why do the bill's proponents insist on their retention? Under those powers he can give away every defense weapon we possess, to anyone he pleases. I don't think he will, but why does this bill authorize it? Why is the President empowered to turn our Navy over to Britain? The bill's proponents say that even to presume such a thing is ridiculous. Then why do they insist that such power must be specifically provided?

Would Britain get a single additional airplane, gun, tank, or shell because of this bill? Not unless there is an intention of giving up arms, planes, and ships now in possession of or building for our own defense forces.

If the emergency is half as grave as the President's spokesmen say it is, stripping our Army and Navy of their weapons at such a time would be nothing short of treason. If the 60- to 90-day crisis abroad, of which we have heard so much, proves to be a fact, might we not find them later all returning with their business ends pointed our way?

What could we do, if this bill were passed, beyond what we are doing now to help Britain before this supposedly impending crisis? Nothing, unless we send them our Navy and air force. That, then, must be the intent behind this bill. The American people have the right to know whether the answer to that is yes or no. Such action means war, and before we are through, make no mistake, total war.

There is only one conclusion that I can arrive at from studying this bill and listening to its proponents—that it is a war bill, permissive perhaps, but a war bill.

And America does not want war. It is true that our people have had no chance to express themselves directly upon this issue. We are but recovering from a Presidential campaign in which both major candidates assured us over and over again that if elected the last thing they would do would be to involve us in war.

But it seems to me the issue is squarely before us in this bill. The people should be allowed to know it and with that knowledge to express themselves before any such momentous decision is made.

Just because Europe does not consult us before she starts her wars is no reason why we shouldn't be consulted before we have one of our own started for us.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Senator JOHNSON of California. I forgot to ask you: Did you serve overseas?

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. In what organization?

Mr. MACNIDER. I was a foot soldier in the Ninth Infantry of the Second Division, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How long were you there?

Mr. MACNIDER. Twenty-three months.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You went in as a private?

Mr. MACNIDER. I went in as an enlisted man; yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. What rank did you have when you ceased?

Mr. MACNIDER. When we came back from Germany I was a lieutenant colonel of infantry.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally, have you any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No questions. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Just one question.

Mr. MacNider, you at one time were commander of the American Legion?

Mr. MACNIDER. Twenty years ago, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Twenty years ago?

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. I believe you were at one time Assistant Secretary of War?

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Were you our diplomatic representative in Canada?

Mr. MACNIDER. I do not know how diplomatic I was, sir. I was up there.

Senator GILLETTE. As a diplomatic representative?

Mr. MACNIDER. As Minister to Canada; yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. As Minister to Canada?

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper, have you any questions?

Senator PEPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead, have you any questions?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I want to ask Mr. MacNider some questions, yes.

In the first place, I want to compliment you for the very fine statement you made. The question that has been raised here is something that has occurred to me this afternoon—that the business of every

government is to maintain and protect its own sovereignty. The main instruments of protection are the instruments that have been provided for the common defense. Now, if a certain government turns those instruments over to another sovereign government with the idea that that other sovereign government is necessary to its own protection and turns over those instruments of defense blindly, without recourse, it seems to me that it puts the safety of its own sovereignty subordinate to the sovereignty of the foreign government. It puts its own safety in the hands of another foreign government, without recourse; and, in fact, it puts itself subordinate to the sovereignty of a foreign government and underwrites its war aims, whatever they may be, openly expressed, or secretly, as we did last time.

Whereas we went in as an independent allied government at that time, under this bill we do not go in as an allied government. We go in as a subordinate government, turning over our instruments of defense to another sovereign power.

I would like to ask you your opinion on that.

Mr. MACNIDER. I certainly can understand the possibilities of what you say, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Is there something to that observation, in your opinion?

Mr. MACNIDER. Well, I can see that there would be a tendency that way, Senator.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. We have not asked anyone, so far as I know, who these sovereign powers are that we turn our instruments of defense over to; and, so far as I know, we do not know what secret arrangements they may make.

Mr. MACNIDER. No, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. We underwrite it blankly. Do you not think that is a serious and dangerous thing to do?

Mr. MACNIDER. I certainly think it would be true if this bill were passed and those powers were given.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Colonel, in connection with Senator Shipstead's statement, does not this bill put the United States in at least one of two positions: Either blindly handing over munitions, practically on requisition of a foreign country, or else putting the President in the position of being more or less of a super general staff to pass on strategic questions as well as other things, through the control of the munitions flow?

Mr. MACNIDER. There is certainly that possibility.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. As Assistant Secretary of War I believe you were charged by law with the matter of procurement for the United States Army and also war plans, were you not?

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. From your experience in that capacity and from your observation, is it not a fact that the office of munition control may really be the controlling element in strategic matters as well?

Mr. MACNIDER. It would have a great deal to do with it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. For instance, it is well known that in the last war Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions did not hesitate to overrule the general staff of the British Army, or the French Army, either, by his control of munitions; and that is entirely possible under this bill, when the President of the United States is really constituted the sole agency for the control of munitions flow?

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. For instance, if the British were to go to the President and tell him that if he would give them a thousand planes they would start an offensive up through the Balkans, through Turkey and Gallipoli, and if he thought that was feasible and would give them 1,000 planes, that would be exercising strategic control over the war, would it not?

Mr. MACNIDER. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Colonel, from the standpoint of our own national safety—and I ask you this question not only as someone who fought in the uniform of the United States in a distinguished way, but also as one who has had a public position in the War Department—Do you think the United States, under any conditions whatsoever, is justified in giving to other nations weapons which we need for our own defense or might need for our own defense?

Mr. MACNIDER. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. From your experience in the War Department and from your observation, do you consider that the United States is adequately prepared at the present time?

Mr. MACNIDER. Well, apparently not, although I am not in a position to know what our defense has been.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I understand you have been out of the Department for some time, but to the best of your information and observation, based on your wide experience, do you understand that the United States is prepared enough to be giving away part of our defenses at the present time?

Mr. MACNIDER. I do not think we should give away any of our defenses at any time.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You were prominently mentioned for the Republican nomination at the Philadelphia convention?

Mr. MACNIDER. Not very prominently. I do not know that very many people know it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You had a large number of votes.

Mr. MACNIDER. My State was good to me, and after they had made a very pleasant, homelike gesture, we all went on our way.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If you had been a candidate for President, do you think you would have made a flying trip to Scotland, England, Wales, and Ireland, and then come back to make a report?

Mr. MACNIDER. Well, I think the gentleman from Indiana is having the time of his life.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He has gone to pubs and palaces and danced the Lambeth Walk. Can you dance the Lambeth Walk, Colonel?

Mr. MACNIDER. I have never tried it.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, you recommended him for President of the United States, did you not?

Mr. MACNIDER. I worked very hard for him, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not lend yourself to an effort to discredit him if he should come back and be called as a witness?

Mr. MACNIDER. Not at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are willing for him to be heard on his merits?

Mr. MACNIDER. Certainly. I think he is a great American.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You did not think so last November.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I thought he was a great American last November, and I am now confirmed in that belief.

Senator Reynolds, did you have any questions?

Senator REYNOLDS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Thank you very much, Mr. MacNider, for coming.

Mr. MACNIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. I am now going to ask the police to ask the audience to be excused. I have dealt reasonably with you, and the committee has, and we do not want these demonstrations, because this is not a town-hall meeting. Now, I am asking the police to ask the audience to be excused, please, except the witness Armstrong. The officers will please open the door and let the audience retire. The committee will proceed in executive session.

(The audience left the committee room.)

STATEMENT OF O. K. ARMSTRONG, SPRINGFIELD, MO.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Armstrong, will you give your name to the reporter and your connection with any organization for whom you appear?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Senator George and Senators, my name is O. K. Armstrong. I live in Springfield, Mo. I am not representing any organization. Recently I was connected with an organization, but I am not connected with any organization that I am speaking for this afternoon.

I have come to speak as an individual citizen and as a veteran of the last great war against House bill 1776. I hope this bill will not be passed at all. It should be overwhelmingly defeated. The American people, as they slowly become enlightened upon this proposed measure, as rapidly as they understand its terrible implications and probabilities, are themselves turning overwhelmingly against it.

The bill under discussion might be made less un-American, less evil, by generous amendments. But it never could be made a good bill. The purpose back of its inception was and is bad. That purpose is either to take the United States into war by our overt actions, or so to flirt with the dangers of war as to invite a declaration of war or acts of war against us by some country or countries. Either course would be a betrayal of the American people, the vast majority of whom desire to keep out of wars now raging in the Old World.

I speak as a veteran of the World War, and I say that the sentiment of veterans is overwhelmingly against our participation in war unless we are attacked. I am confident that 90 percent of all the United States veterans of the World War are against taking the trail of the destruction and slaughter of war again, if it can be avoided with honor.

Let me make it plain that although I am a member of the American Legion and have held positions of honor and trust in that organization, I do not speak here for the American Legion. However, I feel

free to inform this committee that during my recent experience as a member of the foreign relations committee of the Legion, with wide contacts with our program of world peace and foreign relations, and with veterans of many States, convinces me that the sentiment among the members of this organization is against our being dragged, duped, or taken by degrees into foreign wars.

On the face of it, this bill would indisputably take this Nation in the direction of participation in war. Taking such a direction long enough and fast enough will result in getting there.

No one has refuted the repeated statement that this measure would permit the President, without further action on the part of the Congress, to engage in acts of war. We must assume, then, that such is true. Then it does no good to contend that the President, if given that power, would not use it. He would either use it or employ the threat of its use in an attempt to gain certain ends. The use of warlike powers would mean war. The threat of such use would lead toward war. What is the difference in the end?

The argument that we are doing this to aid a nation that is fighting our war does not ring true to a veteran's ears. It has a hollow sound, a counterfeit ring. It does not sound like the spirit of George Washington, John Paul Jones, or Grant, Lee, or General Pershing. It sounds like the cowardice one might expect to find in nations that have been beaten down by dictators telling them what to do.

If this is our war, the President would ask the Congress to declare it today, the Congress should grant the declaration, and the American people should support it. If the men, women, and children of England, China, and Greece are dying in battle and under bombs for a cause that is our just cause, or for our physical protection, then every American worthy of the name should feel ashamed. If any Member of Congress believes these wars are our wars, it seems to me that he should go back and tell his constituents that he believes that to be true, without quibbling. If I thought the battle of Britain was our battle, or was being fought by the British to defend the United States, I would enlist in the English or Canadian forces today, and I would urge every one of my comrades of the last war to do so.

But I know it is not. My comrades know it is not. Let me quote you the words of Steven F. Chadwick, when national commander of the American Legion at the national convention over which he presided at Chicago in September 1939:

The disillusionment experienced in this country after the conclusion of the World War, in which our men gave their lives or risked their lives to "make the world safe for democracy" or to fight a "war to end all wars" looms as a warning today to all who would have us participate in world conflicts. We should not do it again.

At the same convention the foreign relations committee offered this resolution which was passed unanimously and with cheers:

The American Legion views with the gravest concern the apparently widespread belief that this Nation must inevitably become involved in the present European conflict. We not only believe that this Nation need not become involved but insist and demand that the President of the United States and the Congress pursue a policy that, while preserving the sovereignty and dignity of this Nation, will prevent involvement in this conflict. * * *

In the preamble of the constitution of the American Legion, quoted by members as they stand at attention at the opening of their meetings, are these words:

For God and country we associate ourselves together * * * to promote peace and good will on earth. * * *

And in the chaplain's prayer are these words:

God of the nations, send Thy peace to our Nation and to all nations * * *.

These things have real meaning to veterans. Armistice Day has real meaning, for it signifies the end of a war that might put an end, we thought, to major wars. If we plunge back into this war, the significance of November 11, 1918, is gone forever, as it is already lost to all other countries.

Perhaps the veteran's greatest hatred of war lies in his knowledge of the utter futility of war. Who won the last war? We thought the Allies did—with our help. We crushed the power the Kaiser and his military machine held upon the German people. We helped liberate France, Belgium, Britain, and other countries. We hoped that the German and Austrian people might join the free peoples of the world in rehabilitation and economic growth that would permit this new freedom to be translated into democratic processes.

I do not need to remind you that shortsighted statesmen of the so-called victor nations, following the ancient pattern and practice of "to the victors belong the spoils," refused to permit it. They prostituted the League of Nations for their own imperialistic uses—as some of our more farsighted statesmen predicted they would. So now we find the soil on which our comrades died, and where many of them are still sleeping under the crosses, row on row, is being governed by Frenchmen who have made an alliance with a German Government more ruthless, more autocratic, more militaristic than ever was that of the Kaiser's. They have turned their guns on their former Allies, the British. So who won the last war? Can any American Gold Star Mother tell us? And who will win this war?

Some of those guns turned by the French upon the British, we now learn, we furnished by our Government from our own meager supplies. Yet we must write a blank check to underwrite a British victory.

What assurance can we veterans of the last war have that events will not turn, in this fast game of military power, so that when we have followed our guns with our boys, those guns to Britain will not be firing at our sons? It is entirely possible. By that time, since entrance into this European war means also entrance into the wars in the Far East and in Africa, we will indeed be confronted by a hostile world. Will our Latin-American neighbors love us so devoutly as to come to our rescue? We shall find ourselves surrounded by enemies our own foreign policy has made.

But it is contended by proponents of this measure that this is provision for our own defense. It is nothing of the kind. The cruelest, most despicable hoaxes are now being practiced upon the American people under the name of "defense."

To a soldier or an ex-soldier defense means an area that must be protected—that must be held at all costs. Why, then, cannot we say what is the geographical extent of our defense? Then we can say to the whole world: "Here are the ramparts we watch. Keep out! We will defend this to our last man, to our last resources." Does any patriotic American doubt we could do it?

Should we defend the Western Hemisphere from aggression? Specifically, veterans' organizations have said "Yes." "We will fol-

low the Monroe Doctrine, which means that we will permit no aggression by Old World nations upon the rights and sovereignty of the nations of this hemisphere; and, conversely, that we will not interfere in the affairs and quarrels of the Old World."

But this bill would throw away all our concepts of defense. It would even tear up the agreements of neutrality we have so recently and solemnly made with our Pan-American neighbors.

It places the issue squarely before the American people. That issue is this: Shall the Government now take such steps in giving military assistance to certain belligerents as will lead the United States to actual combat in areas not in any way connected with the defense of this Nation or this hemisphere? Should we use our military preparedness to police the whole world? Should we maintain by force of arms the status quo of foreign empires?

This bill says positively "Yes." The American people overwhelmingly say "No."

In my opinion, the vast majority of American citizens do not want to see any peace written as the result of a Nazi victory. They do not want to see Britain beaten. What they do want to see is a termination of this destruction of war, and a peace that will be just to all peoples, who, after all, are the victims of all wars.

If, then, the purpose of this bill is to aid Britain, it is a subterfuge and a hoax. If it is the will of the American people to aid Britain with war materials and still to stay out of active participation, let the issue not be blanketed by such dangerous provisions as are included in this bill. We permit Britain to purchase materials of war. If there is no more money to pay for such purchases—and I do not grant that—then let money be appropriated and loaned—or given—to Britain for such purchases, without strings attached, and with no further obligation on our part. We would not at least be skirting the rim of war with every move we make. We could at least be freer to build our own defense and to remain the last great nation preserving democracy at peace in a world driven to totalitarianism by war.

The American people, through Congress, have been kind to the veterans of the World War. Most of our requests have been granted. I predict that within the next few weeks the voices of many veterans will be heard, insisting that all we tried to do in the last war be not undone by becoming involved again.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. I have just one question.

You live in Springfield, Mo.?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You spoke of being connected with an organization up until recently. What was that organization?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That organization was the No Foreign War Campaign.

Senator CONNALLY. Were you president of it?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I organized the group known as the No Foreign War Campaign beginning along last fall, culminating in a conference that was held here in Washington in October 1940.

I served as acting chairman of that group until, I believe the exact date was the 13th day of December, at which time I relinquished my position as chairman of that group. I continued to serve-----

Senator CONNALLY. Did you resign?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir; I continued to serve as field director of the No Foreign War Campaign until about the 15th of January, when I resigned.

Senator CONNALLY. That was a salaried position, was it?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, it was to have been, but I could not go along with the policies of those who were supporting in part—financially supporting—that organization, so I refused to have anything to do with it financially or otherwise, and I withdrew.

Senator CONNALLY. You did get paid part of the time, did you not?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, I had some expenses in connection with some meetings that I had arranged. I turned in all of that money that I had been out, and it was paid. That is all I drew.

Senator CONNALLY. You got compensation?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Oh, yes; I was compensated for money actually out of pocket.

Senator CONNALLY. And you were field director?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I was field director for that time after I resigned as acting chairman.

Senator CONNALLY. You resigned and did not get any pay?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, a salary arrangement was to have been put into effect. I asked that they withhold that after the first day of January, when I felt that I could not, in conscience, go along with the program that seemed to me developing the committee.

Senator CONNALLY. If you had continued you, of course, would have been on a salary?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. But you did not like their financial policies and arrangements and so you resigned; is that right?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. By "they" I must point out that the groups that came, at my invitation, to the city of Washington to attend that conference in October, comprised 60 people here, and they represented, by actual count, 23 very fine organizations.

When I say "they," I do not refer to such men as Mr. Thorpe, of the United States Chamber of Commerce, or Colonel Lindbergh, or others who testified here. I am speaking of the ones who became active directors of that campaign.

Senator CONNALLY. I mean your organization.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. The people in control of your organization were pursuing financial policies that you did not advocate, and you quit?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. The main financial arrangement was your salary?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Oh, no; you misunderstood. I had made no financial arrangements for the No Foreign War Campaign. The money I spent was out of my pocket.

When I discovered that there were some interested in financing the No Foreign War Campaign, apparently for motives that were not suggested to me or that none of us had in mind when we organized the thing, to keep this country out of war, I refused to go along with it.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you mind stating what those interests were? I do not want to know what the names were. Some big business concerns, do you mean?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, I shall be specific and say that the press, the first week of January—almost any day; the story was run along continuously as developments came—linked my committee with a man by the name of W. R. Davis. I did not know Mr. Davis, and I have no brief for or against him, but the then chairman of my committee—our committee—revealed what was entirely new to me and entirely new to anyone else who had been connected with the movement—that this gentleman had agreed to finance the movement, and I withdrew.

Senator CONNALLY. That is the same Davis who was supposedly going to offer peace terms?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. Who went over to Germany and was connected with the German Government in some way, unofficially probably?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. And the same man who was down in Mexico, getting German oil from Mexico?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. Is he still financing your organization?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I know nothing about it, after I withdrew. I was simply informed by news reports that he had promised to underwrite the committee. I did not want to be connected with it in any leadership to keep this country out of war or to have anything to do with it.

Senator CONNALLY. You say you got expenses in addition to your salary. Where did that come from? Mr. Davis or anybody else?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No; that had come from contributions made from all over the country. They came on just general appeals of the committee, and I do not know how much money had come in, but contributions had come.

Senator CONNALLY. When you quit you quit because of Davis' connection?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That was one reason.

Senator CONNALLY. Did he continue then? It was a case of either you quit or he quit? You quit and he went on; is that the idea?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The chairman of the committee was Mr. Verne Marshall.

Senator CONNALLY. The same Verne Marshall who has been speaking over the radio?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I have read accounts of his speeches; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Was he a member of your organization?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. He was appointed chairman of our organization on December 13, 1940.

Senator CONNALLY. Who appointed him?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. To be frank about it, most of the representatives of the conference held here in Washington left the matter to me and to my decision. On the advice of a number of our mutual friends, I suggested that he be chairman of the committee.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you in effect appointed Mr. Marshall chairman?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, I agreed to it. We had a number of advisers.

Senator CONNALLY. You say they left it to you and you suggested him and he went in, so in effect you selected Mr. Marshall?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. In effect; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Is that organization still functioning?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I do not know. I severed my connection with it.

Senator CONNALLY. You have an interest in its objectives, have you not?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Did you keep up with its developments?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Only through the press, because I had a number of commitments to speak. I have been speaking and filling those engagements. I have been in the West and in the Middle West.

Senator CONNALLY. You were compensated?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You were not compensated?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir; I have been paying my own expenses, and I expect to continue to do so, although a great many of my friends have urged me to announce a new organization. I may or may not—that has not been decided—but I am entirely on my own.

Senator CONNALLY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any of you any questions?

We have no further questions, Mr. Armstrong.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Philip Murray, president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, desired to appear, but I advised him that on the days when he could appear this week there were other witnesses already scheduled, so he furnished this brief, and I would like to have it go into the record at this point. I presume there is no objection.

(The statement of Philip Murray is as follows:)

S. 275, which is under consideration, presents problems of deep significance and of far-reaching importance. It will determine the pattern for our future domestic and foreign policy and thereby affects the lives and well-being of every single American.

The Congress of Industrial Organizations embraces and is concerned with the interests of millions of working men and women and the members of their families. We have a vital stake in the future of America and are deeply concerned in the consideration and outcome of this proposed legislation.

At the outset I would like to make two cardinal points which I believe are uppermost in the minds of the American people:

(1) The people of the United States cherish their democracy and democratic institutions. Every true American despises and loathes totalitarianism. The people of Europe are at present engulfed in a blood bath for which the leaders of totalitarianism, through their ruthlessness and rapaciousness, are responsible. As a result, innocent working men and women and children are being killed, maimed, and starved. I believe I speak what is in the heart and mind of every common man and woman when I say that the burning desire of all of us is to preserve democracy and to combat every form of totalitarianism.

For these reasons the American Nation supports the policy of giving full aid to Great Britain.

(2) The people of this Nation have demonstrated at every opportunity that has been presented to them in the recent past that they are equally determined not to be dragged into the present foreign wars that are raging throughout the world. This does not mean that Americans will insist upon peace at any price, but it should be clear that Americans are determined to remain at peace rather than be drawn into the blood bath of Europe. The reason for this is that we know that war means an end to our democratic way of life, our democratic institutions, and the very ideals which we are attempting to preserve.

In light of the foregoing two guideposts, the question is presented as to the wisdom of S. 275. I do not pretend to entertain any expert knowledge as to the intricacies of international law which is furnished at length in the report of the

House on Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the companion bill in the House. I do not speak as any military expert. I speak as an ordinary layman and primarily as a representative of labor, to discuss the uncertainties, the questions, and problems over which American working men and women are pondering in relation to this proposed legislation.

The basis for the proposed legislation is the protection of national defense. Under this declared policy it should be anticipated that any interpretation as to the powers bestowed upon the President under the bill will always be at the expense of private rights, whether they be of labor or property, rather than any curtailment of the authority of the President. This is true particularly in light of the growing intensity of public fears regarding the international situation.

Section 3 of the act, which provides the authority for the President to obtain defense articles for transfer to foreign governments, specifically provides that such authority may be exercised "notwithstanding the provision of any other law." This specific quotation would appear to set aside, if it is in conflict with this bill, any other outstanding law. This might include the National Labor Relations Act, the Wages and Hours Act, the Walsh-Healey Act, or any other outstanding labor legislation if, in the opinion of the President, such legislation if enforced bars an effective prosecution of the President's authority under the proposed bill. For instance:

Suppose the President were to determine that in order to achieve the objectives of the proposed legislation it is necessary to alter certain relations existing between management and employees which were established under any of the foregoing laws or on the basis of voluntary agreements which were obtained as a result of the operation of any of the foregoing laws. I pose the question whether a court might not construe the provision "notwithstanding any other law" to the effect that the President has the authority to set aside such existing relations between management and employees in order to effectively prosecute the ends sought under the bill now being considered.

If this authority is present under the bill, labor should not be asked to rely on the mere press statement that it is not intended to exercise it.

It is easy to say that of course this far-reaching authority is not contemplated under the proposed legislation. However, I wish to point out that where the rights of patent holders are affected, a specific provision is incorporated protecting these rights. From this it might easily be argued that the rights of any other private parties, whether they be of labor or other groups, may be set aside where deemed necessary for the successful prosecution of the authority granted under the proposed bill.

Congress is now considering the establishment of a definite policy regarding its foreign relations. This proposed bill purports to determine the pattern. Labor, when considering the impact which such contemplated legislation may have upon its rights and its existence, must necessarily take into account other legislative measures which are being proposed at the same time under the guise that they are necessary to further the foreign-policy program.

I have reference to the clamor which is made by a few vociferous Congressmen demanding that the right of labor be curtailed or eliminated as an essential part of a national-defense program. I know of no more fatal mistake that can be made than such action.

Labor must necessarily look askance at any program under which it is urged that for its successful prosecution the rights of labor must be destroyed. This is precisely what is being proposed under the bills that have been submitted by several Congressmen at this session of Congress. National defense must include the protection and existence of the economic and political gains of the people of the Nation. It is on this basis that the support of the people has been solicited and is forthcoming.

It is therefore essential that in connection with any legislation to be initiated by Congress to guide the foreign affairs of this Nation there be incorporated a forthright and unequivocal declaration that the policies of the Government must guarantee the protection of the democratic rights of labor and of all the people of the Nation.

It must be conceded that under the bill there are no limitations as to the amount or kind of materials that the President may transfer to foreign governments other than that in his determination it is necessary for the defense of the United States. There are no criteria imposed in the act as to what foreign governments should be aided other than the single requirement that the President decide that the defense of such government is vital to the defense of the United States.

Under the section of the act which permits the Secretaries of War and Navy to purchase or acquire material in the foreign countries, the President could place orders in any foreign country, pay for such material, and have it delivered to the foreign government. This procedure would of course eliminate the need of such country raising its own funds from its own people at the expense of America.

Under the President's authority to procure defense articles for foreign governments and to transfer them to such foreign governments, it would seem to be clear that the President could make such requirements that would require American convoys of such material to the foreign governments in order to make certain that they actually arrive in their hands. The President of the United States has himself stated that: "If one nation can convoy ships, either under its own flag or that of another, through a hostile war, on the doctrine of chance, there is pretty sure to be some shooting and that comes awfully close to war." This statement was made by the President apparently to indicate that he was opposed to American convoys. The present bill does not forbid convoys. In addition, the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, testifying before this committee, has stated that he is opposed to a provision which would forbid convoys. These inconsistent statements merely produce confusion and alarm. I believe that there must be unqualified opposition to American convoys into the war zones. This matter should not be left to administrative determination but should be clearly prohibited by Congress.

Congress has been furnished by the Secretary of the Treasury of a very brief and general statement of the alleged dollar assets of Great Britain in the United States available for the purchase and procurement of defense materials. These assets are alleged to be practically exhausted. The statement furnished to this committee does not purport to include the assets of any portions of the British Empire except Great Britain. In addition, it did not include the available dollar assets of Holland, Belgium, or Norway, to mention but a few of the nations who would be entitled to receive aid under the proposed legislation.

The report of the House Committee in support of the companion measure in the House, specifically states that this lend-lease bill does not in any way amend or repeal the Neutrality Act or the Johnson Act. In other words, it is stated that the United States Government may make available to Great Britain or other nations if so desired, through direct appropriations by Congress, credits or materials without being in conflict with existing legislation. Yet this is the sole alleged purpose of this bill.

The powers which are bestowed upon the President under the proposed legislation are more far-reaching than ever suggested at any time in the American history. If this policy is to be adopted, certainly the American people are at least entitled to know the facts which give rise to the grave necessity for such extraordinary legislation.

The hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and this committee have not produced an abundance of facts either regarding the situation in Great Britain or regarding the policies which are to govern the American Government in its foreign relations. Different Cabinet officers have taken diverse positions before this committee on the same basic issues. Certain Cabinet officers have even refused before this committee to accept responsibility for the proposed legislation. The military experts of the Government have testified before executive sessions, thereby depriving the American people of the benefit of their expert advice. Vague generalities have been the vogue instead of plain hard facts.

The proper functioning of democracy demands that the American people be advised and informed of all the facts in order that they may intelligently authorize and direct their leaders to conduct themselves in accordance with an approved policy. I submit that the American people have not received the benefit of such complete and full disclosures which would permit them to pass judgment upon (a) the justification for the requested legislation, or (b) the intended foreign policy of this Nation which is to be pursued under the projected program.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Thereupon, at 5 p. m., a recess was taken until tomorrow, Friday, February 7, 1941, at 10 a. m.)

TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1941

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in the Caucus Room, Senate Office Building, Hon. Walter F. George presiding.

Present, Senators George (Chairman), Harrison, Connally, Thomas of Utah, Van Nuys, Murray, Pepper, Green, Barkley, Reynolds, Guffey, Gillette, Clark of Missouri, Glass, Byrnes, Johnson of California, Capper, La Follette, Vandenberg, White, Shipstead, and Nye.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. ALFORD J. WILLIAMS

The CHAIRMAN. Major Williams, have you a prepared statement?
Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you desire to present your prepared statement without interruption?

Major WILLIAMS. I should like to.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Give the committee such background of your general experience, without detail, of course, as you desire. We would be glad to have it for the record.

Major WILLIAMS. The background of my experience is about 22 years in aviation, 13 of which, approximately, were spent in the Navy; 3 years in the Marine Corps Reserve, and since that time, and a part of that time also, up to the present, as a business executive and newspaper man, engaged in the endeavor to increase public education as far as aviation is concerned.

In response to your invitation to read the prepared statement, as I read this brief I beg your indulgence for a realistic frankness which I deem requisite and proper in discussing national problems at this critical period in our history.

For many years I have steadfastly advocated and sought the provision of a modernized national defense system for our country—with special emphasis on equipping ourselves with adequate air power. This bill before you, H. R. 1776, to my belief, negatives all chances of developing American air power since it will further strip us of existing aircraft and divert future production, and for that reason alone I am unequivocally opposed to it from the start. There is only one thing that could awaken in my heart deeper and more determined opposition to this bill, and that is its deadly potential threat to American liberty, to the American way of life, and to our representative form of government.

This bill represents the first American legislative action purporting to place in the hands of one man all the powers that our forefathers of

1776 fought against and for which they instituted a new political religion. This political religion to which I refer is the detailed and guarded relationship between individual and government most specifically contained in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. Often have I termed this particular portion of the Declaration of Independence as the Lord's Prayer of Americanism and of the American way of life. For the purpose of emphasis I shall quote this Lord's Prayer of Americanism:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, etc.

That to my way of thinking is the essential part of the Lord's Prayer of Americanism. "Certain unalienable rights" definitely precludes signing away any such blank deed in fee simple of American rights as outlined in this bill, or any such bill as places in the hands of any one man complete and dictatorial power over our lives, our peace and happiness, and our wealth.

All these things this President or any succeeding President can do, possessed of such a blank check on the American way of life. To my way of thinking, no time or financial limit on such powers would guarantee that they would be returned by any man who acquires them or by his successor to whom they might pass. The records of history clearly indicate that the relations between individual and government has been a constant struggle on the part of the individual to maintain the limits of powers given to a government or to recover extraordinary powers given in time of emergency. The Bill of Rights is based on this very fear, and the records of history are grimly to the disadvantage of the individual. This bill, therefore, to my way of thinking, means the creation of a virtual dictatorship, benevolent or otherwise. Furthermore, this bill is traveling under an incorrect name, that is, it is not a "lease-lend bill," it is "the end of American liberty bill."

These are my reasons for complete and undying opposition to the passage of this bill or any modification of it. Liberty is a delicate plant, and I fear those who promise to turn this delicate plant into some Utopian growth overnight, with all the risks of destroying that precious plant in the experiment. Any such legislation enabling any one man, be he President or otherwise, to make commitments first and offer the bills to Congress for payment, means the end of America as a representative democracy -- in short, as a republic.

I am opposed to this bill because while it purports to be in the interest of American national defense, it is to my way of thinking, a culmination of all the ills which have stripped our American national defense system of air power worthy of the name. With less arbitrary and discretionary power than outlined in this bill, American air power is weakening day by day.

What has been done to date in the weakening of American air power is substantiation of my second objection to the bill. It amounts practically to giving away an air power still on order and for which we never planned in a businesslike fashion. The slow and calculated involvement of the United States in Europe's war, as far as air power is concerned, can be traced in four simple steps: The release to Europe

of planes tagged—and I offer modestly my own term “fictitiously”—as obsolete. Such a tag has led the American public to erroneously believe that the tag “obsolete” was sufficient since the planes were of no further use. Far too few have voices been raised warning the American people that each one of those so-called obsolete planes was actually worth its weight in gold, to train the man power for the air power we need so critically today. Yet they were turned back to their manufacturers for resale to Europe.

Close upon the heels of this tag “obsolete” was the release of current war plane models, including even the latest experimental types which had been originally developed for our own Army and Navy air service. The best example I can give you of that was the crash of the Douglas bomber in which my friend Johnny Cable was killed, wherein the identity of his passenger was first camouflaged by a fictitious name, but later disclosed by the news services to be an official representative of the French Air Ministry. This was a type of ship that was on the Army secret list, and which no American airman had been permitted to view. What other military and naval secrets of equipment had been sold and delivered to Europe was known to only a few people in Washington, and not generally known to the people whose money had built them. This is an important point, since a democracy is only as good as its familiarity with the details of its own business.

Number 3 was the stripping of our first-line planes out of the active Army and Navy squadrons and delivering them fully equipped, even with machine guns, for delivery by flight, directly to a belligerent nation. I stood at the United States Army Air Corps airdrome at Mitchell Field and watched dozens of active service Air Corps planes depart for Canada, fully equipped, and at the same time the then current type of Navy dive bomber was also stripped from the naval squadrons and flown to Canada. Perfunctory permission to make such deliveries and perfunctory approval for the tag “obsolete” from the heads of the Army and the Navy Air Services was readily acquired from men who were professionally unable to protest.

Still pacing off the dangerously unlimited and undefined steps short of war, the next stage found our aircraft industry completely invaded and ships contracted for and allocated to our own Army and Navy Air Services set aside for delivery to Europe. This is what I mean by stripping America of her air-power defense. At first there was indefinite talk of a rule-of-thumb allocation to Europe, and to our own national defense, of 50-50. The rule-of-thumb ratio was arrived at as far as I know, arbitrarily, and later shifted without the knowledge or consent of Congress. In short, we, the people, have discovered from time to time what had actually been shipped after the delivery had been made or the commitment effected which necessitated delivery. Here I quote the destroyer deal. Again I quote in point the exposé of the PT 10's—the new torpedo patrol boats which were supposed to form the nucleus of what will some day be known as our “mosquito fleet.” This deal was uncovered and quashed only by congressional exposé.

All of these things have been done and the arbitrary actions taken have been explained and excused as “aid to Britain.” I am for aid to the poor, to the unfortunate, to the oppressed. Likewise, I am for offering no aid until the national safety of the United States is secure and complete. I regard this policy in much the same way

that I regard my contribution to the Community Chest. I make that contribution after I have paid my bills and discharged my obligations to those dependent upon me. I do not make that contribution first and let my bills and my people take care of themselves. And I believe that this simple principle applies to a nation's conduct and policy in regard to international charity or any form of humanitarianism. Anticipating such a question upon making such a statement, that is my stand on aid to England now. My answer is -- when and when only, the United States is possessed of adequate air power, to protect the United States and all that it stands for, am I in favor of giving one wing or one propeller to any other nation.

For years I have been acutely conscious of the tendencies of this Government's involvement in Europe's war. Talking peace at home and shouting war abroad, and, may I be permitted to add, meddling in the internal affairs not only of Europe but also of Asia, I doubt very seriously if the United States today has one single worthwhile friend among the major nations of the world.

I am acutely conscious also of the persistent promotion of hysteria by both the administration and several powerful groups in this country concerning the imminence and threat of overnight invasion of the United States. This invasion threat is a fear complex constantly held over the heads of the American people, but unsupported by logical argument or requisite technical details to date, and has served as a lever for prying off and stripping America of her vital and required air power.

America today is woefully deficient in air power. In fact, American air power is nothing more or less than a "myth." The neglect to provide that vital arm for America's national defense system is, to my way of thinking, nothing short of criminal. Periodically the American people have been subjected to a series of horror stories concerning some sort of overnight invasion of the United States. I want to go on record as saying flatly and unequivocally that this is pure nonsense--a physical and mechanical impossibility now and for a considerable stretch of years.

Likewise a naval invasion of the United States, accompanied, as any such naval invasion must be, with a land force invasion, by any combination of the Axis powers, is, in my opinion, an incredible fantasy, unsupported to date by any qualified military or naval opinion of standing.

Any sort of working familiarity with the machinery of air power, its limitations and its dependence upon intensive ground organizations, readily disposes of the threat of an effective air invasion of the United States from bases 3,000 miles distant. As far as a naval invasion, followed by landing parties on our coast lines in the Atlantic, is concerned, I believe that the air power versus sea power lessons of Europe's war to date completely negate any such possibility now or ever. Calm consideration and evaluation of these lessons conclusively indicate that invasion of the United States by surface forces is physically impossible.

In the light of reason, I cannot conceive of the Germans even contemplating the use of sea power against us--thus using against America the type of war machinery which has failed in combat and is failing on blockade for the British against them. And as far as the Pacific is concerned, we are free from invasion by the Japanese

and the Japanese are free from invasion by America. Only imperialists amongst us dream of exerting American naval or military dominance in the Far East, and I believe we should quash these wild dreams immediately, withdraw our armed forces from the Far East, silence these admirals who chant "the inevitability of war," and recognize that there are zones of military and naval influence beyond our control.

The passage of this bill—and I offer my opinion humbly—or, as I said before, any modification of this bill, will amount to a virtual suicide of the American way of life. Accepting even this suicide, I see no additional hope in this bill wherein unprecedented power, never before granted to any other American President, would provide in a shorter time the adequate American air power so vital to the safety and preservation of this country.

A blank mandate or check on American liberties, American blood, or American destiny is, in my opinion, not the solution.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Just to emphasize what I thought was not brought out very clearly while some of the members of the committee were absent, how long have you been an expert on the airplane?

Major WILLIAMS. Sir, I should hesitate long to claim the status of an expert. I have been in the business only 22 years, flying vigorously in every branch of it, and I must confess honestly that I do not think anyone knows very much about it today. But I have had this 22 years' experience.

Senator JOHNSON of California. But you have been in the business 23 years?

Major WILLIAMS. Twenty-two years.

Senator JOHNSON of California. In what capacities have you been in the business?

Major WILLIAMS. I came into it, sir, during the World War; in naval aviation, remained in the naval aviation service, exclusively detailed to aviation duty with the Navy, for approximately 13 years. Then I resigned and joined the Marine Corps Reserve, and later entered business, and later still took up this newspaper activity to spread and promote public education in air matters.

Senator JOHNSON of California. From your knowledge of the situation you hold that it is utterly impossible that there should be an invasion of us, or an attack upon us—I will not say attack upon us, because an attack may be made anyway—an invasion of this country by airplanes?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; I do believe that.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. Your theory is that at present we are not in any danger of an invasion by air?

Major WILLIAMS. That is my opinion, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Because it could not succeed?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. That is, an enemy could not successfully invade this country by air?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Your view is also that they could not successfully invade the country with naval power?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Would that view be changed if the British Navy should be conquered and destroyed?

Major WILLIAMS. May I ask the Senator to distinguish so that I will better understand it—if England or the British Navy is to be conquered? If England is conquered, to my way of thinking, it would be an unwarranted indictment of British courage to assume that the British Navy would still be in existence.

Senator CONNALLY. Perhaps so, but we might bring that indictment; I am assuming it would happen. You can base your answer on the assumption that it would happen, regardless of the cause, but if that happened, I just asked your opinion as to the possibility of a naval invasion.

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Even though the British Navy should be conquered or should be destroyed, it would not change your view that a naval invasion would be impossible?

Major WILLIAMS. Mind you, I do not desire to squirm from under your question, and I will answer it directly first by saying that the British Navy will never be turned over to the Germans, not by reason of Mr. Churchill's promise, but because of strategical and tactical reasons. The first is, the British are thoroughly aware of the fact that the Isles without the fleet are useless, and that the fleet without the Isles is useless. Assuming that the Germans took the entire British Navy, I still maintain that length of communication lines is still a vital factor in modern warfare, and therefore while we could not hope to overcome a combination of British, German and Italian Navies in their waters, likewise the stretching of those lines of communications would enable us to meet them with far less force.

Senator CONNALLY. In other words, boiled down your view is that even though the British Navy should be conquered or destroyed, still no nation could successfully invade the United States with a navy?

Major WILLIAMS. I believe that.

Senator CONNALLY. They could not invade us with an air force?

Major WILLIAMS. No; sir.

Senator CONNALLY. It necessarily follows, of course, that they could not invade us with a ground force, because if they could not get over here with their navy or aircraft, they could not get an army here.

Major WILLIAMS. Quite.

Senator CONNALLY. So we are in no danger from any source, according to your view, then?

Major WILLIAMS. That is going a little bit beyond my opinion expressed so far. I believe we are in danger. With the world on fire I still believe that every effort should be exerted toward providing America with all the defense equipment we can get, for reasons unforeseen by people at the present time. And I also believe that one of our gravest dangers is right home here.

Senator CONNALLY. You think, though, we cannot be invaded by air or by sea or by land, but still we should prepare against any eventuality in the future a strong navy and a strong army and a strong air force. Is that right?

Major WILLIAMS. May I offer as a basis for my reason that I view the world as on fire. The world is actually on fire protesting against the status quo existing throughout the world. A threat of fire in the neighborhood would be sufficient for my equipping my home with fire apparatus.

Senator CONNALLY. I notice you say in your typewritten statement, "In fact, American air power is a 'myth'." I understood you to read, though, that American air power is nothing more nor less than a myth. Is that right?

Major WILLIAMS. I did wander a little bit from that. I cannot write as I speak.

Senator CONNALLY. I am not criticizing you; you have a right to tell it in your own way.

Major WILLIAMS. I mean approximately that.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you go that far, that the American air force is nothing more nor less than a myth?

Major WILLIAMS. For actual, active flying combat at the present time, I know of no single squadron possessed of planes, which are in turn possessed of equipment, capable of enabling their pilots to hold their own over the battlefield of Europe today.

Senator CONNALLY. Assuming that is true, that is not quite a myth, is it, when we have several thousand planes--the Army and the Navy?

Major WILLIAMS. It is as far as combat is concerned. Perhaps I am wrong in using that word "myth."

Senator CONNALLY. That word "myth" is a big word.

Major WILLIAMS. Suppose I turned it around and said we had no fighting equipment capable of holding its own over the foreign front today.

Senator CONNALLY. You did not say that, "on the foreign front." The assumption was that we were defending. It would not require as heavy a force to defend as it would to attack, would it?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir, by no means. I used that as a measure, as a yardstick, of our American air power and its equipment.

Senator CONNALLY. How long has it been since you were intimately in touch with the air force, and knew about its strength?

Major WILLIAMS. I never get very far away from it. That is all I have to do in life, to remain in contact.

Senator CONNALLY. I am not talking about the industry, I am talking about the naval aviation, for instance. You were in that for years. Are you sufficiently acquainted with the Navy's equipment, naval aircraft equipment, and its number of pilots, and number of airplanes and number of fighters and number of bombers? Have you sufficiently accurate information at the moment to say that our naval aviation is wholly a myth? I just want to get your viewpoint.

Major WILLIAMS. I do not know the numbers. I do not think any one except those in official positions know the numbers. My concern was with types.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you know whether or not they are now producing the very latest types that invention and ingenuity and genius are able to produce?

Major WILLIAMS. I believe they are, yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You think they are?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. So we will not be a myth always, then, will we, if we proceed along that line?

Major WILLIAMS. I did not carry that into the future in the form of an assumption. I was just thinking about the present time.

Senator CONNALLY. Part of an air force's function is to get planes and produce them, is it not?

Major WILLIAMS. That is only part of it. The major part of it is to produce planes of outstanding performance.

Senator CONNALLY. That is true, but you also know, do you not, that the progress of naval aviation, invention, and the change of types, and the new devices and new gadgets, is very rapid, is it not?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. And a plane that was made six months ago might not now be the very latest word in aviation?

Major WILLIAMS. I think that calls for a little lengthy answer, because it is a point that has disturbed people very gravely today. That is the excuse generally offered for not having first-line planes of outstanding performance. But that is based upon an erroneous belief, that the rapidity of advance in aviation is so fast that we cannot keep up with the production. On the other hand, the advance in automotive engineering has been rapid, but that never prevented Ford or any other manufacturer from consolidating and freezing types and models. That is my point for that argument.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you say that a plane that was made 6 months ago, which was at that time a good plane, up to the last minute, ought to be junked just because a month later somebody invented a new gadget and put it on some other plane?

Major WILLIAMS. By no means, but to use that plane which was developed 6 months ago requires a carefully prepared, progressive program. You never get tomorrow's planes today, and you do not get yesterday's planes today.

Senator CONNALLY. You speak of being a business executive. In what business are you engaged?

Major WILLIAMS. I am in the petroleum business, in connection with aviation.

Senator CONNALLY. In connection with aviation?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir, exclusively.

Senator CONNALLY. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette, have you any questions?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Major Williams, you stated in your opening presentation that—

Far too few have been the voices warning the American people that each one of those so-called obsolete planes was worth its weight in gold, to train the manpower for the air power we need so critically today. Yet they were turned back to their manufacturers for resale to Europe.

In some of the published statements which have come from official quarters there has been constant iteration and reiteration that we are getting a large number of training planes. From the standpoint of the layman, would you kindly expand this idea which you have presented here, and indicate, if it be a fact, to what extent training planes, per se, are adequate for training men for combat service, and whether or not it is a fact that they have to go from the so-called training ships to flying actual combat ships before they are ready for active service in conflict?

Major WILLIAMS. I shall try to answer that question as concisely as possible, sir.

Training planes, in the ordinary acceptance of that word, means primarily training planes or aircraft which teach men to fly, navigate through the air, land and take off, and perform various evolutions in the air. The next and greatly neglected stage in thinking of training planes is the use of obsolescent and obsolete planes to complete the education of the military and naval airman, as in college you need different equipment for each class, freshmen, and so on, through the course.

The secondary stage, or the intermediate stage, let me say, of an airman's training is principally tied up with the use of obsolescent and obsolete equipment which belongs generally to the existing service of that day, and reflects the tactics of that day; and the step from training plane to the high-powered fighting plane of first-line type is a tremendous jump, because those secondary and intermediate stages are merely teaching a man to fly; it is teaching him to fly or do something in a military fashion, and I cannot exemplify that any better than by just stating that you cannot step from the cockpit of a private yacht to the bridge of a Queen Mary or a warship. Intermediate training is required, and that is the particular point wherein every single type of existing military aircraft is worth its weight in gold.

The French failed—and that is one of the reasons why they failed. Senator LA FOLLETTE. You mean that they did not have sufficient so-called obsolete or obsolescent planes of pursuit or bombing character to train the personnel after they had gone through the preliminary stages in training?

Major WILLIAMS. As a matter of fact, they did have a superabundance of obsolescent and obsolete aircraft, but they had not used them. They were busily engaged in shipping them abroad to their interests in Spain, which is practically what I imply has been our fault to date, because, may I add, the training plane, as I said before, is merely to teach a man to fly. The most important thing for a military and naval pilot is to learn how to automatically use the complicated machinery he finds in the cockpit for his use, such as retractable landing gear, such as supercharged engines, the readings of which come to him through instruments, and one must learn to interpret those instruments and to use the throttle for the power to be used at various altitudes, and one must learn to use the adjustable-pitch propeller. The complications are just as great as you will find in a junior's university course over that of the freshman.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Are you familiar with the training course that prospective pilots are put through at Pensacola?

Major WILLIAMS. It would be rash to say that I am at the moment, but I am generally conversant with it, yes.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. For example, can you tell me approximately how long the average student who enters training at Pensacola is trained in a so-called training plane?

Major WILLIAMS. That is generally, and almost universally, limited by the time required to bring him up to a certain standard of handling that type of ship.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Well, he spends a considerable time, first of all, in ground training, does he not?

Major WILLIAMS. Quite true.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Then he goes into a trainer?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Now, then, what is the next step up? A so-called obsolete or obsolescent pursuit or bombing type of plane?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; preferably a type which has recently been taken from the active service.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Then, as I understand it, in order to complete the training, many of these men are assigned as reserve officers to active duty with air squadrons of the fleet for the purpose of getting a further and final training in the latest type of plane which the Navy may have in active duty at that time; is that not correct?

Major WILLIAMS. That is correct, sir.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Now, if I understand you correctly, if you break this step or if you deprive these pilots, or prospective pilots, of an opportunity to train in these so-called obsolete or obsolescent planes, you have deprived the armed services of an opportunity to put these men through a logical training course, have you not?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; and you have deprived the nation of a thoroughly coordinated method of training the manpower for the air power we need, as I said before.

It is not sufficient to build aircraft. People have fumbled around with all these ideas in all the nations in the world. Some have learned the mistake and others are blind to that mistake yet. The emphasis today is on production.

We can see airplanes coming out of the ground in the form of raw materials. We can see those materials heat-treated and otherwise. We can see them machined and going through the factories. We can see those planes leavened. We can see those planes coming out of the door of the factory.

Gentlemen, that is only part of the program. This machine ago does not run itself; and, of all things, an airplane does not run itself.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. From the general knowledge you have of the situation and from the information which is available to a person like yourself, who is in touch with the industry—and I assume you are—can you tell me or would you care to give an opinion to this committee as to what the present state of development and design is so far as the military arms of the United States services are concerned?

Major WILLIAMS. That forces me back to a yardstick which is being demonstrated under natural active war conditions. We must go back to sea level before we leave that. There is not a standard and accepted single-seater fighter in this country which can hold a candle to the British experimental marine Spitfire or to the German Messerschmidt 109.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. How do you account for that, Major?

Major WILLIAMS. The pause in answering is to find a simple way or a quick way to answer your question, and it is very difficult, for the simple reason that those ships to which I referred as the yardstick of the single-seater performance today are the result of long and arduous and carefully regulated programs—engineering, tactical, and so forth.

You cannot walk out of a factory with a brand new type of airplane and just put it into the air. It is the growth and progression from one model to another. That is what produces the automobile at our door today. It did not just happen overnight.

I think we are sadly deficient in engines, for instance. By that I do not mean to imply that the builders and designers and manufacturers of existing engines have anything to be ashamed of. We have a great deal to be proud of in what they have done. But, gentlemen, no wise man commits himself to one type of power plant in this undeveloped age of aviation. We have no streamlined engines.

You asked me why these ships of ours do not compare. I attribute the deficiency in performance, particularly in point of speed, generally to the single type of engine to which we are committed.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. You are referring to the so-called Allison engine?

Major WILLIAMS. I am referring specifically, sir, to the necessity for two or three types of the streamlined, liquid-cooled engine which is exemplified by the Allison today.

As I understand it, the Allison was originally started as a balloon or airship engine. Later on, through the years, it was converted over to its present state and developed a great deal. As a matter of fact, the Allison originally in this particular period was specified to turn out about 1,075 horsepower. That engine is not today turning out 1,075 horsepower. It is limited to an official restriction of 950, and that 950 is seldom used by reason of the unreliable performance.

Now, compare that quickly to a Rolls-Royce, 1,200 to 1,300 horsepower—the accounts vary—and the Daimler-Benz of the Germans, approximately the same horsepower. Those are the engines you find in the English single-seater and the German single-seater which have been waging the war to date.

The new types of those very same engines, stepped up, are now running between fifteen and seventeen hundred horsepower.

The latest development in both of those engines is now represented by what we know as an X engine—that is, two 12-cylinder engines tied together, in such fashion (indicating). The Daimler-Benz and the Rolls-Royce now develop 2,000 horsepower; and we have no such in-line engine capable of developing a straight and continuous 1,000 horsepower.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Now, you state on page 4 of your statement:

I stood at the United States Army Air Corps airdrome at Mitchel Field and watched dozens of active service Air Corps planes depart for Canada.

Do you know to what extent naval squadrons have been stripped of model planes?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir; but I wish I did. Those reports have never been issued to me or to the people. We know not what has been taken.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Now, Major, have you had any occasion to observe the actual performance or production facilities of planes in European countries?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; I have.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. How recently?

Major WILLIAMS. My last trip to Europe was in 1938.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I think that is all. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the Major a question.

On page 4 I find this statement:

Perfunctory permission to make such deliveries and perfunctory approval for the tag "obsolete" from the heads of the Army and the Navy air services was readily acquired from men who are professionally unable to protest.

Just what do you mean by that, Major?

Major WILLIAMS. Specifically, I mean, sir, and it may be a bold statement, but from my knowledge of the military and naval services, I have never known a chief of either service to date who was ready to give up a single airplane. They did; and current opinion among ex-service people and service people is that there was no possibility of any man dependent upon selection for promotion to do more than risk his career by standing stalwart and firm against anyone taking anything away from him. That is as briefly as I can put it, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Then, you mean to say that these men who are officers in the Army and the Navy are not permitted to, or they do not dare to, do anything except that which they are ordered to do? If they take a new plane and they want it to be called obsolete, you mean to say that Army and Navy officers are compelled to certify that such a plane is obsolete?

Major WILLIAMS. Not compelled, sir, by force or pressure, but compelled by fact which is adroitly used, wherein, if I were in that position and I were asked about a certain type of aircraft, "Is this type of aircraft obsolescent?" and it might be in age and design and in improvements, I might have to say "Yes," and if I am not asked any more, to the public I have gone on record as tagging this as an obsolete plane.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. And still it was good enough to be used here for training?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, it was good enough for foreigners to want it, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Is it a fact that the last Chief of the Air Corps was court-martialed for standing up for his views?

Major WILLIAMS. Possibly you are referring to General Billy Mitchell?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. Yes.

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; that is true. I believe it is fair enough to say it was because he stood up for his views, because he neither backed nor took water. He saw the air power which is in existence today. Unfortunately for himself and his own happiness, I believe, and we believe, he was about 15 years ahead of his time; and there is a penalty to be paid for that—the penalty which England is paying in part today and France has paid—deficiency of air power.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I understand he had an independent income, so his livelihood was not dependent on his salary in the Army?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; but may I say something which impressed me and has always impressed me very deeply? His income supplied shoes and clothing and food and shelter, but never supplied that void in his heart from being cut from the Service. I knew what happened after that affected him greatly. He died from some ailment, but there was something else underneath which he tried to hide.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. He paid a price for being an honest man and for having stood for the courage of his convictions?

Major WILLIAMS. I believe so; yes, sir.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.

Major, you have made some statements here that to me have very serious implications, and unless they are fully substantiated I feel that they should not be made or should not have been made. Senator La Follette has inquired with reference to two or three of them, and may I go a step further?

On page 3 you state:

What has been done to date in the weakening of American air power is substantiation of my second objection to this bill.

Then you outline three or four things that have been done. One is the release to Europe of planes tagged as obsolete, and the Senator from Wisconsin just went into that. I do not care to go into that further.

You state as a second situation the release of current war plane models, including even the latest experimental types which had been originally developed for our own Army and Navy air service, and you cite as a specific instance of that charge the crash of the Douglas bomber, in which you say an official representative of the French Air Ministry was traveling under a fictitious name, and it was a type of ship that was on the army secret list, and no American air man had been permitted to view it.

Are you sure of the statements that you have made there?

Major WILLIAMS. As sure as any man can be, sir, of any information where he has not particularly seen each item and been present at every transaction.

The records are absolute concerning the fact that, first, the ship had not been open to the view of any American air man. Even army and navy people, without special authorization, were not permitted to see that ship. I was not. Cable himself told me that if I came out there I could not see it, that even he could not see it. We were not permitted to see it.

Senator GILLETTE. You say "we were not." Whom do you mean by "we"?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, just all the people interested in air power and air defense, such as myself or ordinary service people.

Senator GILLETTE. You were not in the Service at that particular time of the crash of this Douglas bomber?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, may I go to a third statement on page 4, which gives me even more concern. You state:

No. 3 was the stripping of first-line planes out of the active army and navy squadrons and delivering them fully equipped, even with machine guns, for delivery by flight, directly to a belligerent country. I stood at the United States Army Air Corps airdrome at Mitchel Field and watched dozens of active service air corps planes depart for Canada.

You stand by that statement, do you?

Major WILLIAMS. I do, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. You saw these planes that belonged to our Air Service at that time, the property of the United States Government, sent to Canada?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; I did. Those planes were flown by army pilots to Mitchel Field. The army pilots returned to their various stations. They were then manned by volunteer private pilots, who were guaranteed a certain sum of money. I forget what it was. They dickered and they had some collective bargaining among themselves with the people concerned for a certain price. Some of them—the private pilots—had never been in a military plane before.

Senator GILLETTE. Where is Mitchel Field?

Major WILLIAMS. It is at Long Island, near Mineola.

Senator GILLETTE. And these planes were turned over at Mitchel Field to a foreign government or agents of a foreign government?

Major WILLIAMS. I presume that the turn-over of title must have been there, for the simple reason that it was there that someone offered to pay American private pilots to fly these military planes to Canada. It could not have been the military people at Mitchel Field who made that deal.

Senator GILLETTE. When did you see these things? When did this occur?

Major WILLIAMS. Now I am at a loss, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Approximately when? Of course, I do not expect you to fix the date exactly.

Major WILLIAMS. You see, that general incident, sir, of turning over the navy dive bombers and ground strafing planes I cannot give the exact date of without contradiction.

Senator GILLETTE. Was it 1940?

Major WILLIAMS. It was sometime in 1939, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Sometime in 1939?

Major WILLIAMS. I think the end of 1939.

Senator GILLETTE. The end of 1939, to the best of your memory, and you say that you saw dozens of these government planes started for Canada at that time?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir. I did not count them, but I believe there must have been. There were more than two dozens.

Senator GILLETTE. More than two dozens?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Then you stated that at the same time that the then current type of navy dive bomber was also stripped from the naval squadrons and flown to Canada?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. I believe you stated, in reply to a question from Senator La Follette, that you did not know how many of these were stripped from the Navy?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir; I did not.

Senator GILLETTE. On what information or on what knowledge do you base that statement?

Major WILLIAMS. Current information. There is one thing that air men do, sir, and that is talk to one another. It is a peculiar kind of religion that we discuss with one another, that we would not think of talking about with other people, even among foreigners.

Senator GILLETTE. I am not finding fault with you. If these things happened nobody would resent it any more than I. I am trying to find out if they did happen.

Major WILLIAMS. I am trying to tell you that, to my knowledge, they did happen, and I am convinced that they happened, and I say so.

Senator GILLETTE. You are convinced that dive bombers were taken from our Government-owned airplanes and transferred to Canada at about the time of the transfer of these army planes?

Major WILLIAMS. Sir, in addition to the current talk of the details concerning such transfers, the newspapers were full of these pictures of navy dive bombers being dragged over the international line in some instances, and the news services continually discussed them.

At the time the P-36 was delivered to France it was superior to anything else we had in quantity in the Army air service.

Senator GILLETTE. If the things which you have stated here occurred, they did not constitute a surrender of priorities in machines that we had on order, in which we allowed delivery to be made by the manufacturer to a foreign government and postponed the filling of our own orders? This, you say, was the actual delivery of planes in possession of the United States Government to a belligerent power?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. On page 4 of your statement, using the language to which Senator Gillette has referred, you use this language:

Perfunctory permission to make such deliveries and perfunctory approval for the tag "obsolete" from the heads of the Army and the Navy air services was readily acquired from men who are professionally unable to protest.

Do you mean by that language to imply that men in the air service, both the Army and the Navy, who were willing to give up their lives in the service of their country, are so cowardly in the face of a superior officer that they would not tell the truth about the condition of airplanes?

Major WILLIAMS. By no means, sir. I lived with those men for years. I know their caliber. They are much more ready to die than people outside the Service.

Senator BARKLEY. I grant that, and that is why I do not understand why you say they are not honest or courageous enough to tell the truth to a superior officer and simply perfunctorily tag a plane as obsolete when they know it is not.

Major WILLIAMS. May I go back over my answer to one of the previous Senators? I mean to imply nothing, sir. I think the best use of the English language is in direct statements, and I have tried to do that and use it in that way.

"Perfunctory," according to my intention, meant just this, that the character and the adroit cross-examination of a witness can bring out certain impressions which will justify certain conclusions if you carry that adroit questioning only so far and accept the implication.

For instance, if any man were asked—if I were asked right now—"Was such and such type of ship obsolete or obsolescent?" I would say "Yes," if I knew it to be so.

Hence, as an officer in the Service, or as a citizen, I would be telling the truth.

I might be aching to say, "Yes, but we need it so badly for this or that reason," but if I were not asked the follow-up questions, I would depart from the witness stand.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you know whether any superior officer in the Army or Navy air service has asked any inferior officer as to the obsolescence of a plane, merely asking him the perfunctory question, "Is it obsolete or obsolescent?" and he said, "Yes," and no further questions were asked?

Major WILLIAMS. Not in the Service, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. You do not know to what extent superior officers, who, by the language here, you seem to imply have some sort of moral influence by the mere fact of superiority over those below them, create a lack of frankness on the part of inferior officers in answering questions of the superior officers about the conditions of any plane?

Major WILLIAMS. Sir, I am particularly anxious to clear up any misconception you have derived from what I have said. When I use the word "perfunctory" or mention this adroit examination, I am not speaking of the inter-service examinations here, because the chief of the air service knows just as much about the types of airplanes that are obsolete and current as the man he has asked, but I am talking about finding a public excuse for saying that such a type is obsolete and getting that answer from the head of the military or naval service, and then telling the people, in anybody's own particular fashion, that the plane is obsolete.

That creates the impression in the public mind that there is no use in keeping second-hand junk around.

Senator BARKLEY. In other words, you mean that outside the Service the heads of the Service may be asked certain questions about the condition of a plane, and, if they give an answer, that would be an excuse for disposing of it?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir. I am doing my best to be specific. The public does not critically examine the head of a service.

Senator BARKLEY. No. Somebody may. Whom do you mean?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, I mean specifically those, say, in the Government.

Senator BARKLEY. You mean the President of the United States might ask the Chief of the Air Corps about whether a certain plane was obsolete or obsolescent and that the Chief of the Air Corps would tell the President that it was obsolete or obsolescent, having in mind that the President wanted an excuse to dispose of it? Is that what you mean?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir. I will not say that that is what I mean, but that is what could be very readily done.

Senator BARKLEY. Was it your purpose, in the use of that language, to create the impression that that is what you had in mind?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. When an officer was professionally unable to protest?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. Unable to protest to whom?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, I cannot follow, sir, all the devious methods which do not make sense to air men in this country for disposing of ships that we need, and at no time have I heard a protest.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you know of any officer in the United States Air Corps, either Army or Navy, who has been afraid to protest to anybody above him in regard to the disposition of any airplane?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir. I think that would be known elsewhere.

Senator BARKLEY. You do not know a thing about it yourself?

Major WILLIAMS. Not about that.

Senator BARKLEY. But you have been willing to state here in your formal statement and leave the implication that there are such officers in the Army and Navy Air Corps who would be afraid to protest to somebody above them and that their answers would be perfunctorily "Yes" in given cases.

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir; I do not mean to leave that impression or create that implication.

Senator BARKLEY. I am simply trying to find out what you meant by that statement, Major. I am not trying to trick you into any answers, but you made this statement voluntarily. I am trying to find out what is meant, sir, and what you base it on.

Major WILLIAMS. I had better try to explain it again. In spite of the fact that there is usable equipment and vitally important equipment going out of the country, being taken out of our services, I know of no protest which reached sizeable proportions against such transfer.

Senator BARKLEY. You just do not know of any. You do not know whether any were made or not. You did not hear of any?

Major WILLIAMS. There were not any.

Senator BARKLEY. What is that?

Major WILLIAMS. There were not any protests of sizable proportions made. They did not reach the public.

Senator BARKLEY. You do not know that they were made in the Service within the Government?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, again, my familiarity with Service life leads me to believe they were made but did not go any further.

Senator BARKLEY. Can you identify the month of 1939 when you saw these planes leaving Mitchell Field?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir. I said I would be unwilling to say so.

Senator BARKLEY. Was it before the war started in Europe?

Major WILLIAMS. Oh, no, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. After?

Major WILLIAMS. Indeed, yes.

Senator BARKLEY. It was sometime between September 1st and Christmas?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. Major Williams, you held a world speed record for as long as seven or eight years, I believe, did you not?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. What was the nature of the plane that you flew in establishing that record?

Major WILLIAMS. That was a racing plane, sir, built by the United States Navy in furthering the research on high-speed flight, with the ultimate intention of converting such data and information into faster fighting planes.

Senator NYE. Who designed the plane?

Major WILLIAMS. The Curtiss Company.

Senator NYE. Did you contribute very largely to that designing?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir; not to the designing, but we in this instance—I say “we;” I mean the pilots—were invited, for practically the first time, to sit in on the discussions and conferences of the designers in order that those cockpits might be made to accommodate us.

Senator NYE. This accomplishment, Major, was responsible, was it not, for the conferring of the Distinguished Flying Cross?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir. As I remember that citation, it was for other work. I forget the wording, but it was for a variety of other applications. Let me see how that was. It was for the development of aerial maneuvers conducive to progress in aerial fighting, and that is about all I remember. It was contributory, I suppose.

Senator NYE. Was this award given to you while you were in the Navy?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. And these activities of which you speak occurred while you were in the Navy, did they not?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. What was your rank in the Navy?

Major WILLIAMS. When I resigned, sir, it was lieutenant, senior grade.

Senator NYE. When you resigned?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. Are you an Annapolis man, Major?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir.

Senator NYE. Had you had any aviation experience before coming into the Navy during the war?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir.

Senator NYE. What was your work, generally speaking, while you were in the Navy?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, following the Navy custom, sir, it was routine flight operations, but specifically it was concentration upon high-speed research for fighting planes and the application of that high-speed research to tactical maneuvers. Test work was a great portion of it for a period of time.

Senator NYE. You have testified, Major, to active participation in aviation since leaving the Navy. In that connection you have done what you referred to as newspaper work. Your newspaper work, I believe has consisted of the writing of a column?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. For American newspapers?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. Has this column been devoted to any particular activity or has it been a general work?

Major WILLIAMS. Originally, sir, it was inaugurated for the education of the youngsters in aviation matters, and in these initial steps we organized a group of youngsters throughout the country, known as the Junior Aviators. We built this organization until it reached approximately three hundred forty to three hundred fifty thousand youngsters who were actively engaged in model competition and model building.

Each city where this program had been set up took names for their squadron, and each year these youngsters would come to Akron or some other central point and enter into a general competition.

But rapidly the educational program drifted into the field of trying to teach the public something about the safety and facility of airline transportation; and, of course, since this critical situation abroad developed and since my visits abroad, the column, I believe, has turned mostly to the discussion of military aviation and air power.

Senator NYE. Thank you, Major.

In the role of writer you have had, of course, to continue a great deal of research work and reading?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; considerable.

Senator NYE. You have stayed very close to the aviation cause, have you not?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, that is all I am happy doing.

Senator NYE. You wrote a book of your own on the subject, did you not, Major?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. What was its title?

Major WILLIAMS. Very typically called "Air Power."

Senator NYE. What sort of reception did this writing enjoy from officials or those conversant with aviation work? Was it highly received?

Major WILLIAMS. It was critically received, sir. How highly, I do not know, but it did receive some little attention because it introduced some radical thoughts, just the same as might have happened in the days of Genghis Khan when he put all his army on horseback and gave each soldier four horses, which sort of upset the Alexander phalanx and the Roman conception of the marching legend. I imagine there must have been vigorous protest in those days.

Senator NYE. Your book dealt chiefly with military aviation, did it not?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. What has been your experience and familiarity with aviation abroad?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, I have been particularly interested, for the last twelve or fourteen years, not only in what has been going on in this country but what has been developing in Europe, because my first contact with the foreign phase of aviation was developed through this high-speed research, where we in this country read and studied every development of Europe.

Finally, we came to the point where we were holding speed records over here, which, far from headlines or publicity, interested us in a minimum sense; but we constantly and continually saw these performances in the air transferred some day into modified racers equipped with guns. That was our business.

That was my first interest, and that interest has quickened and livened as I saw the British, for instance, go into the development of high-speed planes for the Schneider Cup races.

I never will forget, while we were trying to interest our Government to continue high-speed research in this country—and it was considered a stunt in those days—reading and clipping out the statement of the then existing Air Minister of England as he sought the appropriations from Parliament, telling Parliament in words approximately such as these, "If you will give me these appropriations, I will develop for you the fastest fighting engines and planes in the world"; and that, if you please, sir, that background of racing—what is commonly known as the

racing activities of the Schneider Cup, what we term high-speed research—is the background for the present supermarine Spitfire and the Rolls-Royce engine.

Senator NYE. How extensively did you tour Europe in these activities?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, my first inspection or investigation of a European aviation tour was in 1930. The next was in 1931.

In those two trips I had an excellent opportunity of going through British, French, Italian, German, and Polish aviation.

Senator NYE. Do you mean simply inspecting the planes or did you go through their plants that were manufacturing planes as well?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, it is difficult to answer that, sir, and there is no censoring the eyes of an airman.

Senator NYE. There is no what?

Major WILLIAMS. No censoring the eyes of an airman and no end to his curiosity; and I did not intend to create a wrong impression when I said it must be some sort of religion with us, because there is no money in it, and I am not interested in that, but I do say that airmen will talk to one another and tell things that they know would be guarded, that they would never mention to anyone else.

If there was a new type of gasoline pump in the middle of Africa and I had the money to get there, I am sure that I would go there quickly, and I would be followed by as many more as had the money to get there.

That brought me into intimate contact with the progressive spirits in each one of these air forces of Europe.

Senator NYE. On these trips to Europe did you go independently? Were you on your own, so to speak?

Major WILLIAMS. I do not mean to be irreverent, sir, in my answer, but I still believe that is the only way to get anything done.

Senator NYE. That was the way you went?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; that is, in the early trips in 1936 I made a definite and very intensive effort to find out what was going on in Europe, because the reports, technical and otherwise, coming out of Europe led us to believe then we were nearing this air-power age, approaching it at a far faster rate than people suspected.

May I tell you in a moment what a trip means to a man who knows no end to his curiosity in this line? It meant leaving a hotel at 6 o'clock in the morning, journeying to factories, to airports, visiting squadrons, going wherever you can be taken, and returning home at night to spend the rest of the hours—until you fall asleep—writing the data acquired during the day.

Senator NYE. On one of these trips you had a rather extended conference or conversation with Lord Beaverbrook, did you not?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; I did. That was in the 1938 trip.

Senator NYE. Was Lord Beaverbrook then in any official capacity with respect to British aviation?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir. I had met Lord Beaverbrook in Miami through some mutual friends, and after listening to him talk about aviation in general all evening and being somewhat acquainted with his Lordship, I had maintained my silence, but after going too far in our discussion on other matters, we had two or three definitely challenging remarks and we parted that evening and I thought that would be the last I would see of him. I told him that I thought the

smartest thing the British had done in the last 100 years was passing the Act of Westminster, giving the Dominions dominion status before they took it. That was the end of that evening.

About a year later I was amazed to receive an invitation from Lord Beaverbrook to bring my plane, which is a single-seater fighter type such as used in the Navy, 1,000 horsepower—it is probably good for about 280—to Europe.

Senator NYE. Is that the type of plane that we were dispossessing ourselves of at one stage?

Major WILLIAMS. If I am not mistaken, sir, that is what the Greeks refused.

Senator NYE. Thank you.

Major WILLIAMS. Two hundred and eighty today, sir, is not in the big league.

I packed my ship in a crate and went over on the Queen Mary, and that was my first contact with Lord Beaverbrook in his own bailiwick.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye, I do not want to suggest that we hurry along with the testimony, but I do suggest that there are several witnesses here, and it will be my purpose this afternoon to go constantly through the session, even if I have to go into the night, to finish hearing these witnesses.

Senator NYE. Mr. Chairman, I know of no witness whom we have had before this committee, or any who are yet to appear, who is possessed of the information that this committee ought to have, particularly as it refers to aviation, as Major Williams. I have been questioning him now for 13 minutes. I certainly had no intention of prolonging his testimony, but there is very definite information that I want to gain from him and that I hope to gain.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that you might go directly at it. I make the suggestion, in all kindliness, that I do not see how a long-drawn-out conference with Lord Beaverbrook when he was in no official position would have any direct bearing, but maybe something was said or done that has. I think you have the right to ask the direct question. It would shorten the examination very much.

Senator NYE. Well, I shall be very happy to make my questions as direct as I possibly can, and I know the witness will be as direct as he knows how to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I am not going to make any further suggestion about it, but the testimony can be very much shortened, I think, if we give just a little thought to it.

Senator NYE. Had you finished your response, Major, to my last question?

Major WILLIAMS. Your question was, I believe—

Senator NYE. I want to know what developed in your conferences abroad with Lord Beaverbrook.

Major WILLIAMS. He was the reason for my going abroad in 1938. I took my own ship. I had been through British aviation in its entirety in 1936. What I saw in a few visits in 1938 convinced me that they had nothing new to invite my tour except some new factories, doing the same thing and building the same general type of aircraft and engines and equipment.

From there I flew through the Continent and used that ship as my means of transportation. At that time I found, very quickly and

rapidly, with full confirmation from British authorities and others, that I do not like to disclose, that the French were in still worse position in 1938 than they were in 1936, and I could not waste time there.

I went to Italy, and I found, as far as research was concerned and the building of equipment and the general appearance of air power, that they had made great strides over 1936.

It was in Germany that I found the most striking progress made over the foundations I had seen appearing in 1936. I saw the German main research department outside Berlin, for instance, which in 1936 had been possessed of about 5,000 research experts had had the number boosted to about 7,500 people. This was particularly striking because in our own country the N. A. C. A. during that year had approximately 210 people devoted to research.

Naturally, I was interested for the simple reason that it is through research that you find out what you want to build in commerce, anyway, and without that there is no use building.

Without detailing that, I went through practically all the important German aircraft factories. I saw their engines and their planes. I saw each and every one of the types of planes that is being used in this present war. I became familiar with their performance. I had the unusual opportunity of flying a Messerschmidt 109, the muchly discussed single-seater fighter being used against the British Spitfire. No one else had ever flown that ship from the day that it came out of the factory. I won't go into discussing why, but we just don't do those things, if we can possibly keep them to ourselves; but Mr. Udet, who had become a major general and who had been to this country during previous years and who was known to me very intimately through those visits, asked me for permission to fly my ship.

Well, I hesitated, but I was a guest in the country, and they had shown me much of their aviation, and there was nothing to do but agree. The Yankee instinct in me made me say that if I would "I would like to fly one of yours."

He said, "Well, suppose I permit you to fly a Messerschmidt 109 or the Heinkel single-seater fighter?"

That was far beyond my dreams. I did fly the Messerschmidt 109, with the big engine. That is the engine used in current operations in the European war. I found the ship to be an excellent airplane, and I came home and reported it to be a superb fighting ship, the best I had ever seen. I reported it was capable of speeds ranging between 350 and 360 miles an hour.

Senator NYE. To whom did you report this, Major?

Major WILLIAMS. To the country, in special articles.

Senator NYE. Did you make any special report to the aviation authorities of our country?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir.

Senator NYE. You were not under any requirements to do so, were you?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir; I was not, and the reason I did not do it is that I believe at that time radical, direct methods were necessary to get this information before the public, and had I supplied a technical report to any military authority it would have been tagged as confidential and I would have been precluded from reporting to the people.

Senator NYE. Major, did you make to the American public what amounted to recommendations in the light of what you saw abroad?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir. And perhaps I have bored them from time to time with doing just that.

Senator NYE. Did you not contribute largely to the increased public interest in this all-important aspect?

Major WILLIAMS. That is the significant thing about air power. In itself it is one thing; but it is a direct reflection of public psychology, either through desperation or otherwise to change and alter its entire method of thinking of warfare.

After going through those factories in Germany, for instance, I came away possessed with a very definite opinion, which has since been corroborated time and time again, and I told the people in flat and no uncertain terms, that the Germans at that time, which was approximately forty-some-odd days before Munich, were building approximately 600 finished war planes per month, using one eight-hour shift per day and utilizing but one out of every four machines in every factory. Time prevented telling the details of all the other things that I found. But I came home tremendously alarmed.

But before coming home I went to England. It was then that I was interrogated by the people—none of the officials of the Government, it is true. Most of them were service people. As I say, I stayed away from Embassies. I had work to do; I had no parties to go to, and I had no time to go to parties.

One of Lord Beaverbrook's assistants came to me and asked my opinion on the German air force. I said:

It is a terrific thing. You English will have to do something radical.

He said:

In that case, I think you'd better see Lord Beaverbrook.

Each time the British ask a question they assume that they are going to get the right kind of an answer, which is generally to their credit. If you don't give that answer you are in for an argument, if you care to argue. But I was anxious to just tell them what I had seen. I had been very careful not to disclose international secrets around the countries that had been given to me in an atmosphere of semi-confidence. But there was nothing in the world to prevent my telling them when they asked. When they asked, "How does our air force compare with that of Germany," I said, "It does not compare." When Lord Beaverbrook first asked me that question I told him that it did not compare.

In plain blunt English, he stamped around. I didn't mind that, and when he impugned my pro-Nazi leanings when I was talking numbers and refused to give the answers apparently desired, I tolerated that for quite a long time. Finally, during this long-drawn weekend conference or contact—I listened ad infinitum to Lord Beaverbrook—he said—and he is the man today charged with the aircraft production of England—"The bomber is a much over-advertised method. It is a product of the unknown and of imagination."

Senator NYE. This is the Messerschmidt?

Major WILLIAMS. No; the bomber. And he said, "We will blow it out of the air with our anti-aircraft guns," and he said "We will do thus and so."

There was nothing to be gained in arguing on that. But finally when provoked beyond measure, I did make the statement to Lord Beaverbrook—

You may not believe me and apparently you do not. But if you combat that German air force as it exists today with what you have today you may get the licking of your life; and that licking may cost you your Empire.

I had no idea that the war was imminent.

Senator NYE. And this was in 1938?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes.

Senator NYE. You found then rather a large complacency on the part of the British. They did not seem to be particularly fearful of their ability to defend themselves against the instruments which were being reported?

Major WILLIAMS. On the contrary, sir, the Government and the people would loathe interest in providing adequate national defense, but with the distinction that the Air Service people should not have that full, complete autonomy which would have permitted them to accomplish their destiny.

On the other hand, the Government was producing under the slogan "A warship a week" or "A warship a day." The people in the street impressed me tremendously by demanding news of this air power war that they thought was coming. I have never forgotten the significance of the public instinct, their knowing that this war was coming against them instead of against the armed forces of the nation; and their tremendous and vital interest was in air power.

Senator NYE. Upon your return home from those trips, Major, did you make certain recommendations that you hoped might be pursued by our country and by our Government?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir—in public print.

Senator NYE. In brief, Major, what were they?

Major WILLIAMS. In brief, that we take the example of what was already in existence and that we consolidate the Air Department in America under a suitable, autonomous organization, based simply on the old-fashioned conception that you will never get a job accomplished in a new, pioneering movement until you gather men who eat, think, sleep, and drink it, and give them power enough to go ahead and accomplish its destiny.

Senator NYE. What was it, Major, that caused you to feel so strongly that one plane in particular, the Messerschmidt, was a superior plane?

Major WILLIAMS. Well, the best evidence in the world, and that is that I obtained the information in the cockpit. And we do go for that whenever we can.

Senator NYE. Flying the ship itself?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes.

Senator NYE. And you had flown many others?

Major WILLIAMS. Approximately one-hundred-and-twenty-odd different ships of military types.

Senator NYE. In commenting on the bill, H. R. 1776, you say that it would strip our service of current planes and divert new ones on the production line. I am not asking you this question because it represents my views, Major, but it is a question that is being put frequently, and that is: Isn't it good business to get rid of the old

planes and await new ones, tested under actual war conditions, to replenish our war service?

I wish you would explain something further about old ships being so important to us. Is there anything beyond what you have already testified to concerning their availability that you could say or that you would like to say upon that score?

Major WILLIAMS. Again I suggest that in order to determine useful results of aeronautical research that we should consult the automotive industry, because they have not been changing types every month. They have consolidated on types and they have been working on models. It is very difficult, Senator, to answer briefly the question that you asked me but any military plane in the United States is valuable for use, whether it is equivalent to foreign performance or merely possesses the equipment and something like the performance reflecting tactics in our services today.

Senator NYE. Then you count the utility of these planes in our own hands as giving us a far greater advantage than the experimenting which our ships are undergoing in the European war?

Major WILLIAMS. I consider that as a side issue—the experimenting in European war. You have to have airplanes, engines, and guns in order to go to war. National defense is concerned with going to war.

Senator NYE. In brief, Major, what do you consider the proper procedure for establishing and maintaining an adequate air force?

Major WILLIAMS. That introduces a very radical conception shared by myself and a great many others. I am afraid to go into it. I simply state that I believe this arm of national defense which is of such vital importance in the war today, should be in a separate department and given separate autonomy.

Senator NYE. In your opinion, Major, where have we fallen short in our preparation for air defense?

Major WILLIAMS. In the first place, the best way to be deficient at anything is to keep on giving it away or disposing of our equipment.

Senator NYE. We should hang on to what we have.

Major WILLIAMS. That is right.

Senator NYE. In your statement, Major, you have spoken of the possibility of a dictatorship being benevolent or otherwise. Just what was your meaning there, Major?

Major WILLIAMS. The concentration of too much power in the hands of any one man is a dangerous thing. History indicates that, as I say. What a benevolent dictatorship is I do not know. We know too much about those that are not benevolent. Since you have pinned me down, and since I do not expect to be pinned down for a definition of "benevolent dictatorship," Senator, I am quite at a loss to explain it except to say some sort of a new Lincoln, or something like that.

Senator NYE. You heard Colonel Lindbergh's testimony yesterday?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. What is your own thought with respect to the ability of England to win this war?

Major WILLIAMS. I don't think, sir, that she can win this war.

Senator NYE. Does that mean that you do not think that she can successfully resist the conquest of the Isles that is undertaken?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir. To my way of thinking there is a tremendous distinction between those two questions. The defense of

your home is one thing. I don't know what will happen there. My thoughts are purely suppositions as to what she will be able to do if the invasion develops. But to win this war and to accomplish the aim expressed to date by the British Government, the crushing of Hitlerism, that cannot be physically or materially accomplished without invading the Continent. And that I believe to be physically impossible.

It has long been demonstrated that one must possess a tremendous superiority in mechanization of all types and to invade must outnumber the defense at least three to one. A predominating air power would dominate that situation.

Senator NYE. What is your opinion as to the ability of Germany to produce planes? How many can she produce, to your knowledge?

Major WILLIAMS. As early as 1938, as I said a little while ago, the Germans were building 600 finished airplanes a month on a flat eight-hour shift per day and using one out of every four factory production machines—lathes, presses, and so on. Naturally I questioned how that production might be stepped up. I was told—and the reason and the explanation seemed logical—that there would be no difficulty whatsoever in changing to a three-shift 24-hour working day, with an additional inclination in the army for using the additional machinery already installed.

We generally estimated—and the opinion was accepted on all sides, by the Army and the Navy in this country as well—that that production could readily be stepped up to at least 1,800 planes a month, and an indefinite increment due to other factors involved.

It is my present belief, and it has been for some time, that the Germans are actually running between 3,000 and 3,500 planes a month. Those figures are ultraconservative, I hold. They may be running as high as 4,500 to 5,000 planes a month.

Senator NYE. At the moment what do you feel to be our own ability to produce planes here in the United States?

Major WILLIAMS. If we could make up our minds, sir, as to the purpose of building these planes, there is no question but that we could boost our production beyond any figures known today. The last figures that I heard were somewhere around 950 airplanes. It is time to tell the public that these 950 airplanes are not combat ships. It is time to tell the public. The people are seeking figures today. Our production capacity is unlimited in this country. But it is not unlimited in any form until we make up our minds what we are going to do with the product. And the product takes appropriate form.

Senator NYE. Finally, Major, you have testified to a belief that the men in the Air Service of the United States Government are not at liberty to say publicly what they do say privately among themselves and to others who contact them with respect to the problem.

Major WILLIAMS. That seems to be getting me into trouble, sir. I don't think the public explanation of internal opinions ever take place, even in Congress.

Senator NYE. You do know that there is a hesitancy on the part of those attached to the Service in speaking openly their minds, do you not?

Major WILLIAMS. From my long experience in the Service I know that that has been the case. I know at times I dared not express my opinion.

Senator NYE. In confirmation of your own thought, there are members of this Committee who were on the Senate Military Affairs Committee at the time of this bomber crash of which you speak, and after some delay it was revealed that Americans were not permitted to see this secret bomber plane but it was being demonstrated for the benefit of this secret French Buying Commission. I can say as one member of that committee at that time that when it developed that these resources were being made available to a foreign country some of us were besieged by high ranking officers in the United States Army and Navy and were being urged to protest with all the might we had against what was being done, demonstrating the concern that they had at that time. I speak of this only in confirmation of the thought that you have expressed.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Major Williams, Senator Gillette inquired of you about this incident to which Senator Nye just referred. Are you familiar with the fact—because it was afterwards made a matter of public record—that this Frenchman was on this plane over the original protest of General Craig, the Chief of Staff at that time, and the Secretary of War, who had been overruled in that matter by the Treasury Department?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir; I didn't know that.

Senator CLARK. I can say that it was testified that no American officer, even on the active list, and no matter of how high a rank, would be permitted to see that plane without written permission from the Chief of the Air Corps and the Secretary of War, and that when this Frenchman appeared at the factory along with a naval officer who had been sent out there by Secretary Morgenthau, Acting Secretary of War Craig refused to permit him on the plane but was afterwards overruled by higher authority.

Now, Major, you have mentioned the matter of training as being one of the great necessities of preparation. How long does it take to train a crew of one of these big four-engine bombers?

Major WILLIAMS. You see I struggle to be concise. The subject is wide.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It takes several years anyway, doesn't it?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir. The ordinary course for teaching a man to fly in military training in simply a single-seater type of war plane, is approximately 6 months. That is a hurry-up course. That is an overnight correspondence course in military training.

But, sir, when you have four engines and you have seventy or eighty thousand pounds of equipment that is still attracted by gravity and it is only your handling of controls that prevents a too quick settlement between gravity and wings, it is equivalent to taking a battleship through a crowded harbor. And you couldn't step from the putt class, using the slang for it, that is, a little 60- or 70-horsepower plane, and compare it with one of these cockpits with a maze of instruments before you. There is nothing mysterious about it, but it requires experience. You cannot do many things, and one is that you cannot acquire experience overnight.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Can you acquire experience in any other way than by flying?

Major WILLIAMS. No, sir; no more than you can acquire experience in golf or any other activity.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You cannot train crews for these big bombers except by having them fly the big bombers?

Major WILLIAMS. That is the way the Captains of the Queen Marys come up.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If we transfer to some foreign power a very substantial part of the big bombers that we might have or might have had in our possession, by an absolutely corresponding ratio we diminish our possibility for training crews for bombers in the future?

Major WILLIAMS. I am sorry it is difficult to express my feelings about that particular transaction. That is the type of airplane that we need the most critically, that is, the four-engine bomber. That is the type of airplane with which we can progress furthest to sea against any naval invasion or anything on the surface. And every one of those things, even if you made them of platinum, would not indicate the cost of American defense.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Here is what I was trying to get at, Major. Even assuming that we could step up our production of these bombers so that a year from now or at some future time we might have a large number of them delivered to us instead of to somebody else, still we would not be prepared to use those planes unless we had had the planes in the meantime in order to prepare the crews to fly them?

Major WILLIAMS. Senator, moving quickly, may I call to your attention that 12 or 13 Army pilots competent to fly single-seater and twin-engine jobs on the operations, which was not contact flying, were killed when they were given the specialized job of flying big ships in nonclear weather. The four-engine bombers are of no value in the face of antiaircraft equipment or single-seater fighters.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In advocating that the United States should take possession of its own output or production of war material until we are completely armed, apparently you discount the idea that has been advocated here on numerous occasions, Major, that we are buying time, and apparently you discount Great Britain's existence as being an effective method of keeping the war from our shores. What would you say if the British fleet would fall into the hands of the Germans? Then what would be your answer to that proposition?

Major WILLIAMS. The performance of an airplane and the number of airplanes required on defense, particularly at great distances from enemy air bases, can afford to be much lower than would be required if close to an enemy air base. I was highly amazed when I read that Mr. Stimson had said that America can't buy time, because that is exactly what they hung Mr. Chamberlain for.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Now, we are supposed to be buying time. As a matter of fact, about 2 years ago Congress authorized the construction of 6,000 airplanes, which we were assured by the responsible heads of the War Department and by the Chief of Aviation, was a completely adequate force; and in a separate bill we authorized, I think, some 2,500 additional planes for the Navy. That was 2 years ago. During this period in which we have been buying time can you tell me as an aviation expert, Major, how much better off we are in the preparation in aviation than we were when we authorized this enormous program?

Major WILLIAMS. We are not better off. That is an outstanding example in our service of our most vital and important programs ever

instituted in America for the development of American air power. As I said so many times, the production of airplanes over here and some sort of training over here does not make for air power. Those two operations, to say nothing of research are the timing gears of aviation. It was my belief—and carefully we arrived at that belief—that the purpose of that program, which I think was 5,500 airplanes—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It was 5,500 airplanes, but afterward it was raised to 6,000. And the testimony of the Chief of Air Service was that 5,500 would be completely adequate, but Congress raised it to 6,000.

Major WILLIAMS. The importance of that was to find out if America could gear our timing gears so that the engine of air power would fire, to see if we could turn out 6,000 airplanes and to prepare the required number of trained pilots to operate them. When we saw that program cancelled by diversion of airplanes and the interruption of that program we knew we were done. When I say "we" I mean the airmen.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Some of these planes that we have been carrying in these various figures that have been given up here you can't even give away. Isn't that right?

Major WILLIAMS. I don't like to join in that view. I am too honest about it. I understand the Greeks did refuse some of those planes. They are not ready for combat. To accept them and fly them means that some of your men must die.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And they have been carried as a part of our air defenses?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Now, Major, apparently you have discounted as being completely fantastic the idea of invasion of the United States by air. Isn't it a fact that we constantly read about planes capable of extremely long flights, and we know about the passenger flights going across the Atlantic constantly? Couldn't bombers come from European bases in the same way?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; they could come. But it is a question of whether they could get back again. Of course, if I just go along with you that far I am sitting in with the War College books.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I want you to answer completely and fully, Major. That is what I want you to do.

Major WILLIAMS. In answer to your question, you don't need to come back any more. Nobody ever told me about the absolute necessity that you must come back. You are generally sent to do a job. At least we were in the Marine Corps. We can be raided but we cannot be invaded. There might be a desperate move.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You mean that a suicidal expedition might come over here and cause some damage by dropping bombs but would not be able to get back, and it would not have any military effect on the United States?

Major WILLIAMS. No primary effect, no more than a lone cruiser might run up and bomb some of the coast and keep on moving.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In addition to that, Major, in regard to a naval attack you say the lessons of the present war prove that a landing force in the case of air power is impossible? What are those lessons to which you refer and where have they occurred?

Major WILLIAMS. Briefly, sir—and, again, it is difficult to sketch it quickly—eventually some sort of a show-down could be staged between sea power and air power. The first important show-down between sea power and air power was in the Skagerack when the German lines of communication from Denmark to Norway during that invasion were wide open sea lines. The most notable example, to my way of thinking, is that of Nelson in the Mediterranean, who completely squelched Napoleon's dream of conquest in Egypt by breaking the French Fleet at Alexandria. When he broke the French Fleet the sea lanes of the French were destroyed. And it makes little difference whether the ships are sunk or are put out of condition for the duration of the war. It was done in the Skagerack and at Trondheim, where the British Navy wanted to go in courageously, but rather stupidly, I think, but were restrained by the Army and Air Force advisers on the General Council of Defense. When they turned away from Trondheim instead of cutting the lines of communication over the open sea, but using hit and run units, they gave us an indication that some of her forces were going to pass. There is much evidence available to leave us to believe, and the best authorities will tell you, that there is no British sea power, great units such as cruisers and destroyers, in the North Sea today. The best evidence of that is that following the Skagerack the British moved back from the Norwegian coast to the Faroe Islands. That was a complete back-up.

Now, take the case of shore-based aircraft versus sea power. And, mind you, there is a most definite place for sea power in this modern picture. But no one yet has found its role. It is not in the form of the existing sea power. Take the case of the British attacking and sinking Italian battleships at Taranto.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The thing actually has happened in this war that General Mitchell was court-martialed and "busted" for, that is, for predicting that it would happen?

Major WILLIAMS. Quite so. And much more so, I think, than he believed at the time. And I don't see any difference between defending the American coast line with shore-based aircraft. Any of these bombers will carry about a 2,000 or a 1,000 pound bomb.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. With regard to your statement as to the transfer overseas of large expeditionary forces, we managed in the last war to transport and land and supply some 2 million men on the Continent of Europe. Will you please point out the difference between that operation and any possible operation of attacking the United States?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir. When we transported our A. E. F. to France we were forced to rebuild the harbor facilities of the four great French harbors, and we were also forced to amplify those in England. And, in addition, those harbors were the harbors of a friendly country. Then the Germans came along with their air power, taking the Atlantic coast line of France, and we are quite sure that they had a very definite purpose in closing the sea gates.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And, now, Major, assuming as Senator Pepper says, that air power is capable of staying off invasion by sea, I would like to ask your expert opinion, as one of the great aviation experts of the country, whether or not we possess sufficient aviation strength to accomplish this impossible task, assuming that air power is perfectly capable of doing it.

Major WILLIAMS. I think in desperation we could today just about accomplish that job. Our concern is not just having a razor edge chance of doing it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What do you think our requirements are in this regard? Two years ago when we authorized 6,000 planes for the Army and 2,500 planes additional for the Navy, we thought we had completely provided for a sufficient air force. What do you regard as our necessity in that matter?

Major WILLIAMS. To answer that question, Senator, I would answer it just as if it were a business operation. We need a definite, practical assignment of numbers of aircraft, let us say, ten or fifteen thousand—opinions vary—with a suitable reserve. But, Senator, may I add that when experienced airmen heard that fantastic idea of 50,000 airplanes we did not cheer because we knew the people who had talked to them had no conception of what it was going to take to build 10.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. To build 10?

Major WILLIAMS. To build 10.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Major, you served in the Navy for a long time, I believe. Let me ask you whether, in your opinion, our Navy is comparable to or superior to the Navy of any of the other big powers.

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir. We have a considerable edge on the Japanese. No one knows how much of the British Navy is still serviceable. As to the capacity of our Navy to withstand an air attack from shore-based air power, I can only quote you what Mr. Edison said when he told the public and told Congress that our warships are not able to withstand an air attack from shore-based aviation, that their superstructure must be rebuilt.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you think it is possible to rebuild the superstructure?

Major WILLIAMS. I don't know, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, Major, do you claim without limitation that airplanes can sink a battleship?

Major WILLIAMS. That is another question. It is not necessary to sink a battleship, provided you put it out of commission during the war. That is the point on which all of this discussion turns.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Isn't that precisely what we would be confronted by if, as suggested in some quarters, we undertake to convoy merchant vessels by our naval vessels to European waters?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Wouldn't we certainly encounter an attack by shore-based airplanes as well as submarines?

Major WILLIAMS. We most assuredly would. And those ranges extend out now beyond the North Sea. There is a time coming when there will be a quite sizeable area in every ocean marked off or segregated for fighting battleships.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. On the other hand, we would have an equal advantage in defending this continent and this hemisphere against attack from abroad, would we not—assuming that we had shore bases adequately located in this hemisphere?

Major WILLIAMS. But with a fraction of the air power required to go to Europe today. I see no difference in defending the coastlines from air attack than already encountered by the Germans when they

were trying to keep open their lines of sea communication over the Skagerack.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Major, you were here yesterday when Colonel Lindbergh testified, were you not?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you feel that Colonel Lindbergh was correct in his statement that geographically the German air power has a tremendous natural advantage over British air power in the matter of reaching military objectives?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir; with the very simple statement that Germany is operating on what are known as interior lines of communication.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is the same principle they employed so effectively on land during the last war, Major?

Major WILLIAMS. And think what it means in terms of swift movement today.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You stated unequivocally, as I recall it, that this bill or this proposed measure would undermine American air power. Will you please tell the committee in what specific ways that would result from this bill? I think that is an extremely important item.

Major WILLIAMS. First, the fifty-fifty rule of thumb assignment of material that we need in fighting any foreign country, to my knowledge has been materially shifted to the point where—and I have good reason for the assumption and the belief that it is at least 80 percent of modernized equipment—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. As stated here to the committee by one of the witnesses, the best estimate is we are giving 95 percent of our aircraft production. Do you know about that?

Major WILLIAMS. I see no aircraft around the country being delivered today. I see some T-40's and things like that, which are not first-line fighting ships.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Please outline the specific way in which you think this bill is calculated to undermine our air power rather than enhance it.

Major WILLIAMS. Under the explanation of aid to England, and under the explanation of that being our first line of operation, or whatever they say it is, the line was in France, but now it is on some other coast and then back again, but we are shipping abroad equipment that we need here in the most critical way. And that explains why we need it, whether it is first line or not. If it is what we need, we should keep it here, because it is useful, essential, and vital.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Even an airplane which may not be the best in the world but which is based upon a shore base, Major, for the defense of the United States is much to be preferred to none at all, isn't it?

Major WILLIAMS. That is quite true. I do not believe—and I believe the records will substantiate this claim—that there is one single-seater fighting plane or interceptor in the United States today that is modern in any sense of the word, either in armor against antiaircraft guns or in performance.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Well, Major, have the lessons in this European war developed the fact as to requirements that, first, we should have a self-sealing gasoline tank, and that we should have armor protection?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Has our development during this time when we have been buying time, Major, strengthened us in those particulars?

Major WILLIAMS. We have one experimental type, I believe, a single-seater which adds a cannon. But at the present time the British are relegating to second-line ships the airplanes that we are building at the present time, so far as gunpower is concerned. And the caliber today is absolutely useless. The British are going to cannons. We can't use cannons under the ordinary acceptance of use. We just haven't got them.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What kinds of cannons do they have or do they use?

Major WILLIAMS. Fifty-caliber, and all the way from 20-millimeter to half-inch.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Are you familiar with the fact that we did send a lot of airplanes to France which were afterwards captured and used by the Germans against the British?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you believe that any planes that we might send to Great Britain might be used against us, Major, in the event of war between Germany and the United States?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And the same is true of naval vessels?

Major WILLIAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

You may be excused, Major Williams.

Mr. Kingman Brewster, Jr., will you please come forward?

Senator BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, before this witness begins his statement I would like to have inserted in the record the reply of Secretary Knox to a question that I asked when he was on the stand, which he has sent to the Chairman, giving the instances in which present laws affecting the Navy might be affected by the present bill?

The CHAIRMAN. That is in response to a request made by you?

Senator BARKLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask whether a similar compilation, which was promised by the Secretary, has been received?

The CHAIRMAN. It has not been received. This is the only one that has been received.

Senator BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think the letter from the Secretary should also go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. It may go in in connection with Secretary Knox's testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I would like to ask whether, pursuant to my request, with which the Secretary of State said he would comply, as to the withdrawal of the moral embargo on Russia, anything has been received?

The CHAIRMAN. No, Senator. It has not been furnished to me.

And in connection with the testimony of the Secretary of War the committee has received a letter, and the Secretary desires the letter to go in the record of his testimony in the open session, that is, to

have the letter placed in the record following his oral testimony given by him in the open session.

Senator JOHNSON of California. What is the purport of it?

The CHAIRMAN. I think I would better read the letter. It is not very long. The Secretary is undertaking to correct what he says is some misinformation that got into the press. The letter is as follows:

On the morning following my appearance before your committee in executive session Thursday afternoon, January 30th, a newspaper of this city published a purported summary of my testimony on airplane deliveries. This publication was not only inaccurate but its omission of factual background has resulted in a gross misrepresentation of the actual situation.

This essential misrepresentation thus given by the publication is that, by the delivery of airplanes from this country to Great Britain, our own defensive program has been impaired and the safety of this country thereby imperilled. Such an implication is quite untrue. It disregards completely the fundamental fact that air power depends upon productive capacity and not merely the number of planes. It is also inaccurate in that it gives the impression that the War Department could have or would have bought the planes which the British are at present receiving on orders placed many months ago and long before the substantial appropriations were made for the development of our own Air Corps.

Far from constituting an interference with the purchase of planes by our Air Corps, the purchases made in this country by Britain and France in particular over the past 2 years have been primarily responsible for the expansion that has taken place in the aircraft industry in this country.

As a result of these foreign orders the American airplane industry in the latter part of 1939 and the year 1940 has expanded approximately 100 percent. As early as 1938 foreign countries made available to our manufacturers money for doubling the productive capacity of aircraft engines of the types currently used by our own Air Corps. Substantial foreign orders placed over a year ago for military planes enabled the American manufacturers to expand their plant facilities in a fashion which would have been impossible under the Congressional appropriation then current. In the early part of 1940 additional substantial foreign orders for engines and air-frames were placed which required continuation and the broadening of production facilities of the aircraft industry and its suppliers.

It was not until 1940 that funds made available to the Air Corps by Congressional appropriations were adequate in size to enable this country acting alone to place sufficient orders to justify expansion of the aircraft industry. Until that date it is an undeniable fact that our Air Corps has not had sufficient funds to permit rapid development. Therefore, bearing in mind that it usually takes from 18 months to 2 years to develop production of a new aircraft motor and about 16 to 18 months to develop production of a new model airplane, you will realize without the headstart given industry by the foreign orders mentioned above we would at present be in a very grave situation as to the plants and facilities which we now need for the pending emergency. Within 4 to 6 months we expect accelerated deliveries on late model combat planes on contract for our Air Corps. These planes will incorporate the latest developments arising out of actual combat experience. In some cases where more modern equipment could be obtained by deferring deliveries of certain types for a few months, we have felt it wise to do so, in view of the fact that such action will help prevent the Air Corps from being furnished with planes which would be obsolete on the dates of delivery.

That is not all of the letter, but I have read the material portions of it. That is the letter which the Secretary desires to follow his testimony in the open hearing.

Senator GILLETTE. Reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—I wish to say that I do not believe this committee is interested in any controversy of the Secretary of War as to assertions made in any publication. If the Secretary wants to supplement his statement that was given before the committee, of course, we are glad to have it as a supplement, but, in my opinion, he should appear here in giving that testimony or in supplementing the testimony given, so that he can be interrogated by members of the committee. Person-

ally I do not like to have a letter filed here in reply to some publication in a newspaper. But I am not objecting; I am simply making that statement.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I agree quite thoroughly in that.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, Senator Gillette, I think the Secretary has a perfect right to call attention to a misquotation in any newspaper, and I would be disposed to place it in the record upon his request. I think the Secretary's letter's in this instance is some contribution beyond a mere refutation of what he says was a misrepresentation of facts.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And other witness has the same right?

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly. I think any other witness should have the same right.

Senator JOHNSON of California. So that if in the future there should be any misrepresentation of any witness' testimony, that witness may file a letter correcting it?

The CHAIRMAN. I would not commit myself on that.

Senator CONNALLY. Let each case stand on its own merits.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary of War certainly has the right following an executive session when none of his evidence was supposed to have been given to any newspaper, but there was a publication. This was in executive session. He says the facts were not correctly stated, and he asks to correct them. I think he has that right.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I think any man has a right to refute any statement that is made concerning him; but the only question is as to the manner of that refutation. But I believe the Secretary of War stands in no higher position nor in any different attitude here than any other witness here. He has just those rights but no more.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not agreeing to that. Any witness who is called before this committee in executive session, when his testimony is not a matter of public record, has a perfect right to come and say that somebody has misrepresented the facts and ask that they be corrected. And that is this case. It does not relate to testimony that was given in open session.

Senator JOHNSON of California. What difference does that make?

The CHAIRMAN. It makes quite a great deal of difference.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I can't see it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If the Secretary of War or any other witness is permitted to go into matters which were discussed in executive session, it certainly follows, does it not, that any member of this committee has a right to give any version he pleases as to what went on in the executive session?

I don't know what the Secretary of War is complaining about. I was out of the room for the moment. But if he can give his version of what happens in an executive session, anybody who pleases should be relieved of any obligation of secrecy in connection with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, if you will read his letter I think you will see what he is referring to. And, therefore, he is writing the letter and asking that it go in as a part of his testimony that was given in open session.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I did not observe very closely the letter. I did not observe that he gave any figures of production, either. Is that your understanding?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He did not say anything that might not as well have been said in open session.

The CHAIRMAN. Will Kingman Brewster, Jr., come around, please?

STATEMENT OF KINGMAN BREWSTER, Jr.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Will you state your name, please?

Mr. BREWSTER. Kingman Brewster, Jr.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Where do you reside?

Mr. BREWSTER. My residence is in Cambridge, Mass.

Senator JOHNSON of CALIFORNIA. Your present residence is temporary?

Mr. BREWSTER. I am a student at Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Do you hold any particular position in Yale University?

Mr. BREWSTER. I have just retired as chairman of the Yale Daily News, and I am a senior, in the class of 1941.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You are not connected with the Youth Administration, are you?

Mr. BREWSTER. I have no connection with any other organization save my temporary chairmanship of the Yale Chapter of the America First Committee.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Are you familiar with the bill that is before us?

Mr. BREWSTER. I believe I am.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Will you please proceed with your statement? Subsequently questions will be asked you.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I assume that I have been invited here to present and explain the point of view of those many young citizens who oppose active official participation in the war abroad, especially as it is implied in the measure which you are considering.

Although we are interested in today, quite naturally we young citizens are mainly concerned with the kind of world which we shall inherit, and more particularly the kind of America which you will hand down to us. If we are called upon as soldiers today, we shall, of course, willingly carry out the decisions and commands of those in authority. But we are deeply concerned with the kind of America that we shall live in as citizens tomorrow. We are willing, we are eager to give our lives and our deaths if need be, in the service of the nation. But we do insist that those lives or those deaths be not wasted. I wish to express my gratitude to this committee for inviting one member of our generation to record his opinion at a time when the course of America's destiny for years to come is being determined.

Fundamentally we believe that the peace of this hemisphere has has more to offer the world of tomorrow than any possible outcome of a devastating transoceanic war.

This position is based upon the assumption that by adequate preparation on our part the Americas cannot be successfully invaded from across the ocean. For all the attempts of certain people to make it look otherwise, this assumption does not rest on any faith in the word of the dictators. It springs, rather, from a faith in ourselves. If a transatlantic war is to be waged we would rather make the enemy cross the water and try to land. We cannot quite under-

stand the logic of those who say we are not strong enough to hold any enemy from our own shores, yet say that we can wipe the strongest military power in the world off the face of Europe—and all without sending a single American soldier abroad.

We of the young generation are deeply aware of the horrors of National Socialism. We hate it. Hate it perhaps more than others for what it has done to the hopes of men of our own age. We, too, want to see democracy victorious over this alien way of living. But we feel (1) that nazi-ism can only be defeated by making democracy work as an alternative. (2) That if America goes to war that last chance is forfeited, perhaps forever. (3) Not only would democracy's last opportunity be lost, but the causes of which your Hitlers, your Goerings, and your Goebbels are but the effects, would be many times intensified everywhere by world prostration, world misery, and world hate.

We, therefore, put the peace of this hemisphere even above the victory of Great Britain. And all this in spite of the fact that many of us are of English descent, have traveled in England, have studied English literature, and all hold the common English tongue and traditions. Even more, we make this choice in spite of the realization that an English victory which did not involve us would be to our best interest. There has been a constant effort to make it appear that those who oppose going to war do not want to see England survive. Many who use this technique of accusation know it is not true. Quite simply, our case is that while we would prefer to see England win, American peace and sovereignty are far more important.

Now, the President, the man to whom this measure would give unlimited authority, evidently feels otherwise. If words have any meaning, the President seems to believe that our national security calls upon us to underwrite a British victory at any cost. In other words, as I see it, while he would prefer to see America keep her peace, English victory is more important. I for one cannot see how the pledge to "regain and maintain"—I quote from him—a free Europe can be reconciled with American peace. Nowhere have I seen convincing evidence that Hitler can be defeated in Europe by American aid "short of war." I would like permission to read an excerpt from a comment along this line, written in London by an American correspondent and, I suppose, passed by the British censor. I believe he writes for the Chicago Daily News.

Mr. Stoneman quotes the President's statement—

I believe the Axis Powers are not going to win this war. I base the belief on the latest and best information.

And he goes on to remark—

In the past, the Government in Washington has on many occasions been more optimistic about the situation here than facts justified. With the roar of another blitz on London still ringing in their ears, the spectacle of an intact German army on the other side of the channel, and the submarine war at its greatest height since the spring of 1917, many observers think that this "latest and best information" of which the President spoke may also be slightly wishful.

I use this only to emphasize that, in short, I cannot evade the conclusion that the President's avowed aims mean war whether he intends it or not; perhaps war alone if Britain capitulates before we can turn words into action.

But, gentlemen, even if I were not completely opposed to the intentions enunciated by the man to whom this bill gives absolute power,

I would be opposed to the method which the bills uses. Like the framers of the constitution I am opposed to giving any one man—whether I agree with him or not—the power of life and death over the Nation. Extraordinary powers have been granted before, but never before has it been proposed that one man should have the power to forfeit the armed forces of the Nation as he sees fit, even without certificate from the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations and without regard to any existing laws. Unless you want to go to war—in which case dictatorship seems inevitable—I can see no justification for such a sweeping grant to any one man. And if the President intends to impose limitations on himself, why not put them in the bill?

As to the limitations suggested, I can't see that they mean a thing. What good is it to put a time limit on such authority when it gives the President power to create situations as well as to meet them. Nor can I see any real meaning to the rider about no convoys. What good does it do to prohibit American convoys when the bill gives the President the right to give the whole fleet away and make a virtual alliance inevitable.

Lincoln's powers during the War between the States have been cited as precedent. To my mind, nothing could be further from Lincoln's great strength—intellectual honesty. I think without assuming to represent anyone but myself, and I hope without seeming impertinent, I can say categorically that one thing is common to the great majority, if not all people of my age. We are resentful of the deceit and subterfuge which have characterized the politics of foreign policy. We have not been moved by, rather we have been impatient with, the name-calling and accusation technique. Perhaps that is why we have listened to Colonel Lindbergh whether we agree with him or not, and have admired his courage and straightforwardness. We resent the unwillingness of certain people to be honest and square with the public. We have resented the use of glib phrases just because they sound well even though they are loaded with dynamite which may determine our future. We resent the effort to hide from the American people tomorrow's consequences of what we do today. And in my opinion this bill is the embodiment of all these, simply because it refuses to put the ultimate question squarely before the American people: If and when the choice must be made, which do you care for most, American peace and sovereignty or the victory of Great Britain? We cannot hope to proceed deliberately and proudly in a manner which will command respect and sacrifice of a whole generation until this decision has been made openly and freely. I speak for those young citizens who have decided in favor of American peace and sovereignty. Having made that decision we are unalterably opposed to the measure under consideration:

(a) Because it puts the nation's whole destiny in the hands of a man whose announced aims must mean war, whether he intends it or not.

(b) Because no matter what his intentions may be, we do not believe in giving one man unlimited power of life and death over the strength and sovereignty of a free nation.

(c) Because if we are going nearer to war we ought to take each step deliberately on the people's free decision. Then if we end up in war, at least we will have our eyes open and our chin up instead of sliding into it with our head bowed muttering nothings about "short of war."

I thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, Senator Johnson?
Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Brewster, I believe you say you are or you were head of the America First Organization in Yale. Is that right?

Mr. BREWSTER. We established a local chapter, which had no official dependence upon the national organization but which assumed the name of the Chapter of the America First Committee.

Senator CONNALLY. You have no connection with the national organization?

Mr. BREWSTER. We are formed as a chapter of that organization.

Senator CONNALLY. You are affiliated with the national organization, are you not?

Mr. BREWSTER. I think that is fair. At no time have I been a member of the national committee; so I have never claimed to underwrite their releases or opinions or programs.

Senator CONNALLY. The national organization is made up of local chapters, isn't it?

Mr. BREWSTER. I believe the national committee was started—

Senator CONNALLY. I am not talking about the committee. You have a national organization and a committee, and a board of directors of the national organization, and it is an affiliation or federation of local chapters? I don't know, Mr. Brewster. I am just trying to find out. You belong. But I don't know.

Mr. BREWSTER. I can't really say that the local organizations are in any way in constant touch with the national committee, no.

Senator CONNALLY. I did not ask you about constant touch. Are they a part of the national organization? Do they make up the national organization?

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes; I think that is fair to say.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you know W. R. Davis?

Mr. BREWSTER. No, sir; I do not.

Senator CONNALLY. Who is supposed to be financial sponsor or one of the financial sponsors of the America First Committee?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Mr. Chairman, that is not correct.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is not true.

Senator CONNALLY. I will be glad to call either one of you as a witness.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I think the Senator from Texas is under a misapprehension. He is confusing the Committee To Keep Out of War with the America First Committee.

Senator CONNALLY. That may be. I thought the young man perhaps would know.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Yes; I do know.

Senator CONNALLY. I will be glad to call you as a witness. You seem to know a great deal about both of them.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I do.

Senator CONNALLY. I just want to know. I don't belong to either one of these organizations.

Mr. BREWSTER. In answer to that question concerning Mr. Davis, I believe he has no connection whatsoever with the America First Committee, but, rather, he was identified or was construed to be identified with the No Foreign War Committee.

Senator CONNALLY. Then you do know who Mr. Davis is?

Mr. BREWSTER. I have heard of him through the press.

Senator CONNALLY. If he is not connected with your organization, that is all right. That is all that I am trying to find out.

Hereafter I will call upon Senator Clark to give me the information of this kind.

Senator CLARK. If I have the information, I will be glad to.

Senator CONNALLY. Perhaps I would get a lot of information, but it would be of the wrong kind.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I question this method of procedure.

Senator CONNALLY. I was entirely innocent. I thought it was the same organization. I am not trying to delude the witness. And, if I do, I am sure the Senator will correct me.

Senator JOHNSON of California. He can take care of himself.

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, I submit that I have not been rough with the witness. And I don't expect to be.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And I don't propose to permit you to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Senator.

Senator CONNALLY. The Senator from California had the witness and finished with him, and I thought I had a right to ask a few questions. If he doesn't think I have the right to do so, I will withdraw. I recognize his right to control the witness.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Go ahead and ask your questions.

Senator CONNALLY. If you will just be quiet for a minute, I will.

Mr. Brewster, I read from your statement at the bottom of page 4:

We are resentful of the deceit and subterfuge which has characterized the politics of foreign policy.

I think that is a fine statement and a fine sentiment—you are resentful of the deceit and subterfuge—and I agree with you.

You also expressed the view—

We have not been moved by, rather we have been impatient with, the name-calling and accusation technique.

That is a very commendable attitude. I approve of it, and I congratulate you—although you say a few lines below—

We resent the unwillingness of certain people to be honest and square with the public.

Would you clarify that as name-calling and accusation technique?

Mr. BREWSTER. No, sir; I would not. I don't call anything name-calling that can be justified and backed up.

Senator CONNALLY. You say you resent the unwillingness of certain people to be honest and square with the public. That is a rather serious charge, isn't it? Whom are you talking about, and when was that? Wouldn't you call that, Mr. Brewster, name-calling or accusation technique, which you condemn?

Mr. BREWSTER. Not insofar as I believe the accusation can be substantiated. The name-calling to which I was referring, if I may be permitted to extend my answer, is the name-calling which does not answer the arguments of a man but rather seeks to dismiss him by calling him an appeaser or fifth columnist.

Senator CONNALLY. Then you don't think the charge of people being dishonest and not square comes within that category?

Mr. BREWSTER. No. And neither do I refer to people being called appeasers, if it can be substantiated.

Senator CONNALLY. You have studied the bill rather carefully, I assume.

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. And it is your conclusion from a study of the bill that this bill gives the President unlimited power over the lives and fortunes of the American people? Is that true?

Mr. BREWSTER. That seems to me, sir, without limit.

Senator CONNALLY. Without limit?

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. He can do anything he wants to?

Mr. BREWSTER. I don't say that he can do anything he wants to, but I merely say that if you give him the power conferred by this bill, he seems to be in a position whereby he can have the strength of this nation and, therefore, commit it to a condition and a situation and, therefore, a course from which there is no appeal.

Senator CONNALLY. What you mean is that by the exercise of these powers the President could get us into war? That is what you mean, isn't it?

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. Under the Constitution he could get us into war now, couldn't he? Don't you realize that he is the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy?

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. And without this bill.

Mr. BREWSTER. I realize that.

Senator CONNALLY. Without this bill, if he desired, he could send the fleet to Europe now?

Mr. BREWSTER. I believe he can.

Senator CONNALLY. And thereby he could probably get us into war?

Mr. BREWSTER. I believe he could.

Senator CONNALLY. He could send the Army to other countries or other lands and, if he wanted to get us into war, he could do so by that method, couldn't he?

Mr. BREWSTER. I believe he could.

Senator CONNALLY. But you don't mean to say that this bill gives the President unlimited power over life and death and over the strength and sovereignty of a free nation?

Mr. BREWSTER. If I might be permitted to interpret myself, Senator, by "unlimited" I mean on that text that he had the power to get us into a position from which there was no appeal.

Senator CONNALLY. You don't mean to abrogate free speech and a free press and authorize somebody to arrest you and throw you into jail without authority and trial?

Mr. BREWSTER. Not directly. But this seems to be the sign of war itself.

Senator CONNALLY. That is not confined to this bill?

Mr. BREWSTER. Indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette, have you some questions?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. No questions.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state, if I may be recognized for the purpose, that it is not an unprecedented situation when some Senator in his question makes a statement of fact

known to be incorrect, for other Senators to correct him. Now, if that is a breach of the precedent of the committee, I will be perfectly willing in the future to await my turn.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I think the record will be shown to be replete with interruptions which have been made when palpable errors were made in questions propounded by others.

I wish to proceed in order, Mr. Chairman, but in the future I shall be glad to await my turn when I am called to correct statements of that kind, if that is to be the practice.

The CHAIRMAN. I think perhaps you misunderstood Senator Connally.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I heard him say that he would call me as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted you to have the opportunity to testify, if you wanted to make any further statement beyond what the witness himself made.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If the Chairman wants me to take the stand and be sworn, I shall be glad to do it. If there are any questions that Senator Connally wants to ask me, I will be glad to answer them.

I thought the Senator was under a palpable misapprehension in the question he was asking the witness. For that reason I intervened to state to Senator Connally that he was not stating it correctly.

If Senator Connally or the Chairman wants me to be sworn and be subject to cross-examination, I will be glad to be sworn.

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, I have no complaint as to the interruption of this witness. I was not trying to mislead this young man. I thought that Mr. Davis was connected with his organization, and I asked him the question. I thought he would probably know as much about his own organization as Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. I saw the Senator from Texas was under a palpable misapprehension and was confusing the two organizations, both of which have been described in great detail in the newspapers.

Senator CONNALLY. I thought the witness would be able to answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is of the opinion that the witness, Mr. Brewster, did have full knowledge and did clear it up entirely. I wanted the three Senators to have an opportunity to clear it up, if they did not think it was clear.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I think it is perfectly clear now, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley, have you any questions?

Senator BARKLEY. Mr. Brewster, you said in your statement that you resent deceit and subterfuge which has characterized the politics of foreign policy. Whom do you have in mind in that statement?

Mr. BREWSTER. It seems to me the politics of foreign policy should be divided into two categories, that is, the international politics of foreign policy carried out by organizations which purport to represent a substantial number of citizens, and the official political foreign policy.

Senator BARKLEY. Does that statement include both?

Mr. BREWSTER. It can be construed to include both.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think the President of the United States and the Secretary of State, who handle our foreign policy, dealt in deceit and subterfuge?

Mr. BREWSTER. I did not say that.

Senator BARKLEY. You did not?

Mr. BREWSTER. I did not say that. In the second category I am not merely including the Federal Government; I am including the actual political activity. I might be permitted to cite the most vigorous proponent of intervention, Herbert Agar, who takes it upon himself to write an article in a recent periodical in which he takes to task both candidates of the political presidential campaign of last fall; although his belief about the war is quite contrary to mine, he makes it perfectly clear that, consciously or unconsciously, many people engaged in that campaign were trying to sell the American people two things that could not go together; that is, the promise of British victory and the promise of American peace; but it seems to me that is a kind of duplicity which is not the best way to build up the moral powers of the people upon whom you are calling for sacrifice.

Senator BARKLEY. As to deceit that is associated with deliberate intentions to deceive, you don't think that would be done unconsciously, do you?

Mr. BREWSTER. No, I don't think so.

Senator BARKLEY. In other words, the exercise of freedom of speech and the freedom of the press that we boast of in this country as American citizens, that is deceit and subterfuge? Is that true?

Mr. BREWSTER. They have said one thing when they went a lot further in their own minds.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you deny to the press and to the American people the right?

Mr. BREWSTER. Certainly not. But that would not keep me from criticizing the people who abuse it.

Senator BARKLEY. But you have used rather strong language, which amounts to an accusation of deliberate misrepresentation and deliberate deceiving the people of the United States.

Mr. BREWSTER. And, if I am not impertinent to officials of the Federal Government, I might refer to the very fact that one of the major political candidates waited until the election was over to present to the American people his program and experience in foreign policy in two addresses which were broadcast over the radio. It seems to me, or at least I would say from my own amateur acquaintance with the trend of American politics that it seems to me in a way to breach the faith with the American people for those speeches to be delayed or for those principles to be hidden until the election was over.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you know whether the changes in connection with the international situation have been so kaleidoscopic as to bring about almost daily and weekly and hourly changes, and such as not to enable any man, whether he was a candidate for office or not, to know prior to November what the policy ought to be in December or in January?

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes; that is why I was so slow and deliberate in my answer, because I realize you have to take into consideration changes in the international and external situation. And I was trying to think back to that period of European diplomacy which afford such a wide diversity of opinions and principles as that evidenced between the election and the convening of this session of the Congress.

Senator BARKLEY. Inasmuch as you have mentioned one major candidate, Mr. Brewster, I suppose you recall that the other major candidate has also endorsed the same policy?

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. And that prior to the election some people criticized him because they claimed that he went even further than the President of the United States, who happened to be one of the major candidates?

Mr. BREWSTER. Oh, yes. Let me make it clear that I agree with Mr. Agar that not one but both of the major political candidates were in error. This is not a partisan breach.

Senator BARKLEY. You say here that you resent the unwillingness of certain people to be honest and square with the public. Whom do you have in mind there?

Mr. BREWSTER. Well, it seems to me that there have been evidences of certain efforts on the part of people who believe that we must go to war, who sincerely believe that, to bring about our involvement in this war by each time saying "This is short of war."

It seems to me that this bill itself, in a way, is an evidence of the unwillingness of certain people to be honest with the American people. That is, I cannot quite see myself the logic of those who would report out this bill as being the best way to keep out of war. It may be the best way of serving our national security, it may be the best way of aiding England, it may be the best way of defeating Hitler; but certainly it is not chiefly the best way of keeping out of war.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you want to stand by your phrase that those who are supporting this bill, which would include those people who vote to report it favorably and who are advocating it, are not honest and square with the public? Is that what you want to lead this Committee to believe?

Mr. BREWSTER. I do not want to lead the committee to believe anything other than what I have said. And everybody is permitted to put his own construction upon what I have said.

Senator BARKLEY. You realize that all of these matters are matters of opinion, but there are honest differences of opinion?

Mr. BREWSTER. I grant you that.

Senator BARKLEY. And many equally patriotic men and women differ about these matters?

Mr. BREWSTER. I agree.

Senator BARKLEY. You would not want to leave that impression, would you, that everybody who disagrees with you, even about this bill, are dishonest and not square with the public?

Mr. BREWSTER. Certainly not.

Senator BARKLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions to be asked by any of the Senators?

Apparently not.

Mr. Brewster, we thank you for coming here.

It is now after 1 o'clock. If it agreeable to the Committee we will return at 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 1:05 p. m., the Committee recessed until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the Committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m., and proceeded further as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will please come to order.

Dr. Morrison.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON, EDITOR, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY (CHICAGO)

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Morrison, have you a prepared statement?

Dr. MORRISON. Yes; I have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you additional copies for the members of the Committee?

Dr. MORRISON. Yes; I have a few copies, and I think other copies have been distributed.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Doctor, will you state your name.

Dr. MORRISON. Charles Clayton Morrison.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Your residence?

Dr. MORRISON. Chicago.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Your occupation?

Dr. MORRISON. I am editor of the Christian Century.

Senator JOHNSON of California. How long have you been the editor of the Christian Century?

Dr. MORRISON. 33 years.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And will you state what that publication is, please?

Dr. MORRISON. It is an undenominational journal of religion, circulating in all of the churches. Its constituency is a constituency of church leadership and leadership of social enterprises and ideals. You might call it a journal of religious opinion.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Have you familiarized yourself with the bill that is now before us?

Dr. MORRISON. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Will you go on, in your own fashion, please. If you have a prepared statement, you might read it first, and then subsequently submit yourself to cross-examination.

Dr. MORRISON. Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen of the committee, I am opposed to the bill which you are now considering. In my opinion it should not be amended and passed, but uncompromisingly rejected. A new bill, based strictly upon national defense, should be put in its place. The present bill is constructed on un-American lines, and it cannot be reconstructed on American lines. It purports to be a bill to defend America. In reality, it is a blueprint for the surrender of American democracy to a dictatorship. It is the equivalent of a declaration of war without the declaration. But war is war, whether declared in the old-fashioned way or undeclared. The Constitution lodges the power to declare war in the hands of Congress. By this the Constitution means not merely the formality of a declara-

tion but the power actually to make war, to initiate acts of war, to determine the time and place of war, and to designate the enemy.

I do not believe that any of the amendments now proposed, or all of them together, will restrict the dictatorial power of the President which this bill will give him. The time limit of 2 years, or 1 year, or even 90 days, will be quite sufficient for our resourceful President to create a situation, a fait accompli, from which there will be no exit save to go on in the course to which he will have committed the Nation.

I believe the people of America positively and overwhelmingly do not want to be taken into this war. But they desire to believe the President, who has solemnly and repeatedly promised that he will not take the country into the war. They are torn between their loyalty to the President and the all too transparent purpose of this bill as a war measure. The people are confused. But their confusion is no new thing. For more than 3 years the chief strategy of the administration in foreign policy has been to confuse the people and in the confusion to commit them to one step after another leading into war.

I say that the American people do not want to enter this war. And they are opposed to any action, when once they sense its trend, which ties their destiny to the fate of any other nation. If Congress gives the President the powers provided by this bill, he will exercise them. And their exercise will be a de facto participation in the war. But the President, in my judgment, will carry a divided people with him. They may go along, but not in the spirit of defending America, nor of defending freedom, nor of saving democracy, nor of preserving civilization. They will go along because their President will have put them in the position where they must go along, because they cannot turn back.

The President has assumed a terrific responsibility. It is astonishing that any President would be willing to assume it. Such a war will not be America's war; it will be the President's war. America has never fought a President's war. Its war Presidents have waited patiently until the popular will was crystallized by free discussion or by some decisive event, and they then led a united people in defense of a cause to which the overwhelming body of the people felt that there was no alternative. This was true of all our war Presidents, of Lincoln, of McKinley, of Wilson. But if America goes into this war, by passing this bill, it will be the President himself who has led the American people into it. He has assumed a role which no other President ever assumed. By fomenting fear, by lending the prestige of his great office to the weirdest fantasies of an imminent invasion, by inventing shrewd devices to circumvent both domestic and international law in giving aid to Britain, by deliberately dramatizing his unauthorized assumption of the solidarity of the United States and Great Britain, he has already geared our national life into the European conflict, and has developed among our people a feeling that is little short of helpless fatalism. Resistance to his course is felt to be futile by many, not because war is felt to be inherently inevitable, but because the President, with his vast power and his unprecedented self-assurance in wielding it, has committed us to this course.

There are those who applaud the President for his self-assurance in leading a confused and divided Nation into war. This, they say,

is leadership, great leadership? Closer inspection will, I believe, disclose that it is not leadership, but dictatorship. The President's bill now before the Senate is just as truly the consummation of a cumulative policy leading to dictatorship as was the final act of Adolf Hitler in abrogating the Weimar constitution and transforming the Reichstag into a body of "yes men," whose sole function is to rubber stamp the decrees of a totalitarian regime.

The President is now applauded in England and America, but I do not believe that history will applaud him. I believe that history will condemn him. And if you gentlemen of this Congress consent to this usurpation, it is my profound conviction, which I declare with great respect but in all candor and sincerity, that you will share in the execrations which history will heap upon his head.

Gentlemen of the committee, I beg you to reflect upon the state of mind in which this discussion is being carried on. For weeks now, you and your colleagues of the lower House have been debating America's duty in an atmosphere of fantastic unreality. The issue has been set before you in a framework in which rational decision is impossible. The administration has fabricated the frame in which the issue is presented. It is the framework of a momentary threat of invasion. Hectic imaginations have conjured up the most remote possibilities and thrust them upon you and the country. They are played up as the imminent occasion for plunging America into a war that can be called our war only because the President has led us so far into it that we have lost our perspective. A reversal of this policy now requires more courage on your part than it takes to go on.

From that day in 1939 when a whale off the Atlantic shore was taken for a German submarine and exploited by the President himself as such, to the testimony offered here by a Cabinet member who told you that if this bill is not passed Britain will quit fighting, everything has been done to scare the country and the Congress into such a state of nervous apprehension that we would be willing to commit the Nation and its treasures to the keeping of one man. All the conceivabilities of invasion have been exploited in your hearing. I shall not take your time to recall them. As a result, the state of mind of the American people is that of a vast psychopathic hospital, with its violent ward located on the Atlantic seaboard.

You will receive a fresh injection of this brainstorm stimulant when one or two week-end visitors return from England with their eyes and ears full of what they have been shown and told. Does anyone suppose that an American barefoot boy could spend a week end with Hitler at Berchtesgaden and come home with an unbiased mind? No doubt their story will be exciting. It will play upon American sympathies with dramatic—or better, melodramatic—skill. But the question I am bound to ask, and which I believe Congress must ask, is, Will their story be relevant? Will it be relevant to America's decision? Of course it will further inflame the psychosis which has been generated in the public mind. But is it conceivable that it will be relevant to the issue which this Congress faces? Where shall the people look for sane deliberation if not to Congress? We hear much talk about our first line of defense. The supporters of this bill say that Great Britain is our first line of defense. But I say that Congress is our first line of defense. If Congress abdicates its responsibility, American democracy is lost on the home ground. I plead that Con-

gress shall detach its deliberations from the hysteria, the sentimentalism, the melodramatics and the fantasies in which the President and his supporters have stated the issue, and recast the issue in the more realistic framework in which our national decision must be made.

It is easy to conjure up future possibilities of danger from Hitler's Germany. But in this game of fantasies the advantage lies always with the most vivid imagination. You can bring forward unlimited expert testimony, including that of generals and admirals and Colonel Lindbergh, and that extraordinary testimony to which we listened this morning, to deny these wild imaginings, but the net result is inconclusive if the issue is kept within this framework of fantasy. You cannot effectively deny a fantasy. If Professor Compton, famous explorer of the cosmic rays, should assert that an army from Mars is about to invade America by sliding down the cosmic rays, the assertion could not be effectively disposed of by merely denying the possibility! If the discussion of this bill is carried on in this atmosphere of fantasies, the decision will register the fears, the sympathies, and the prejudices of Congress, rather than a genuine conviction based upon a penetrating and realistic analysis of the objective scene.

In response to your invitation to testify here, it is my wish to direct your attention to a single fact, together with its bearing upon the decision which Congress must now make. That single fact is this: The framework in which the President conceives America as going all out for Britain is being shattered everywhere in the world by forces which have long been gathering and which have weakened the whole international structure to the point of disintegration. For the United States to consent to the new doctrine that our future depends upon the continued existence of any other nation, and to tie itself to any nation, is to hang our destiny upon nails driven into rotting timber.

Let us be clear about this. The tight, snug, dependable world of nations in which all previous wars were fought, has passed away. In that world a war could be fought and a victory won. But in the present world a victory may turn out not to be a victory. The World War of 1914-18 was the last war whose settlement could presuppose the continuation of a world order consisting of the national entities then existing. That war was fought within a relatively stable international structure. It could be assumed that a victory then would be a victory. The nations were then sure of themselves. Today they are in terror of themselves. This is true of every nation in the world, including our own. Their very existence is precarious, and that not merely because of external enemies but because of the upsurge of powerful forces at home.

Up to and including the last war a nation could fight without fear that the battle won at the front might be lost at the home base. This is not true today. The political structure of the world is no longer the trim, firm, calculable thing it was. Today it is trembling on the brink of collapse. During the last war we could think of a League of Nations by which peace, once achieved, could be maintained. The League was built upon the then unquestioned presupposition that the nations were dependable political entities, that their pledged word could be trusted.

I ask Congress solemnly to consider that we no longer live in that kind of world. Something has happened to undermine the security

of every national state as a political entity. What is it that has happened? This has happened: The economic life of mankind has become ascendant over the political authority of nations. Ascendant, not alone in the sense that economic need dominates political policy, but in the sense that it threatens to undermine every national state as a political entity.

It is this kind of world in which it is proposed that the United States shall tie its destiny to one of the existing empires. To do this goes against the whole proud tradition of American independence. But that is not my point. For this country uncritically to act upon the assumption that the sheer preservation of the British Empire will assure the preservation of the independence of the United States or of the democratic ideals which this country cherishes, is to make a momentous decision in a framework of assumptions which no longer exists.

The decision which the President asks Congress to make involves a high degree of probability that we shall be launched upon a vast war, demanding all our resources of wealth, labor, and manpower, engaging an enemy on remote seas and in far distant lands, continuing for years, and with the outcome uncertain. This decision ought not to be made within the narrow limits of a debate on the question of the possibility of Hitler's future invasion of America. Nor ought it to be made on the basis of either our hatred of Hitlerism or our sympathy for England and our unbounded enthusiasm for her valiant resistance. In a world of unstable and disintegrating national entities, it cannot possibly be the duty of the United States to ally itself with any nation on the bare ground of sentimental trust in the continuing identity of interests with that nation when the war is once over.

Certain it is that, however the war turns out, the map of the world as we have known it will present a wholly different picture from the international scene with which we have long been familiar. Assuming that Britain wins, with the help of the United States, what, we have got to ask, will she do with her victory? The continent of Europe will then be her ward. The dean of St. Paul's in London put it exactly and frankly. "Victory for Britain," he said, "means that the British Empire will be extended to include the whole continent of Europe." Is the United States ready as an ally in the victory to be also an ally of Great Britain in the reorganization of Europe on the basis of British imperialism? Is the United States ready to embark upon the policy of European imperialism for herself, and to do so in the name of democracy?

It is the bounden duty of Congress to look ahead, to anticipate the consequences of both defeat and victory, and to envisage them not in the unstable framework of the Old World order, which is being shattered, but in terms of the vast change that is coming over the whole political structure of the world, a change that is nothing short of a world revolution. But if the President insists upon binding our national destiny to the national destiny of any other nation, the least we can ask for is a clear declaration of that nation's purposes in the event of her victory. What conception of the consequences of her victory does Great Britain entertain, and to which she will pledge her people? It is blind sentimentalism for the United States to plunge into war beside Great Britain without having as clear an understanding as it is possible for statesmanly imagination and purpose to

forecast. Decision on the President's bill should be withheld until this understanding is arrived at.

Repeatedly and persistently, Mr Chairman, the demand has gone up for Britain to define her war aims. Persistently has this demand been refused. America is asked to tie her destiny to Great Britain as a naive act of trust in Great Britain's magnanimity. In the present precarious condition of the whole international order, and confronting the incalculable forces of social and political revolution everywhere including Britain and the United States, it would seem obvious that to identify our national destiny with that of any other nation is to take up our abode in a house whose beams are already eaten with decay.

I am asking you, gentlemen of the Congress, to make your decision in the full recognition of the chaotic condition of the world. This condition was not created by Hitler. He is only a symptom of it. The defeat of Hitler will not bring order into this chaos. On the contrary, it will the more probably present us with confusion worse confounded. The crucial decision of America's duty amid this incalculable disorder should be withheld until we know what we are fighting for. The least Great Britain can do is to tell us what we shall be fighting for if we go "all out," as the President now demands, on her side. The American people will have no heart in a war, declared or undeclared, whose single aim is the preservation of the British Empire. Such a war, gentlemen, cannot possibly be America's war.

I am sure that the American people are in the dark as to the importance of defining the issue in such terms as I am suggesting. They are in the dark because the debate has gone on largely in the framework of the fantastic threat of invasion. The great question for our people to face is: What will Great Britain do with the victory if she gets it? Unless we ask that question now, the sacrifice of blood and wealth which the passage of this bill will surely entail will be a crime against America, a cruelty to Great Britain, and an unspeakable loss to civilization.

Why do we insist that Britain declare her war aims? Is it merely to afford a basis of an American war alliance with her? No. Of course, if we are going to have such an alliance, such a declaration should manifestly precede our entering into it. But our purpose in asking for Britain's war aims is not war, but peace. The American people desire above all things that the war shall stop, shall stop without victory for either side, and that it shall be stopped by reason and hope, not by exhaustion in a military stalemate. A statement of war aims is an instrument of such a peace. I do not believe that any thoroughgoing effort has yet been made for a negotiated peace. Attempts have been made for appeasement, but not for peace.

A negotiated peace based upon the principle of appeasement would be only a precarious and unstable armistice. For America to go into this war on terms of any set of war aims which envisage only appeasement is to act like a silly moth drawn into the flame, or like dumb sheep following other sheep to the slaughter. America is not concerned with appeasement, whether of Hitler's Germany or of Churchill's Britain. For this country to conceive its role as the protector of Great Britain's ascendancy in the power politics of a crumbling world order is to court for ourselves the fate which Secretary Morgenthau fears may soon overtake Great Britain. America's entrance into this

chaotic world scene, panoplied with armament and with no other purpose than to smash Hitler, will only prolong the death agony of an order that is already doomed.

How much longer, gentlemen, must the hell of fire burn in Europe, before America learns that all this talk about preserving civilization—it has been said in testimony given by a Christian scholar here before this committee, "In preserving Christian civilization"—how much longer must this go on before America learns that all this talk about preserving civilization by "crushing the Kaiser" or "smashing Hitler" is only angry and futile sentimentalism? How could civilization be more utterly destroyed than by modern war? Before we act, therefore, we must look forward to the consequences of our action.

I wish now to suggest that it may help us to look forward to the consequences of our action if we will stop a moment to look backward. "Let us suppose"—as the children say—let us suppose that Great Britain stood again at Munich. What, in the light of the experience of the past 18 months, would her statesmen do if they stood again at Munich? Even today, while Britain's fate is still in the balance, her statesmen must wish to God that they could go back to Munich and do it all over again.

Instead of offering Hitler a sop to appease him, would they not like to say to Hitler and the German people something like this:

We, of Great Britain, are ready to unroll the whole map of Europe—the political map and the economic map of Europe—and to explore the possibility of a basically new order of political and economic life for all our peoples, including Germany; if you, Herr Hitler, will join us in such an undertaking we promise that Great Britain will participate in such a radical reconstruction of our way of living together, and whatever sacrifice of national and imperial privilege its accomplishment may require.

Would not Great Britain, I ask you, like to be in a position today to say just that to the German people?

But suppose Munich proved to be too late to make such an offer, with any hope of its acceptance? Suppose Hitler would have taken it as an evidence of military weakness at that moment, and pressed his ambition for power still more relentlessly. Then let us carry our supposition back farther. Let Britain go back to the moment when the Weimar republic was tottering, or back to the days of the Dawes plan, or all the way back to Versailles, gentlemen—back as far as may be necessary to find the German people in a mood to respond to a sincere offer of justice. Would not Great Britain and France like to be able to go back and do it all over again? There is not a French or British statesman who would not go back and do it all over again—this time not in terms of appeasement, but in terms of sincere search for a constructive peace. But they cannot go back! The processes of history are irreversible. No, alas, they cannot go back!

Gentlemen, I am not merely indulging my fancy and trespassing upon your patience by all this talk about "going back" and "doing it all over again." My reason for picturing this fanciful supposition is to say as vividly as I can something about America. What I want to say is that America is already back—not in fancy, not in supposition, but America is already back in literal fact—back where Britain and France wish to God they might be! America stands today at Munich! Or, if you will, ten years, aye, twenty years before Munich! We stand where Britain and France once stood—at the beginning of a sequence of decisions whose end proved, in their case,

to be war and sorrow and the destruction of everything precious in civilization.

America is in a position where we can do it all over again! We have no commitments, save those unauthorized commitments which the President may have made. America had no part in the sequence of decisions which led Europe into war. It is not our war. We were not consulted at any of the stages leading to the final decision by Britain and France which caused Poland to go down to destruction rather than give up Danzig and the Corridor.

For America now to make her decision inside the framework of a situation which she had no part in creating, to rush to the support of the crumbling order with our flesh and blood and our resources of military might would at best only prolong the death agony of an order already doomed, and at worst carry us down with it.

It is in America's power to find a better way. We can choose to prolong for a time the old order which carries within itself the inevitability of still other wars, or we can wholeheartedly contribute to the constructive realization of the new order which is struggling to be born. I believe it is the duty of Congress to help the American people to make their decision in the framework of this larger and more realistic scene. This cannot be done unless the debate is lifted out of the fantastic setting in which it serves the purposes of the administration to have you consider it.

America's interest is peace, not war, and her primary devotion is to peace. She is not interested in appeasement. Every intelligent American knows that the forces which have surged up in the present world will not be satisfied by flinging sops to Cerberus, or casting this bit of territory or that to the hungry wolves. Genuine peace requires that a whole new order for Europe shall be envisaged. Such an order has got to be defined sooner or later. If not now, it will have to be defined at the settlement of the war. Why should not Britain define it now? Why not announce it now as a means to peace, rather than as a consequence of victory?

No man can foresee the effects of such a declaration made now. Let Britain tell the United States—she need not speak directly to Hitler, unless she wants to—let her tell the United States what kind of world she is fighting for, and will pledge herself to achieve, especially what she proposes to do in the reconstruction of Europe, what sacrifices she will make and what sacrifices she expects others to make.

Before committing this country to the proposals involved in this bill, it will then be America's supreme duty to explore the possibility of a negotiated peace on the basis of Britain's declared war aims. It is not fantastic, I say, to imagine that other belligerent peoples will ask: Why should we continue to fight when even our enemy is willing to cooperate in achieving such a world of justice and peace without further bloodshed?

Specifically, what, then, shall America do? To this question, my answer is, in just a paragraph, that Congress should uncompromisingly reject this bill and its basic assumptions that we are already virtually at war. Congress must retain its constitutional power as our first line of defense against dictatorship. It should write and pass a genuine defense bill constructed on lines of national defense. The rational and patriotic alternative to the course envisaged by the President's bill is for the United States to preserve its full freedom

of action, meanwhile preparing itself against an incalculable future by building up its own defensive strength and working out an economic order of justice and contentment for all its own people. It will thus insure the inner strength of America, as well as her armed strength, for whatever emergency may arise. This war, I affirm, is not America's war, and Congress should take no action which Great Britain or the world or the American people may interpret otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison?

Senator HARRISON. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I believe not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. Not one, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No questions. Nobody could improve on that statement.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Doctor one or two questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Doctor, the Christian Century is an organ of the Disciples of Christ, is it not?

Dr. MORRISON. No; it is not the organ of any denomination.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You yourself belong to the Disciples Church?

Dr. MORRISON. I belong to the denomination called the Disciples of Christ; yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is the same organization in which my father was an elder, for years.

Dr. MORRISON. He was a very distinguished member of our denomination.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Also, my grandfather was an original member of that faith.

Dr. MORRISON. I know that to be true.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He was an original disciple of Alexander Campbell, whose followers were long called "Campbellites."

Dr. MORRISON. Yes. Your father extended courtesies to me when he was a member of the House of Representatives here in Washington.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In spite of the fact that you, yourself, are a member of the Disciples of Christ, is it not a fact that the

Christian Century has more subscribers among Protestant ministers than any other publication in the United States?

Dr. MORRISON. Oh, yes; very many more.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And in spite of the fact that you, yourself, are a member of the Disciples of Christ, it is a fact, is it not, that you have been invited frequently and have appeared as an honored guest at the meetings and conventions of the many other Protestant faiths?

Dr. MORRISON. Oh; very many more than among the Disciples of Christ; yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Doctor, I shall not ask you to give us a detailed list at this time, but you have appeared before the Baptist convention?

Dr. MORRISON. Oh, yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And before the Methodist conventions, both North and South?

Dr. MORRISON. Many times.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Also, the Presbyterian conventions?

Dr. MORRISON. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In fact, you have appeared as an honored guest before every Protestant faith?

Dr. MORRISON. I know of no denomination before whose gatherings I have not appeared many times, as well as the great interdenominational and ecumenical bodies like that at Oxford and Edinburgh, where I was a delegate in 1937.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Doctor, could you tell us offhand a few of the gatherings before which you have appeared, among Protestant bodies all over the world? I will not press you on that, because I know you are not prepared on it.

Dr. MORRISON. I can hardly think of any that I have not appeared before, Senator. I have appeared before the quadrennial conferences of the Methodist Church, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, and many different bodies of the Southern Methodist Church, the Southern Presbyterian Church, the Lutheran Church, and I can hardly recount the number of them.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I was sure you would not have any list handy, here, Doctor.

Dr. MORRISON. No.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. But let me ask you this. In connection with this bill, and in connection with this whole movement of the United States toward war, the term "pacifist" is frequently used as a term of opprobrium. Outside of the designation "pacifist" to a man who really desires to keep out of war, are you a pacifist, any more than I am, or than Senator Tydings is, whom I see sitting before me, or than many more of the men who wore the uniform of the United States?

Dr. MORRISON. I may be a little bit more of a pacifist than you are, Senator Clark, but I am not sure about that. I am not a pacifist, however, in the definition of that term as one who is absolutely opposed to participation in war; and the Christian Century is not a pacifist organ.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are in favor of any measures that may be necessary to make the United States impregnable against attack from any source?

Dr. MORRISON. I am.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And you are perfectly willing to have the United States if necessary go to war to effect our mission of defending ourselves in this hemisphere?

Dr. MORRISON. Yes. I have no quarrel with that position at all. I would personally consider the circumstances and issues that are involved, and I would also explore the possibilities of a pacific settlement of whatever issues or circumstances may be involved, but if America were attacked, I would feel that I ought to participate in the support of her defense.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And you are by no means of the opinion that if the defense of the United States involves it we should not go to war?

Dr. MORRISON. My answer is that I am of the opinion that if the United States is attacked we should go to war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Yes, sir. I gathered that from your statement.

Dr. MORRISON. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Thank you, Doctor.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your appearance, here. You may be excused.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Thank you particularly for your paper.

Dr. MORRISON. Thank you. Thank you so much.

Senator NYE. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that at this time Miss Fay Bennett may be called.

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Fay Bennett is not on the list, Senator. We must get through with those on the list.

Senator NYE. I beg the Chair's pardon. I was informed that she would be called next.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Will the Chairman announce at this time who is on the list?

The CHAIRMAN. I am about to call those on the list.

Rev. Lodge Curran.

I believe that Mr. John T. Flynn is not here yet.

Is Judge O'Brien in the audience?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Judge O'Brien is in the building. He is up in Senator Wheeler's office. I advised him that he was not likely to be called, because I understood Miss Fay Bennett would be called. He can be brought down here within 5 minutes, I am certain.

If the Chair will advise the committee as to who is on the list of witnesses, about which the committee has never been advised, I think it might be very helpful to the whole committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair desires to state, Senator Clark, that the subcommittee has conferred about the witnesses, and Senators Johnson and La Follette, members of the subcommittee, had arranged for these witnesses, and I thought that if they were here they should be called.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I am entirely in sympathy with that. I certainly do not wish to impinge on the prerogatives of the subcommittee, but I understood that this week was to be given to the opponents of the bill. If there is any suggestion that we are running out of witnesses, I should like to have an opportunity of knowing who is on the chairman's list.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I shall say to the Senator from Missouri that I have on the list for tomorrow Governor Alf Landon.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am speaking now about today, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I have called all the names on the list for today, except that I did not call Judge Mathews. I understood that he was with Judge O'Brien.

Senator JOHNSON of California. He is not here.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not here.

Who is the witness you wish called, Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. I hoped that Miss Fay Bennett might be heard. She was in the room just a minute ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Fay Bennett.

STATEMENT OF FAY BENNETT, SECRETARY, YOUTH COMMITTEE AGAINST WAR

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Bennett, would you give your name and your connection with any organization to the reporter?

Miss BENNETT. Yes; I would be glad to. My name is Fay Bennett, and I am here as a representative of the Youth Committee Against War.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that committee, please?

Miss BENNETT. I would like very much to say that the Youth Committee Against War is made up of sincere American young people who are devoted to the principles of democracy and who want to see this country kept out of war, because they believe that America's destiny can best be fulfilled by an America at peace.

We are absolutely opposed to all forms of totalitarianism in our devotion to democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the committee located? Where is its headquarters?

Miss BENNETT. Our national headquarters are in New York City.

The CHAIRMAN. New York?

Miss BENNETT. Yes. We have branches throughout the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you have a statement that you wish to make to the committee?

Miss BENNETT. Yes; I have.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, and you will not be questioned until you have finished your general statement, if you wish to follow that course.

Miss BENNETT. I should like to make clear the exact nature of the Youth Committee Against War—which I am representing today. It is an organization representing some hundreds of thousands of American young people who are firmly dedicated to the ideals of democracy and who are vigorously opposed to every form of dictatorship, whether Hitler's, Mussolini's, or Stalin's. We want to keep this country out of war because we believe that such a policy alone can promote the defense of the United States and make possible a genuine contribution to the welfare of the rest of the world.

Our opposition to the lease-lend bill is based upon the powers which it gives the President, both in matters of foreign policy—which we believe to be war powers—and in matters of domestic policies, which we believe to be virtual dictator powers. Our opposition is also based

on our denial of the assumption upon which the bill is based, namely, that the defense and security of the United States rests with what happens to countries several thousand miles away.

There are four main arguments which proponents of this bill have advanced since its introduction:

1. We hear first that the fall of Britain would make a successful German invasion of this country inevitable.

Now, I do not come here today as a military expert. Men older and better informed than myself have already told you that the present naval building program will make America virtually impregnable against attack by the time which will elapse before Hitler can organize the coalition of forces necessary for such a campaign. I commend their sober judgment to you.

2. The bill is supposedly designed to send increased aid to Britain immediately. But William S. Knudsen has already testified that it cannot speed up production for a long time to come—and certainly not in time to make any difference in our shipments to meet the much-talked-of spring crisis. If speed-up is what is wanted, why do not the proponents of this bill ask for it specifically and openly? Why should we give the President powers which he may use over every aspect of our domestic and foreign affairs?

3. The bill's supporters have told us that its purpose is to aid democracy in the fight against totalitarian aggression. Although no one would deny the right of England, Greece, or China to fight for their independent existence as nations, we are not too sure that democracy is the issue. Is there anyone here who will argue that complete democracy pervades every part of Greece or the British Empire? What is more, we are asked to give the President discretion to aid any country "if he deems it in the interest of our defense." The recent lifting of the moral embargo against Russia is an indication of the lengths to which the State Department is prepared to go in the defense of democracy.

There is another aspect of American defense which I would prefer to see discussed here. In recent months we have heard of the "strategy of terror"—the elaborate machinery by which Hitler and his agents have spread confusion and hysteria in the minds of democratic peoples. Some friends of the lease-lend bill have pointed out that the enemy is already here; that, even if he cannot invade America from across the sea, Hitler can take advantage of internal weakness to crush us at home. Our own democracy, they tell us, in short, is too weak to survive in the face of a Nazi Europe.

I agree that our danger is from within. So convinced am I of the realness of that danger that I have been shocked to hear responsible officials spreading hysteria with dark tales of our weakness in face of Hitler's might. Hitler has no better friends than those who would confuse America by calling some of its most patriotic citizens "ap-pause" and agents of the Nazi dictator.

Yes, I agree that our danger is from within. For that reason the defense of America cannot be separated from an offense against our unsolved problems at home. The thousands of young people who await their future in the long lines outside the employment offices of the Nation, the farm boys chained to a land which has no room for them, the Okies who ride hungry on California's wide macadam roads, the faceless boys and girls on the street corners of New York—here, gentlemen, the dictators find their greatest allies.

This is a bill to promote the national defense by aiding democracy in its fight against the hunger and repression of dictatorship all over the world. Yet what are we doing for democracy here in America?

I know no more eloquent critic of the effect of a war economy on the social and civil life of a nation than President Roosevelt himself. Remember his Chautauqua speech:

Nevertheless, if war should break out again in another continent, let us not blink the fact that we would find in this country thousands of Americans who, seeking immediate riches—fool's gold—would attempt to break down or evade our neutrality.

They would tell you—and, unfortunately, their views would get wide publicity—that if they could produce and ship this and that and the other article to belligerent nations, the unemployed of America would all find work. They would tell you that if they could extend credit to warring nations that credit would be used in the United States to build homes and factories and pay our debts. They would tell you that America once more would capture the trade of the world.

"Fool's gold" is a good phrase. In ten years it will have a poignant ring to people of my generation. In the best days of the New Deal there were nearly four million young men or women with neither jobs nor hopes. The arms factory is no more an answer to their problem than the army camp.

That answer cannot be postponed. I am convinced that few generations in our history have as much love for and faith in the best of the American tradition as my own. But America cannot forever ask us to stand in her trenches because we have no real place in her workshops.

Today the great majority of young people have no future that is not bound up with the military system. The National Youth Administration—once a new deal for youth—is now an adjunct of the War Department.

Yesterday I learned on unimpeachable authority that the Administration's next bill will provide for total conscription, to include girls as well as boys. This system of compulsory labor camps comes straight from the pages of *Mein Kampf*; it is a basic part of the concept of a slave state.

I say again that if we want to defend democracy we must make democracy worth defending. We must not, in the name of defending democracy, establish dictatorship. Democracy today in the United States is little more than a farce to those who happen to be sharecroppers, or Okies, or Negroes, or slumdweller, or jobless. If democracy—and this means economic as well as political democracy—is not to be possible for these millions of disinherited and disfranchised Americans, the day may soon come when freedom will also cease to exist for those who criticize the Government's policies.

Nor can we spread democracy with the bayonet. No invader in history has carried freedom in his saddlebag.

In the Youth Committee Against War we have chosen the path of peace, security, and freedom. For these things alone we, along with the great mass of Americans, are proud and glad to fight.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison?

Senator HARRISON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. What is the name of the organization you represent?

Miss BENNETT. It is the Youth Committee Against War, the youth section of the Keep America Out of War Congress. We have been in existence for about 3 years, ever since the war emergency began to seem very real.

Senator CONNALLY. You are an officer?

Miss BENNETT. Yes. We have a national office, which is in New York City, and we have several district offices——

Senator CONNALLY. You are an officer?

Miss BENNETT. Yes; I am. I am executive secretary of the Youth Committee Against War.

Senator CONNALLY. You are on a permanent status?

Miss BENNETT. Yes; I am.

Senator CONNALLY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. Did your organization take any position with respect to the repeal of the arms embargo and the enactment of the present neutrality law?

Miss BENNETT. Yes. We took a position against the repeal of the arms embargo on the ground that that was one of the steps that would help break down our neutrality.

Senator BARKLEY. Did your organization take a position with reference to selective service?

Miss BENNETT. Yes. Our organization was opposed to peacetime conscription on the ground that it was not necessary for American defense.

Senator BARKLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no questions, Miss Bennett, you may be excused. We thank you for your appearance.

Miss BENNETT. I would like to thank the committee for allowing both myself and another representative of this generation to give our views on this important bill.

STATEMENT OF HERBERT A. O'BRIEN, CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK COMMITTEE TO KEEP AMERICA OUT OF WAR, JAMAICA, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge O'Brien, will you give for the record your name, address, and connections?

Judge O'BRIEN. Herbert A. O'Brien, 152-01 Eighty-Fourth Drive, Jamaica, New York City; chairman of the New York Committee To Keep America Out of War.

My personal occupation, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. You may give it, if wish to, Judge. It is very well known to the committee, but you may put it in the record if you want to.

Judge O'BRIEN. Justice of the Domestic Relations Court of the city of New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to ask any questions, Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Judge.

Judge O'BRIEN. During this conference and in discussing some of the angles of this momentous question I know any remarks, however blunt they may appear, that I may make in the presentation I am sure will be received in the same gracious spirit that the members of this committee would undoubtedly receive if they were in my place discussing the matter before some other august body.

In the brief time allotted one can only touch the high lights of the situation new in the history of this nation. This committee is facing a puzzled and bewildered nation, or, rather, to put it more accurately, perhaps, a puzzled and bewildered nation is facing this committee—a nation so divided, so befuddled, and so without accurate information as to create a unique national unity—a unity of suspicion, a unity of a keener scrutiny of their representatives in Congress, who they are, what they say, why they say things they say. Before this keen scrutiny the toga and the title of office, gentlemen, disappears, and the nation, with a deadly earnestness and even, as the last speaker indicated, a dangerous earnestness, is examining each representative in Congress no longer as a representative but as one American facing the other.

A bewildered nation has read the minority report of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives. Those reputable members, over their written signatures, declared bluntly that the lend-lease bill will lead us into a war, and they say a war that cannot be repealed, a bankruptcy that cannot be repealed, and a dictatorship which cannot be repealed.

Now, the magnitude of this irretrievable disaster which these honorable American representatives declare will follow the passage of this bill alone and by itself should lead this committee to reject it with horror. These honorable Congressmen, in their report, quote the statement of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and I quote:

This is too much power for a bad man to have, or a good man to want.

But besides those Congressmen signing the report, other eminent statesmen of long and distinguished public service not only reaffirm the minority report but in effect and in substance publicly charge the President of the United States with using this bill to plunge the nation into war; and, what is even more shocking, to destroy the constitutional government of this Republic and to establish a dictatorship.

Those favoring the lend-lease bill freely acknowledge the vast, unheard-of powers which will supersede Congress and be placed in the hands of the President—they concede these vast, unheard-of powers—but they declare that the President will never use them, or some of them. Well, it is as plain to the great United States, from here to California and down to the Gulf of Mexico, that the Congress has no power to abdicate its powers to the President, nor has the

President, by the same token, any moral or legal right to ask for such powers or to assume to exercise them. But the sinister fact that shocks the American people is that the President himself has prepared this bill and has demanded these powers.

Senator Wheeler, that distinguished Democrat, has revealed some things that have startled the nation, and around him are gathering millions of Americans who for the first time are beginning to listen and hear things they never thought existed. He says bluntly that the result of this bill will be a dictatorship and war. He says boldly that it is a plan to plow under every fourth American youth.

A startled nation has begun to hang upon his words, for apparently, under the rule of Chairman Bloom of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House, information of the greatest value to this nation has been suppressed.

Following Senator Wheeler's statement came the announcement from the War Department that a contract for 4,500,000 metal tags had been let to identify casualties. Why, that announcement fell like a pall upon every home in America. Its significance was not misunderstood when they tried to explain it later.

Following this Senator Wheeler revealed to a startled and angry nation that the few planes that we have and are now in use were not leak-proof and were nothing but flaming coffins. An ordinary American does not understand the techniques of that, but he understands what he said.

Secretary Stimson's reply was both tragic and pathetic. He declared that Senator Wheeler had not informed the American people that the Navy Department had the materials on hand necessary to make the airplane gas tanks leakproof. Secretary Stimson did not reveal when he would begin to attempt to make these gas tanks leakproof.

Analyzing the bill itself, the powers given to the President are so astonishing as to excite derision, incredulity, and then a deepening sense of outrage and insult so far and so deep and so Nation-wide as to make a calm and orderly analysis difficult. One would think, on the face of the bill, that its instant rejection would follow.

One would think—and I say so most respectfully—that the rage and fury of a peaceful industrial people being quick-triggered into war would be a strong warning to the proponents of the bill to desist. For, if we are trying something that has only a chance of irretrievable disaster, then the logical and inescapable sequel of this bill may be civil war.

You heard the previous speaker. The great American people are not going to be quick-triggered into a war willingly and tamely. Let us do a little thinking.

I am going to ask that Mr. Goodwin, who came with me, be given a few minutes to give you an idea of the situation in New York, where the civil war is on already.

Now, Secretary Morgenthau said the other day, and it was reported in the press, that unless we can help Britain she must cease fighting.

That brings up this question. This morning's London Times has demanded from the British Government to state its war aims. What is it fighting for?

Well, if the British people cannot learn what the war aims of the British Government are, what logic, what sense is there in this com-

mittee's supporting war aims which even the British are unacquainted with?

Now, this bill have been analyzed many times by eminent men, and yet to the ordinary American who would just take it up on its face, apart from the derision which it excites, it sweeps away all law, by section 3: "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may," as he sees fit, do thus and so.

Qualify it with "in the interest of national defense;" Congress is perfectly able and well-fitted, with the scores of eminent statesmen there, to handle those problems as they come up.

Moreover, in section 3, article (1), not only can the President take complete control of the United States of America, but apparently that power extends to the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States. But the whole financial structure collapses under the provisions of this bill.

Let me read section (5), subdivision (b):

The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory.

Why, he is going to run the whole United States. He is going to run every plant, every factory, every store, every ship; and here is the point at which the financial structure collapses:

The terms and conditions * * * shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

Let me read that again:

and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit.

This country's industrial structure is founded upon money, upon dollars, upon payments for goods—not in indirect payment, not sunshine, not make-believe protection money.

The airplane manufacturer must have money to meet his pay roll. Those men must have money to meet their rent and pay the grocery man. This destroys the financial structure of this country—collapses it.

He is able, under the powers of this bill, to take these munitions—tanks, planes, wheat, cotton—every conceivable kind of products of the workmen of this country.

How is he going to pay for them? It says he shall pay for them out of the United States Treasury. How is he going to get it back into the United States Treasury?

Look upon the whole financial set-up now. When I was a bank director we were compelled by law to keep 10 percent of government bonds in our bank in order to be able to liquidate in a hurry if we needed money. Now, watch the statement of J. Pierpont Morgan; watch the statement of the Chase National Bank; watch the statement of the Commercial Bank; watch the statements of the banks in Philadelphia and Boston—a rising tide of government bonds, so that they now equal 40 percent of the assets of the people.

Those bonds are promises to pay. They mean in effect that they have already absorbed 40 percent of the entire capital of the United States.

What are we going to go to war on? Absorb the rest of the earnings and the savings of the people?

Senator Carter Glass said to Morgenthau—and it was reported in the paper—"You know," he said, "that you blackjacked"—these are not his words, but the substance—"the banking institutions into taking these government bonds. They are loaded with them now."

Morgenthau then said, "How do you account for the high price?"

Carter Glass said, "You have kept it up with wash sales." 40 percent of our assets are already consumed. The entire savings of all the citizens of the United States amount to only 25 billion dollars. Yet I see by the paper that that sum will carry us along until 1942.

What is going to become of the country? Who conceived this thing? Where is the former situation which would give it the slightest justification?

Furthermore, still talking about this bill, section 6 says, as I said a moment ago, that the President is authorized to appropriate from time to time any money out of the Treasury. What treasury? They haven't got a cent, except as they take it from the banks and take it from the people.

Furthermore, it allows warships to be repaired in our own harbors. What is to prevent the Germans from sending a warship into the harbor after the other warship, bringing the war into our country?

President McCracken, of Vassar College, says it is a huge conspiracy to destroy our country.

Do you suppose the people of this country are not listening to all that? Do you suppose they are not listening to the debates night after night on the radio? The debate between Senator Pepper over the Forum of the Air, only Sunday night a week ago? The other debates, to which there has not been a single, logical answer to the questions propounded by Norman Thomas? The debate last night in which Sokolsky outlined the whole dangerous situation? When we go into this war it is not like the last war. In the last war we had France with us, we had Italy with us, Portugal, Belgium, Japan, Russia, and Serbia. Thirty-eight million soldiers fought by our side in the last war. Then the United States had unlimited credit. Then we had no national debt—just a small one. Then we had the powerful advantage of the great French Navy. Then we had the powerful advantage of the Japanese Navy. This time we would enter into the world war alone. This time we go in plunged in debt. This time we go in outnumbered by millions. This time Hitler and a united continental Europe confronts America with deadly hatred, from the icy waters of the Arctic Ocean down to the currents of the Adriatic.

On the entire European coast there is not a single foot of available land open to an American or British expedition, and there is a starving Europe—starved by us, gentlemen.

The neutrality bill was nothing more or less than a deal with the British people by which we would starve Norway and Sweden and Denmark and Holland into surrendering their ships, just as they want our ships now—starved by the British blockade, made effective by the neutrality bill, passed at the insistence of the President of the United States.

Europe is watching every move that we are making with a deadly horror and disgust, as countless Dutch, Belgians, Swedish, and Irish—where my ancestors came from—are starved.

That neutrality bill was passed to make effective the British world blockade. By cutting off the food supplies of these small nations, they thought they would be forced to send their shipping into Britain, as they did in the World War. It did not work. Mindful of the starvation imposed—the Swedes and the Norwegians—how they fought. The women fought soldiers with their bare hands, because we cut off the grain. Norway and Sweden—without fuel oil, without lubricating oil, without food, and the whole Christian structure of those nations tottered, while Britain and Lansing and Wilson secretly conspired to cut them off.

This time they tried it another way, through the neutrality bill. It did not work. They promptly threw themselves into the hands of the Germans. Somebody telephoned to Norway that it was not Germany, it was somebody else, and they surrendered.

Holland stopped. Belgium stopped. France withdrew when she saw the British soldiers deserting her, and they surrendered to Germany.

Now the British blockade and the neutrality passed by this country are starving Europe, and the people are appealing to God, and there is a curse upon those people who are responsible.

The British blockade is countered by the German submarine campaign. Look at the record of the sinkings. They far outnumber those of the British.

Our further entry into the present war through the passage of the lend-lease bill makes it almost certain—the controversy is going on at this minute—the French Navy will be released. The dispute between Petain and Laval is upon the release of the French Navy to meet this bill. It is just as plain as the nose on your face.

Franco seizing both sides of Gibraltar. Doesn't that mean a thing to men who study? How long will it take them to close up the space of 9 miles? All the British have left is the rock itself.

If we enter the war and Britain is defeated, what will be our position? What will the American people do? How will they feel toward those American politicians who have betrayed them? How will 130 million people in their fury feel? What will they do?

What intelligent American can say now that Britain and America are certain to succeed in a war? A war conducted remote from our shores with Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan, France, the most powerful military nations in the world, fighting us and upon their own ground.

The continued statements that we must fight them in order to keep them from coming over here is the most deceitful and transparent British propaganda ever offered to delude an unsuspecting, wholesome people.

Since Germany with her huge army of 6 million men finds it difficult to invade England with but 20 miles of water between them, how can any European nation hope successfully to invade America with a barrier of thousands of miles of ocean? Even the President said that there is not the slightest danger of invasion. He said so.

To enter the World War now will ruin America and destroy this Republic. The problems of Europe are not ours. To proclaim Great Britain as a democracy is a transparent falsehood. Great Britain controls 550 million people. Five hundred million of them are black and brown and yellow, without a trace of liberty, without a right to vote, held down by an overpowering military force. Britain and democracy? What a transparent falsehood!

George Washington, whose era of peace and domestic unity is now being scuttled by the enemies of this Republic, uttered many holy and inspired truths for the guidance of this Nation. One that sounds down the ages with clarion note of warning in these words is this:

It is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character.

On May 16, 1797, President John Adams sent this warning to Congress:

We ought not to involve ourselves in the political system of Europe. It would not only be against our interest but it would be doing wrong to one-half of Europe, at least, if we should voluntarily throw ourselves in either scale.

The entry of America into the war means the immediate release of the French Navy to Germany. France, enraged over the murder of her sailors and the sinking of her ships by Britain, may presently join with Germany.

You recollect that only 2 or 3 weeks ago a vessel loaded with supplies from South America left for France. That is significant. Anybody who would only read and think knows what that meant. Three times it came out, so as to give you warning. It was a vessel owned by the French Government, loaded with food for France. It went back three times, and it came out again, and finally, the fourth time, it was seized by a British cruiser within the 3-mile limit, in violation of the President's own declaration.

What was the purpose of that French vessel's coming out? To let the French people know that America was determined that she should perish.

A ruined Poland relied upon the broken promises of Great Britain. A raped and spoliated Finland relied upon the unkept promises of Britain. Both Italy and Russia in the great World War had a written treaty with Britain. Not one clause of these solemn promises in writing were ever kept. France entered into this war under the most holy and solemn agreement ever made between nations. France was left deserted, abandoned, and ruined.

How can America, in the face of these shocking repudiations by Britain, hope to benefit by any alliance with such a treacherous ally.

What did Britain do to us in the Civil War? She swept every American ship from the face of the sea, gave countenance to the southerners, and keep alive that fight for years, to the ruin of the South, hoping to split this Nation in two. We may split into three or more, simply becoming a British colony.

How can America, in the face of these shocking repudiations by Britain of sworn and sacred obligations, hope to benefit by any alliance with such a treacherous ally? No. We must keep out of the European war. We must fortify America. We must not let a single drop of American blood be shed in any foreign war. This bill, if passed, means the destruction and the ruin of our country, because all over the country has gradually seeped into the national mind a conviction that we are being quick-triggered into war by certain groups who are inadvertently betraying their country.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. Judge, from the concluding portion of your speech, I judge your belief is that this bill will get us into war and that it would get us on the wrong side?

Judge O'BRIEN. It will get us into two wars, the civil war in America, which will begin, as far as I can judge, almost at once——

Senator CONNALLY. Let us stop right there and let me interrogate you a little on that. What is this civil war that you are talking about? You say it has started in New York already.

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes. There is a boycott among the Italians. They hate the other side. And the other side hates them. Businessmen are ——

Senator CONNALLY. Who is the generalissimo of the insurrection?

Judge O'BRIEN. It does not have to be a generalissimo. It is being incited among Americans——

Senator CONNALLY. You say we are having a civil war?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you believe there will be a civil war in the United States?

Judge O'BRIEN. I do not believe the American people will allow themselves to be blackjacked into war without a severe protest.

Senator CONNALLY. What do you mean by "civil war"?

Judge O'BRIEN. I do not believe the American people will allow themselves to be blackjacked into this European war without a violent national convulsion.

Senator CONNALLY. You said "civil war." Do you mean this country will break out into two armed camps and have a civil war in the United States?

Judge O'BRIEN. I can't foretell what the extent will be.

Senator CONNALLY. You said it had happened. You did foretell.

Judge O'BRIEN. That is my opinion.

Senator CONNALLY. What right have you to say that?

Judge O'BRIEN. Because the 22 million people who voted against war are, in my opinion, convinced that this country should not allow itself to be blackjacked or quick-triggered into any European war.

Senator CONNALLY. You realize that in the last election most Presidential candidates advocated all possible aid to Britain?

Judge O'BRIEN. Well, one candidate, by trickery, deceived the people into believing he was against war.

Senator CONNALLY. Which one was that?

Judge O'BRIEN. Wilkie; and the President himself said he was against war. He took practically the same stand.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, they held the belief that they could give aid to Britain without getting into war?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes. Both of them, I think, not only deceived themselves but they deceived the American people.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you think that was malicious or on purpose?

Judge O'BRIEN. I do not know the background.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you expressed a pretty able-bodied belief. Do you believe they did it intentionally?

Judge O'BRIEN. I have no opinion to express upon that. Draw your own conclusions.

Senator CONNALLY. I am trying to get your conclusions. I have had conclusions all the time. I am just trying to get yours.

Now, you are talking about having England give us our war aims. Do you know the war aims of Hitler?

Judge O'BRIEN. No.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you want to know? Why do you not call on him to give his war aims also?

Judge O'BRIEN. I only know the peaceful aims of America.

Senator CONNALLY. I know, too. In your statement here you are demanding that Great Britain make known her war aims. Why not call on Mr. Hitler to make his own war aims known?

Judge O'BRIEN. Britain declared war, didn't she?

Senator CONNALLY. But Mr. Hitler has been making war.

Judge O'BRIEN. If war was declared by him, I assume——

Senator CONNALLY. There was not any war declared until after he attacked Poland, was there?

Judge O'BRIEN. No. What has that got to do with America?

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you have been talking about the whole world.

Judge O'BRIEN. What has that got to do with America? That is what I would like to know. What Poland did or what happened in Europe—what has it got to do with America? England promised help to Poland, and the French Government said that we promised help to France if she would get into this war. Daladier said so.

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Hitler also attacked Czechoslovakia.

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes; and Russia gobbled up Lithuania and all those small Baltic states. Not a word about that. Why don't you ask me about that, Senator?

Senator CONNALLY. I may do it if you answer what I am asking now. I will get to that later. So you are not concerned with Mr. Hitler's war aims, are you?

Judge O'BRIEN. I do not know what they are.

Senator CONNALLY. Therefore, you ought to know. You demand that Britain tell us her war aims. Why do you not call on Hitler for his war aims?

Judge O'BRIEN. The British people are demanding——

Senator CONNALLY. Are you speaking for the British people?

Judge O'BRIEN. I am not speaking for anybody but myself and my people.

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Mussolini has some war aims, too—he did have; I do not think he has now. Why do you not call on Mussolini to tell his war aims?

Judge O'BRIEN. I am only interested in America.

Senator CONNALLY. I do not want to get into war.

Judge O'BRIEN. Tell us our war aims when we get into war.

Senator CONNALLY. We shall know them when we get in.

Judge O'BRIEN. Why not know them before you get in?

Senator CONNALLY. Congress can declare war, and only Congress can declare war.

Judge O'BRIEN. Not only, under this bill.

Senator CONNALLY. Certainly, because there is no power given to declare war under this bill.

Judge O'BRIEN. Power is given indirectly. It is very clear. A child can see that.

Senator CONNALLY. What is that?

Judge O'BRIEN. A child can see that.

Senator CONNALLY. You take the bill. You have read it and studied it. Point out where a child's keen eyesight can locate that.

Judge O'BRIEN. Well, if you want to go over it again-----

Senator CONNALLY. Do not go all over it. Find out this one step.

Judge O'BRIEN. By giving these powers to the President to give aid to every country on the face of the earth. If that does not mean war-----

Senator CONNALLY. Are you quoting the bill now?

Judge O'BRIEN. That is the substance of it:

To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards * * * any defense article for the government of any country.

That takes in the whole globe.

Senator CONNALLY. Is there not any other limitation about it at all?

Judge O'BRIEN. That the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

Senator CONNALLY. That is quite a different matter, is it not?

Judge O'BRIEN. Why put it in one man's hands?

Senator CONNALLY. If you are going to authorize aid to Great Britain somewhat along these lines, in whose hands would you put it to do it?

Judge O'BRIEN. Congress.

Senator CONNALLY. That is fine. Congress would take care of the manufacturing of these supplies itself?

Judge O'BRIEN. No. It does not have to do that.

Senator CONNALLY. How?

Judge O'BRIEN. The ordinary normal course of business.

Senator CONNALLY. The ordinary normal course of business now is that when we want some battleships we authorize the Secretary of the Navy, who is a member of the President's Cabinet, to build the ships, do we not? We do not do it ourselves.

Judge O'BRIEN. Of course, that is elementary.

Senator CONNALLY. If we want some arms or munitions for the Army, we turn it over to the Army, do we not?

Judge O'BRIEN. We do.

Senator CONNALLY. And the Army is under the command of the President, is it not?

Judge O'BRIEN. It is.

Senator CONNALLY. The Navy is under the command of the President, is it not?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. So we do normally, in most elementary fashion, turn the production of these things over to the President every time we pass a bill for the Navy or Army?

Judge O'BRIEN. You are dodging the issue.

Senator CONNALLY. No; I am not.

Judge O'BRIEN. You are dodging the issue, and I will put it up to you right now.

Senator CONNALLY. I am putting it up to you. Is it not true that when we pass a law to get something for the Army or Navy we empower the President to do it?

Judge O'BRIEN. Of course we do, but we do not empower the President to aid every country in the whole world.

Senator CONNALLY. We shall get to that in a minute. You want to put it in the hands of Congress?

Judge O'BRIEN. Not put these provisions in the hands of Congress.

Senator CONNALLY. Let us take it seriatim. If you want to get these supplies, you have to get Congress to get them?

Judge O'BRIEN. Supplies for whom?

Senator CONNALLY. For us.

Judge O'BRIEN. Certainly.

Senator CONNALLY. They are ours. We dispose of them, do we not?

Judge O'BRIEN. Sure.

Senator CONNALLY. Then, if we want to put them at the disposal of Great Britain, we authorize the President, as commander in chief of the Army, to turn them over under this bill. Whom else should we authorize?

Judge O'BRIEN. You should not put it in the hands of anybody. It should be Congress.

Senator CONNALLY. You are not in favor of putting it in the hands of anybody?

Judge O'BRIEN. Congress.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not favor this bill?

Judge O'BRIEN. I do not favor it at all.

Senator CONNALLY. There is nothing in it to put it in the hands of Congress. Your idea is not to do anything?

Judge O'BRIEN. You are just joking about it now.

Senator CONNALLY. You are against the bill?

Judge O'BRIEN. The bill is a dangerous bill. It creates a dictatorship and will drive us into war, and the American people won't stand for it.

Senator CONNALLY. Are you against it or for it?

Senator CONNALLY. Are you against it or for it?

Judge O'BRIEN. Against it.

Senator CONNALLY. There is nothing you are in favor of to put it in the hands of Congress or anybody else?

Judge O'BRIEN. You asked that question.

Senator CONNALLY. You were against the neutrality repeal, were you not?

Judge O'BRIEN. I was.

Senator CONNALLY. You made a speech down here against it, did you not?

Judge O'BRIEN. I did.

Senator CONNALLY. Were you against the conscription bill?

Judge O'BRIEN. No.

Senator CONNALLY. Are you for that?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. Did you come down here and make a speech before the committee?

Judge O'BRIEN. No. I was also against packing the Supreme Court.

Senator CONNALLY. You were on the right side once, anyway. You were for the so-called conscription bill, were you?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes. What has that got to do with this?

Senator CONNALLY. I am just trying to find out your international attitude on these matters; that is all.

Judge O'BRIEN. You've got it.

Senator CONNALLY. I got it after some difficulty; I'll say that.

Judge O'BRIEN. Not on my part.

Senator CONNALLY. If we have as hard a time getting into this war as getting you to answer, we won't get in it.

You are a judge of domestic relations in New York City?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You seem to have been giving a good deal of time to foreign relations as well as domestic relations.

Judge O'BRIEN. If we mix our foreign relations along the lines of this bill, we will have no domestic relations.

Senator CONNALLY. Is that why you are fighting the bill? You do not want your job lost?

Judge O'BRIEN. I do not need the job, Senator. I made a living before I got that job and I can make one afterward on another job.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Judge, Senator Connally interrogated you to some extent about the matter of war aims. Now, it is a fact, is it not, that we once got into a war, about a quarter of a century ago, without knowing what the war aims of our prospective allies were? Is that not true?

Judge O'BRIEN. Not only did we not know, but we did not have the brains or sense or foresight to know those Allies had made a secret agreement between themselves to divide up the earth. We did not know that. We did not even know that there was a secret treaty concealed from us by Great Britain, a treaty which they signed before we got into it. They hid it from us, just as they may be hiding a lot of things now. You are quite right, Senator.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Judge, is it not a fact that it was repeatedly stated, in the public press and in the debates in Congress leading up to the declaration of war on the part of the United States and upon our entering the last war, that it would never, never be necessary for us to send troops abroad?

Judge O'BRIEN. That is quite true.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And within 10 days after our entrance into the war, by a declaration of war, was it not disclosed to us that if we did not send troops immediately or as fast as we could our Allies were going to be sunk?

Judge O'BRIEN. That is true.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Now, is it true—and this is a matter of public press, which has never been denied—that about 2 weeks after our entrance into the war in 1917—possibly I should make the time a little longer; within a month—Earl Balfour disclosed to Secretary Lansing the fact that the British and the Allies had entered into a lot of secret agreements, which were afterwards the bases of the Versailles Treaty?

Judge O'BRIEN. That is true. That information was given by Balfour when he came to this country, after we had been in the war.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. After we were completely engaged?

Judge O'BRIEN. Up to our neck.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. So far as you know, was that ever disclosed to the people of the United States or the Congress of the United States or anybody else before our entrance into the war?

Judge O'BRIEN. It never was.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am speaking now of the secret agreements contained in the Balfour memorandum.

Judge O'BRIEN. The secret agreements were never disclosed. They were made public when the Bolsheviks seized the Russian Government and found the secret agreements there and made them public for the first time, long after the fall of the Russian Czar. They had been hidden and made secret and kept secret, and they never revealed to President Wilson that, like a lot of fools, we were engaged in a war to cheat us and cheat the world.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is it not a fact that President Wilson arrived at the Versailles Conference and was confronted by a lot of secret agreements and that he said—and I am perfectly willing to take his word, because he never lied in his life, that I know of—that he did not know anything about them, although they had been conveyed to Secretary Lansing some two weeks after our entrance into the war?

Judge O'BRIEN. That is quite true. He expressed horror at not having known about these secret agreements.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Senator Connally has interrogated you about the provisions of this bill. Do you have the bill before you?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You do not have any doubt, do you, that the provisions of this bill authorize the President to enter into any sort of alliance that he pleases?

Judge O'BRIEN. I have not the slightest doubt of that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Read the first two lines of section 3, appearing on page 2:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, do certain things.

Then drop down to line 12, page 3:

The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

Now, Judge, do you have any doubt that, reading the section as a whole, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may transfer any of these things on any terms he pleases, and the

benefit to the United States may be any benefit, direct or indirect, which the President deems satisfactory?

Judge O'BRIEN. I think, Senator, that not only does that destroy the financial structure of this country, but it also destroys the treaty-making power of the Senate. It allows the President, under these terms, under that section (b), to make any kind of treaty he likes with any nation in the world, on any terms that he sees fit, excluding Congress from any participation in it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am not assuming at all that the President would do it, but under this bill he is granted power, if he wishes to do it, to transfer any part of the United States Navy to any power, on condition that they quit calling us Uncle Shylock or naming the street in Paris again, as they formerly did, for President Wilson?

Judge O'BRIEN. I think that clause is most vicious in its interpretations and implications. It simply robs Congress of all of its powers. Section (5), subdivision (b), and section 3, subdivision (a) strips Congress of all power, except as the President may want to do this, that, or the other thing. And the tragedy of it is, Why does he ask it? That is what the American people are asking now.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you think, in view of our past experience, the United States would ever again be justified in forming an alliance in which we would lend out tremendous materials and resources to any country, unless we knew in advance what the complete aims of that country were?

Judge O'BRIEN. That would seem to me to be the only logical, fair, commonsense base upon which to proceed.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Judge, the term "appeaser," which originated in England, has been used by a great many people in this country as an application to everybody in this country who is in favor of staying out of war.

Does not this bill grant the President power, if he wished to use it and use the tremendous powers conferred in this bill, to act in the way of an appeasement toward Russia? Do you see any limitation as to time or space or substance in this bill?

Judge O'BRIEN. No. Section (5), subdivision (b) includes all of that which you have said.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It has been many times repeated in the press, by the very same sources who prognosticated the destroyer deal, that Great Britain was bringing pressure to bear on us to appease Russia in the Orient in order to protect the British interests there.

Does not this bill grant explicit power to the President, if he wants to use it, to give a few battleships or a few airplanes or many airplanes to Russia?

Judge O'BRIEN. Under the terms of section (5) there is no limitation. The language is:

The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory.

That includes the broadest interpretation, just as you have stated.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Of course, we all have a great respect for the President of the United States, and I have a particular respect for the President of the United States, whom I have supported three times.

However, under this bill, is it not conceivable that a man who has just gone over to Europe on his own responsibility, and visited various pubs and danced the Lambeth Walk and visited various palaces, if he were President, might use these powers really to form an alliance to get the United States into a war?

Judge O'BRIEN. It seems very logical.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is all.

Senator GILLETTE. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette.

Senator GILLETTE. Judge, in response to the interrogations of the Senator from Missouri, and I believe in your main statement, you gave it as your impression that the effect of this bill, if the authority granted was acted on, would be to bring us into at least partial alliance with Great Britain?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. Holding that belief, it is perfectly logical for you or anyone else holding that belief to ask for what Great Britain's war aims are?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. In response to inquiries from the Senator from Texas, Senator Connally, as to why you did not inquire into the war aims of Mr. Mussolini or Mr. Hitler, if there was legislation pending here which in your judgment would bring us into partial alliance at least with Mr. Mussolini or Mr. Hitler in a war enterprise, you would feel it perfectly logical then to inquire as to their war aims, would you not?

Judge O'BRIEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be excused.

Judge O'BRIEN. May I thank the committee for its great patience? I shall carry back to New York with me your courtesy in hearing me.

Mr. Goodwin has come from New York with me and must go back tonight. He won't take more than 5 minutes of your time. May he be heard?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. GOODWIN, DEMOCRATIC LEADER, QUEENS COUNTY, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please give your name and address and connection with any organization?

Mr. GOODWIN. My name is William J. Goodwin; 138-33 Two Hundred Thirty-third Street, Laurelton, Queens County, N. Y. I am Democratic leader in Queens County.

I presume to speak for the reason that at the last election, notwithstanding the extremely high regard I have for the President of the United States in person, for his culture, brilliance, and character, I felt that his election would mean getting into war, and I asked, over the radio, that the people of Queens County reject that idea by voting for another name. In my talk I was specifically careful to say what that name was. The result was that in my county, which was over four and a half to one democratic, the opponent carried the county, meaning that 200,000 Democrats voted the way that I did. As a lifelong Democrat, it was very difficult.

The breaking of the third term tradition has given the President unprecedented prestige. To add to this the limitless powers of the lease-lend bill would give to him power not only to help England but also any country he might select.

He has announced that he believes he is leading a world-wide crusade for democracy. This bill would give him the authority, constitutionally belonging to Congress, to declare war on the side of any country selected by him as a "democracy".

For example, he has designated Greece as a democracy. Greece is an absolute dictatorship. He has designated China as a democracy. In a democracy the citizens have a vote. Who ever heard of a Chinaman voting?

Moreover, China is drenched with communism and its government is dominated by Russia in a great part, which leads to something very interesting.

For years prior to September 1, 1939, our metropolitan newspapers referred to Russia as a democracy. They were grouped in the news with France, England, and ourselves—that is, until that date when Joseph Stalin shook hands with Adolph Hitler.

There was reference to Russia as a democracy in spite of the fact that all churches of the Christian religion were destroyed, the marriage institution in practice was abolished, and private property privileges were extinct in that "red" land of capitalistic ruin.

Moreover, after that deal was effected between Stalin and Hitler, our President stated that he regretted the end of the great democratic experiment in Russia.

Are we to expect—and there have been certain indications of it—that red Russia will be welcomed back to the fold of democracies if Stalin breaks with Hitler? In passing, I want you to know that I have nothing but detest and contempt for the unspeakable Hitler.

Certainly, however, this administration has shown great affection for the other dictator, the greatest destroyer of Christianity since Nero, first by recognizing Russia, since then by chastising her for the rape of the Baltic states and Finland by a diplomatic slap on the wrist, and lately by lifting the moral embargo—yea, more than that, we recently shipped machine tools, so needed by our national defense, to Russia.

The newspapers of our city failed to get excited over this, with one or two exceptions. Why?

I make bold to tell you why. Our administration does not appear to hate "red" bolshevism. Our metropolitan press, such as the Tribune and the Times in New York, do not appear to hate red bolshevism.

As an American citizen, born here, and my parents born here before, I hate and detest all bolshevism, whatever color, red, brown, or black shirt.

Then, gentlemen, why the partiality toward red bolshevism by our newspapers in the city of New York and by certain members of this administration?

I make bold to tell you. We are flirting with Russia, or certain of our administration members appear to be flirting with Russia, in the hope of an alliance.

There is some indication of a hidden alliance either already made or in the making among Britain, Russia, and this, or part of this, administration.

I say "this administration" advisedly, because, in my humble opinion, an alliance with Russia will never be consummated with the people of the United States behind it.

Perhaps, as Senator Clark suggested, the administration will attempt to commit us to such an alliance, if the lend-lease bill is passed, by sending arms to Russia. But I assure you that so long as I am alive and men like me are alive, this country will never willingly embrace red Russia in an alliance.

If you think I talk vainly, let me describe some conditions to you in New York City. We have in our city approximately 400,000 people born in Russia, about 350,000 people born in Italy, about 250,000 people born in Germany, about 250,000 Polish born, 250,000 Irish born, and 700,000 others born in various foreign lands and who have either a love for or a hatred for certain foreign lands. In fact, some of them hate foreign lands and foreign leaders more than they love the United States.

Gentlemen, seriously, New York City is a veritable powder keg. Our entrance into this war might touch it off. This bill will lead us into war.

Many distinguished men, educators, legislators, and other people of importance think so.

Consider what New York City will be faced with in view of such a population as we have and in view of the intense racial and religious feelings that exist in our city today.

Moreover, I give you some thoughts for consideration. The F. B. I. is supposed to be active. I hope earnestly that they are, because in New York City our municipal administration is permeated with communism. The schools, the welfare department, and the police department are at present infected with communism. The Rapp-Coudert committee is exposing the conditions in the schools. The welfare department communist scandal is supplying current newspaper headlines. Key positions in the police department are filled with civilians who have access to, if not control over, any and every message going through police channels.

I wish you would summon a few New York City policemen and detectives for a secret hearing, and perhaps you would stay awake for a few nights after listening to their testimony. You would at least start to wonder what would happen in New York City if we went to war against or on the side of Russia.

Russia has more influence in certain sections of our city and in certain departments of our government than has the United States Government itself. I hate to say this. This may not be so distasteful to some of those in the Administration and in the newspaper world who have been thinking, if not working, hand in glove, with the Ambassador from Russia and with Russian agents and certainly with Russian ideas.

Is it fantastic to say that there are those who would welcome an alliance with anti-Christian Russia when one recalls that Si Gerson, an avowed Communist, stayed on the pay roll of the city of New York for years in spite of the protest of our citizens, especially the American Legion, while neither the Federal Administration nor the State Administration or the city of New York did or said anything about it?

The President of the Borough of Manhattan defended Gerson's presence on the pay roll and defied public opinion by keeping him on.

To conclude, in view of the opinions expressed by so many eminent public men that this bill is designed to create a dictatorship and to lead us into war, it might, even before that, prove the spark to touch off the powder keg that is New York City.

Senator Connally, I have great respect for you. I think you are one of the greatest debaters we have had. But Judge O'Brien was not talking through his hat when he said it might even lead, at least in our city, to civil war.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Judge O'BRIEN. May I leave with the committee an account in the daily press of 3,000 people who protested this bill? May I file these with the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be filed.

The committee will hear no other witnesses this afternoon, but we have some matters to put into the record:

Senator JOHNSON of California. I desire to submit two letters that have been received by me. The first of these letters is from John Bassett Moore, 960 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y., January 25, 1941, and it reads as follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR JOHNSON: I have received today your letter of January 21 enclosing a copy of the lend-lease bill.

The bill, which may, as it expressly provides, be cited as "An act to promote the defense of the United States," is entitled "A bill further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes."

By section 2 the term "defense article" includes "(1) any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat," "(2) any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production," of any article described in the subsection, "(3) any component material" etc., and (4) "any other commodity or article for defense."

By section 3, subsection (2), the President is empowered, "when he deems it in the interest of national defense," to authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government, "to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of," to "the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States," "any defense article" mentioned in the preceding categories.

By section 3, subsection (5), clause (b), the "terms and conditions" on which a foreign government is to receive the authorized aid are to be "those which the President deems satisfactory," and the "benefit to the United States" may be in the form of "payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory." This, in effect, embraces everything from selling or lending to giving away. Anything and everything might be given away where, in the thought of the President, there was any kind of "direct or indirect benefit."

By section 4 a foreign government to which title of possession is transferred must include in its contract a clause that it "will not, without the consent of the President, transfer the title to or possession of the articles in question to another government, without the President's consent." This naturally does not include the case of an involuntary transfer, such as capture by an enemy of the government to which the article was sold, lent, or given.

The provisions of the pending bill, as just summarized, require no extended comment. They speak for themselves. The phrase "aircraft, vessel, or boat" is broad enough to include, and apparently is intended to include, those built and equipped for military purposes, including men-of-war, without limitation of the number, so as potentially to embrace the Government's entire force. It is further to be remarked that the provisions heretofore quoted obviously authorize the sale, transfer, exchange, leasing, lending, or other disposition for purposes of offense as well as defense. It is a matter of common knowledge that, where two nations are at war, each professes to fight defensively rather than offensively, and, even if it fights "offensively," it regards itself as doing so in self-defense. It is proverbial that military commentators often speak of "offensive" fighting as being in certain situations the best defensive fighting.

By the Constitution of the United States there is lodged in the Congress, and not in the President, the power "to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." Likewise there is vested in the Congress the power "to raise and support armies," "to provide and maintain a navy," and "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."

The terms of the pending bill in effect embody a proposal that Congress shall abdicate the exercise of the foregoing powers, if not expressly, at any rate by indirection. No question more momentous could be presented for the consideration of the Congress, as it involves not only the form but the substance of our Government; or, to use the historic phrase, the question whether we shall have a government of laws or a government of men.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) JOHN BASSETT MOORE.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Mr. Moore is sick and is unable to be present, and I offer that for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be entered in the record, without objection.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Now I offer and will read the second one, from Edwin Morchard, 144 Edgehill Road, New Haven, Conn., January 25, 1941, addressed to:

The honorable the COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

GENTLEMEN: Senator Taft telephoned me yesterday inviting me to appear before the committee to testify on the so-called lend-lease bill. As I am unable to make such arrangements, I promised to give you by letter a short expression of my views on the bill. I write purely as a private citizen.

It is painful to have to comment on the bill. The emotions underlying the bill are probably shared by most of the American people. And yet the methods adopted are calculated to disintegrate the United States internally and expose it to unlimited danger externally. President Hutchins of Chicago called it "suicidal," and I fear this is no exaggeration.

The bill authorizes the President to make military alliances with any foreign nation for any purpose or on any terms that he sees fit, and to place at the disposal of such nation or nations any part of the military establishment of the United States. Most of the operative parts of the bill authorize acts of war, such as supplying government arms or vessels to foreign nations and repairing and outfitting foreign vessels in American harbors. Section 6 contemplates unlimited appropriations.

Since the country has been assured that it is not the President's purpose to put the United States into war, then the President, it is respectfully submitted, should not ask for the power to commit acts of war. If it is the intention to put the country into war, or if the risks of war are knowingly run, then it would be more forthright and cheaper for Congress to declare war on the particular country or countries on the blacklist and advisedly take the responsibility and the risks. But you cannot, I think, authorize the commission of flagrant acts of war and leave the country under the impression that you are not engaging in war. Nor can the Congress under the Constitution transfer the war-making power, or the Senate transfer the treaty-making power, to the President. Especially the power to make military alliances should be retained by the direct representatives of the people.

So far as concerns the international aspects of the problem, it is too bad that the President wants this extraordinary power. The responsibilities involved are so great that I should think he would wish to share them with the Congress. The bill, in my opinion, is a direct brain child of the jaundiced philosophy of article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant, which implied that the good countries would in common deliberation choose the "aggressor," i. e., any nation in revolt against the status quo, and then combine to starve, suppress and if necessary exterminate such "aggressor." The assumptions involved in this philosophy were extraordinary, having no roots in history or experience. But it captivated the imagination of many fine American citizens, who were unwilling or unable to penetrate the postulates and the consequences of such a policy. It was superficial in the highest degree. It necessarily required war to implement it. But whereas under article 16 foolhardiness was safeguarded by the assumption of unanimity among the assembled nations, there has been a tendency in this country for some years to assume the sole management of the policy of selecting and then suppressing

aggressors. This was strongly manifested in the desire to chastize Japan in 1931 and to impose sanctions on Italy in 1935. It reaches its apotheosis in this bill. It is a policy which has already made enemies for the United States in many parts of the world and is calculated to engulf the country in more or less permanent war for objects that cannot be defined. It is disheartening to think that such destructive policies have taken command of a nation of reasonable men and women. President Hutchins of Chicago hinted at its results internally. I believe it will be equally disastrous externally. The good intentions behind the bill do not neutralize its almost inescapable consequences. A wise man remarked: "The excesses of virtue are more dangerous than the excesses of vice, because they are not inhibited by the restraints of conscience."

Very respectfully yours,

(Signed) EDWIN BORCHARD.

The CHAIRMAN. During the examination of the Secretary of War, he was asked to supply for the record certain information. This occurred in the open session. His letter indicates what he is now furnishing the committee.

Let this appear in the proper place in the record.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I am perfectly willing to reserve the request, if the Chairman thinks it is more proper, until we are in executive session, but with all due respect to Secretary Stimson as a lawyer—I know he has had a great deal of legal experience—it seems to me it would be better to get an opinion of the Attorney General, and I propose to make that motion at the proper time.

If the chairman desires to have it disposed of now, I shall be glad to do it, or if the chairman desires to have it disposed of in executive session, I shall be glad to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no objection to this, have you? The Secretary is undertaking to cite those statutes which affect the Military establishment.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I understand that, but, with all respect to the Secretary of War, I would much prefer to obtain it from the Attorney General as to any laws which may be suspended or are suspended.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection to asking the Attorney General for such a compilation?

Senator BARKLEY. This memorandum is one prepared by the Judge Advocate General of the War Department, just as the one that we filed this morning from the Secretary of the Navy was prepared by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. With all respect to both the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Army, I would like to have an official opinion of the Attorney General. I know in times past the Attorney General has refused to give information on these matters, but it seems to me it ought to be requested.

Senator CONNALLY. Would it be any better than this opinion?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It is more conclusive.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, the committee will call on the Attorney General and ask him to furnish it, if he can do so or will do so.

I think, in that connection, the Attorney General might well be supplied with the documents already submitted by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. It might assist him in some way.

Among some of the organizations that wished to appear and have not been listed for appearance before the committee is the National League of Women Voters. They send a statement containing one

page and three lines, merely expressing their approval of the pending legislation.

If there is no objection, that will be introduced into the record. (The statement is as follows:)

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF S. 275

FROM THE

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS

On January 16 the National League of Women Voters announced its support of the so-called lease-lend bill. On January 30 it announced its approval of the House committee's amendments to the bill.

The League of Women Voters is a Nation-wide organization composed of 31 affiliated State leagues and some 600 local organizations. For 18 years members of the League of Women Voters have been seeking substitutes for war. The program of the organization adopted by delegates from the State leagues first called for cooperation by the United States with other countries in efforts to find peaceful means for settling international disputes.

As the situation in the world changed and cooperation for prevention of war failed, the league members turned temporarily from their insistence upon international cooperation and through the adopted program of work stated their belief in unilateral action by the United States against war-making nations. Therefore the League of Women Voters worked for repeal of the arms embargo in the summer and fall of 1939.

At its biennial convention in the spring of 1940 the league again announced its support of a foreign policy as a nonbelligerent which permits discrimination against aggressors and favors the victims of aggression. It is under the authority granted by this statement of policy that the League of Women Voters is supporting the lease-lend bill.

The League of Women Voters recognizes that "the act to promote the defense of the United States" is of such far reaching implications that it cannot be operated without sacrifice, public and private, present and future, comparable to the sacrifices demanded by war itself. We are convinced that it is not an act providing for war. On the contrary, it is a substitute for war, and the great powers conferred upon the President leave him free to carry out his repeated pledge not to take this country into war.

By MARQUERITE M. WELLS,
President.

FEBRUARY 6, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson has handed me a very brief statement by Mr. John B. Trevor, of the American Coalition. Mr. Trevor himself desired to appear or to have someone appear for his organization. We found that impossible, in view of the crowded condition of the calendar made up of witnesses.

If there is no objection, that will be introduced into the record at this point, together with the resolution expressing the views of the American Coalition, adopted at its annual meeting in Washington, D. C., January 27, 1941, with particular reference to H. R. 1776, but to the pending bill as well.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

Mr. Chairman, I represent the American Coalition. The headquarters of the society are in room 701 of the Southern Building, Washington, D. C.

The bill now before this committee was considered at the annual meeting of our society which was held in the Carlton Hotel on January 27.

A resolution in opposition to H. R. 1776 was unanimously adopted on that occasion. This resolution has, I notice, been printed in the Congressional Record and referred to your committee. To save the time of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I will with your permission file a copy of this resolution for the record and speak directly to the bill.

ARGUMENT

We regard this bill as a confession by its proponents that democratic processes of government have failed. Therefore, we cannot accept the political philosophy which is the real basis of this bill. We contend that personal government is Hitlerism. If the members of the committee desire, they can find the argument for the administrative principles underlying this bill well set forth on pages 435 and 436 of the first, complete, unexpurgated, English edition of *Mein Kampf*. That fact condemns this bill for us and we suggest that it is sufficient to justify the defeat of this bill.

We oppose this bill, Mr. Chairman, because we see in it a counterpart of the Enabling Act adopted by the Reichstag on March 24, 1933, under which Hitler governs Germany by executive order.

The definition of defense articles in this bill is so comprehensive and the powers delegated to the President to administer their production and procurement—notwithstanding the provisions of any other law—are so enormous, that we contend the passage of this bill represents a virtual abdication by Congress of its constitutional functions.

We believe that the clause in the House committee analysis of this bill which reads: "This term"—that is, defense article—"does not include men nor does any other provision of the bill deal with the utilization of our armed forces" to be without foundation in fact or law.

We make this contention because paragraph 2 of section 3 (a) specifically authorizes the President to transfer any defense article to a foreign power and the provisions of the bill place no limitation as to the place or method of transfer. There is clearly, we contend, an implied power here to transfer defense articles abroad and to transfer these articles which include ships, armed or unarmed, under their own steam and manned with American crews.

The proviso "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law" of course nullifies any and all prohibitions now in force against entering the war zone.

The powers delegated to the President to strip our Navy of some or all of its ships—to strip the Army of its guns and the air force of its planes and give them to a foreign power at war with a country with which we are at peace, cannot be defended as measures of defense or grants of aid short of war. Why, Mr. Chairman, these powers violate every elementary principle of international law. More than that they violate our statute law. I refer specifically to section 11 of the United States Criminal Code.

Let me give you one citation, Mr. Chairman, from the greatest living American authority on international law, John Bassett Moore.

"The obligations of a neutral state may be embraced in 'three classes, involving, respectively, Abstention, prevention, and acquiescence.' By the first of these the neutral state is 'bound not to supply armed forces to a belligerent; not to grant passage to such forces, and not to sell to him ships or munitions of war, even when the sale takes place in the ordinary course of getting rid of superfluous or obsolete equipment.'" (International Law Digest, vol. VII, sec. 1288, p. 863.)

In short, the exercise by the President, of the powers conferred upon him by section 3 (a) of this bill, would be acts of war.

We contend, Mr. Chairman, that if Congress in its wisdom, determines that it is in the paramount interest of the United States to participate in Europe's eternal wars or that we must fight Japan—not in our interest but in China's interest and back of China in the interest of Communist Russia's ambition to dominate all of China to the Yellow Sea, then Congress should assume the responsibility conferred upon it by the Constitution of the United States and declare war.

We believe, Mr. Chairman, that any exercise by the President of the powers granted in paragraph 3 of section 3 (a) to outfit or recondition "defense articles" of some belligerents and exclude others, not only violates our statute law (sec. 11, Criminal Code) but raises the spectre of the Alabama claims.

I need hardly recall to the memory of this committee that because the British Government acquiesced in the outfitting, arming, supplying and reconditioning of commerce raiders in private British yards, the Geneva Court of Arbitration awarded the United States \$15,000,000 damages.

Under the provisions of this paragraph, Mr. Chairman, the President is authorized to repair, outfit, or otherwise place in good order any defense article for any government. Obviously, such an act would constitute a far more flagrant violation than any act committed or permitted by the British Government between 1861 and 1865.

Here again, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that this bill is a bill to make war and not a measure to give aid short of war.

The last section of this bill, Mr. Chairman, on which I wish to comment, is section 6.

The members of the committee are of course aware that the House committee reporting H. R. 1776 contends the language of this section as written does not constitute an appropriation. True, this section is merely an authorization of future appropriations. As such, it overcomes a possible technical objection to the consideration of some future appropriation proposed in Congress. But as this section stands, we are of the opinion that the language is tantamount to a blank check on all the moneys heretofore appropriated by Congress. Indeed, morally speaking, it serves notice on the country that in pursuance of the purposes of this bill, the President is justified in calling upon the Congress for the expenditure of the very last dollar that may remain in the Treasury of the United States.

As I do not wish to intrude too much upon the patience of the committee, I will refrain from making any suggestions for the revision of this bill and simply conclude by saying that we contend S. 275, as now drafted, is un-American in conception, subversive of our representative republican form of government, and wholly unnecessary to accomplish its alleged purposes of rendering aid short of war to any belligerent.

¹Resolution adopted by the American Coalition at its annual meeting in Washington, D. C., January 27, 1941--H. R. 1776]

Whereas the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8, subsection 12, provides that the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years; and

Whereas H. R. 1776 authorizes the appropriation without the limitation of time of all the moneys of the people of the United States deposited in the Treasury, not otherwise allocated by Congress, for expenditure by the President in his discretion in the national defense; and

Whereas the dictatorial powers conferred upon the President by H. R. 1776 place in the hands of one man authority to lend or give away any defense article, including military or naval equipment of all kinds, to any power and give the President authority to commit every act of war except the actual sending of troops and ships of war into battle; and

Whereas these dictatorial powers conferred upon the President violate the spirit of the reservation of war powers to Congress, as set forth in article I, section 8, subdivision 11, of the Constitution of the United States, and, in general, tend to subvert the whole basic philosophy of our fundamental law; and

Whereas these powers, if conferred upon the President, will have the effect of destroying our republican form of government in this country and making our Government totalitarian, just as was the case in Italy and in Germany under similar conditions of alleged emergency; and

Whereas the grant of such powers is not essential to the supply of any war material, to foreign countries, which may possibly be spared in the present emergency; Therefore be it

Resolved, That, while the American Coalition favors the extension by our country of all appropriate aid to nations which the American people desire to serve in this hour of peril, it opposes all attempts to give such aid through the employment of dictatorial, totalitarian or unconstitutional methods, and be it further

Resolved, That the American Coalition condemns any legislative or executive action which under the plea of combating totalitarianism abroad, creates totalitarianism at home.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one other brief statement by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, representing two thousand societies, requesting that its views be entered in the record of the hearings, without personal appearance.

If there is no objection, that will be entered. This organization is expressing itself as favorable to the bill.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, representing over two thousand societies, respectfully submits for the consideration of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations the following:

We believe that the passage of the pending bill, H. R. 1776, on the aid to be given by the United States to the peoples of the British Commonwealth of Na-

tions, Greece, and China is part and parcel of an absolutely necessary plan to protect ourselves, to lead to the collapse of the designs of the aggressors for world domination, and to bring about conditions where America could more successfully insist upon further realization of a world order based on democratic ideas, so dear to our people.

We have in mind the liberation of international trade, equality of access to credits and raw materials; as well as to sea lanes and sea ports for all nations, efficacious administration of international law, general improvement of the standards of living, international organization for the protection of health, safeguarding of interests of backward races, development of democratic institutions and procedures, guaranties of civil liberties, recognition of minority rights; self-determination of peoples combined with a measure of economic unification, outlawing of aggression.

On this occasion we call attention of the American people to the necessity of restoration of independence and self-determination not only for nations whose present sufferings, trials and tribulations are well known, but for all enslaved peoples, including more than 40 million Ukrainians who have been so often forgotten in the past. Economic unity of nations and self-determination of peoples should be the two cardinal principles of reconstruction of the world. The failure of Europe and of the part of American public opinion to thoroughly grasp the difficult, but right, and American-proclaimed program of international economic cooperation, reconciled with the idea of national self-determination and political democracy at the end of the first World War is one of the main causes behind the present war. If this failure continues, America will have to resign herself to becoming an armed camp because recurrent bloody world upheavals are bound to ensue and they will threaten our very existence.

We believe that the enactment of bill H. R. 1776 is an imperative step toward the perpetuation of American traditions, toward the attainment of American ideals, and toward the defense of American interest; therefore, we urge you to favorably and speedily report, without fundamental changes, this defense measure to the Senate. A free America cannot grow now in a world half free and half slave.

To take a comprehensive view on the problem facing the people of the United States today, the security and the development—nay, the very independence of America—depends, we believe, upon the continuation of the country's reform work now in progress, on the outcome of the present World War, and therefore, upon our preparedness and aid given to the peoples of the British Commonwealth of Nations and others struggling for freedom, and upon the kind of peace that follows.

Senator PEPPER. Before the Chair takes up the other subject, I think all the Senators have received a communication from Assistant Attorney General Norman M. Littell.

Has the Chairman noticed his communication as Assistant Attorney General?

Senator GUFFEY. It was handed around about an hour ago.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not recall reading it.

Senator PEPPER. Perhaps the Chair might reserve it for a later time, but I wanted to move that that information, included with Mr. Littell's letter, be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not read it yet.

Senator CONNALLY. I think we should examine it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a rather lengthy document.

Senator PEPPER. That is all right. I withhold that request until the Senators have a chance to examine it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I have examined it, Mr. Chairman, and I shall oppose it, because it is an ex parte statement in answer to a statement made on cross-examination by a witness before this committee; and when the motion is made, I would like to be present and have a chance to oppose it.

Senator BARKLEY. You are a little incorrect there, Senator. It is a speech made on January 25 in Chicago, some days before Colonel McCormick testified, and it was sent over here on the theory that

what he said on that date conflicted with what Mr. McCormick stated yesterday.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I shall be very glad to discuss it.

Senator BARKLEY. I do not want to insist that it go in the record. I do not know whether it should go in or not.

Senator PEPPER. I withhold the motion until a subsequent time.

The CHAIRMAN. I would appreciate it, Senator Pepper. It seems to be a lengthy statement, and I would like to examine it. We shall have an opportunity to discuss it.

(Thereupon, at 5:10 o'clock p. m., the committee commenced a discussion on other matters, and an adjournment in the present hearing was taken until tomorrow, Saturday, February 8, 1941, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1941

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Hon. Walter F. George, presiding.

Present, Senators George (chairman), Harrison, Connally, Thomas of Utah, Van Nuys, Murray, Pepper, Barkley, Reynolds, Guffey, Gillette, Clark of Missouri, Glass, Byrnes, Johnson of California, Capper, Shipstead, and Nye.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wagner, Senator La Follette, Senator Vandenberg, and Senator White, are absent on account of illness this morning. Senator Green is out of the city today. The other members of the committee are here, or will probably report later.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALF M. LANDON, FORMER GOVERNOR OF KANSAS

The CHAIRMAN. Governor Landon, you have been invited to appear before the committee this morning, and if you have a formal statement which you desire to make, you may make it before you are asked to respond to any questions. The committee is glad to have you, and you may proceed in your own way, through such formal statement as you wish to make on the bill before the committee.

Mr. LANDON. I thank you for the invitation, Senator.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, congressional committee hearings are for the purpose of informing not only the Members of Congress but the people.

The American people are divided into three great groups by the lease-lend bill. Members of one group favor the bill as written. Another oppose it. A third has not made up its mind. Generally all agree that our future would be less difficult if Britain were to be victorious. For that reason the vast majority favor aid to Britain in some measure.

Before the election the aid to Britain discussed was limited. The lend and lease bill permits unlimited aid. This is a distinct departure from the promises of the campaign. Therefore, the national policy decided in the last campaign was limited aid to England. There was fundamental agreement on that policy. The national policy on unlimited aid was not decided because it was not an issue. But this bill permits unlimited aid. That is one of the compelling reasons I am opposed to it.

In view of the foreign policy outlined in the President's fireside chat and message to Congress, I believe Congress should keep control of the aid we send England. There was nothing even remotely hinted in the last campaign that we were to gamble on being involved in war. That issue never went to the jury. If for no other reason, there should be the fullest debate on this bill. After the World War there grew up a very prevalent feeling that we were tricked into that war. For the sake of national unity now we must not do anything to encourage that feeling.

Party lines disappear in the consideration of the bill, as they should in a matter which ultimately may involve life or death reaching into every home.

Members of these three groups are exercising the great American privilege of disagreeing with each other. All are equally sincere and earnest and patriotic.

There should be no politics in the consideration of the bill. The election was over last fall, and the citizens who opposed President Roosevelt for reelection have accepted the result as Americans always do. It remains for those who supported him to adjourn politics.

Democracy cannot grow strong in defending itself if its right arm of full and free expression is tied to its side.

I do not appear before this honorable committee with the thought that I can contribute to the information you already possess, or can easily acquire, on what is popularly known as the lend and lease bill. I appear more as a private citizen to protest against the organized attempt that is being made to suppress public thinking and public opinion in this country on the bill before you.

Every Republican who is opposing the bill is being accused of doing so from partisan or petty factional motives. We are constantly being urged to put our country above our party, the inference being that we are not, because we do not accept--hook, line, and sinker--the proposals of the President.

Never in all our history--not even in the tragic and bitter Civil War era--have we witnessed a President attempting to gag the mouth of a brilliant and sincere member of the United States Senate, as we are now witnessing in the continued attacks from the White House on Senator Wheeler.

Objective debate on the bill is being lost sight of. Apparently, from the flood of propaganda, and mounting tide of confusion and hysteria, those who are opposed to the bill have only a short time in which they will be able to speak. Naturally, an issue meaning life and death to millions of American homes is being discussed with all the intensity that deep conviction on such issues produces. Families are divided. Political parties are divided. But today freedom of debate and discussion on this subject is being discouraged in America by the flood of Government propaganda and war hysteria.

I think it is necessary that we meet this situation frankly and seriously. I do not think any worse thing can happen in the conquered countries than the destruction of deliberative procedure in this country by the destruction of an opposition.

I am not afraid of taxation--incidentally, I am more afraid that taxation will not be increased--even though it lowers the standard of living and gives us a lifetime of privation. But I do not want to live in a country where personal liberty of expression, by direct or indirect

means, is being denied any citizen. And when we have reached a time when even an able United States Senator cannot lift his voice in opposition to the Chief Executive without undergoing a systematic attack to weaken his influence, I think it is time to protest.

Even in these troubled times, with the civilization we believe in cracking before our eyes, I think it is all to the good to argue things out, even though the public does wobble around once in a while. In the long run, the people's collective judgment must be right more often than wrong, if the Republic is to live.

Many of those who are for all out aid to England say, of course, we must debate, but hurry, hurry, hurry. And by innuendo, and the sly turn of the adjective, these attempt to throw on the opposition the smothering cry of partisanship or personalities as the actuating force behind the opposition to this bill. The Chief Executive has led the way, by hurling even the charge of pro-German at a leader of opposition in the United States Senate, Senator Wheeler of Montana. If this were to go unnoticed and unchallenged, there would soon be no brakes on the Chief Executive. That is not healthy at any time and under any president in a republic.

I have always believed that one of the blackest marks on the record of the Republican Party was the attempt to silence Senator Wheeler. I now denounce, as equally dastardly, the systematic attempt of another Chief Executive to silence his voice and blacken his reputation.

The difference of opinion on this bill I think is the difference in views as to what is the best interest of America. We must have deliberation in the Congress and speed in the factories.

I have seen no claim that the bill is to be any help in our first job in industrial production for national defense and aid to Britain. There has been no showing that present Executive powers are inadequate to bring defense production to its peak. Yet Congress is asked to delegate more power when the President has not exhausted the powers already possible.

Those who are for the lease and lend bill have the surface advantage of emotional, sentimental, and ethical feelings and argument. We who are opposed to the bill are not unaware that the dearest ideals of America are endangered. We realize the menace to America caused by the tragic economic and spiritual collapse in most of the world. We realize the greater the nation, the more progressive and advanced it be in terms of industry and communication, the more certain and more gravely it is bound to be affected.

I, for one, have always believed that effective isolation of such a nation from the affairs of the rest of the world is impossible.

As I said several years ago, "the duty of leadership in the maintenance of democracy plainly devolves, in a large measure on us." That does not mean guaranteeing a British victory. I also said that commerce under completely controlled arrangements has potential meanings and effects far different from those of the ordinary private commercial arrangements to which we in the United States are accustomed. In other words, State controlled barter takes the place of bayonets.

While stressing the economic feature, I think we must recognize that distribution of healthy economic opportunity is impossible without removal of the paralyzing fear of another war just ahead.

The lease and lend bill is an omnibus bill. I might be pardoned not attempting to discuss it in detail, when even members of the President's Cabinet have been unable to answer the questions of the committees of the House and Senate as to a clear-cut definition of its powers, or even the omnibus parentage of the measure.

I might cite in this connection a statement placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Barkley, of Kentucky. In that statement this sentence appears:

It does not, however, authorize the use of American vessels to deliver war materials to combat zones.

This statement may be correct, but the language of section 3 (a) subsection (2) raises a doubt in my own mind as to the complete accuracy of the statement. This section reads:

3. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

(2) To sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article.

I would call attention of the committee to the word "transfer." The language of the section is not "transfer title," or transfer possession—the word stands by itself, "transfer."

I find in Webster's New International Dictionary of the English language the following definition of the verb "transfer":

Transfer, verb, transitive: 1. To convey from one place, person, or thing, to another; to transport, remove, or cause to pass, to another place, person, or thing.

Now I am inclined to believe that Attorney General Jackson, if asked by the President if this language authorized him to direct that war materials be transported, would have to go no further than the plain and primary meaning of the word "transfer" to rule that it means transport. And a simple next step would be to hold that, considering the general and very broad purposes of the act, that would include using American ships to transport the defense articles, "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law."

Advocates of this measure have pointed out, time and again, that the President already has the power to direct the conveying of any vessels by the United States Navy, under his general powers as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. I admit that.

Then I think that logically, if the bill gives the authority to direct that defense articles be transported to any other nation, the President, if he directed such transport in American vessels, would be bound to provide those vessels with protection through convoys. In other words, I have serious doubts if, after the bill became law, the Attorney General would feel bound to follow the simple statement of Senator Barkley that, "it does not, however, authorize the use of American vessels to deliver war materials to the combat zone."

I cite this as merely one instance of the possibilities of the bill, none of the provisions of which the Cabinet officers, with the possible exception of Secretary of War Stimson, attempted to explain.

In the light of the President's fireside chat, it would seem to mean not only aid to Great Britain, which is chiefly emphasized and which most of us are for, but also getting aid to all the people of the world who are struggling for freedom and democracy. That is a horse of a different color. That involves so much that I think Congress and

the people should clearly know just where that is going to take us, and how. That is just about the biggest order any President has ever given the American people to fill. I have seen no showing that the powers in this bill are needed to bring industrial production for national defense to a peak.

I take it that the purpose of this committee is to inquire into improvements that might be made in the bill. I take the liberty of calling your attention to the proposal I made early in December, of an outright subsidy to Great Britain as part of the cost of national defense.

Of course it is to our advantage for England to win, our very great advantage, but we should not confuse what is desirable with what is necessary.

As I understand the testimony of Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, as reported in the press, this legislation is necessary because Britain has exhausted, or soon will have exhausted, her dollar exchange with which to obtain materials in this country.

If that is the case it would seem desirable under our own commitments, and in our own interest, to provide the necessary exchange, as I pointed out last December. But the fact that it might be desirable to give, or exchange, for things of value to our national defense, one, two, three, or more billions of dollars to Britain, does not to my mind make it necessary that Congress abdicate its powers under the Constitution, and grant these powers to one man, even though he be the President, unlimited.

As I stated before, in the November election the people did not vote to give unlimited aid to Britain, to say nothing of unlimited powers to the President.

I do not intend to go into specific details on the bill. The fault with the bill is not the specific details so much as the principles on which the measure seems to be based, and upon the implications it carries.

I do say that the bill, as a whole, taken in conjunction with the President's latest fireside chat, and in conjunction with the statements in his latest message to Congress, raises some serious questions that ought to be answered before such far reaching legislation is even recommended to the Senate for passage.

Is it the intention of Congress—remembering that the campaign speeches and declarations stressed aid for England short of war—is it the intention that Congress guarantee the present territories of the British Empire forever, by placing the unlimited resources of the United States—solely at the discretion of one human being—forever at the disposal of the British Government?

Is it the intention of Congress to grant this broad power to make unlimited commitments to the British Government, without any attempt to discover what that Government intends to do in the realm of world power politics, without serious consideration of where such a wide-open program might lead the American people in the future?

Is it the intention of Congress to give to the President the power to supply money, ships, planes—and ultimately, and it seems to me, inevitably, men—until the French Government is restored, and the former and future boundaries of the French Empire are guaranteed? It might be well for us to remember, before such serious commitments are authorized to be made by one man, that there is a British Empire, as well as the democracy of England; that there is a French Empire, as well as there is—or was—a French Republic.

Is it the intention of Congress to give to the President the disposal of all the resources, political, economic, spiritual, and material, of the United States until he has restored or recaptured all lands overrun by Hitler? Until Finland and Poland have had returned to them the territories taken by Russia?

Does this Congress seriously propose to place at the disposal of one man all the resources of this Nation to restore the territories of Holland—and the Dutch Empire—Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, and Luxemburg? Remember, once that one man has set in motion the forces which inevitably lead to war, Congress has no choice but to support the program; the Nation will be committed to carry on until the bitter end.

Does Congress propose to give to one man the resources of the Nation to be used until Japan has been driven out of China? Until the Communists have been run out of China? Until Russia has been pushed back to her old border lines? Until Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania are restored as democracies?

You say the bill does not give these powers. I ask you who, supporting this bill, has stated what powers it does give? If words have any meaning—words in the bill, words in the fireside chat, words in the message on the State of the Union—I say the powers are there.

I have heard it stated that it is preposterous to suggest that the President would use these powers. Then I suggest it is equally preposterous to suggest that the Congress grant these powers.

Now as to its being preposterous to assume that the President does not have it in mind to use these powers he has asked for, I assume that proponents of the bill believe the President means what he says when he sends a message to Congress; that he means what he says in his fireside chats.

I would call your attention to some passages from the President's latest message to Congress. I believe it is only fair to measure the provisions of the bill against the background of the message which immediately preceded the introduction of the bill.

In that message the President—and I must assume that his words have meaning beyond their appeal to the noblest emotions—set forth his objectives for a new world order:

A world founded upon four essential freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—

again everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic and standings which will secure to every nation a peacetime life for its inhabitants—

for the third time—everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction in armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—

this time anywhere in the world.

When that message was delivered to the world, it was commented in London that the words were noble—and they are—but that they would have to be followed by action to make them effective.

The pending bill, I presume, is at least a step toward making the words effective. To make them effective, the United States must,

by force if necessary, carry these four freedoms "everywhere in the world"; in other words, we undertake the job of policing the world.

If that is not what the message, implemented by broad and unlimited provisions of the bill, means, I am sure the country would be glad to have the sponsors of the bill tell exactly what is meant. That is fair enough. It is up to them.

And one sentence from the fireside chat-- not as binding perhaps as a message to Congress, but the words were spoken by the President of the United States:

We are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations of our security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers.

What is he going to do about this, if it happens? No one can be sure. I repeat, we should not confuse what is desirable with that which is necessary. If it is necessary, if it is essential to our security, that England win this war--then let us stop fooling around with this lease-lend bill. If we intend to tell England the Yanks are coming, the sooner we let England know it, the better we can coordinate our activities with theirs. If the Yanks are not coming, the English are entitled to know that.

If an English victory is not essential to our security, then the only fair and decent thing to do is to say to Britain, "We will help you with money and materials only, and it is your job to get them." A simple appropriation is all that is needed, if that is our only purpose. And it would be agreed to, practically unanimously.

One other thing, and I shall be through. Eighteen months ago the Declaration of Panama was sponsored by this country amidst a great ballyhoo. It was to be a grandiose Monroe Doctrine--new and surprising in its conception. Now it is to suffer the fate of so many of the plans of this administration. It is to be repealed as promptly as it was conceived. For this lease-and-lend bill, in providing for the use of our navy yards by English warships, repeals the Declaration of Panama.

I thank the members of this committee in affording this hearing, and for the time and patience you are giving to an issue that is being discussed with all the intensity that deep convictions on such life-and-death issues always produce. I know you are deeply and profoundly stirred by the sense of your responsibility. You have a tough problem, and I think you are doing a good job.

But get this Nation prepared for national defense now. Then long and seriously consider the wisdom of a "guess and be damned policy." That is what I think this bill is.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. None at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. Governor Landon, we are very glad indeed to have you come before the committee and give us your views. At the beginning of your formal statement you said that you contrasted aid discussed before the election with this bill. Aid to Britain was discussed pretty generally in the last Presidential election, was it not?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. The candidates of both major parties advocated aid to Britain, did they not?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. There were other candidates, however, who did not advocate it. There was Mr. Norman Thomas. I do not remember his pronouncements; in a way he qualified them recently. So the people in voting for the two major candidates, if that was an issue at all, approved aid to Britain, did they not?

Mr. LANDON. Limited to aid short of war; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You approved that course, did you not?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. And as I understand you now, you favor aid to Britain?

Mr. LANDON. Limited as I said; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Limited to what extent?

Mr. LANDON. I think that becomes a matter in the field of experts. I think it was rather loosely described as "aid short of war."

Senator CONNALLY. I am getting your own view. You favor aid to Britain. What kind of aid and how much aid do you favor giving to Britain?

Mr. LANDON. Senator, I think the answer to that question would take pretty near all day. We would have to have expert advice, and we would have to sit down and spend a good bit of time in discussion. I would say, just very loosely, money and materials that will not involve us in war.

Senator CONNALLY. That is very fine. You said you had submitted a plan of your own last fall for a subsidy to Great Britain. Did you mean for the Government to pay part of the cost of arms and munitions and supplies for Britain? Is that what you meant?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir; just an outright subsidy.

Senator CONNALLY. How much would you favor giving them?

Mr. LANDON. As I suggested here, one, two, three, or four billion dollars, what ever the Congress would think would be wise in view of the expert information that is available to you.

Senator CONNALLY. Whatever amount Congress would be willing to appropriate as a subsidy, a gift to Britain, you would be in favor of giving?

Mr. LANDON. I would not go that far, but I would be very much inclined to accept the Congress' view on it.

Senator CONNALLY. You said two or three or four billions, whatever Congress thought wise.

Mr. LANDON. I would be very much inclined to accept the Congress' view of it, but I would not want to commit myself.

Senator CONNALLY. You would be for it if it suited you, and if it did not suit you, you would be against it?

Mr. LANDON. That is the way most of us are. That is right.

Senator CONNALLY. I thought so. You were at one time a candidate for President?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Suppose you had been elected and you were President right now.

Mr. LANDON. No; I would not have been, perhaps. There was another election in between.

Senator CONNALLY. I think it is a fair assumption. We will just assume it.

Mr. LANDON. I thank you for the compliment.

Senator CONNALLY. We will assume you are President of the United States right now, and you want to help Britain, you are strong for aid to Britain. What would you do about it? Would you not ask Congress for some authority, some power, to aid Britain?

Mr. LANDON. Senator, that would involve, as I say—I think it would take us all afternoon to discuss that, to answer that question.

Senator CONNALLY. If you can solve that, I am willing to stay here until midnight tonight. I think that is the crux of this situation.

Mr. LANDON. The first thing I would ask you to do would be to bring in the military and the naval experts in order that I might have the benefit of their advice. If you will do that, I shall be glad to stay with you and discuss it.

Senator CONNALLY. We have had it.

Mr. LANDON. You have, but I have not.

Senator CONNALLY. But you should have prepared yourself by talking to them.

Mr. LANDON. I am afraid they would not talk to me.

Senator CONNALLY. So you do not know what you would do?

Mr. LANDON. No; I did not say that, but I do say that that enters into a field in which technical and expert information is very necessary, and I, as a private citizen, do not have the access to that information.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you not assume that the President has access to that information?

Mr. LANDON. Undoubtedly.

Senator CONNALLY. There are the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. And that he would continue to have that, whatever he might do toward giving aid to Britain?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You are not satisfied that we are giving enough aid at the present time, are you?

Mr. LANDON. Of course, you know how much aid we are giving. I do not think very many people in the country do know how much aid we are giving.

Senator CONNALLY. We are giving them aid by letting them buy and pay cash for whatever they want. That is the aid we are giving them now. We have exchanged the destroyers with them for the Atlantic bases, and after Dunkerque we did supply, or loan, or otherwise dispose of, some rifles—sold them. In other words, we supplied the British with some rifles by sale after the collapse ending in Dunkerque. Outside of that, with the exception, probably, of some trifling matters, we have not given Britain any aid. What she buys here she has to pay cash for before she takes it away from the United States. Are you satisfied that that is all the aid we ought to give Britain?

Mr. LANDON. As you pointed out, I suggested early in December an outright subsidy to them.

Senator CONNALLY. When they got that subsidy, you would not put any strings on it, they could go ahead and buy what they pleased in the way of munitions and supplies and arms and things of that kind?

Mr. LANDON. Just as they are doing now.

Senator CONNALLY. You made the point that under the bill you do not think it wise to give any of these powers unless we could know what England is going to do about her prosecution of the war, and what would happen after the war. Would you tie the same condition to the subsidy, or would you let her take the money and go on?

Mr. LANDON. With a subsidy I do not think we should make any particular conditions. Frankly, I am more interested in knowing what the President proposes to do.

Senator CONNALLY. We are at the moment interested in knowing what you think about it.

Mr. LANDON. Thank you.

Senator CONNALLY. If your proposed subsidy were in effect, you would give them two or three or four billion dollars, and the British might take it and do what they pleased with it in the way of purchasing arms and munitions and supplies and ships and airplanes, and so on, with no limitation?

Mr. LANDON. Subject to our present laws; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. We have no laws to regulate the British after they get it and take it across the water. That is very fair. I mean, you would not put any limitations on how they would run the war, or what kind of a peace they would prosecute, or anything of that kind?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. I think that is a very generous and a very fine attitude, Governor. I really do. There is not a great deal of difference between us. Basically the only difference is as to how we will implement this aid, is it not, how we shall execute the plan?

Mr. LANDON. Yes; if we give them a subsidy, that is following the traditional policy England pursued for a great many hundred years, in subsidizing other nations.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you regard an English victory as essential to our safety?

Mr. LANDON. I said it was to our very great advantage.

Senator CONNALLY. You think a British victory would be very greatly to the national advantage of the United States as a country?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. And that is of course why you are willing for the Government to give this subsidy?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you see much difference between giving money and giving what money will buy from our factories and the supplies which we may manufacture in this country?

Mr. LANDON. The chief difference would be, you would have a little more accurate accounting of where you were all the time.

Senator CONNALLY. The bill provides for an accounting.

Mr. LANDON. I say, I think we would have a little more accurate accounting.

Senator CONNALLY. You intimated that the bill would give the President unlimited control over the resources of the United States.

Mr. LANDON. I thought I had made it more definite than that. That is exactly what I do mean to say. I think it does.

Senator CONNALLY. You realize, of course, that under the bill Congress would have to appropriate from time to time the money that would be expended.

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. For the manufacture of munitions and arms, and that the President would not spend any money out of the Treasury until that was done.

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Would not that be a limitation on his authority over the unlimited resources?

Mr. LANDON. Just as I have said, once you embark on this program, Congress might have to go along; it would be in a position where it would have to go along.

Senator CONNALLY. Suppose we embarked on the subsidy plan; once we started on that, we would have to go along.

Mr. LANDON. Not necessarily.

Senator CONNALLY. Suppose we put up \$4,000,000,000, and it should take more than four billion to do the job. Would you just chop it off?

Mr. LANDON. If Congress should deem it wise, they would be in position to do that. That is the advantage of the subsidy program.

Senator CONNALLY. Once we embark on a program, you say we cannot stop. Would not that apply to your program just as well as to this bill?

Mr. LANDON. No; I think there is a vast difference. The President's message says, "everywhere in the world."

Senator CONNALLY. This bill does not indicate everywhere in the world.

Mr. LANDON. I am reading it in the light of the President's message.

Senator CONNALLY. I submit to your fairness that that speech did not intimate that the President favored the United States, by the Army and the Navy, going everywhere in the world. You agreed that the sentiments in the speech were noble sentiments.

Mr. LANDON. If he is to make them effective——

Senator CONNALLY. He did not say he was going to make them effective.

Mr. LANDON. You are not attributing the weight to the President's words that I do.

Senator CONNALLY. I realize that. I am very sure I did not. That is the reason why I am asking you about them. You construe the speech as an intention on the part of the President to send the Army and the Navy everywhere in the world. You kept quoting that.

Mr. LANDON. That is the only real meaning I can read into it, that he is to do what he outlines in that message to Congress.

Senator CONNALLY. You say that there is a good deal of feeling that we were tricked into the World War. Do you think we were tricked into the war?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir; I do not.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You recall how the German Army and Navy and the German Government sank our ships over a period of about 4 years?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir; I spoke of the general, prevalent feeling, not as expressing my own feeling.

Senator CONNALLY. But you do not subscribe to that?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You think we had a just cause for entering the World War, do you not?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. They killed our citizens, destroyed our property, and marked off a place in the ocean and said we could go in that zone, and that if we got off it they would kill us, murder us.

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. So in essence you are for aid to Britain?

Mr. LANDON. As I stated, I am for aid to Britain in the way I have outlined.

Senator CONNALLY. If we could not have it exactly that way, you would not favor any aid?

Mr. LANDON. I would not favor any aid that involved us in war.

Senator CONNALLY. No one on this committee I am sure wants our country to become involved in war more than you do; but I say, if you cannot get the exact plan you propose, are you against all other plans for aid to Britain?

Mr. LANDON. That is not a fair statement, Senator.

Senator CONNALLY. You are the one making the answer.

Mr. LANDON. I answered it. I say it is not a fair statement.

Senator CONNALLY. Let me put it in another way: I do not want to be unfair to you. I am not trying to trick you into saying anything. You cannot be tricked. [Laughter.]

Mr. LANDON. I thank you.

Senator CONNALLY. Of course, you supported Mr. Willkie last fall?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You were at the convention at Philadelphia which nominated him?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You knew his views before the election?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You know his views now?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir. [Laughter.]

Senator CONNALLY. If you wait over until about Monday we will give you the benefit of his views. I assume he will have some views and he will be here before the committee Monday. During the campaign, did you not confer with Mr. Willkie repeatedly?

Mr. LANDON. Repeatedly? No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Once, then?

Mr. LANDON. Once; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. And this matter was discussed?

Mr. LANDON. Somewhat, briefly.

Senator CONNALLY. You and he agreed that we should aid Britain, did you not?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You have not changed your mind?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Have you any reason to think he has changed his mind?

Mr. LANDON. I say, I do not know.

Senator CONNALLY. That is all.

Mr. LANDON. I might add that if he has, and we do not agree a hundred percent, I hope they will not try to purge him.

Senator CONNALLY. Purge him?

Mr. LANDON. Will not start a purge in his party.

Senator CONNALLY. Oh, in his party. I thought perhaps you meant otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys?

Senator VAN NUYS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette is not here this morning.

Senator Vandenberg is absent on account of illness.

Senator White is absent.

Senator Shipstead, have you any questions?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. No; Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. Governor Landon, I am interested in your construction of the word "transfer." You understand that the word "transfer" might imply the necessity of this country actually delivering any of the material that is going to be given to Great Britain?

Mr. LANDON. As it stands; yes, sir—by itself.

Senator MURRAY. If you entered into a bill of sale in your home city undertaking to sell some goods to a citizen at some distant point and you signed the ordinary bill of sale, would you feel that that would require you to deliver?

Mr. LANDON. Senator, as I pointed out, that stands all by itself there. I don't think I can add anything to my explanation or the legal discussion of a bill of sale in a private sale and the use of the word in the bill as it is used here.

Senator MURRAY. You understand, do you not, that the word "transfer" is customarily used in bills of sale?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir. Sometimes it says transfer and deliver doesn't it?

Senator MURRAY. That would be different. But an ordinary bill of sale is not to transfer and deliver, and if it did not contain the word "deliver" you would not understand, if you signed an ordinary bill of sale using the word "transfer," that that would require you to actually deliver?

Mr. LANDON. I think that would depend greatly upon the interpretations of the court, just as I have said here that it depends upon the interpretation that the Attorney General might put upon it.

Senator MURRAY. And you think a court in construing a bill of sale using the words sell and transfer might construe it to mean that you would have to deliver it at some distant point?

Mr. LANDON. As I say, that depends upon the view of the court. I raised the point here as to how the Attorney General would interpret it.

Senator MURRAY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. Governor Landon, I am one of those American citizens who has observed with much satisfaction the many efforts that you have made to submerge any partisan attitude and your thought that the country should face unitedly an international crisis, which apparently has presented itself. Do you recall the public statements that you have made about the danger of the general situation to democracy in the world and to this country from the time immediately preceding the beginning of the war that is now going on in Europe and

subsequent to that time? What has been your general attitude and your general efforts to cooperate?

Mr. LANDON. Senator, I think you stated it very nicely.

Senator PEPPER. You have had conferences with the President at times when these situations became a fact. And I believe everyone recalls that you went on a mission to South America with Secretary of State Hull, did you not?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Do you recall when that was? Do you recall the date?

Mr. LANDON. I sailed in November 1938.

Senator PEPPER. To where did you go?

Mr. LANDON. To Lima.

Senator PEPPER. And you participated as a representative of this country in the Lima conference?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Did you discover any evidence while you were down there that the totalitarian powers, or any of them, were trying to infiltrate their propaganda and their machinery into South America?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. You found some evidence, perhaps, of dangerous proportions down there?

Mr. LANDON. Yes. I think that is a correct statement.

Senator PEPPER. Do you have any doubt about the general design of the Axis Powers to establish themselves in the Western Hemisphere, if they are permitted to do so?

Mr. LANDON. I think probably no more than has been going on for a great many years.

Senator PEPPER. And there has been a studied effort, has there not?

Mr. LANDON. Yes; I think so.

Senator PEPPER. And financed to a considerable extent by the governments themselves?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Do you give any credence to the report that before German citizens go to South America they are carefully trained by Government agencies as to how they can break down American and perhaps, we will say, British competition down there?

Mr. LANDON. I don't know about that, Senator. But I do think that there is a control by the German Government over their citizens in South America.

Senator PEPPER. You think the German Government does control the German citizens in South America?

Mr. LANDON. It attempts to exercise control in a great many cases.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think the German citizens who go to South America give up their allegiance to the old country and give it to the new country whose hospitality they receive down there?

Mr. LANDON. Not generally speaking, especially in the last few years.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Governor, as an American citizen and one well informed about world affairs, I have no doubt you have experienced some concern about this threat to democracy and our way of living which has arisen from these Axis Powers, haven't you?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. And no doubt you are very keenly aware of the fact that it presents to us a very dangerous and a very difficult situation, doesn't it?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Requiring, perhaps, that we do things that we prefer not to do in many instances, such as spending money and taking steps which we prefer not to, or which we would prefer not to take if the danger were not present?

Mr. LANDON. We have to take steps to meet it.

Senator PEPPER. As you said to Senator Connally, the question boils down to this, that it is a danger that has to be met, and the question is how best to meet it?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Do you believe that the sentiment expressed by Secretary Knox is desirable, that this country gain further time in which to continue its preparation for its defense?

Mr. LANDON. I think there is a general opinion to that effect in the country at large.

Senator PEPPER. Do you think the longer that England holds out the stronger we will be here at home?

Mr. LANDON. I think that is rather obvious.

Senator PEPPER. And that it is desirous for us to help England to hold out in any way that we properly can?

Mr. LANDON. I have said that.

Senator PEPPER. You do not object, do you, Governor, to an efficient organization of our efforts so as to get the best results?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. And if the principal effect to be accomplished by subparagraph (1) of section 3 on page 2 of the bill—and that is the language which authorizes the President, in the interest of the national defense, to authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government “to manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, any defense article for the Government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States”—if the principal and primary effect of this is to organize aid to give England, you would not have any objection?

Mr. LANDON. Senator, as I have said, I did not come here to discuss details of the bill. I am reading it, in the light of the President's message, to go anywhere in the world.

Senator PEPPER. I beg your pardon, Governor?

Mr. LANDON. As I have said in my statement, I did not come here to discuss the details of the bill but just the broad general principles.

Senator PEPPER. I just put that as sort of a hypothetical case to you. Of course, we have now the National Defense Commission which is handling these matters.

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. And that even goes so far as to apply to getting the engines and getting the necessary materials?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. You are not objecting to that, are you?

Mr. LANDON. As I pointed out, apparently this bill does not deal with that.

Senator PEPPER. If one of the purposes of the bill is merely for the Government to better organize the arrangements by which this aid is given, that would not be objectionable to you, if it did not involve any new principles, would it?

Mr. LANDON. If as you say.

Senator PEPPER. Now, Governor, if the primary object of this bill could be taken by hypothesis to be simply a method by which the British might be able to buy goods here when their dollar exchange runs out, and if nothing else were involved, you would not object to that, would you?

Mr. LANDON. I would say that was an "iffy" question.

Senator PEPPER. Perhaps so. And some "iffy" questions might be good and some bad.

Mr. LANDON. I didn't say it was a bad one. I said it was an "iffy" question.

Senator PEPPER. It depends upon the point of view?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. But insofar as the bill has for its purpose making dollar exchange available to England so England will be able to continue to buy goods here, you do not object to that?

Mr. LANDON. As I say, I favor a subsidy to England.

Senator PEPPER. And you said you were willing to let that be in the nature of a gift instead of a loan?

Mr. LANDON. I understand that is what a subsidy means.

Senator PEPPER. You do not object to the British paying to the extent of their ability?

Mr. LANDON. I said I favor a subsidy. And in view of the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury that they have run out of their ability to pay, or will do so shortly, I think we should give them a subsidy.

Senator PEPPER. Let us start with the assumption that you favor the subsidy, which you say is a gift, and that you are willing to give them so much money; have you any objection to their paying to the extent of their ability to pay, Governor, before we give them anything?

Mr. LANDON. The Secretary said that they can't pay any more, or that they will not be able to very shortly. That is what I am dealing with.

Senator PEPPER. My question is, Governor, you do not object to our making them pay according to their ability to pay?

Mr. LANDON. The Secretary said that they cannot pay, that they are running out of money. That is what I am talking about.

Senator PEPPER. But you do want us to require that they give us what dollar exchange they can get hold of, Governor, before we give them anything, don't you?

Mr. LANDON. I don't see what we are talking about, Senator, because the Secretary of the Treasury says that they haven't any money or credit left in the United States and that they are going to run out of dollar exchange.

Senator PEPPER. That is what I am talking about. Under your suggestion, Governor, apparently when the dollar exchange is exhausted— and I assume you refer to the dollar exchange that they can realize from their assets in this country, do you not?

Mr. LANDON. I don't know exactly what the Secretary of the Treasury had in mind, but I gathered that from the press accounts.

Senator PEPPER. Then, that would mean they would not be exhausting their resources in South America. I might join you in a proposal that we first require that the British mortgage on the Western Hemisphere be lifted before we give them anything, even a subsidy. Under this bill, the President can take from them considerations, he might take some more bases, or he might take some assets that they have in South America, or he might take some assets that they have somewhere else in the universe, and not resort to the pocketbook of the American taxpayer to give, without any specific consideration, our property. You do not object to that, do you?

Mr. LAXTON. I believe the President said that he was in favor of taking the dollar sign off of the aid to Great Britain.

Senator PEPPER. Well, suppose we do take the dollar sign off of the aid to Great Britain, and suppose we get some bases, and swap so many guns, so many airplanes, and so many rounds of ammunition for so many bases; you would not object to that, would you?

Mr. LAXTON. If that is what the President meant when he said he was in favor of taking the dollar sign off.

Senator PEPPER. Would you object to that?

Mr. LAXTON. We have done it.

Senator PEPPER. And you would not object to it in the future?

Mr. LAXTON. No.

Senator PEPPER. Now, suppose one of those transactions were in contemplation; do you think that each one of those transactions should be handled by Congress and not by some commission or some agency or some executive or by somebody? Do you think Congress should pass upon how many bases we should take for so many guns and so many airplanes, and come up here and debate it?

Mr. LAXTON. No; I think we might say, "We will cut down the number of airplanes by and large, but we will put in 15 more rounds of ammunition, for instance, and you give us more bases."

Senator PEPPER. Is Congress, as it is constituted, in position to make that kind of detailed bargaining for the country?

Mr. LAXTON. I think it is well for Congress to keep its hands on as many of these things as possible.

Senator PEPPER. We are keeping our hands on them, and we have a President elected by the people of the country, and we have adopted as a policy for the Nation aid to England short of war, for certain reasons. Now, their dollar exchange is about to be exhausted, and we are trying to find some other way whereby upon the principle of a quid pro quo, or something like that, we can continue to give aid to them. We think that Congress is not fitted to decide what is a fair consideration for every article or group of articles or every volume of articles that might be sent over there from time to time; consequently, we are going to vest in the President of the United States the authority to make these decisions. And we do it in these words:

The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

And then in a subsequent paragraph on page 4 the President shall require that the agency make a report so that there will be a record of what was sent or what was received. As you say, that is not an unreasonable method of working out these bargains?

Mr. LANDON. As I said, Senator, I came down to discuss the broad principles. I did not come down to discuss the details of the bill. I am discussing its broad general principles, the whole bill itself, and the President's message to Congress.

Senator PEPPER. But if Congress itself is not fitted to pass upon each one of these transactions, then it is necessary that it select some agency to pass upon these transactions for it?

Mr. LANDON. It generally does.

Senator PEPPER. Have you any agency to suggest that is better qualified than the President of the country?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. Governor Landon, what choice, as respects the international issue, did the people have in the November campaign as between the two leading candidates for President?

Mr. LANDON. There was substantial agreement.

Senator NYE. They were in quite complete agreement, were they not?

Mr. LANDON. I would say very fundamentally so.

Senator NYE. The point has been made that the people of the country had a chance, if they had chosen to do so, to vote for Norman Thomas, who took rather an opposite position to that of the two major candidates. Do you think the 23,000,000 votes that Mr. Willkie received in November were all or even that measure of aid that was being promised then by both candidates?

Mr. LANDON. I don't quite get your question, Senator, because as I said, there was substantial agreement on the fundamental question involved in this aid.

Senator NYE. Isn't it altogether probable that Mr. Willkie got a considerable number of votes from people who were opposed to any aid to England whatsoever?

Mr. LANDON. I imagine he got some. How many, I don't know. I wouldn't have any idea as to how many. There are not very many of those folk in the country, I believe.

Senator NYE. Do you feel, Governor, that the position that you have taken on this bill squares in a considerable way with the Republican platform of 1940?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. Do you consider that that platform was in any way or in any degree a mandate for such a course as is proposed in the pending legislation?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator NYE. Was this bill in any degree an issue in the November campaign, in your opinion?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator NYE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. Governor, if Congress passed no bills and enacted no legislation following an election, except such bills as were submitted to the people or discussed in detail before them, it might be rather inactive for the following 4 years, might it not?

Mr. LANDON. It might be; yes. It might not carry out its promises to the people.

Senator BARKLEY. But you realize that, especially in international affairs, frequently it is impossible in June or July to foresee what is necessary or desirable in January or February of the following year?

Mr. LONDON. That is right.

Senator BARKLEY. You said you did not intend in your statement to discuss the bill in detail; and I don't think you did, except you did take up one word and discuss it in detail, and you quoted something that I had said about it. But you said that you would rather have the Attorney General's opinion than mine, which I can very well understand.

Mr. LONDON. I did not say that, Senator.

Senator BARKLEY. But I think that was fairly to be assumed.

Mr. LONDON. No. I meant purely from the point of view of his office.

Senator BARKLEY. I was giving my opinion of the meaning of that word "transfer" in connection with the purposes of the bill.

Mr. LONDON. In connection with another clause, I believe.

Senator BARKLEY. You are a lawyer, I believe?

Mr. LONDON. Not a practising one.

Senator BARKLEY. You have never practised?

Mr. LONDON. No, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. I thought you had.

Mr. LONDON. I am a member of the Kansas Bar, but I never practised.

Senator BARKLEY. You know that in all instances of writing in conveying property that lawyers are in the habit of using probably too many words, for instance, sell, convey, alienate, transfer, and many other words that mean the same thing, so that by no stretch of the imagination have they left us anything that will convey the property to someone else. But unless there is a specific provision for physical delivery, that is not employed. So in order to convey, alienate, transfer, sell, and do all of the other things necessary you do not say physical delivery.

Frankly, Governor, I am not wedded to any words here, and nothing was further from the mind of anybody who had anything to do with the omnibus authorship, of which you spoke, than that the word "transfer" should be interpreted to mean physical delivery of the property across the sea or anywhere else, except to deliver the ownership of it to the nation to which it was transferred.

You have read subsection (1) of section 3 (a), which authorizes the President, through the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

to manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

Do you object to that power being given to the President?

Mr. LONDON. I believe the Senator and I were discussing that.

Senator BARKLEY. You would not object to somebody's having authority to manufacture these things in our own factories and arsenals?

Mr. LONDON. Well, I think I have answered that, Senator.

Senator BARKLEY. I might not have understood your answer. Was it yes or no.

Mr. LANDON. I said no. As I have pointed out, I just discussed the general principle of the bill, I think, in the light of the President's message.

Senator BARKLEY. You have discussed it in the light of the construction to be given authority to do these things anywhere in the world?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. So in the light of his expressions and your fears that this bill implements the powers of the President to do anything thing anywhere in the world, would you care to express an opinion as to whether this subsection authorizing him to permit the manufacture of these things in our own arsenals is something that you would object to?

Mr. LANDON. No. That is one thing I believe the President, in his press conference the other day, said he had authority to do—to take any plant in the country already.

Senator BARKLEY. That is under the so-called Selective Service Act that was passed last year where, in case of refusal or failure to cooperate with the Government, or for reasons set out in that act, he might take over a plant and operate it for the benefit of the Government and the soldiers we are calling into service. But that has nothing to do with this paragraph. This deals only with plants that are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, or some other agency.

You have no objection to paragraph (2), to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of articles of defense to other countries?

Mr. LANDON. That involves many questions of date and policy. I repeat that I think it has to be considered in the light of the "anywhere in the world" expression of the President.

Senator BARKLEY. You are afraid that he would sell whatever he sold anywhere in the world because of one of his speeches, in which he had in mind that the conditions ought to exist or might exist anywhere in the world?

Mr. LANDON. I don't know what he would do to make it effective. I raised that question—what he would do. No one can be sure.

Senator BARKLEY. You would not object to somebody selling these things to England?

Mr. LANDON. I have said I was in favor of an outright subsidy to England.

Senator BARKLEY. But if Congress does not see fit to appropriate money out of the Treasury and give it to England but prefers to appropriate money for somebody in an executive capacity to manufacture things that the money will buy, would you still object to the use of the word "sell"?

Mr. LANDON. It depends upon the other limitations.

Senator BARKLEY. Or to lease or lend or exchange?

Mr. LANDON. A general statement of commitment.

Senator BARKLEY. You object to the authority under section 3 (a)? Well, take section 3 as a whole. That is the one which confers the authority upon the President to do the things under this bill. Do you object to authority being given to test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order any defense article for any such government?

Mr. LANDON. As I said, I did not come down here to discuss all of the details of the bill.

Senator BARKLEY. In your testimony, Governor, you have expressed your view that the bill gives the President too much power. I don't think it is unfair for a witness who condemns the whole bill to say whether he condemns certain parts of it.

Mr. LANDON. I think I have answered your question, Senator, in answer to some of the questions that were asked by other Senators along that line.

Senator BARKLEY. You do not care to amplify that answer?

Mr. LANDON. No.

Senator BARKLEY. You don't know whether you are in favor of testing, inspecting, proving, repairing, outfitting, reconditioning, or otherwise placing in good working order any defense article for any such government, or for any other country?

Do you object to giving to any government that gets these materials, Governor, information about how to operate or run them?

Mr. LANDON. Again, that is a question of detail.

Senator BARKLEY. And you do not care to answer?

Mr. LANDON. I think I have answered it.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you object to release for export any defense articles so that they can be taken over after they have been sold or leased or rented or given away, or anything of the kind?

Mr. LANDON. I repeat what I said, Senator.

Senator BARKLEY. I don't think you have answered, with all due respect, Governor, whether you object to that. Do you think there is anything wrong, if we sell or lease or lend some defense article to another country, in letting them know how to run it or operate it and in giving them information concerning it?

Mr. LANDON. Senator, I have answered it repeatedly.

Senator BARKLEY. All right. If you think you have, I will not pursue it. Under your plan of giving to Great Britain \$4,000,000,000 or \$3,000,000,000 as an outright gift out of the Treasury with which she would buy these defense articles in this country, do you think that would create sort of a competitive situation in the productive capacity of the United States wherein England and the United States would be competing with each other in the production or purchase of these articles?

Mr. LANDON. We do not have a competitive situation now, do we?

Senator BARKLEY. Well, we probably would except for the fact that the Government has been willing to defer the delivery of some of its own products in order that England might get them first. You feel that if Congress gave England three or four billion dollars that there ought to be somebody who had authority to decide to which country the deliveries should be made first?

Mr. LANDON. I presume that would naturally follow. That would depend upon the requirements of our military and naval experts and how they feel.

Senator BARKLEY. If it should develop that there would be a competitive situation existing between the two countries so that difficulties might arise in determining which should get the material first, assuming for the present, at least, the capacity of our factories might not be sufficient to satisfy the demands of both? Do you think that would create an unfortunate situation?

Mr. LANDON. I think that would naturally be solved, as I say, by the opinions of our experts and our Army and our Navy Department experts.

Senator BARKLEY. You have no objection to the experts of the Army and the Navy, including the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, who, of course, would consult the experts, as any President would; and if they decided that the delivery to England of some product which we had ordered for our own country from the standpoint of national defense was to our advantage, you would not object to the prior delivery of that article to the British Government?

Mr. LANDON. Not on the face of it. I think it would still remain subject to some debate and question by every citizen in the country.

Senator BARKLEY. It would depend upon the case?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. In the case of tanks, or aircraft, or guns, or rifles, or ammunition, if there were a question as to whether we needed delivery of a certain quantity of those things or they should go to England, that would depend upon the situation in each case?

Mr. LANDON. The major policy, but not the minor details.

Senator BARKLEY. It would be determined by those competent to determine it if such a situation did exist, and if it would be to our interest to permit prior delivery of these articles to England you would be in favor of it?

Mr. LANDON. It would depend upon what expert opinion I myself would have on it. But I would be inclined as a private citizen, not having access to that information, to accept the judgment of the experts in our military and navy departments.

Senator BARKLEY. You do not regard the results of the election last year as a mandate one way or the other with regard to legislation that might be necessary by Congress in view of the changed conditions, do you?

Mr. LANDON. Senator, I do not regard that it was a mandate, which is the claim offered by many of the proponents of this bill, to pass this kind of a bill. They are the ones who are claiming that it was a mandate, that is, the proponents of this bill.

Senator BARKLEY. Frankly, I don't know any proponent of this bill who claims the result of the election was a mandate.

Mr. LANDON. I have seen some editorials to that effect.

Senator BARKLEY. Of course, we still have the freedom of the press, which both you and I would sacrifice a good deal to defend, and also freedom of speech, and all of the freedom that we enjoy. But I am speaking of those who favor the bill or who had anything to do with framing it or who will vote on its passage. I have not heard any public statement, or I do not recall any public statement from any public officer claiming that the result of the last election was a mandate to pass this particular bill or any other bill.

Mr. LANDON. I was speaking of the general editorial discussion.

Senator BARKLEY. Many people, both men and women in all parts of the country, voted for both major candidates, or for one of the major candidates, regardless of their particular view about the kind of aid that we should give to England. Don't you think so?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. And it would be difficult to put on the screen a concrete consensus of opinion of 45 or 50 million people who voted for

the major candidates as to just what they would interpret their vote to mean in terms of legislation.

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator BARKLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds?

Senator REYNOLDS. Governor Landon, you do not by any chance consider the war that is going on in Europe today a war between democracies specifically and the dictatorships, do you?

Mr. LANDON. I do not quite get your question, Senator.

Senator REYNOLDS. The war that is raging in Europe today is not primarily one between the democracies and the dictators?

Mr. LANDON. Do you mean by that that it is a war between two theories of government?

Senator REYNOLDS. Yes; in a sense. I have in mind Greece, which is a dictatorship, and about 2 years ago when they had an opportunity to have a democratic form of government they voted ten to one for the dictatorship in preference to the democracy. You do not consider the war now going on over there merely a war between the democracies and the dictatorship?

Mr. LANDON. There may be some exceptions, as you pointed out, sir. But, largely speaking, I do think it is a war between two theories of government.

Senator REYNOLDS. A war between what?

Mr. LANDON. Two theories of government.

Senator REYNOLDS. Between two theories of government?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. It is sort of a mixed-up theory, isn't it?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. England is said to be a democracy.

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Greece is known to be a dictatorship?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. With reference to Ethiopia, prior to Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia, that was a dictatorship, wasn't it?

Mr. LANDON. A monarchy, I believe.

Senator REYNOLDS. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. LANDON. I believe so.

Senator REYNOLDS. And today the British are fighting to restore that dictatorship? That is correct, isn't it?

Governor, you do not think this is our war, do you?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. If you did, Governor, you would insist that we declare war and go to it now, wouldn't you?

Mr. LANDON. Yes; that is what I attempted to say.

Senator REYNOLDS. In view of the fact that it is not our war, Governor, I want to ask you why the overburdened taxpayers of the United States should be called upon to pay for a war that does not belong to them.

Mr. LANDON. Well, Senator, they are being called upon to do it now to some extent, are they not?

Senator REYNOLDS. They are. But do you agree that that is proper?

Mr. LANDON. Yes; as I said, I would favor a subsidy.

Senator REYNOLDS. If it is not our war, Governor, why should our people over here be called upon to pay for it?

Mr. LANDON. Because I think it is to our advantage to see the British victorious.

Senator REYNOLDS. To what extent?

Mr. LANDON. To the extent of money alone.

Senator REYNOLDS. We are not fighting and we are not called upon to fight for the restoration of the British Empire.

Mr. LANDON. But I do not want to do anything that might lead to that.

Senator REYNOLDS. The people of Luxemburg are just as much interested in the restoration of their country as anybody else, are they not?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Well, don't you think before our taxpayers in this country are called upon to pay taxes to prosecute this war and to restore their country to them, Governor, that the people of wealth in that country should be called upon to pay before we would have to pay?

Mr. LANDON. I think it would be desirable if that were possible.

Senator REYNOLDS. And don't you think that is true of Belgium and of Holland?

Mr. LANDON. Yes; if it were possible.

Senator REYNOLDS. Governor, we hear a lot about our giving aid to England. The truth about the matter is that this bill ought to be entitled a "lend-lease-give bill" instead of just a lend-lease bill; isn't that true?

Mr. LANDON. It would be my judgment that the title does not accurately describe it.

Senator REYNOLDS. Of course, if we pass this bill and we give to England many billions of dollars as has been suggested, we are giving to them money that we take from all of the taxpayers of the United States, are we not?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. Don't you think that the millionaires of Great Britain who own estates ranging anywhere from a hundred to a thousand acres and having anywhere from ten to fifty horses in their stables, and anywhere from five to fifty hounds, and millions of dollars worth of jewelry, ought to give what they can to save their country before they call upon our little merchants and poor farmers to strip themselves?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. Senator Nye just said on the side that they have a lot of Scotch in the cellars that they might sell, too.

Senator BARKLEY. Inasmuch as Governor Landon comes from a dry State, he might not care to answer.

Mr. LANDON. I was thinking of that myself, Senator.

Senator REYNOLDS. In the last World War, Japan was with the Allies, wasn't she?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. And Russia was with the Allies?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. And Italy was with the Allies?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. And, as a matter of fact, Great Britain has been doing its best to get Russia or Stalin on her side?

Mr. LANDON. That is according to reports.

Senator REYNOLDS. I have heard many times that we are entirely dependent upon Great Britain for our existence. You have heard that, too?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Isn't it just the other way around, that Great Britain is dependent entirely upon us? Instead of our depending upon Great Britain for our existence, doesn't it appear to you from all that you hear and read, Governor, that Great Britain is dependent upon us?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir. I do not believe I would reach that conclusion.

Senator REYNOLDS. Don't you think Great Britain will be defeated if we do not go to her aid?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir. I don't think we can assume that.

Senator REYNOLDS. Do you think that our existence is dependent upon the British Navy?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Governor Landon, reference has been made in interrogations to you as to the possibility of the action of the people at the polls last November being construed as a mandate with reference to certain action in giving aid to democracies. I believe the Senator from Texas asked you with reference to the issue as drawn in that campaign, and further asked you if, as a matter of fact, the people of America at the polls did not commit themselves to aid to Britain; and I believed you answered that they did, with certain limitations. Is that correct?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. May I refresh your memory by quoting from the two platforms of the major political parties on this subject, which is a verbatim quotation. The Democratic platform says:

We pledge to extend to those people (speaking of the democracies) all of the material aid at our command, consistent with law and not inconsistent with the interests of our own national defense.

Now, Governor, I will quote from the Republican platform:

Our sympathies have been profoundly stirred by the invasion of an unoffending country. We favor the extension to all peoples fighting for liberty or whose liberty is threatened of such aid as shall not be in violation of international law or inconsistent with the requirements of our own national defense.

Now, so far as an issue was drawn by the platforms of the two major political parties, they are in almost identical words—aid to Britain subject to two definite limitations—"Not inconsistent with law" and "not inconsistent with the needs of our own national defense."

I will ask you, Governor Landon, if such an issue were drawn in the last campaign it was based upon those statements upon which the two political parties went before the people, with those limitations.

Mr. LANDON. And the interpretations which were put on them in the campaign speeches and in the keynote addresses to the conventions, et cetera.

Senator GILLETTE. Do you know of any speech of any major candidate for the Presidency which repudiated the statements in the platforms on this issue?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir. They did interpret it to be aid short of war.

Senator GILLETTE. You were interrogated by members of the committee this morning with reference to the exercise of powers under the authority given under section 3, I believe it is, this comprehensive section of the proposed measure, under which the President could secure certain things of value as he might see fit, of direct or indirect benefit to the United States, by the use of that authority, and the disposition of articles of war, or defense articles, as I think they are defined.

I will preface my question with this quotation which I am reading from the testimony of Secretary of War Stimson before this committee last week on this very section, and these are quotations from the Secretary's statement to this committee when he came before us as a Cabinet officer as one of the proponents of this measure. [Reading:]

We are not seeking to make a loan to Great Britain. We are buying, not lending.

Under such circumstances, to try to turn the transaction into a loan is one of the most short-sighted views a great nation could take.

It is not an investment of our money in any sense of the word in a loan. We are seeking to obtain the wisest and most economical way of securing the goal.

Based upon that statement of a proponent of the measure, and one of the outstanding spokesmen for the proponents of the bill, isn't it a fair assumption to make that in the exercise of this power, upon the construction of the words "to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of" the President of the United States could dispose of them without compensation?

Mr. LANDON. I rather think so.

Senator GILLETTE. Some of the members of the committee like to call attention to section 6 when interrogating the witnesses as to the control that Congress is retaining over the plenary powers that some of us feel are delegated under this bill. I will read to you the language in section 6, although it has been read many times:

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this act.

May I say that that is almost word for word what is included in many, many of the provisions of Congress, and to comply with certain requirements of our laws on appropriations.

Now, Governor, I will ask you if the President, in the exercise of these powers - and I am not saying that he will. We are the ones who are delegating the powers. We are not saying how they will be used. But if in the exercise of that power the President disposes of those articles of defense without compensation, if he gives them away, there is no appropriation required by Congress in such a transaction as that?

Mr. LANDON. It would not seem so.

Senator GILLETTE. If in the exercise of a power which we delegate to him clearly, Governor, he proceeds to make commitments for the manufacture of material or for the purchase, as we authorize him to

do, from any other source, of defense articles, can you imagine any Congress or any Member of Congress who would refuse to appropriate the money to carry out the contract which the President had entered into under the authority we have delegated to him?

Mr. LANDON. No.

Senator GILLETTE. And you, as a Member of Congress, certainly would not be against such a thing.

Mr. LANDON. That is the hole, I say, that Congress is getting itself into.

Senator GILLETTE. You would sustain it?

Mr. LANDON. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. So would any man in Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Governor, Senator Pepper, in his examination, asked you about certain parts of the President's foreign policy. Is it not a fact that you went about as far with the President's foreign policies as you were possibly able to go?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir. That is the reason why I am opposing this bill.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You believe that this measure as proposed will get us into war and grant dictatorial powers in the United States?

Mr. LANDON. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Governor, Senator Barkely asked a question about whether anybody had ever claimed that this legislation was a mandate. Is it not a fact that Mr. Willkie, in some intervals while dancing the Lambeth Walk and visiting pubs, has maintained that there was a mandate for this particular bill?

Mr. LANDON. I had not noticed it, Senator, if he did.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is certainly a fair inference from Mr. Willkie's statements?

Mr. LANDON. That would be the fair inference.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I do not know that it actually occurred in intervals while he was dancing the Lambeth Walk, but he certainly made such a remark.

Now, Governor, you have been examined with regard to your statement as to the powers granted the President under section 3 of this bill.

Will you turn to page 2, section 3, beginning with line 14, and notice these words:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law--

and I think that is the heart of the whole power granted--

the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense

do certain things.

To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law * * * to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article.

Now, under that paragraph, is it not perfectly possible--I assume that everybody will agree that a battleship or a cruiser or a destroyer

is a defense article—for the President to procure any such article in any way and transfer it, because the President has authority, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, to do it?

Now, suppose the President, in his discretion, was to manufacture a battleship or cruiser, or otherwise obtain it, or otherwise have it, and was to order that ship transferred and delivered at Liverpool, let us say, or Southampton. He certainly has the power to do that under this proposed act, does he not?

MR. LANDON. It is clear to me that he has; yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And if, while our battleship was on its way to be delivered at Southampton or Liverpool—or any other point, no matter where in the world; perhaps at Singapore or perhaps at Alexandria, or at any other portion of Great Britain's far-flung empire—that ship was to be torpedoed or sunk by aerial bombardment, the sinking of an American vessel of war under those circumstances would inevitably cause the entrance of this country into war, would it not?

MR. LANDON. That is my judgment; yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Now, Governor, as a matter of fact, under the provisions of this act is not the President authorized, if he so desires, to enter into alliances with any country, without the necessity of submitting them to the Senate?

In other words, when it says—

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law—

He may do all these things, and then says, on page 3, beginning with line 12—

The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory—

Under that provision can he not enter into an alliance if he wants to?

MR. LANDON. Well, Senator, as I said to the other Senators, I did not come to discuss the details of the bill. I discussed the broad, general principles. In the light of his official message to Congress and in the light of the words of this bill and the general principles of this bill, as I have indicated in this statement, I think that that would be true.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Now, Governor, referring you further to the President's official annual message to Congress, he said that our national policy is this:

First, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to all-inclusive national defense.

I take it there is no question in anybody's mind as to that statement.

Second, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to full support of all those resolute peoples, everywhere, who are resisting aggression and are thereby keeping war away from our hemisphere. By this support, we express our determination that the democratic cause shall prevail; and we strengthen the defense and security of our own Nation.

As a matter of fact, Governor, there was not any commitment on the part of either major party in the campaign, was there, to such a principle or to any other principle except extending aid to Great Britain short of war, and the proviso "short of war" was emphasized

particularly in every speech made by both of the leading candidates for President?

Mr. LANDON. I think that is correct.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is it not also correct that the Democratic platform specifically declared against any involvement in the war and that President Roosevelt himself, in his campaign speeches immediately prior to the election, emphasized his prior determination to keep this country out of war?

Mr. LANDON. That is my understanding.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You will note that any provision about "short of war" is notably missing in that paragraph which I just read from the President's annual message.

Now, furthermore, in the President's annual message—he speaks as you referred to in your statement, but I am just reading it for the purpose of clarifying it for the record—he said:

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

Now, of course, we are all very much in favor of freedom of speech and expression—sometimes we think it is being circumscribed too much in this country in many ways—but do you know of any way, short of waging war clear around the world, in which that aim could be achieved?

Mr. LANDON. That is what frightened me; and the reason why, as Senator Pepper was kind enough to say and as you pointed out, I am not able to go any further in support of the President in his foreign policy.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Could we be successful in invading Russia for the purpose of establishing freedom of speech and expression which have long been abolished in that country?

Mr. LANDON. I think that is an excellent illustration.

Senator CLARK of Missouri (reading):

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way.

Many of us are descendants of people who came to this country originally for the purpose of obtaining freedom of religion, but do you know of any way in which we could compel the Russians to restore Christianity in Russia, or the Germans, or anybody else who happen to follow different governmental concepts?

Mr. LANDON. Not without war or a crusade.

Senator CLARK of Missouri (reading):

The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

Well, we have not been able completely to secure that desirable ideal for our own country in the last few years, have we, Governor?

Mr. LANDON. Unfortunately, we have not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you think it is in any degree probable, that, either by force of arms or otherwise, we would be able to obtain that ideal for the whole world?

Mr. LANDON. I do not see how we could make it effective.

Senator CLARK of Missouri (reading):

The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.

That is an idea to which the United States has long been committed and for which we made enough sacrifices in the way of sinking our first-line battleships to give proof of our desires in that matter.

Do you know of any way, either by conducting war or otherwise, in which we can relieve a condition of fear that has lived through generations?

Mr. LANDON. That is what frightens me in the proposals we are now considering.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If this bill is supposed to implement that ideal, we are embarking on a far-reaching and unknown program, are we not?

Mr. LANDON. Nobody can be sure where it is going to take us.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It is a fact, is it not, Governor, that this is a bill without limitation as to time or substance or space or map?

Mr. LANDON. I use the word "forever."

Senator CLARK of Missouri. To show that this is no conception of an idea, but intended to be a program for the United States, I call your attention to the next paragraph in this annual message of the President:

This is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation.

Now, Governor, would you not understand that to be a pledge by the President on behalf of the United States to start out and establish all of these reforms throughout the world, in our own time, including the abolition of fear throughout the world and the abolition of want throughout the world and the establishment of our own ideals of freedom of speech and freedom of religion?

Mr. LANDON. That is where I stopped going along with him in his foreign policy.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Thank you very much, Governor.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrnes?

Senator BYRNES. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson desires to ask a question.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You were interrogated somewhat about the dangers to democracy in South America, I believe, and perhaps in other localities. Can you conceive of any danger to American democracy that could be greater than that created by this bill?

Mr. LANDON. No, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, we thank you for your appearance, and you may be excused.

Mr. LANDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, through you, the members of the committee for their time and patience and courtesy. I think they have been very fair and are trying to do a tough job, as I said, good.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very glad to have you and have your testimony.

Senator CONNALLY. You have been very helpful, Governor.

Mr. LANDON. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF ANDRAE B. NORDSKOG, LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please give the reporter your name, your address, and for whom you appear? Will you please bear in mind that our time is limited and that you want about 10 minutes?

Mr. NORDSKOG. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Will you state to what point you are going to testify here?

Mr. NORDSKOG. My name is Andrae B. Nordskog, of Los Angeles, Calif.

Mr. Chairman, I might say that this matter has been discussed in the State of California through radio forums and on the public platform, and I have had the privilege of getting the reaction from the public there, and many persons urged that I come to the capital to make known my particular views.

The bill under discussion is H. R. 1776, commonly known as the lend-lease bill, which might better be called the "gift-lend-lease" bill.

Under the terms of said bill, should it become a law, the President of the United States will be enabled to give away, without compensation, any of the articles mentioned in the bill.

Even though the time limit of 2 years be fixed for the operation of this proposed law, the President may commit the Government to untold expenditures within the 2-year limit, although the fulfillment of contracts thus entered into might not be completed for many years thereafter. During such 2-year period the President would be enabled to commit the United States Government to the completion of contracts in favor of any nation on earth if he saw fit so to do, no matter how many years it might take for the completion of same. And that reminds us—we haven't forgotten the famous Hog Island war contracts, many of which never were completed, but for which the Government paid, and paid millions and millions of dollars for which we, the taxpayers, got absolutely nothing.

Section 5 of this bill provides that the President shall, from time to time, "but not less frequently than once every 90 days," transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this act "except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose." This empowers the President to enter into secret treaties with foreign nations during peace or war time, and keep the Congress and every other department of the United States Government in ignorance of such treaties.

Section 6 provides that:

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this act.

It will be seen from the foregoing that there is no limit as to the amount the President might spend. It has frequently been stated by opponents to this measure that there will be no need for a Congress if the President is given these broad powers in times of peace or war. Most certainly the provisions of the above-quoted section 6 give rise to the belief that the authors of the bill believe that there would be no more sessions of Congress after the possible adoption of same; else

why should they include provision in section 6 that the President, and not Congress, should be the deciding genius as to the unnumbered billions of dollars which may have to be spent, while Members of the Senate and House of Representatives sit idly by and watch the spending parade go along without interruption? Just how far away did the authors expect Congress to go?

Not outside of the Sunday comic strip have we seen anything comparable to this blank check idea. Polly, in the Polly and Her Pals comic strip angrily told her pa to move his account to another bank, because their old bank refused to cash any more checks because of overdraft.

It is quite certain that if the President has determined to aid foreign countries between sessions of the Congress, then he must know how much will be needed each month during such recess period. There can be no logical reason given why the Executive should be given blanket powers to commit the Government to unlimited expenditures in the name of defense.

Singular, indeed, that in section 9, article 1, of our United States Constitution, appears not only that "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law," but also that "No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States," et cetera. It could not have been the intention of the founders of the Constitution to throw the Treasury door wide open for billions of dollars of unforeseen contingencies not even apparent to the Members of Congress, to be left to the sole judgment of one single individual. But, then, perhaps we do not know the meaning of the word "totalitarian."

The reason I mentioned as part of section 9, article 1, of our Constitution, the provision relating to "titles of nobility" is that so many of the proponents of H. R. 1776 constantly remind us that England is our first line of defense for the protection of democracy. England certainly cannot lay claim to being a democracy, a nation of kings and queens, and lords and dukes, and titled nobilities of the non-producing class. Our own country, once a part of Great Britain, broke away from that empire because it was not a democracy, but a nation of titled nobilities maintaining and cultivating the sharpest class distinction in the entire world.

Our constitutional founders, who had paid with their blood for the independence of this Nation, made specific provision in our fundamental law that it should differ from such political monarchy by forever barring such class distinctions, and never grant any titles of nobility. In fact, it is inconceivable to one like the writer, who was born in the United States, that a truly democratic nation could, by any stretch of imagination, separate its people by such outmoded grants of title, in the past patented only by monarchies.

We may wonder if the President would enter into secret treaties or agreements with foreign nations during peace or wartime. Do we not recall that 2 or 3 years ago a French aviation officer was nearly killed in a Douglas airplane in California while making a secret test of that United States Government airship? Would the public ever have known or would the Congress ever have known about this very secret arrangement made by the President or the State Department had it not been that the airship crashed to earth, killing the pilot, an American boy? Evidently not.

Then what reason have we to believe that now, under the stress of great international excitement, that our President is not also making secret agreements and perhaps secret treaties with foreign nations he is so desirous of aiding with all kinds of war supplies and warships?

Following the overthrow of the Czarist regime in Russia, many of the secret documents publicly unknown were brought to light for the first time. From records in Russia it was found that that nation and France entered into a secret treaty in 1892, and that these nations were later joined by England, whereby they, as the Triple Entente, were to make war on Germany. The records show that while Germany, Austria, and Italy constituted the Triple Alliance, the Triple Entente should, upon the proof that any nation in the Triple Alliance was mobilizing, also mobilize at once, and that such mobilization on the part of the Triple Entente should be considered war, and so understood by each member nation, including Russia, France, and England.

Russia caused the Slav population in Serbia, by intrigue, to cause Austria—of the Triple Alliance—to mobilize; and this act on the part of Austria gave Russia, France, and England—the Triple Entente—justification under their secret treaties to also mobilize and to enter Germany without declaring war.

The German leaders, according to the report made to the United States Senate, by the then Senator Robert L. Owen on December 18, 1923, did their utmost to localize the conflict to Austria and Serbia and prevent a World War; and that the Germans strenuously insisted from July 26, to July 31, 1914, to Russia authorities that general mobilization of Russia meant war on Germany; and that Germany would be compelled to mobilize if Russia persisted in its warlike preparations against Germany.

On July 31, 1914, after the Russians had been mobilizing for 7 days, the German Government demanded of Russia the immediate cessation of its mobilization within 12 hours, as of 1 p. m., Saturday, August 1, 1914.

Upon Russia's refusal, the German authorities ordered a general mobilization at 5 p. m., August 1, 1914, and notified the Russian Government at 7 p. m. the same day that Germany considered itself in a state of war with Russia, because Russia's warlike preparations against Germany, which they refused to suspend, meant war against Germany.

The Russian patrols crossed the German line in four places on August 1, 1914. The French patrols crossed the German line in two places on August 2, 1914. The British troops, equipped for war, were in motion through London on the morning of August 2, 1914; this proving that the Triple Entente was not taken by surprise as they would have the world believe, when Germany entered the war.

Senator Owen stated very definitely, after many years of untiring research and the examination of hundreds of official documents bearing on the secret treaties entered into by Russia, France, and England, that there was conclusive evidence that Germany did not want that war, but that the Triple Entente did want it, and that they were the ones who plotted it for many years and finally brought it about.

Said Senator Owen in his report to the Senate, December 18, 1923:

All the people involved were, probably 90 percent or more, innocent of wrong purposes, and they were all, whether victorious or defeated, the victims of this

tragedy. Over 37,000,000 people suffered death or mutilation, and other unrecorded millions disappeared; 6,000,000 died from civil strife and 40,000,000 from consequent epidemics; hundred of millions suffered indescribable sorrows and anxiety. It was through no conscious fault of their own. They merit compassion.

And I must join with this noble and honorable gentleman, who so long labored for public good in these very Chambers, ex-Senator Robert L. Owen, in saying:

To sin by silence when we should protest
 Makes cowards out of men.
 The few who dare must speak and speak again
 To right the wrongs of men.

I assure you honorable members of this committee that it is not easy to take a stand against a measure such as this, which is supported by the slush funds of a vast empire bent on influencing every avenue of publicity in this Nation. It is so easy for the proponents of this of this give-lease-lend bill to call the name of "Nazi" anyone daring to voice opposition to their efforts to have this measure adopted. I am not interested in foreign "isms." I am interested in the United States of America, first, last, and all of the time. I think we are endangering our country by aiding England.

I live on the west coast, and I want some member of this committee to tell me what protection we have in the city of Los Angeles, which spreads over more than 450 square miles, to make a wonderful target from the sky. Yes, I ask you gentlemen what provision have you made for the protection of our homes in California, and Oregon, and Washington? And please don't make me laugh when you try to tell it.

Our own State engineer declared in an official report to the Governor that the long 300-mile aqueduct carrying our water supply from Owens River Valley down to Los Angeles would be but a plaything in the hands of the enemy. What protection have we for that essential water supply for nearly 2,000,000 citizens? Not any, so far as I know.

What protection have we for the other supply from the Colorado River to Los Angeles and 12 other Coastal Plain cities through the metropolitan water district aqueduct? This aqueduct at the intake on the Colorado River rises over a 1,900-foot range of mountains, and through which a 1,500-second-foot flow of water must be pumped over to the 13 cities on the Coastal Plain. What protection has the Congress, the very Congress which provided funds through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the construction of this large aqueduct, given to this expensive water project costing \$220,000,000 of public money?

What protection has the Congress given to the Skagit River water and power project in the State of Washington for the city of Seattle, whose millions of dollars are invested therein? Not any that I know of.

And what protection has the Congress given to the huge water and power developments on the Columbia River for the defense of the citizens of Portland and other coastal cities? Not any that I know of.

Then why this great rush to throw our money away in foreign nations to which we owe no allegiance?

I have talked with a number of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives about this H. R. 1776, and I have not found one of them trembling over the fear that Hitler is coming over

here; and I have not found any of them who, when confronted with the question, "Do you think it would be easy for any foreign nation to defeat this country if we would build proper defenses while we still have the time to do so?" but what they have said that we could readily keep out any foe if properly prepared to defend ourselves.

I will ask any one of you gentlemen sitting here on this committee: Do you really fear invasion of this country, particularly if we keep our long nose out of Europe's troubles and mind our own business?

Knowing as much as we do about the intrigue and treachery so long practiced by certain foreign nations, are we not convinced that Winston Churchill might be ever so right when he said to William Griffin, editor of the New York Inquirer, in 1936, in substance:

Legally we owe this debt to the United States, but logically we don't, because America should have stayed out of the World War; and if she had England would have made peace with Germany in the spring of 1917, and would have saved the lives of a million British, French, American, and other soldiers; and would have prevented the rise of nazi-ism and fascism.

And to Winston Churchill we will say: "Thanks, old top, for the information. Next time we will mind our own business and stay at home."

Two weeks ago I took part in a debate and round table discussion of this bill, H. R. 1776, in Los Angeles, Calif., on radio station KFAC. I opposed adoption of the bill. Two very well known attorneys of Los Angeles, representing the William Allen White committee, favored adoption of the bill. There were about 200 people in the assembly room at the radio station, and from the response it indicated that fully 95 percent of them opposed adoption of the bill.

On the Sunday following, I spoke to 2,000 people in the polytechnic high-school auditorium in Los Angeles on this subject, and I put them to a test by asking those favoring the adoption of the bill to raise their hands, and not one hand was raised; but when I asked those who were opposed to the adoption of the bill to raise their hands, every hand in the house went up. It was unanimous.

A few days later at a gathering in Hollywood, Calif., I again put the people to a test, and in that group everyone opposed adoption of bill H. R. 1776.

The people, the common people who must pay the war bills, do not want war; and they do not want anything done to provoke our entry into Europe's never-ending conflicts.

I strongly oppose adoption of this bill because it tends to set up a dictatorship in peacetime. It will bond our properties to death. In Los Angeles County our bonded debt, public debt alone, is nearly \$2,000,000,000, or 78 percent of the assessed valuation; and with interest charges our debt is more than 100 percent of the assessed valuation. So we do not own anything, we only owe the bondholders more than our properties are now worth. Such indebtedness is always the forerunner to revolution, and revolution we do not want.

We can have peace and prosperity, if we mind our own business. We cannot afford to insult nations whose sons and daughters now live peacefully among us in this country.

A New York City judge has testified before this committee that he feared civil war in that metropolis if we should adopt this bill. His fears were further explained by a Congressman from that city. It was not idle talk. We are a nation of many foreign-born people. If

we are a neutral nation, then why scandalize the names of certain European national leaders, and wine and dine others, racing to meet them with open arms out into the high seas?

Before you honorable gentlemen vote on this bill, I suggest you do as I have done, take a tour through some of the large Government hospitals housing thousands of our boys who paid the awful price to help England make the world safe for a kind of "ocracy" she has never known. I have seen them, playing cards with one hand because the other one was left over in Flanders Fields where poppies grow. I have seen them in these hospitals, with eyes blown out, with ears torn off; some with one leg; some with none; waiting for the nightfall to come so they can go to bed and forget, forget that they fought and lost everything, while the war-profiteering racketeers foreclosed on our homes and our farms and our factories and our hotels and drove the aged fathers and mothers of these noble soldiers down the dusty highway looking for a place to lay their heads.

Gentlemen of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, can you not again see the phantom forms of the patriots of old looming on the horizon, with arms outstretched, pleading with you not to let your country perish?

Can you not see, even dimly, the form of George Washington as he stood before the American people giving his farewell address, saying:

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. * * * Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachment for others should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated.

Antipathy in one nation against another, disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody conquests. * * *

So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducements or justification. It leads also to concession to the favorite nations, or privileges denied to the others, which is apt doubly to injure the Nation making the concessions, by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill will, and a disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens who devote themselves to the favorite nation, facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion or a laudable zeal for the public good, the base or foolish compliance of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.

Those were the parting words of the Honorable George Washington who went through many years of war against the tyrannies of a political monarchy in order to set this country free. Let us keep it free by keeping out of all foreign entanglements in Europe and elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. What is your business, Mr. Nordskog?

Mr. NORDSKOG. I have been in financial counseling.

Senator CONNALLY. Is that your business—financial counseling?

Mr. NORDSKOG. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. You are a native of the United States, of course?

Mr. NORDSKOG. I was born in the State of Iowa.

Senator CONNALLY. I believe that is all.

Mr. NORDSKOG. I thank you very much.

In closing I wish to state for the benefit of the committee that I hold here a book that is entitled "Russian Imperialist Conspiracy" that was published by Senator Robert L. Owen at the time that he was in the Senate, and I believe that every member of this committee should obtain a copy of that and read it before he passes on this bill, because it gives the entire history.

Senator CONNALLY. How many copies did you bring?

Mr. NORDSKOG. Only one. I presume you have it in the Congressional Library.

Senator NYE. Mr. Chairman, knowing that former Senator Owen has been desirous of testifying, may I inquire whether or not he had been given a time when he could be heard?

The CHAIRMAN. No; he has not, because his name has not been submitted to me, and therefore no time has been given to Senator Owen.

Mr. NORDSKOG. I believe it would be very helpful to your committee to have Senator Owen here. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be excused. Thank you.

At the request of Senator Vandenberg, certain documents will be inserted in the record immediately following the testimony of Gerald L. K. Smith, who testified before the committee a few days ago. Senator Vandenberg has secured the information and documents, and they may go into the record at that point.

(At this point there was a commotion in the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will have order, and the officers will please put out of the room all those people who are disturbing these proceedings. Take them out now. Not until the room is cleared will the Chair recognize anyone. Clear the room of all those who provoked this outbreak. Those who engaged in the demonstration will please go out.

Is there any other witness?

Senator NYE. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. George H. Cless is here and is desirous of being heard.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Before he is called, I should like to say that I do not know who this young man is who got up and asked to be heard, but I do protest against the police hustling out a person who appears in a respectful manner and asks to be heard by this committee. The young man no sooner got up—I was unable to hear what he said and I do not know whom he represents—than he was ushered out of the room. No matter who the man was, I protest his being hustled out, so long as he is not causing any disturbance. I do object to the person being hustled off by the police as soon as he makes his request. [Applause.]

Senator HARRISON. Mr. Chairman, we cannot proceed this way and we ought to go into executive session, if there is a matter to be gone into.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Perhaps it is desired to give us the bum's rush, too.

The CHAIRMAN. With reference to the question of the procedure this afternoon and what witnesses are to be called——

Senator NYE. Mr. Chairman, I do not even want to seem to be obstreperous, but I think fair play requires a plain statement of the

facts at this time. There have been witnesses who have been urging one Senator and another to be heard. There has not been any definite way in which those who wish to be heard would be notified as to when they might have an opportunity. If I am correctly informed, there are three or four ready to be heard this afternoon, and others on Monday and Tuesday, if the opportunity can be afforded, and they can be given notice in time to be here.

The committee has, of course, indicated an intent to hear Mr. John T. Flynn. Mr. Flynn is especially well qualified to discuss the ability of the British to convert the securities and holdings they have into exchange dollars, which she is declaring a need of at this time. I hope there is going to be that opportunity afforded him when he has recovered from his illness. The information is that he hopes to be able to be here Monday or Tuesday.

Mr. Merwin K. Hart, president of the New York State Economic Council, who could have been here today had there been notice of opportunity for him, will not be able to be here until Monday.

Some members of the committee have indicated that Mr. Thomas E. Dewey has been hoping for an invitation from the committee to be heard. I cannot testify beyond what I have heard from these other Senators.

Dr. A. P. Hauke, who is president of the American Economic Foundation, with offices at Cleveland, Ohio, desires a chance to give his testimony.

Ralph Townsend, a former member of the Consular Service of the State Department, will be in Washington, if he is not already here, sometime this afternoon, and he is eager to be heard.

Mr. GEORGE H. Cless, who may be in the chamber now, was sent for in the anticipation of the possibility of having an opportunity this morning.

I was advised that Mr. Leslie Gould, financial editor of the New York Journal-American, was desirous of being heard. I have wired him and have not yet had a response.

Mrs. Rosa M. Farber, who is understood to be here and prepared—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye, I think we had better go into executive session and determine when the public hearings on this measure are going to end.

I shall ask the audience to retire as promptly as possible, so that the committee may, in executive session, learn its course.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee went into executive session, after which they met in open session at 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m., and proceeded further as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Is there a witness the opposition desires to have called?

Senator NYE. Mr. George Cless, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. George Cless in the room?

STATEMENT OF GEORGE H. CLESS, JR., GLENS FALLS N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you desire to have this witness limited, gentlemen?

Senator NYE. There is no reason or occasion for it this afternoon, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Be seated, Mr. Cless.

The Chair wants to make a statement. The public have been invited to these hearings, and the committee has been glad to have you; but the committee from the beginning has insisted that there be no demonstrations in the room, because one demonstration begets another, and continued demonstrations interfere necessarily with the work of the committee.

In the allotment of time, those who favored this bill utilized 1 week, during which time the committee called, as of necessity, for the benefit of both sides, the four secretaries of the executive departments, who appeared before the committee. This entire week has been given over to the opposition to this bill, and the witnesses called are the ones selected by Senators of this committee who oppose the bill. If you have not been called, it is because, out of the number of witnesses selections had to be made. The Chair is making that statement in justice to the full committee.

The committee has by vote resolved to bring the public hearings on this bill to a close Tuesday evening next. This afternoon and all day Monday the opponents of the bill will be allowed to call such witnesses as they desire, and to regulate the time of those witnesses. On Tuesday, those favorable to the bill will exercise the privilege of calling witnesses for that day, and such witnesses as the proponents of the bill desire to call. As I have already said, at the conclusion of Tuesday's hearings, the committee will close the public hearings; that, by vote of the committee, not by agreement of all of the Senators, but nevertheless by a majority vote of the committee.

I am making this statement because innumerable organizations and individuals have appealed to me to put them on in opposition to this bill. I had no right to do so, and would not exercise the right to do so, because the selection of witnesses out of the large number desiring to appear, as I have already said, has been left entirely to those on the committee who oppose the bill.

Now, I wish to repeat, we realize as practical men that things will be said in the course of the examination of witnesses that frequently provoke some degree of laughter. That is one thing, but demonstrations, and staged demonstrations, are quite another thing. It is the demonstrations that we ask that you refrain from making, and we ask it courteously, but until the hearings are finished we must insist upon that course.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, might I say a word?

The CHAIRMAN. You can.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, in the first place, on behalf of the opponents to this bill I want to thank you for your very courteous and fair treatment of our witnesses throughout this week.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that my protest this morning against the police rushing a man who apparently in decency and order was making a request to be heard was no criticism of the chairman.

I agree fully with the policy of the chairman in putting down demonstration, because I do not think that the hearings before this committee were intended to be a hippodrome performance or to be the subject of demonstrations. I agreed fully this morning with the position of the chairman in asking the demonstrators to leave. I agreed fully with the position of the chairman the other day in clearing the room after repeated demonstrations, and I think that policy ought to be pursued throughout these hearings.

I did not think this morning that the fact that a man claimed recognition and asked to be heard justified the police in rushing him and throwing him out on his ear; but I want to make my own position perfectly clear, and I think it is the position of all of the opponents to this bill on this committee, that the chairman is perfectly correct in restraining demonstrations, and at any time there is a demonstration I think the chairman is perfectly justified in clearing the room.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Senator Clark.

Mr. Cless, you have been invited by the committee. Will you state to the stenographer your name and address?

Mr. CLESS. My name is George H. Cless, Jr., of Glens Falls, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you connected with any organization?

Mr. CLESS. I have no connections, Mr. Chairman. I am representing no group or organization of any kind; speaking solely for myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a prepared statement that you first wish to submit to the committee?

Mr. CLESS. Mr. Chairman, for the very reason that you stated a little while ago, in the confusion and uncertainty in regard to the appearance of witnesses and myself, and my hasty call here this afternoon, I have no copies of my statement. In fact, I have notes, and so forth, from which I will have to speak more or less extemporaneously.

The CHAIRMAN. You may speak without interruption, if you desire, until you have finished your general statement.

Mr. CLESS. Thank you, sir.

Senator NYE. Mr. Chairman, might I state for the benefit of the record, finding it necessary to leave for just a few moments, that Mr. Cless has been one of those whom I have advised all week long that there probably would not be a chance for him to be heard this week. If he is not fully prepared, I must of necessity take some of the responsibility for that myself.

Mr. CLESS. That is all right.

If war should break out again in another continent, let us not blink the fact that we would find thousands of Americans who would be tempted for the sake of fool's gold to break down or evade our neutrality * * * it would be hard for many Americans I fear to look beyond to realize the inevitable penalties; the inevitable day of reckoning * * *.

The proponents of this measure may not agree with that statement, but I did not make it. It was made on August 15, 1936, at Chataqua, N. Y., by the star proponent for this bill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and on that day of August 15, 1936, when he took a positive stand for the best interests of the United States through strict neu-

trality and nonintervention in the power politics of Europe and Asia, President Roosevelt was applauded by a united Nation.

Today, because of a conspiracy, as charged by John T. Flynn, because of a conspiracy as charged by President McCracken of Vassar and one-time leader of the now blacked-out White Committee to Defend America; second, because of that alleged conspiracy to lead America into the cesspool of a foreign struggle for trade power, the American people have been confused and divided.

The administration—the administration forces in Congress, aided and abetted by their elite workers throughout the country, have split the Nation wide open today through their step by step policy of international meddling, culminating in their demand that the American people buy the 57 varieties of fools' gold wrapped up in this lend-lease bundle—this war-making bill, this power-acquiring bill, this money-spending bill, this national-bankrupting act of 1941.

Now, this is called a "defense bill," and is based on the assumption that the salvation, security, and defense of these United States is dependent upon our underwriting the survival of Great Britain, China, and Greece, and any other country that the President may see fit to designate. That means war sooner or later, in any man's language; but we apparently do not understand these things so well as do our British friends. They know that this "short of war" philosophy is pure bunk. They tell us so, very nicely, in the London Economist, of July 6, 1940, when they refer to the "short of war" idea as "a delusion that hostile acts can be taken with limited liability." They also refer to the "determination of Americans that, even if they are dragged into war, they will not send an army to Europe," and then add a comment that I think should be of profound interest to all of us, that "these hesitations and inconsistencies will disappear; events can be relied upon to bludgeon them out of existence."

While some of us say, "Oh, no," they say, "Oh, yes," and they are pretty good at calling the turn. Someone here seems to have caught on, though. Four and a half million casualty tags sounds to me like a lot of dead and wounded American boys—unless, by chance, these tags are to be leased to China. They are not just a job for the printer.

By Presidential fiat the United States is now the "arsenal for democracy," and China is to be one of the beneficiaries. Now, China has managed to survive for something like 7,000 years, and there are those who naturally wonder why we are so suddenly called upon to underwrite her survival. What is our stake in the survival of China?

Well, in 1939 we sold China about \$50,000,000 worth of goods. That is equivalent to about a quarter of 1 day's work a year in the United States. We have an investment of less than \$200,000,000 in China, which is slightly more than what we paid for chewing gum last year.

How many battleships, how much of a war, or how much survival underwriting is that worth?

In all of the Far East we have investments not to exceed \$750,000,000. That is materially less than our total cigarette bill last year. And what is the survival value of that to the people of the United States?

On the other hand, it is a matter of record that British investments in the Far East exceed ours by a ratio of 10 to 1.

Is our great fleet, financed and maintained by our money, upholding "democracy," if any, in the Orient? Is it defending the United States, over there, or is it looking out for the interests of someone else? The American people who foot the bill certainly have a right to know.

In urging speedy passage of this war bill, power bill, spending bill, and bankrupting bill, many of its advocates are attempting to terrify us with the threat of invasion by foreign foes.

Since no intellectually valid proof of that contingent has been submitted, there are some who wonder how real it is, or perhaps if it is not just another barrage of fear-inspiring words reminiscent of the days immediately preceding the Spanish-American War, when the people of Boston were so terrified by a well-publicized threat of imminent bombardment by the Spanish fleet that many of them shipped their valuables to safer spots inland.

Is the threat today any more real than that was? Or is it reminiscent of the scare technique used by Hudson Maxim in 1915 in that big build-up for the war to come? You will recall that he wrote a book, *Defenseless America*, which was distributed to nearly every literate person in the United States.

The main object of this book--

He wrote---

is to present a phalanx of facts upon the subject of the defenseless condition of this country, and to show what must be done, and done quickly, in order to avert the most dire calamity that can fall upon a people--that of merciless invasion by a foreign foe, with the horrors of which no pestilence can be compared.

The "phalanx of facts" then was to show that we were next on the Kaiser's list. Now, this "phalanx of facts" is to show that we are supposed to be next on Hitler's list, and the question arises logically, who will be the next one, 20 or 25 years hence, to put us on their list?

There is still a large number of Americans who have not yet been drowned in the torrential flow of war propaganda and hysteria, who still agree with the Prime Minister of Canada, MacKenzie King, who in the spring of 1939 said in Parliament:

I cannot accept the view that this country should here and now say that Canada is prepared to support whatever may be proposed by any government at Westminster. * * * The idea--

And I am still quoting Mackenzine King, Prime Minister of Canada--

The idea that every 20 years this country which has done all it can to run itself should feel called upon to save periodically a continent that cannot run itself, seems to many a nightmare and sheer madness.

Again we are told that unless this bill is passed promptly Great Britain, Greece, and China can no longer fight because they are almost out of money with which to buy the products of our "arsenal for democracy." Is it possible that the resources of the great British Empire have been exhausted already? Or does it mean that England does not intend to exhaust her resources and would stop this wanton destruction of life and property if we refused to finance it? Does it mean that we are really the ones keeping this good war going, especially since we have started to set up a little flirtation with Russia, which, if she accepted our courtship, would soon appear at our democratic table as another great "democracy" fighting to destroy dictatorship?

But so far we have been engaged in a war of words. Bitter words have been hurled back and forth across the seas; threats to some, and beautiful words of hope and promise to others.

Our own people here in these United States have been drugged by powerful hypodermic shots of emotional words just as we were in 1917--about defending America by again making the world safe for democracy; and President Roosevelt has told us all the kinds and varieties of liberty and freedom "we are committed" to enthrone everywhere.

But, nowhere, have I seen or heard about an inventory or blueprint showing definitely and concretely what we have got--what we can do--and how we are going to go about doing it. There is no answer to that question in this bill granting practically unlimited power to one man for practically unlimited spending.

There are those who tell us of the utter stupidity and futility of expecting to defend our freedom, liberty, and security here. We are not strong enough to do that, they contend.

But--in the same breath--they imply that we are strong enough to threaten anyone we do not like; strong enough to withstand the shock and impact of an orgy of world-wide unlimited spending; strong enough to underwrite the security and defense of the British Empire, Greece, China, the whole Western Hemisphere, or any other country the President may designate as essential to our defense in accord with the terms of this bill.

They would like us to believe that we are strong enough to do all that--but no one has yet inquired realistically--or if such inquiry has been made there has been no realistic answer to the question:

Just how weak, or how strong, are we?

Let us pause just a moment in this emotional debauch of words over our American way of life, and take a look at a realistic balance sheet showing some of the things that have happened to this so-called way of life even under a peacetime economy, and what is going to happen under the dictatorship and "arsenal for democracy" policy provided for in this "bankrupting act of 1941."

After the progress and accumulation of 150 years or so of our history, our physical assets in the form of industrial and commercial property used as tools of production amount in value to only \$80,000,000,000.

Yet, in the last 8 years, Government has taken from the people, and expended, the conservatively estimated amount of \$120,000,000,000.

Last year, 9,000,000 farmers produced \$9,000,000,000. But Government took away from the people and apparently expended \$18,000,000,000. Last year, the labor payments of 400,000 corporations amounted to \$28,000,000,000. But, 65 percent of that amount, or \$18,000,000,000, was taken away from our people and apparently expended by Government.

There are 30,000,000 families in these United States, and just simple arithmetic shows that this \$18,000,000,000 represents an average of \$600 taken from each family by Government each year.

Now, I happen to live up in New York State. Up there we have 3,000,000 families, and each family pays an average of \$700 to Government each year.

And all this is happening under a peacetime economy. Now, how strong are we, in the light of such constant and heavy sapping of the vitality of our families in the Nation? Why are we so emotionally disturbed over a foreign way of life on foreign continents? Do we not realize that there is a way of life here which includes food, clothing, shelter, and those other goods which add to the comfort and enjoyment and material well-being of the men, women, and children in our American families? Are they to be sacrificed on the altar of a bankrupting dictatorship here in order to engage in a crusade to destroy dictatorship and enthrone freedom everywhere else?

We have a Federal debt which, the last time I heard, approximated \$50,000,000,000. That is not much in the astronomical language of the day—but let us relate it to something we can feel and touch. Let us not hide it behind words that mean nothing, but rather express in in terms that all of us can understand.

This \$50,000,000,000 Federal debt of ours is an amount more than the total combined value of our farms, farm machinery, farm lands, buildings, and livestock.

Add to this Federal debt the debt of our States, counties, cities, and so forth, and we arrive at a figure of debt which equals the combined total value of our farm, industrial, and commercial man-made physical assets.

Add to that debt the private, long-term debts already outstanding against these same productive assets, and we find that the full debt burden resting against this national productive plant actually exceeds the total full exchange value of that plant.

What are we going to do about that? While we turn our interest and attention to the problems and horrible goings on over in "Europe's old dynastic slaughterhouse," how are we going to cope and reckon with the staggering and demoralizing fact of a debt burden against our national productive plant that actually exceeds the total full exchange value of that plant? What are we going to do about that? What are we going to do about the one-fifth, or is it one-third, of our population that our President referred to as "ill-fed, ill-clothed and ill-housed"?

Assume for the sake of argument the Government figure of \$70,000,000,000 representing our national income last year. This is probably an overstatement by 20 or 25 percent, but we will use the Government figure. That income is being produced by about 40,000,000 people using our \$190,000,000,000 worth of tools of production. It is equal to a national income of about one and one-third billion dollars a month, or \$200,000,000 a day.

But Government, under our peacetime economy, is taking away from us \$350,000,000 every week, or practically 2 days out of every week. How much more does Government expect to take in pursuing its policy, as exemplified by this bill, of underwriting the permanence of Great Britain, China, and Greece?

Now, how strong are we? Are we strong enough to endure the sapping and draining involved in this Gargantuan task of enthroning liberty everywhere and making all men good again as tried, but upon a much smaller scale, in 1917—and at a time incidentally when we had a Federal debt of only slightly over \$1,000,000,000 as against our present handicap of \$50,000,000,000?

How far can an automobile run on flat tires—or on watered gasoline—no matter how good the machine itself may be?

We have a good machine, but remember it is carrying a debt load equal to the exchange value of the machine, and just as there is a limit to every load, there is a bottom to every well. History proves that every nation which has approached that limit or hit that bottom has bumped smack into one of three dread situations—repudiation, inflation, or revolution. And those who pass this bill will have to shoulder that responsibility. That is a gruesome responsibility, gentlemen.

Have the advocates of this bill looked far enough ahead to see what ultimate effect this whole policy is going to have on American labor? This makes a very sad bedtime story for the men who work in our factories and on our farms, and they are the ones who produce the wealth that supports the rest of us.

You will remember that President Woodrow Wilson once had this idea of saving freedom and liberty. He also turned this country into one of these arsenals for democracy at the time of our former European crusade. We sunk billions in that futile effort to reform the world. We were called "Uncle Shylock."

This time, however, it is implied that we will be saved from these unpleasant experiences because President Roosevelt has given his solemn assurance that everything loaned, leased, or given to Great Britain under this bill will be returned to us in kind, or paid for with other products of the British Empire.

Well, that sounds reasonable, doesn't it? But if we look to the realities behind the words, we see a different story. We will see a situation more menacing to this American way of life than is any alleged foreign threat or was the unpaid stupendous sum we put up to underwrite Europe's last great indulgence in her historic pastime.

All of our 130,000,000 people are dependent for their material well-being upon the wealth produced by only 19,000,000—9,000,000 in agriculture and 10,000,000 in all types of manufacturing.

But what will these 19,000,000 Americans be producing when this foreign holocaust is over, and the twenty, forty, or fifty or more billions of dollars worth of goods start rolling into this country in repayment of what was loaned or leased under this National Bankrupting Act of 1941?

As this parade of foreign products, products that ought to be grown and manufactured here, marches by, we will be sitting on the sidelines, again bitterly disillusioned, staring at vacant factories, idle farms, and unprecedented lines of unemployed men and women.

We are told that under this bill we would be lending materials. We would not. We would be giving American labor away.

Who will save us then? Will Great Britain, China, and Greece be our first line of defense against internal chaos? Will then put us on their relief rolls as they are expecting us to put them on our relief rolls today?

Pass this bill, gentlemen, and we are irrevocably committed to a dictatorial regime, to a spending program that will bankrupt the Nation, to a barter policy that will ultimately stop American agriculture and industry in its tracks and throw unprecedented millions out of work, and commit us to a repetition of the costly folly of 1917.

We would be committed to the perpetuation of that unholy alliance of economic stupidity and a messianic complex which brings forth an ideology as idiotic as any now raging on any part of the earth—an

ideology under which we establish dictatorship here in order to destroy it elsewhere, destroy liberty here in an effort to enthrone liberty everywhere else, bankrupt ourselves by playing Santa Claus to others, and under which we are convinced that all the problems of the world can be solved by American boys killing one group of foreigners and dying for another group of foreigners.

Who are we, anyhow, to underwrite the eternal security of Greece and China? Who are we to say to our neighbor, Canada, to Australasia, South Africa, New Zealand, and to the hundreds of millions of people in India, or to the indentured labor of the British East Indies that they must remain forever within the confines of the British Empire? Who are we to tell all the rest of the world to keep hands off these precious spots of earth?

It is a far cry from the sound advice of Benjamin Harrison that "we were never commissioned by God to police the world," to the current ideology that the United States has been commissioned to become the "arsenal of democracy," which in turn is committed to the task of shooting and bombing freedom into all people, from Berlin to Moscow, to Rome, to Tokyo, and of defending democracy all the way from Dakar to Cairo, from Athens to Shanghai, from London to Singapore, from Hong Kong to Bombay, and from Greenland's icy mountains to India's coral strands.

Those who think that we or anybody else can do that have been gravely misinformed; and it is quite possible that they have not seen the statement of the Manchester Guardian of just last October 3, that the conditions which created this war "will not be cured or reformed by a victory and the rehabilitation of pre-war Europe."

It cannot be done. That great and wise British statesman, the late Lord Lothian, pleaded with his Government to get out of Europe, for Europe's good and England's good. "I am inclined to think," he said over and over again, "that Europe will never make peace within herself until we leave her to her own work." Now, why do we have to go back to Europe?

And in the House of Lords on March 3, 1936, that great man, Lord Lothian, was speaking of the possibility of England's getting involved in another European war, and he asked, "What should we be fighting for?" Then he answered his own question.

The only possible cause we could be fighting for would be to insist on the maintenance of the anarchy of Europe. * * * I venture to think that that is not a cause for which it is worth laying down the lives of British men.

Why then should any American believe that it is worth creating a dictatorship in this country, destroying our own freedom, bankrupting our own economy, and even laying down the lives of American men?

America, gentlemen, as you know as well as I, was founded by those who abandoned Europe in order to get away from all its political, religious, and economic tyrannies and restrictions. They came to a new world, created a new form of government, and wrote a constitution that are paralleled by nothing in the world. From their initial work we have developed a social and economic philosophy that is ours, a part of our own national flesh and blood.

We have developed a political, social, and economic system which, tinkered and tampered with as it has been, still has given man a freedom and standard of living greater and higher than any that exists in any other part of the world; and here is still enough old-fashioned Ameri-

can loyalty in my blood, and enough of the American pioneering spirit to restrain me from wanting to sneer at our accomplishments because they have not attained Utopian proportions, or to create within me any desire to return to the European tyrannies from which we ran away, or any foolish belief that we can do anything about those current tyrannies.

If our Republic must be defended, if our free democratic institutions must be fought for, the only place on the face of the earth where we can do that job with any hope of success is right here in America where those things are. We cannot save democracy where democracy isn't, and there is no percentage for anyone in destroying democracy where democracy is by engaging in a crusade to save democracy where democracy isn't.

We have a man-sized job to maintain and perfect right here in these United States a few little things like democracy, freedom, and Christian civilization; and I am inclined to believe that if we attend to that job as we should, there won't be any occasion for foreigners to bark at us, and we will not have the time nor the inclination to run around and scrub the ears of the "Great Unwashed" of Europe, Africa, and Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions?

Senator HARRISON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. You have a singular outlook in this matter that is entirely relative, isn't it?

Mr. CLESS. I hope it is. I believe it is.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I think so from what you have said.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally, have you any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. Where is your home, Mr. Cless?

Mr. CLESS. Glens Falls, N. Y.

Senator CONNALLY. In what business are you engaged?

Mr. CLESS. I am engaged, and I have been for a number of years, in various forms of economic research, writing, and speaking.

Senator CONNALLY. And lecturing?

Mr. CLESS. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. On your own account, Mr. Cless, or do you take commissions from people for economic research?

Mr. CLESS. No; I am speaking entirely on my responsibility.

Senator CONNALLY. I understand that.

Mr. CLESS. I am not working for anybody.

Senator CONNALLY. I am talking about business. Do you give your services to concerns that want you to make economic research, or do you write and lecture on your own?

Mr. CLESS. I write and lecture on my own.

Senator CONNALLY. Have you written any books?

Mr. CLESS. One book, and a number of monographs.

Senator CONNALLY. What is the name of the book?

Mr. CLESS. The Eleventh Commandant, published by Charles Scribner & Sons in 1938.

Senator CONNALLY. That is all.

Senator NYE. Mr. Cless, for the purpose of making the record more complete than I believe it is, perhaps I did not hear you, but can you say when it was that Lord Lothian spoke in the manner that you

have reported here with respect to a hope that if we might stay out of Europe that Europe probably would solve its problems.

Mr. CLESS. I have two quotes from Lord Lothian, Senator. As to one of them I cannot give the exact date or place, but I think it was at Chatham House, about 1937.

Senator NYE. In the nature of an interview?

Mr. CLESS. No, Senator. It was in an address that he was making at Chatham House, London. The other one was taken from his address in the House of Lords, March 2, 1936.

Senator NYE. Did you have access to the address at Chatham House?

Mr. CLESS. Yes, Senator.

Senator NYE. Will you let the committee have that citation, as to the time and place, definitely?

Mr. CLESS. I will send it to you as soon as I get home.

Senator NYE. Thank you, Mr. Cless.

Now, one thing more. Do you have the entire address with you at this time?

Mr. CLESS. No, Senator; I do not have it.

Senator NYE. Mr. Cless, do you think this is our war in any degree that is being waged in Europe now?

Mr. CLESS. This is not our war in any respect or in any sense. If I might be permitted to do so, I would like to submit just a little proof for that statement, Senator. What we are witnessing in Europe today is simply another turn in the cycle of imperialism that has been going on really from 1513, when Cardinal Wolsey first defined the British or English policy toward Europe—"Divide and rule. Create disunity. Create a balance of power."

But it was really in the nineteenth century that the strong nations of Europe went out to build up their great empires. That was the period in which the strong nations conquered the weak, and it culminated in the war of 1914-18 in which the strong nations fought each other for the exclusive control of the weak.

Following that period in which Great Britain and France won, by the grace of America, and took exclusive control of the weak, there was the period in which the strong had to fight the weak in order to keep them in subjection. That was witnessed in Syria, Egypt, Morocco, and other places.

Then the strong began to fight again for the exclusive control of the weak and the facilities and resources that these weak nations give to the strong; and we are seeing a war today in which two strong nations, Germany and England, are again fighting for the same thing for which they fought in 1914-18. You do not have to take my word for it. Right after the last war John Maynard King, that now great British economist, made the statement, "England has again destroyed, as in each preceding century, the trade rivalry." In the century before, it was France. Prior to that it was Spain. I don't know who it will be in the twenty-first century. And then this war comes and Mr. Churchill said this. Now, keep in mind what John Maynard King said about the last war. Mr. Churchill said last summer, August 20, in Parliament: "This war is in fact only a continuation of the last."

We know what the last war was. This is a continuation of the last. We have no commercial or financial business or moral stake in this war whatsoever.

Senator NYE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Cless, you mentioned the matter of the establishment of the empires of the great nations in the nineteenth century, I believe.

Mr. CLESS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are familiar with the fact, of course, that Great Britain achieved its present position in the Orient by precisely the same methods that Japan is now attempting to use in the Orient?

Mr. CLESS. That is right, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are familiar with the history as to the opium war, when Britain shelled Canton, Hongkong, and Shanghai into submission?

Mr. CLESS. That is right—and shocked civilization at the time.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And made China pay an indemnity for the war in addition to giving up Hongkong for the refusal of China to purchase opium from India instead of producing it itself?

Mr. CLESS. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you know any possessions that either Great Britain or France has that they did not take by force?

Mr. CLESS. I cannot think of any. I can run around from South Africa to India.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Then you remember the days of the Boer War, when meetings were held in this town constantly protesting against John Bull's crime in the Transvaal?

Mr. CLESS. I am afraid I was a little under age at that time.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I can remember them very well.

In other words, the establishment of these colonial empires which we are now asked to protect was by essentially the same methods as the methods now attempted on the part of the Axis Powers?

Mr. CLESS. That is the way all empires have been formed—by force, and by ruthless force.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. A little while ago you referred to Hiram Maxim and his book. Isn't it a fact, that Mr. Maxim's inventions were used to a very large extent and with great effectiveness to kill our own soldiers in the World War?

Mr. CLESS. It seems to me that I have heard about the Maxim rifle.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I call your attention to a provision in the bill, Mr. Cless. Do you have a copy of it before you?

Mr. CLESS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I call your attention to subparagraph (4) on page 3 under section 3 (a). Subsection 3 (a) starts: "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law," and subsection (4) to communicate to any foreign power he may see fit.

Mr. CLESS. Just a minute, please, Senator. That is subsection 4 on page 3, you say?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I will first call your attention to the language on line 14, page 2:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law—

The President may—then going over to line 6 on page 3—

To communicate to any such government (that is, the government selected by the President) any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

Are you familiar with the fact that nearly everyone of these tremendous engines of destruction has been invented by an American—the submarine and the airplane?

Mr. CLESS. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And the machine gun?

Mr. CLESS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Are you familiar with the fact that we have had some military secrets such as the bomb sight, which has been testified by the highest officials of our Army as being the most sacred military secret we have?

Mr. CLESS. That is true.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Under the authority of this section which I just read wouldn't we communicate to a foreign power information as to our greatest defense weapons which might be used against ourselves in the event of any future war?

Mr. CLESS. If words mean anything at all to me, Senator, they mean that we can transfer that and anything else to any foreign power.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If we transfer our bomb sight or the apparatus which we have for apprehending approaching airplanes, that is, if we transfer it to Great Britain, in the event of disaster to Great Britain wouldn't they certainly fall into the hands of our adversaries?

Mr. CLESS. That is true. And, if I remember correctly, I read newspaper reports as to how the Germans seized British equipment and turned it on the British to drive them off of the Continent.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are familiar with the fact, are you not, that we did release in priority over our own Army and Navy a great many airplanes to France which were later turned against Great Britain?

Mr. CLESS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is there any reason to believe that if we do the same thing again and Great Britain should fail in her effort, Mr. Cless, that the same weapons would not be used against us?

Mr. CLESS. They would be in position to use them against us.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In the event of war between Germany and the United States?

Mr. CLESS. In that case they are in position to use them against us.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, this provision for the communication of our military secrets means that we are making available to the whole world whatever defense secrets we have?

Mr. CLESS. That is correct—subject to the discretion of the President.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You mentioned something about Canada a little while ago. Are you familiar with the provisions of the draft in Canada?

Mr. CLESS. Not in detail. There is one point that I think I am familiar with, however. If I am wrong, you can correct me. I believe the Canadian draft bill says that conscripts are not to be used in foreign service.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Are you familiar with the fact that they only draft men for a period of 1 month?

Mr. CLESS. No; I am not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And under a stipulation that the draft-ees cannot be used for overseas service without their own consent?

Mr. CLESS. Well, yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Have you ever read our conscription act?

Mr. CLESS. Frankly, Senator, I have not read the act itself.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Have you ever found any such provision in it?

Mr. CLESS. I never heard that such a provision existed.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, we are doing a great deal more for the defense of the British Empire, not only under this bill but under previous bills, than the Dominion of Canada is willing to do or than any other dominion of the British Empire?

Mr. CLESS. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You mentioned the subject of flirtation with Russia. Do you find anything in this bill as to the nations to which aid shall be extended?

Mr. CLESS. If Russia should be brought into the fold of the great democracies and the President should desire to send the same material to democratic Russia that he does to other democracies, he can.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Already we have sent them \$2,000,000 worth of machine tools that we need ourselves.

Mr. CLESS. Under this bill it certainly looks as if he could send them to Russia.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Can you read the provisions of this bill in any other way.

Mr. CLESS. I cannot, not other than the establishment of the proposition.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If the President in his sole discretion wanted to appease—to use a term of opprobrium which has been used very frequently—Russia in the interest of Great Britain in the Orient, he would have the right to give planes or machine tools, or battleships, or anything else to Russia, if he so desired?

Mr. CLESS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You said something about the title of this bill, Mr. Cless. The printed title of the bill is "Further to Promote the Defense of the United States." Don't you think it might just as well be entitled "An Act to Denude the Defense of the United States?"

Mr. CLESS. Yes. That is appropriate, too.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Because under this bill, in the sole discretion of the President—without any reflection on the President and without any assumption that he would pursue that course—he has the power to completely denude the defense of the United States by turning over any battleships, any cruisers, any big gun, any tank, or any airplane to any power in the world whatsoever, if he deems it wise.

Mr. CLESS. I do not say that he would, but I still maintain, sir, that he would be entitled to.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I want to make it very specific that I do not think he would. But he is given the power under this bill to do it, isn't he?

Mr. CLESS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Have you any information as to a report that I heard from very authoritative sources that most of the planes that are being transferred from the United States, and from United States factories, at the present time to Great Britain are being used not for the defense of the British Isles but for their Middle East operations?

Mr. CLESS. I have heard the report, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You mentioned something about the effect of this bill on agriculture; and you are one of the first witnesses who appeared before the committee who did mention it.

Now, referring again to section 3 "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law," the President may have authority to otherwise procure any defense article. Of course, "any defense article" means anything, except possibly perfumery, that anybody can think of, doesn't it?

Mr. CLESS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And that includes wheat, it includes corn, and it includes hogs. They are defense articles. At least, I have never known of any soldier having more hog and hominy than he could eat. But under the provisions of this bill, "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law," the President may otherwise procure these defense articles and fix any prices he pleases on wheat or corn or hogs or anything of the sort, can he not?

Mr. CLESS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Under the provision "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law," Mr. Cless, he could manufacture or otherwise procure. And that authorizes him to repeal, if he wants to or, rather, suspend, if he wants to, the National Labor Relations Act or the Wages and Hours Act or any other act you can think of. I am not suggesting that the present President would do it, but he would have authority to suspend them if we he wanted to?

Mr. CLESS. In short, Senator, can't he do almost anything he wants to do under this act?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Cless, have you ever had occasion to read the writings of a man named Thomas Jefferson?

Mr. CLESS. I have read some of them.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you recall a statement in which he said, in discussing the grant of power, that what might be done may be done?

Mr. CLESS. That is true.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley, have you any questions?

Mr. BARKLEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys?

Senator VAN NUYS. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator GUFFEY?

Senator GUFFEY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. I have just a few questions to ask, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator Pepper.

Sentor PEPPER. Mr. Cless, did I understand you to say that this is the battle of the strong against the strong for control of the weak that is now going on?

Mr. CLESS. That is part of the battle.

Senator PEPPER. Then, how do you reconcile that with the statement made by Mussolini and Hitler that it is a battle of the "have's" against the "have nots"?

Mr. CLESS. I am not reconciling anything that Mussolini or Hitler have to say.

Senator PEPPER. Since you discussed the economic side of the matter, by a victory by which side may the United States be the more adversely affected economically?

Mr. CLESS. I don't know that I have any opinion on that, because it is not of fundamental interest to the people of the United States.

Mr. PEPPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be excused, Mr. Cless.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mrs. Rosa M. Faber in the room?

Senator NYE. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Faber, I know, is within immediate striking distance of the room, at least, and she expects to be called. If she does not respond now, Mr. Chairman, I think we might call another witness at this time and then call Mrs. Faber at a later time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator Nye. Then, who is to be your next witness?

Senator NYE. I was going to call the representative of the Americans United, Mrs. Broy?

The CHAIRMAN. Will Mrs. Broy come forward, please?

STATEMENT OF MRS. CECIL NORTON BROY, PRESIDENT OF AMERICANS UNITED, INC.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please give the reporter your full name?

Mrs. BROY. I am Mrs. Cecil Norton Broy, wife of the United States consul at Brussels, Belgium.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your present address?

Mrs. BROY. 4700 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you appear for the organization mentioned by Senator Nye?

Mrs. BROY. Yes, Mr. Chairman; for Americans United.

The CHAIRMAN. And will you show the composition of or will you state who composes that organization?

Mrs. BROY. I am chairman of the board of directors of Americans United, which was organized nearly a year ago under the District laws. We have a charter under the laws of the District. We have an organizing committee of 9 members who have been working for over a year, with about 100 leading Republican and Democratic women from all parts of the Nation. We have also had an advisory committee consisting of a number of important men and women who have given us much information. That includes wives of Senators, the wives of Members of Congress, and others who are highly informed on foreign and domestic affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a prepared statement?

Mrs. BROY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed with your formal statement, Mrs. Broy.

Senator BARKLEY. You said you are the wife of the American Consul at Brussels, Belgium, did you?

Mrs. BROY. Yes, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. Do you mean the present consul?

Mrs. BROY. Yes, sir.

Senator BARKLEY. Is he on duty now?

Mrs. BROY. He is on duty in Brussels.

Mr. Chairman, I speak for myself, for the women of our organization, and for the millions of American women who believe as we do, but cannot leave their homes or other duties to be here today.

We women are going to do our part.

We insist upon three things: (1) Defense for our country, (2) revitalization of our American people, (3) peace.

American women regard with great anxiety provisions of the lend-lease bill. Therefore, we submit for your consideration a fully worked out plan for a negotiated peace.

We face the facts in order to save our country, our children, and our possessions.

We women of America are calling to you members of this Foreign Relations Committee to go slow—to stop, look, and listen before it is too late. We, as a Nation, are not prepared spiritually nor materially to take on the world, as this bill provides.

Our productive resources are unorganized, and are being kept unorganized by selfish and unpatriotic people within our midst.

We American women want an adequate national defense and we will support the President of the United States to the fullest extent in accomplishing this most necessary objective.

But we women are weary of the continued dissension which has prevailed and is now prevailing between labor and management, finance and industry.

We women demand that any dishonest, selfish labor leaders who are permitting our national defense to be slowed up be made to fall into line.

Millions of American citizens favor labor having permanent work, under good conditions, with good wages.

In the relationship of capital to labor, it should be recognized by both parties that this relationship must be a partnership, in reality. Capital is entitled to a fair return on its investment, "and the laborer is worthy of his hire."

We women believe that it is possible for the representatives of American capital and American labor to sit around the conference table and come to a just conclusion. If democracy is to survive, and it will, this has to be done. But we women say to you lawmakers, if necessary, make them do it now.

We women are casting over 50 percent of the national vote. We speak to you as constituents who are carefully watching every move you make. This is the time when each of you must act according to the dictates of his heart, and not for any selfish interest whom you may have to represent. You must act for the good of the whole, now, or a new system of government will make your presence unnecessary in the Capitol Building of the United States. You are wonderful men. The Nation needs you, active, alert, and on duty in the service of your country. We know the burdens you have carried in the past. Your records of bravery and patience in this Senate of the United States have been carefully noted by us for future reference, and for present commendation.

But we insist that our own house be put in order here in the United States. There is much to be done. We American women are willing to make sacrifices in order that this may be accomplished. Think of France.

Women are not easily deceived when it comes to the basic things of life. We know that we have got to help find jobs for the jobless. We know that our economic life must be so revitalized that there must be sufficient comfortable American homes to house our people. There must be food, warmth, protection, and the opportunity for love to prevail in these homes. The children must be protected, fed, clothed, and educated. There must be freedom of speech and the right to worship God according to each man's own conscience. There must be the opportunity for each man to use his own God-given talents and to receive a just compensation.

The bill before you is not the way out of our difficulties. It is unconstitutional. Articles 3, 4, and 5 unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to the President; section 6 is also unconstitutional. Everything intended to be accomplished by this bill can be done legally and constitutionally.

We women are in favor of a program of armament—sufficient to defend our country, but we want the armament program provided for in accordance with the Constitution.

We favor a bill accomplishing full armament without the delegation by Congress of their legislative authority, and we favor all contracts with foreign governments being made in the method provided in the Constitution.

The people of this country must get behind the President in the defense program.

Any citizen who does not destroy the weapons which the secret agents of unfriendly nations have used, are using, and will almost certainly continue to use to disrupt the unity of our people, is not a patriot.

We want the country armed. We want a negotiated peace.

Peace is the canopy beneath which our world pulsates and pushes forward and upward. War is darkness. Peace is light and progress.

I am told there are at the present time in the United States 1,500 organizations, large and small, which are working directly or indirectly for peace.

I am told that there are about 100,000 churches in the United States. We feel sure that the congregations of these churches are all praying and working for peace.

Gentlemen, the duty of assuring protection and peace to the citizens of our great country, and the strangers within our gates, rests upon the Congress.

American mothers, wives, and sweethearts are calling to you in tears today with heavy hearts to do your duty well, and to let your conscience only be your guide in the consideration of this dangerous bill.

Now, on the other hand, if our country is ever attacked, we, the mothers, the wives, and the sweethearts of the American men, will take our places in the fight even as the brave women of the other countries have done and are doing. But we are convinced that this is not our war.

Some American thinkers have said to us, "Your plan sounds good. How wonderful if it could be accomplished. But Mr. Hitler wants to rule the world."

However, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, it is of momentous importance that Mr. Hitler, after having conquered the better part of Europe, in his address before the German Reichstag a few days ago, made the following important declaration. Herr Hitler said:

That the German people have no quarrel with the American people is clear to everybody who doesn't want consciously to twist the facts and claim its opposite.

He said:

There was merely one single point: The return of the German colonies. And in that connection I said "we want to solve this by negotiation. Even time is no element."

Mr. Hitler also said:

For England, these colonies have no purpose for she has 40,000,000 square kilometers. What is she doing with them? Nothing whatever. It is, however, the spirit of the old usurers not to want to yield up what they possess.

Mr. Hitler further said:

Never yet has Germany sponsored interests on the American Continent, except that it helped to fight for the liberty of this continent. If the states of the continent, however, now attempt possibly to interfere with the European conflict, then the war aims will change even faster.

Then Mr. Hitler said:

Again and again I stretched out my hands to the Englishmen. Nevertheless everything was in vain.

In conclusion Mr. Hitler said:

Again the blood of peoples must be placed at the service of the money of a very small group of interested persons.

Mr. Chairman, we are told that huge sums of money are being spent in propaganda in this country for "aid to Britain." We request that you gentlemen see to it that an immediate investigation is made, so that the American people, especially the American women, may be informed as to these sources of paid propaganda, which are confusing the issues at this critical time, and trying to make us believe that Great Britain is our first line of defense. Also, gentlemen, we American women demand that the name of the author of this bill be made known to the American people. We have heard strange rumors.

Far better, gentlemen of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate of the United States, to have a negotiated peace now rather than after the flower of our American manhood has been killed or mutilated and the womanhood of America is left brokenhearted.

This is not our war. Remember 1917-18—the price we paid in blood and money.

The eyes of the world are focused upon two men—Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the greatest democracy in the world, and Adolf Hitler, dictator No. 1.

An immediate truce is proposed. Such truce permits negotiations for an early peace.

Our five-point plan is as follows:

1. To divide the world into two equal parts geographically, the Eastern and Western Hemispheres.

As some of you will remember, you can stand to the west of the city of London in Greenwich—I myself have stood there with my left foot on the Western Hemisphere and my right foot on the Eastern, as many of you have. You should take this dividing line, the British dividing line of the world for many years for shipping interests, and divide this world into two parts geographically, the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, the dividing line being the meridian of Greenwich and longitude 180, as you see here on this map.

President Roosevelt and all other official heads of democracies within, to organize the Western Hemisphere, he being the leader of the democracies, or the chairman of the democracies, or whatever is the proper democratic term. And leave the existing heads of the countries of the Eastern Hemisphere to organize that half of the world—Mr. Hitler, Mr. Mussolini, and Mr. Stalin, that is, to organize that part of the world as they see fit. That is not our business.

Point 4. The Western Hemisphere to be fully protected by the development of the present emergency defense program.

Some people have said, as I have stated before, How do we know that Mr. Hitler would be willing for a negotiated peace? You know as reasonable, thinking men the problems that dictators have with subjected peoples is one thing, and you know all of the rest. I can't tell you about things that you know more about than I do. But so sincerely do we women feel on these grave questions that we would gladly go, a committee of three of our organization now here offer to go to Mr. Hitler and consult with him on this proposed plan, provided President Roosevelt, our American people, and you gentlemen of the committee first of all, of course, and Mr. Hitler approve.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Broy.

Is Mrs. Rosa M. Faber now in the room?

Mr. REARDON. Mr. Chairman, if she is not present, I am ready to go on with my statement.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. REARDON, HARTFORD, CONN.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please state your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. REARDON. Thomas J. Reardon; Hartford, Conn.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your business?

Mr. REARDON. I am authorized by the citizens of Connecticut to appear here in opposition to the bill, and the Governor of the State of Connecticut, after spending time with him, has sponsored my coming here to appear in opposition to the bill because of the point that I brought up in opposition to the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a statement to make, Mr. Reardon?

Mr. REARDON. In view of the evidence that I have listened to here, and in order not to occupy your time with a repetition of the things that you have already heard, I shall attempt, with the aid of the little slip that I have had placed before you, to follow through and make my statement as short as I possibly can.

Peace to men of good will.

The power of war is the minority manipulation of political confusion. That is also the cause of depressions. We have just reached war at a

point now after 10 years of attempting to solve our national economic problem, and we are now confronted with a war problem.

This bill, in its title is "A bill further to promote the defense of the United States" and then follows "and for other purposes."

My first alarm was for national defense. The pattern of involvement in war is always the same. Our second step was hemisphere defense. This is a step in the world defense. Now we are confronted with the problem of the constitutionality and the proposal steps or method being used to gain that end. This is not in the form of a proposal that after two-thirds of the Senators agree it will then be brought before the country for ratification. So, in reality, if it were reasonable and possible to do it under the Constitution, that is the form that this matter should take.

Under national defense we have a distinct unity in this country. Under international defense you have divided the unity, and as to the word "aid" there have been so many constructions of the word that you have the whole country confused.

As a citizen of the United States I owe allegiance to my country, and my life, if necessary, when you demand it. But, in turn, you, as Senators, have an obligation to support the Constitution of the United States. And this bill here as is, if enacted into law by a joint resolution, would suspend the Constitution of the United States. That is positive.

How do the people feel when confronted with this? They are bewildered; they are confused. They had never dreamed that within the space of one short year they would be confronted with the problem that they are confronted with today.

They have no fear of attack, because with all the figures you have we know we are equal with defense implements to meet any attack on this country that has any semblance of being an actual attack as of January 1941. And if we properly follow through with armament necessary for our national defense, our accumulation of those defense articles will keep pace with this potential danger. And back of all the support of this bill you are confronted with a theory—not a fact but a theory, a theoretical danger. When you get theoretical you can magnify it as you see fit. But I multiply that by ten. And no one can dispute the figures.

But this is the fact. This country is not in danger of immediate attack or immediate invasion. And knowing that we recognize that there is a potential danger at a future date, we are equal to the occasion. And we should safeguard those things that we have been told we need and not now turn them over in defense of another nation which does not come under the Constitution of the United States. And because of the pattern of involvement we are following step by step, the result is positive. It will be the shedding of the blood of our American boys on foreign soil.

Now, following Judge Davis' citation, you have a very, very complete definition of what the Constitution of the United States is by word and intent. So either wittingly or unwittingly, aid to other countries than the United States, by this country, that are involved in war is a doctrine of treason. And wittingly or unwittingly those who support it would betray their country.

Gentlemen, I thank you for the time.

If there are any questions asked I will be glad to try to answer them, because I am capable to take care of the mathematical situation in that connection, knowing the cause of war and also knowing the cause of our economic collapse in 1929.

But don't let's accept relief from an economic situation in the production of war munitions which we are automatically going to give away. That is an economic fallacy, and it is bound to lead to an economic collapse, and taxation cannot satisfy the obligation; it will have to be a complete confiscation of all things worth having or owning.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions by any Senator?

There are no questions, Mr. Reardon. We thank you for your appearance.

Is Mrs. Rosa M. Faber present?

Senator CONNALLY. Senator Nye said she is within striking distance. But it seems that she is on a strike.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Ralph Townsend present?

Mr. WILLIAM LLOYD. Senator Nye said that I would go on this afternoon if there was nobody else available. My name is William Lloyd, Jr.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lloyd, how much time do you wish this afternoon? We are running a little late.

Mr. LLOYD. My statement will take only about 10 minutes.

Senator CONNALLY. Unless the minority sponsors Mr. Lloyd, I am not in favor of putting him on. This is their time, and I do not think we ought to invade their time.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly not, but he said Senator Nye wanted him to speak.

Senator CONNALLY. Senator Nye is not here.

Mr. LLOYD. I spoke to him in the anteroom, just before I came in.

Senator CONNALLY. The other Senators are here. If they want to sponsor him, all right.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is Senator Nye now.

Senator Nye, Mrs. Farber did not answer and Ralph Townsend did not answer.

Senator NYE. Mr. Ralph Townsend had been delayed in arriving from San Francisco to New York, and he is on his way by plane here, but there is no possibility of his being here in time to be heard today.

Mr. Lloyd is not my witness. I told Mr. Lloyd that if he wanted to be heard he would have to make his request to the committee.

Mr. LLOYD. I understood him to say that I would be on this afternoon. Wasn't that your indication?

Senator NYE. No, Mr. Lloyd. I suggested that if you would put yourself in evidence here and the committee would give consent to hearing your testimony, why, this afternoon would probably afford an opportunity to you.

Mr. LLOYD. I applied the first time on January 25 to be heard. I have had my application in since then. I made my application to the chairman of the committee.

Senator CONNALLY. If I may interrupt Mr. Lloyd, this time belongs to the opponents of this bill.

Senator JOHNSON of California. What is that?

Senator CONNALLY. I say, this time belongs to the opponents of the bill.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Are you sure?

Senator CONNALLY. I am trying to give it to you. We had an agreement that they would have the call of the witnesses and that nobody would be called unless they sponsored them. If they want to sponsor you, Mr. Lloyd, that is fine. If not——

The CHAIRMAN. Are you representing an organization?

Mr. LLOYD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the organization?

Mr. LLOYD. It is called Campaign for World Government, Working for Peace, and a United States of the World, in opposition to the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your position and file your brief for the benefit of the committee? Can't you state it without reading the regular prepared statement?

Mr. LLOYD. Well, the statement won't take long. I can read parts of it, but it seems to me——

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Lloyd.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Let me say, for the opponents of the bill on this committee, that we are not sponsoring this statement and have not asked that this witness be heard.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall have to ask you, under the circumstances, to stand aside, to see if there are any witnesses who desire to be heard.

Senator Nye, can you advise me about Mrs. Farber?

Senator NYE. I have tried to locate Mrs. Farber, who was in my office this noon, but she is not available, evidently, at this time. I understand you have called her name.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator NYE. I have no other witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other witnesses that you wish to call?

Senator NYE. I have no others today.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lloyd, you may take the seat again now.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I am perfectly willing to have Mr. Lloyd make his statement, but I wish it to be with the distinct understanding that he does not appear on behalf of the sponsorship of the opponents of this bill on this committee.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Chairman, I did not understand what the arrangements were for testimony, and I applied, naturally, to the chairman of the committee on January 25, which is some time ago. I can assure you that this statement will be one of the briefest that has been heard this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed with as much dispatch as you can?

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not being offered by the opponents of the measure, and we have hesitated to put you in on that time that they would be privileged to use. Therefore, we ask you to be very brief.

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you, Mr. Senator.

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, he is not being put on for the proponents of the bill, either. He is just a sort of hitchhiker witness.

Mr. LLOYD. All right. I will accept that statement.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He is an American citizen, and he is entitled to be heard.

Senator CONNALLY. There are about 130,000,000 citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye said that he might be heard at the end of the testimony. I would not have asked him to sit down if it had not been for that.

Please proceed, and be as brief as you can.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM B. LLOYD, JR., NATIONAL DIRECTOR, CAMPAIGN FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT, "FOR PEACE AND A UNITED STATES OF THE WORLD," CHICAGO, ILL.

Mr. LLOYD. Gentlemen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spectators of these hearings have heard and the country as a whole has read much able testimony and much able questioning before this committee.

I am deeply grateful to you for the opportunity of presenting today a statement on the lend-lease bill from a standpoint which has not yet been expressed here, but one which I feel is vital to the presentation of American democracy. It is a point of view which does not stop at criticism of this bill, but goes on to suggest a very definite and constructive alternative.

America is faced by one of the gravest crises in its history, and this crisis is, of course, not due only to the introduction of the lend-lease bill. We are faced with great economic dislocation if we simply succeed in staying out of the war.

In a recent conversation with a Member of the Senate, I was told of the serious economic conditions produced in Idaho and Colorado by the piling up of surplus potatoes formerly exported. Economic ruin faces many growers out there, and this is just a small sample of the deleterious effects of the war on a nonbelligerent country. There is certainly no doubt about the fact that we cannot close our eyes to events in Europe and Asia. But nearly everyone agrees that our increasing participation and final entry into the war would ultimately produce far greater economic dislocation and, in addition, social and political disturbances of an important magnitude.

We feel that the lend-lease bill would lead to our entry into war, or failing that, would in any event grant dangerously excessive political and economic power to one man.

We believe a constructive method of dealing with the crisis should be tried before we get any further into it. We favor aiding the people of England, and also the people of France, Germany, and the occupied countries, by means of a vital dynamic leadership on the part of the United States toward a return to common sense, a halting of the war, and the settlement of outstanding questions in a world convention based on American principles rather than an old-world diplomacy.

There are not two but three sides to this war. There are the two belligerent sides and, in addition, the group of nations which are still nonbelligerent, principally in the Western Hemisphere, but also including Ireland, Sweden, Jugo-Slavia, Portugal, Bulgaria, and so forth. Action by these nonbelligerent nations is the only hope for a just and lasting peace. It is unrealistic to expect even-handed justice from a victor nation which has necessarily—in order to win the war—been keyed up to an overwhelming emotional drive to crush its opponent.

The following are additional reasons for organizing nonbelligerents:

1. Only countries spared the tremendous pressure of waging war have the energy and impartiality needed to plan and prepare the post-war settlement on a basis of justice, and to prevent a peace dictated by either side.

2. The nations of the Western Hemisphere, although not the most ideal combination, nevertheless, could between them be trusted to maintain the balance between the two belligerent sides.

3. The natural resources and productive capacity of this hemisphere are as necessary to the rebuilding of the post-war world as to the conduct of the war, so that any united constructive move undertaken by the nations of this hemisphere will command the attention and respect of all the people of the world.

4. It offers the last and only basis for a just peace established not by military victory but by impartial, neutral action which is the basis of justice in all civilized countries.

In place of the lend-lease bill we suggest the following specific means of organizing the nonbelligerent nations to lay the foundation for a just peace:

1. Creation of a Joint Congressional Peace Commission, which shall immediately communicate by radio, telephone, and cable with the legislative bodies of all nations not yet at war, requesting a statement of their willingness to cooperate to bring about a cessation of hostilities under joint nonbelligerent supervision, at the same time offering and pledging the extension of the system of federation into a world union of nations as a practical means of readjusting the status of nations under recent or long-standing foreign domination and of permitting mankind to promote peace and to raise standards of living everywhere without constant fear of war and organized destruction.

2. As soon as three to five other nonbelligerent nations have signified their willingness to cooperate, the Joint Congressional Peace Commission, in the name also of the other nations who have joined in this peace action, shall urge by radio, telephone, and cable the legislative bodies of all belligerent nations to agree to a cessation of hostilities on all fields of battle, without permanent recognition of military conquest, but with the pledge that territorial, economic, and social problems leading to war will be solved by the calling of a world constitutional convention which shall draw up the Constitution of a United States of the World to which all nations will be invited.

3. This Peace Commission should proceed to bring as many more nonbelligerent nations as possible into this plan of joint leadership, and at the same time shall reiterate its offer to the belligerents, using short-wave beam radio transmission, and every possible "grapevine" method for giving the offer circulation directly to the people in spite of the censorship of the belligerent nations.

4. Concurrently, the Congressional Peace Commission shall work out, with the aid and counsel of experts, the details of the following international activities which will require immediate operation upon a cessation of hostilities:

(a) The establishment of temporary demarcation lines between belligerents.

(b) The orderly and scientific planning of the relief of starving populations.

(c) The demobilization of millions of soldiers—shifting them into reconstruction work.

(d) The reopening of channels of international communication, trade, and distribution.

(e) The calling and preparation of a world convention which will set up the framework under which these and correlated world-wide tasks can be carried out effectively.

Gentlemen of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the adoption of a program so constructive and dynamic would be worthy of the humanity, sympathy, and intelligence of the American people. Its adoption would undermine in all belligerent countries the demand now enforced from the top down for reckless, uncompromising victory. It would demonstrate to the world that the American people are using the priceless privilege of their nonparticipation in the war for leadership toward the security of all humanity, themselves included.

For our own country a program of waging peace could unify all our naturalized citizens, regardless of origin. Instead of allowing the vagaries of the war to arouse a humanly inevitable sympathy in national groups here for their cousins across the seas, a positive program of peace action would set all our people to telling their cousins to come to their senses and learn to live together in peace as we do here. In this way the feelings of naturalized citizens could all be brought to a focus on peace, democracy, and Americanism.

Hundreds of thousands of veterans and their families saw that war was not effective in saving democracy and are hoping against hope that some influential group will point out another way, as well as warning against the old way.

True, this program has never been tried, but who can doubt that the times call for blazing new trails? Each of the other courses here proposed has been tried again and again and failed of the objectives it tried to attain. During the last 25 years the nations have tried to be realistic and opportunistic. Bluffing has been dominant in international relations. It has brought us once more to a catastrophic stage in the affairs of nations.

We beg you not to commit the United States to the hopeless scrimmage of bluff and power politics. A positive program of peace can awaken the people to the fact that the United States is strong enough and intelligent enough to chart her own course, regardless of European policy, and in the light of constructive world statesmanship.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions of the witness?

There are no questions, Mr. Lloyd. Thank you.

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NYE. Mr. Chairman, who wants the witness Mr. Reynolds to testify?

Senator PEPPER. I suggested that either side offer him.

The CHAIRMAN. He has been invited by the committee to appear, and it was thought he might be able to offer his testimony this afternoon.

Senator NYE. It is not the understanding that he is being heard in the time of the opposition?

Senator CONNALLY. He will be, by your permission.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I should like to say this: That if Mr. Reynolds appears, he will be examined at length. The committee

can do what it pleases about it. I have no objection to Mr. Reynolds' appearing—as a matter of fact, I think it might be very beneficial to our side for him to appear—but I wish to reserve any rights we have to the extent of saying that if he appears he may be examined at length.

Senator CONNALLY. As I understand, the minority does not object to his testifying.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I do not care whether he testifies or not, but I certainly do not wish any understanding that Senator Pepper was trying to make here a moment ago, as to the length of cross-examination, because I think if this man appears—he is a professional propagandist—he ought to be examined to the full extent that any member of the committee wishes to examine him, and I intend to exercise that right.

Senator PEPPER. That will be up to the opposition.

The CHAIRMAN. If we have no other witness, we shall call Mr. Reynolds, if he is available.

STATEMENT OF QUENTIN REYNOLDS, ASSOCIATE EDITOR, COLLIER'S WEEKLY

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your name and address and business affiliations and connections to the reporter, please?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Associate editor of Collier's Weekly.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you desire to proceed until you have finished with your statement before answering any questions?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Whatever you say.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be agreeable to the committee.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I have no long statement to make, but I have an explanation of my presence here. I received a wire 2 days ago from the chairman of this committee, asking me to appear. I was very much surprised, because I do not know any member of this committee and never had met one until yesterday.

I have been back from London about 3 weeks. I am just here for a short holiday and then shall return to resume my job as a reporter for Collier's Weekly. I make my living as a reporter, and I have always made my living as a reporter. That is why I was puzzled and bewildered when I received an invitation to appear before this committee.

I have been reading the testimony of witnesses before this committee and testimony of witnesses before the House committee. It seemed to me that everyone who testified was either a protagonist of this bill or was emphatically against it. In short, every man who appeared had a very definite, very emphatic opinion.

Working reporters, such as myself, can't indulge in the luxury of opinions. It is not our job.

I cannot qualify as an expert on this bill. I have read it. I understand it.

I have been in France and England for the past 10 months. I have seen the war as a reporter sees it. I got out of Paris a few hours before the Germans got into Paris, and I got out of Bordeaux on the last possible ship.

Since then I have been in England. I have flown with the R. A. F. I have spent a lot of time with the men of the R. A. F. I have lived

with the troops, and know something of the defenses which England has in case of invasion.

I have lived in London ever since September 7. I know a good deal about my neighbors in London. I have spent nights with the air wardens and with the firemen. I have spent nights driving in ambulances during the bombings. I have been in hospitals where they kept on operating even while bombs were falling, and even while the hospital was on fire. I visited Coventry and Southampton and Dover and Portsmouth after they had been bombed.

I spent a whole week inspecting and flying in the American airplanes which we have sent to Great Britain. I know as much about them as it is possible for a layman to know. I talked to the test pilots who flew them. I have seen them in combat.

I have met all of the Cabinet ministers. I have interviewed every one of them on the record and talked to them off the record. I would be glad to pass on to you things that these ministers said to me if there is any point to their statements in connection with this bill.

There are about 60 of us American correspondents in London. Ninety-nine percent of us, I think, feel and think alike. If hearsay evidence is admissible here, I'll be glad to give you their views. They think as I do—that to date we have given England all support short of help.

Since coming back I have been startled by the misconceptions people have about England's attitude toward America. I have been bewildered by the feeling of defeatism which seems to be prevalent, especially in Washington. People seem to think that England is on the brink of annihilation. The facts as I know them do not bear this out. People here think that there is no possibility of our being invaded by Germany. The facts as I know them do not bear that out, either. People seem to think England wants our men to go over there and fight.

I had lunch with Ernest Bevin the day before I left England. I asked him: "Suppose America were to give you a blank check and you could fill it in as you wished. Would you fill it in with 'one million men'?"

Bevin laughed and said, "What would we do with them?"

I know what England's needs are, just as every reporter in London knows. I know it not only from personal observation; from intimate talks with men like Bevin and Lord Beaverbrook and Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lord Woolton, the Minister of Food, and Herbert Morrison, Minister of Home Security. I know these men.

I know about the morale of the people of England. I know that it is higher today than it has ever been. I have been with the people of the East End when they were bombed. I have been with the King when bombs were falling close to him. The reaction was the same.

I know that the people of England are waiting for the invasion they feel is coming. I know that they await the outcome of that invasion with every confidence—confidence that is well justified. I know that England cannot and will not lose this war. This is not an opinion. It is a conviction based on fact. I know that they need our help to insure a decisive victory, and I know that we can help them to this final victory without ever sending one man across the ocean.

I have great admiration for my neighbors in London. Every reporter must have an admiration for the kind of courage they are showing. However, we are all objective reporters. We would not hold our jobs long if we were not. We deal, as I said before, with facts, not opinions.

I would like to add that although I have a great admiration for England, I have only two loyalties, only two responsibilities. The major one is to my country. The minor one is to the organization for which I work.

I'll be happy to answer any questions that come within the scope of a reporter, but I hope you will allow me to confine myself to factual answers. I can only repeat that a reporter who deals in opinions can't be much of a reporter. It is a luxury that is denied us.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Harrison?

Senator HARRISON. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. I pass mine to Senator Nye.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. You have had unusual contacts in Europe, on the Continent as well as in England, have you not?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. In those contacts did you encounter anywhere any feeling that any American had given them reason to believe that we might respond in a larger way than we have responded?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Of course, you are referring, Senator, to Ambassador Bullitt, aren't you?

Senator NYE. Well, Bullitt or anyone else.

Mr. REYNOLDS. No; I can't, Senator. I can't say that I have, over—

Senator NYE. You encountered no instance where you were given to believe that anyone in France or in England had been caused to feel that we could be expected to respond in a larger way than we have?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Certainly not in England; and in France I was at the front nearly all the time and never met the kind of people who had the opportunity to talk about such things.

Senator NYE. You have written a book recently, have you not?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. What is its title?

Mr. REYNOLDS. It is called "The Wounded Don't Cry."

Senator NYE. At page 82 of that book I find this language:

We didn't have long to wait. The next day Petain made his incredible speech of capitulation which sickened us all. He called upon the army to stop fighting. We knew that Winston Churchill had come to Bordeaux and promised Petain a division a day if he'd hold out a bit longer. We knew that Bullitt had talked to Petain and had told him that America would help in every way.

Now, what was the meaning of that?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I said no one had talked to me. That, I think, was your question, Senator—anyone had said to me. This was gossip in diplomatic circles which appeared to be pretty well founded.

Senator NYE. So, on the basis of this gossip, you wrote in this book, "We knew that Bullitt had talked to Petain"?

Mr. REYNOLDS. At that time that was our conviction; yes.

Senator NYE. That was only gossip, then?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Gossip from diplomatic circles which had always been true before—sources we had in the embassies, sources we had in the French Government.

Senator NYE. You have reason to believe this was not true?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I have reason to believe it was true.

Senator NYE. That it was true?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. Again, at page 77 of your book, you speak of Downs and Knickerbocker. I take it they were fellow correspondents?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Both very eminent.

Senator NYE (reading):

Downs, Knickerbocker, and I held a council of war. We decided to evacuate Tours—but immediately. By now we knew enough about the blitzkrieg tactics of the Germans to make plausible the rumor that kept leaping from pub to pub, that they were on the way to Tours. If we were caught in Tours it wouldn't have been good for any of us. Knick and I were on their blacklist. Downs had been accredited to the French Army. Even if they didn't kick us around they would make us immobile. They certainly wouldn't let us file stories. And then there was the fairly well substantiated rumor to the effect that Bill Bullitt had told friends that America would be in the war within 8 days.

I wish, Mr. Reynolds, that you would offer for the information of the committee, in a larger way, the rumor, story, or reason that was behind this construction of Bill Bullitt's telling friends that America would be in the war within 8 days.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Well, I made it plain in the book it was a rumor.

Senator NYE. You have called it that here.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes. Now, in Tours and Bordeaux people were just getting in from Paris, and we met several Americans, bankers, men who had planned to stay, whom we knew had planned to stay, and they all told us, when we asked them why they had run out, that the report was rife in Paris that America was going to come in very soon.

This, you will recall, was a week or two after the President's stab-in-the-back speech, and these Americans said, "We are sure the report comes from the embassy."

From whom there? It could not be Petain. We never sent it as a factual story. It was a rumor which we heard on all sides.

Senator NYE. Have you finished?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir.

Senator NYE. You have spoken of these rumors that were persistent that Bullitt had given assurance to the French that America would be in there. Was there more of that sort of rumor? Was it pretty persistent?

Mr. REYNOLDS. It was persistent in Tours in those 48 rather mad hours, when people were running in hysterically and saying "We have got to get out. We hear"—we hear—"America is coming in."

We could never pin it down, and Bullitt was not there to ask.

Senator NYE. You have testified, if I did not misunderstand you, that you believed that there was substance to these rumors.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I have testified to that, sir?

Senator NYE. I thought you did.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I don't know yet. I just don't know. I say we could never prove it. That is why I said in the book it was a rumor.

Senator NYE. But when I called to your attention this declaration of yours, "We knew that Bullitt had talked to Petain and had told him that America would help in every way," you said that you had reason to believe that there was foundation for that rumor.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes. America would help in every way; yes.

Senator NYE. What was your reason for believing that?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Well, you see, that is a little different than America coming in within 8 days. We knew that Bullitt, and all official Americans we had anything to do with there, were all anxious to help France; and after the President's speech, which you will recall was very strong, why, we felt that America was on the verge of doing something active to help France.

In that line there I do not say, "We believed America was coming in within 8 days."

We believed America would do something about the orders she had already accepted, perhaps, and get those airplanes there—the Curtiss-36 and the others which had already been ordered. That was the sort of thing we had in mind.

Senator NYE. But you did not have in mind that Mr. Bullitt was causing them to believe that we might be in in even a larger way than that?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Just didn't know, Senator. None of us knew. I say, we never sent that in our stories, even.

Senator NYE. There is still a doubt in your mind?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Still is now.

Senator NYE. To occasion that doubt there must have been, and continued to be, reason to believe that Mr. Bullitt was rather free with his promises and his assurances over there?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I would not say that "over there," but he was very sincere in his friendship to the French. That we knew, and then when all these other rumors came, one on top of another, on the basis of his well-known and sincere friendship for the French, we put some credence in them—not enough to send a story to our magazines or newspapers.

Senator NYE. Did you ever encounter personally Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes. I met him about twice in Paris, but that is all. I was at the front all the time in France.

Senator NYE. Was this while France was successfully resisting?

Mr. REYNOLDS. It was about May 12, Senator. We thought they were successfully resisting then.

Senator NYE. In your conversations with Mr. Bullitt, did he give you any reason to believe he was hoping that the United States might come in in a larger way than it was already in?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Not at all. I saw him to get accredited to the French Army. It is a difficult and long process, and you have to have the ambassador vouch for you. That is how I met him—only twice—never interviewed him; never talked with him more than 10 minutes.

Senator NYE. Mr. Reynolds, do you have any reason to doubt the reliability and the courage of American newspapers?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Quite the reverse. I have worked on them all my life, Senator.

Senator NYE. What was the meaning of this, found in your book, "The Wounded Don't Cry," at page 125:

The Englishman is also foolish in this respect: He thinks that his personal liberty is the most important thing in the world. In New York if a cop orders us gruffly to move on, sheeplike we obey him. Here the Englishman will want to know why. If the cop has a good reason, well and good. This is reflected in the English newspapers which now, I guess, are the only comparatively free newspapers in the world. Of course we never have had freedom of the press in America so we don't know much about it. Always our newspapers have been dominated by advertisers?

Mr. REYNOLDS. What is the question, sir?

Senator NYE. Are newspapers dominated by advertisers?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I think so, in the main. I think every working newspaperman in the country would agree with me.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is Collier's Magazine dominated by advertisers?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I find not, Senator, strangely enough. You see, John Flynn and I are on opposite sides of the fence, and we are both associate editors of Collier's.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Reynolds, you state in your statement that you do not wish to be examined about questions of opinion. Let me ask you whether there is a single thing in your statement except statements of opinion.

Mr. REYNOLDS. In the statement I made here?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I find it all factual, Senator. I am just trying to say that I have been in England and I do know something about actual conditions there; and if such evidence is of any value, I will be very glad to give it. That is all factual. That I know about.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is not your whole statement in itself a statement of opinion, and have you not made in your appearances at various lectures and in your theatrical appearances statements of opinions?

Mr. REYNOLDS. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Outside of your film, of which I understand you are the executive?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir; which is factual.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Every sentence in this statement that you have given to the committee is a statement of opinion rather than factual, is it not?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Well, Senator, if you will forgive me, I don't see how you can judge a written article in one sentence. I am giving an impression that my job is being a factual reporter.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. But you say you do not wish to testify or to be examined as to opinions, and yet your whole statement is a statement of opinion.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I did not say I did not wish to testify to my opinion. I said my opinion is not worth anything. I am a factual reporter.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Now, Mr. Reynolds, you said you did not have any idea who asked to have you appear before this committee.

Mr. REYNOLDS. None at all. Still have not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You did put in all day yesterday in consultation with Senator Pepper, did you not?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Consultation?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Yes.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I came to meet him. I met him in here when I came into the room. It was the first time I had met Senator Pepper. The wire I got was from Senator George.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am willing to believe you did not meet Senator Pepper until yesterday, but you did spend all day consulting with Senator Pepper?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Not at all.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You arrived this morning at 11 o'clock and saw Senator Pepper?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir; I went to his office to find out what time I came in.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did Senator Pepper advise you about your statement?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Good heavens, no.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He made a statement in executive session that he knew what your statement would be and how long it would be.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes; I told him all that, but the Senator has not advised me. I think he will be very willing to say that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I was advised by a very important Senator, when I protested against your being transferred on to our time, that he did not desire you, but the White House wanted you to do that. Is that right?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Certainly not. I came here voluntarily, on my time, as well as the committee's.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Of course. Every witness who has preceded you has done that. Senator Pepper was very insistent that you be permitted to testify today. I have kept witnesses here for 2 or 3 days during the last week. Do you mean to say that you just happened to pick up Senator Pepper by accident, or anything of that sort?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I mean to say exactly that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. All right.

Mr. Reynolds, you are an advocate of an absolute declaration of war, are you not?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Certainly not.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you make a speech down here a few days ago at Constitution Hall?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In which you said that hate was an old American heritage and we ought to exercise it as far as we could?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I certainly did not, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I have been informed by an extremely credible newspaperman that you said that.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I'll tell you exactly what I did say.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What did you say?

Mr. REYNOLDS. As far as I remember, I said that there is no defense against fascism except a hatred of fascism. Several countries—Poland, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Norway—were helpless before fascism because they did not hate it enough. They did not hate it as a preacher hates sin, for instance, so that he will really fight to the last drop of blood.

To beat this Fascist machine, assuming that it is necessary to beat it—and it was certainly necessary for those countries to beat it—you have got to hate it a hundred percent, with your soul, body, and mind, so that it is the only thing you think of.

That is the only way England has survived. She had no right to survive this far after Dunkirk, but she hated fascism so and loved her liberty so, she drew on resources she did not have, fought with a courage that did not exist, and was kept alive by this courage and her hatred for fascism.

That is roughly what I said.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you refer to hate as an old American heritage?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I am positive I did not; no, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you describe the fact that you owned a ranch out in New Mexico, in rattlesnake territory?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you say that you deprecated and deplored and repudiated the term "defense" because you own a ranch out in New Mexico—

Mr. REYNOLDS. Senator—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Just a minute. Let me ask the question. In rattlesnake territory and that when you wanted to kill rattlesnakes you did not take a defensive position. You summoned your foreman and whatever hands you could get to run out and kill the rattlesnakes?

Mr. REYNOLDS. With one very grave mistake, that is exactly what I said; and the mistake is, Senator, I do not own a ranch. I do not even own an automobile. But every summer I go out to a ranch where Senator Vandenburg visits nearly every summer—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It does not make any difference who goes there.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Where I am a guest. Yes; I did talk about the word "defense"—what a horrible word it was.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. But you repudiated the word "defense"?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Repudiated?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Deplored it.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Deplored it; yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Deprecated it.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Exactly. I can explain why in half a minute.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, you are not in favor of American defense. You think we ought to go and attack somebody. Was that not the purport of your lecture in connection with this film of yours that your company put on for you?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Not quite, Senator.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. All right. I shall be very glad to have you explain it.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I said that wherever I go in America I hear the word "defense." I said somehow that seems like a pitiful word for a great country like ours to be worrying about. "Defense" is the word that stuck in the throat of France and chokes her today. "Defense" was the word of Czechoslovakia and Belgium and Holland and the others. They only thought in terms of defense. And Hitler and his army are so great that you can't think against them in terms only of defense. You have to think of them as rattlesnakes, as we do on the ranch. We do not build concrete walls around the ranch house. We go out and get the rattlesnake before he comes to us, knowing he is coming.

That is roughly what I said, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Are you for this bill?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I can't think of any reason not to be for it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Have you read the bill?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I did not read it until yesterday.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Did you read the title of it?

Mr. REYNOLDS. "Defense," yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. "Further to promote the defense of the United States." Now, if you think that the term "defense" is deplorable, why would you be for this bill?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Well, as the bill virtually says, it is an emergency measure, in case we are threatened with danger-----

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I do not see where the bill says that, because it is without limit as to time.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Well, of course, a lot of us think the emergency has come, but it's time something was done.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You object to the word "defense"?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I just don't like the word, Senator.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is that not what you said in Constitution Hall?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes; I don't like the word.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Then, you do not think the title of this bill, "Further to promote the defense of the United States"-----

Mr. REYNOLDS. I never read the title. I have read the bill.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You say "defense" is wrong.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I just don't like the word.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I happen to like the words "American defense" very much, but if you do not like the words "defending the United States," you certainly must mean that we ought to go and fight somebody else somewhere else; is that true?

Mr. REYNOLDS. That is your inference, not mine.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I ask you whether that is a fair inference or not.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Not at all. I think if a challenge comes we will have to accept it. I think day by day Hitler is coming closer to making overt acts, which I think even you, Senator, will agree are overt acts that we will have to meet them with force. I think he has already done thousands of little acts against us.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What overt act has Hitler actually committed against us any place, any time, on any occasion?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Don't you think any time one of his agents here gets up and makes a speech that that is an overt act against our institutions.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No more so than Lord Lothian and Lord Halifax insisting on lobbying in Congress.

Mr. REYNOLDS. As far as I know, none of them ever attacked our institutions and our way of living, which the bund for one has done.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Who has?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I say, the bund; speakers for the bund.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The bund is an entirely separate matter in this country. That is a domestic matter. It has nothing to do with overt acts of a foreign power against us.

Mr. REYNOLDS. If you agree that the bund is purely a domestic matter, all right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I think the bund ought to be taken care of and thrown in jail, but that is a domestic matter in this country. What overt act has Germany as a nation done against us?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I am sure the records of the F. B. I. will show that thousands of paid agents are here, throwing not bombs or shells but a weapon far more dangerous—throwing Hitler's ideas around to the seven winds for our people to absorb and perhaps unthinkingly embrace, all of which I think are much more dangerous weapons and harder to combat than the beating we take in London every day.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We have no protection on earth from propaganda being put out by Great Britain for getting us into war, such as you have been putting out, have we?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Do I have to answer foolish questions as well as sensible ones, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to answer if you do not want to answer it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Reynolds, you have been appearing professionally?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Two weeks.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. For profit, on behalf of your theater?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Not at all; as a reporter.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Where have you been appearing?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Strand Theater, 2 weeks.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. At the Strand Theater?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Working for a vaudeville show?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Not at all.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you have any information as to whether Mr. Willkie has any contracts, when he comes back to appear at the Strand Theater?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I think Mr. Willkie is coming back to work. I had a short holiday, and then I am going back to work, to London, and they offered me this—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You have been appearing at a theater for profit?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Oh, yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. On behalf of setting forth your expressions here?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Not at all; on behalf of nothing. They asked me as a reporter I gave a 10-minute talk, told two stories of experiences I had, which were, I think you would agree, very innocuous—not a word of what you would call propaganda in them. I am sure you would agree with that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am frank to say that I have not heard your testimony at the Strand Theater. I have heard a good many reports about your speech at Constitution Hall and the speech

of your sponsor, the head of your magazine, which was certainly as great a propaganda as ever took place in the city of Washington.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes; he and I are terrific propagandists for America Senator—nothing else.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Who sponsored that Constitution Hall meeting, Mr. Reynolds?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Collier's Weekly.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And the head of your organization himself made a speech?

Mr. REYNOLDS. That is right.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In which he referred to some testimony which had been given that day by Colonel Lindbergh, saying the man said that—I should not say "the man said that"; something said that—which was not true?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Frankly, I was so worried about the speech I was to make that I did not listen to him.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You remember the rattlesnake story you told, in substance?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Oh, yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You remember using the phrase that hate was an American heritage?

Mr. REYNOLDS. No; I never used that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I have been advised of that by very reputable witnesses—I was not there; I was invited, but I would not go—and they said that you used precisely that phrase.

Now, Mr. Reynolds, in this New Yorker—

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes; I have read it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am going to read it myself.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Oh, do.

Senator CLARK of Missouri (reading):

When Quentin Reynolds popped up, unwounded and in person, as part of the stage show at the Strand, we began to wonder whether any war correspondent of an earlier day had leaped direct from the rubble to the variety footlights. It's old hat, we know, for gossip columnists, explorers, aviatrixes, and lovely murderesses to choose the velvet drapes and baby spots of the vaudeville stage rather than the Ionic columns and glasses of water of the lecture platform, but we can't recall that Richard Harding Davis, even in his most expansive moments, ever joined the soft-shoe dancers at Hammerstein's or that Mary Roberts Rinehart ever took next-to-closing (just before the men with the Indian clubs) at the Palace. Perhaps, however, it's not such a bad idea; perhaps every noncombatant, returning from the wars, should be given his little moment, his loud ta-daa.

Next Week; Ralph Ingersoll in "Pertinent Patter." Coming Soon: Wendell Willkie (the act beautiful) in "How I Spent My Vacation."

You do not know whether Mr. Ingersoll or Mr. Willkie are going to succeed you at the Strand, do you, Mr. Reynolds?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I really do not know. I think Ray Noble is on next week.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What is that?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I think Ray Noble and his band are on next week, but I am not sure. They should be able to make a place for either Ralph or Mr. Willkie.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You are doing a vaudeville act and you have written a book, and was Senator Pepper's insistence for your appearance today more or less a build-up of your other activities?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I only have one job; that is being a reporter for Collier's—

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You have a job appearing at the Strand—

Mr. REYNOLDS. May I finish? I have had a month's vacation.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Might you not take another if properly approached?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I have been approached to make more money in 2 or 3 weeks than I have made as long as I lived. I have turned it all down, because I have had 2 weeks.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If you took the Strand offer, why didn't you take the rest of them?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Because 2 weeks was enough.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You have published a book entitled "The Wounded Don't Cry"?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, Senator.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You were not wounded, were you?

Mr. REYNOLDS. No; I was not wounded. I broke a couple of ribs. You don't call that being wounded, do you?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. How did you do that? Fall out of a car or something?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Senator, I am not here to testify about my ribs.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am glad to have you do so. You do not have to if you do not want to, but you appeared here and were forced by Senator Pepper on our time, and I am not going to press you about anything you do not want to testify about. Were you wounded in that way when you broke your ribs? If you do not want to testify to that, you do not have to.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I do not want to bore the other Senators with personal stories of what happened to me in London. I don't see what that has to do with the bill.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I don't see what most of your testimony has to do with the bill.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I don't, either. You are interested so in opinions, not in facts.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We are agreed that nobody knows why you came down here?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I certainly don't. I thought you wanted to learn some facts about England, but apparently not. That's all I know.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. We are, then, agreed on the proposition that nobody knows why you came down here?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I have no idea.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Neither do I.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions by the Senators?

You are excused, Mr. Reynolds.

The committee will stand recessed until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

(Thereupon, at 5:10 p. m., an adjournment was taken until Monday, February 10, 1941, at 10 a. m.)

TO PROMOTE THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1941

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Hon. Walter F. George presiding.

Present: Senators George (chairman), Harrison, Connally, Thomas of Utah, Van Nuys, Murray, Pepper, Green, Barkley, Reynolds, Guffey, Gillette, Clark of Missouri, Glass, Byrnes, Johnson of California, Capper, Vandenberg, White, Shipstead, and Nye.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be noted that Senator Wagner and Senator La Follette are ill and unable to appear this morning. Senator Barkley will probably be late, and some of the other Senators are late but will report during the morning hour.

The American Youth Congress has submitted a brief one page in length on the pending bill, in opposition to it. If there is no objection, this brief will be entered in the record at the request of the congress, the young people who were assembled in Washington last week. The signatures and organizations represented are indicated on the back of the brief.

(The brief referred to is as follows:)

To the Senate of the United States:

The decision that Congress will reach with regard to the lease-lend bill may change the whole course of our lives. What Congress does with this bill may decide whether the young people of America will have an opportunity to lead creative, intelligent, useful lives, or whether they will be forced to die in Europe's slaughter. It may decide whether or not we, the young people, shall live in a democracy or under a dictatorship.

It is a sorry fact that both the Senate and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs refused to listen to the testimony of young people who will give their blood if this country goes to war. It is a sad commentary on democratic procedure and a foretaste of the complete denial of all democratic rights premeditated under this bill, that these committees would not hear the young people who are opposed to the bill, particularly because it is we who will be most affected if this bill becomes law. This procedure foreshadows the black-out of democratic rights which would follow the passage of the bill.

The cabinet of the American Youth Congress has expressed itself as being firmly opposed to the passage of this bill.

In a resolution passed at its meeting on January 18, the cabinet said:

"This bill, if enacted, would circumvent the legal guaranties established against war loans and credits; it would put us deeper into the war. It is a more deadly and certain path to 'plowing under every fourth American boy' than the Morgan war loans of 1917. It means full participation in the war with American-owned armaments, ships, dollars, and American men.

"This bill, if enacted, would give dictatorial powers to the President to suppress all peace sentiments as 'unpatriotic' and 'dastardly.' Under its terms the President may 'promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and

proper to carry out any provisions of this act.' He may thus destroy the Wagner Act, the Wage-Hour law, the right to strike, and all social and labor legislation under the pretext that they impede national defense."

The United States has already passed from the stage of neutrality to that of an active war alliance with Great Britain. This bill will drag us all the way into the war. It would abrogate the Johnson Act, set no limit to the extent of our participation in the war, make possible the convoying of ships with the inevitable "incidents." In fact, it would put the United States in the position of waging an active war with ships and men—although, as is the fashion of the times, an undeclared one.

We in the American Youth Congress believe that peace is the best defense of American democracy. We hold no brief for Hitler-decorated Americans who would like to see another Munich in Europe at the expense of free peoples. We yield to no group in our determined opposition to any and every aspect of Hitlerism. That is exactly why we oppose this bill which, under the guise of defeating Hitler, institutes a dictatorship in our own country. Nor can we see how the United States would be contributing to the establishment of a democratic Europe by invading it with an expeditionary force and imposing upon the suffering people of Europe another Versailles and, inevitably, another Hitler.

Yet this is just what the lease-lend bill proposes to do. Its avowed aim is to defend democracy. Yet it gives to the President of the United States powers that any Fascist dictator might well envy. It would substitute government by decree for representative government. It would transform Congress into a useless decoration.

The American Youth Congress, therefore, opposes this bill as an act of war and as a measure for the establishment of a military dictatorship in the United States.

Don't lease or lend our lives. Defeat this bill.

Southern Youth Delegation, representing League of Young Southerners and American Youth Congress.

Signed: Gerald E. Harris, Jr., Farmers Union, Green Pond, Ala.; D. Brown Jackson, United Textile Workers of America, Roanoke Rapids, N. C.; Ethel L. Goodman, Southern Negro Youth Congress, 624 Masonic Temple Bldg., Birmingham, Ala.; Robert H. Moore, Executive Secretary, Jefferson County Federation Southern Negro Youth Congress, 624 Masonic Temple, Birmingham, Ala. (S. W. O. C.—C. I. O.); Julius Irving Scales, Textile Workers' Union of America, League of Young Southerners, High Point, N. C.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I should like to make inquiry if Kathleen Norris is in the audience.

The CHAIRMAN. If the following witnesses are present, they will please indicate their presence by merely answering as Senator Johnson calls their names.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Kathleen Norris. (No response.)

Joseph Curran. (Present.)

Judge Matthews. (Present.)

Ralph Thompson. He took a plane yesterday, and he will arrive here during the day, I think.

Mrs. Katharine Curtis. (No response.)

STATEMENT OF MERWIN K. HART, OF NEW YORK CITY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hart, you have been invited to appear before the committee today on Senate bill 275, and before you proceed with your formal statement, will you please give for the record your address, your business connection, and a statement of the organizations for which you appear, if any.

Mr. HART. Senator, my name is Merwin K. Hart; my address is 505 Fifth Avenue, New York. I am connected with a few business organizations. I am a lawyer by training, and am a member of a law firm, though I have not actively practiced for some years. I

appear here individually, and not representing any group or organization.

The CHAIRMAN. If you prefer, you may proceed with your formal statement, submitting thereafter to such questions as the committee may wish to ask.

Mr. HART. I thank you, Senator. I appear in opposition to this bill as a private citizen and not representing any group or organization. I believe wholly in the form of government prescribed by the United States Constitution, and am wholly opposed to fascism, nazism, and communism. I greatly desire to see Britain win this war, but I believe it is of the most vital importance to the people of the United States and to its people to build up its home defense. I believe we should stay out of the war ourselves. I do not think the United States should get in under any circumstances, but should, of course, defend herself if attacked; and I think we should abstain from actions that invite attack.

I oppose this lease-lend bill because I believe it would probably lead us into the war. I do not think that the amendments adopted by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs greatly reduce the threat of war contained in the bill.

I am convinced that our entry into the war would lead to our impoverishment at home, to a vastly reduced standard of living here in the United States, to the destruction of the republic, and to the setting up here eventually of either a Fascist or a Communist government.

I strongly believed in 1914 to 1917 that the United States should enter the World War. I bitterly criticized President Wilson for keeping us out, and when we entered the war, volunteered and spent 13 months in the A. E. F.

Following the war, in common with many others, I came in the course of a few years to feel that we had been brought into the war, partly at least, under the influence of propaganda, some of which was untrue; and that the idea of our entering the war "to make the world safe for democracy" was completely discredited, because after the war democracy was not more secure but, as everybody knows, far less so than before. The war brought communism in Russia, fascism in Italy, and nazism in Germany. The war and its peace contained the seeds of the new war.

At the time the present war broke, in early September 1939, few Americans felt there was the slightest danger that this country would become involved. But I have gained the impression that since then the United States have been subjected to a campaign of propaganda unequalled perhaps in her history. This campaign has made itself felt in almost every phase of our lives. We have seen it in the movies, in the theater, in the newsreels. We have both heard it and felt it on the radio. We have seen it in newspapers, both in the actual text and between the lines. Under the influence of this propaganda the American people have, in the vernacular, been sold a bill of goods. They have been sold the idea that the frontiers of the United States are in Britain, in China, and in Greece—were formerly in France. They have been made to believe that this country could not possibly survive without the existence of the British Navy. I do not believe that to be true.

I look overseas and wonder why, in view of their relative unpreparedness for war, Britain and France were ever persuaded to choose the time they did to declare war on the greatest military power in the world—a choice that has already meant temporary, and perhaps permanent ending of the liberties of the French people. And then I look about me here in America and see this high-pressured emotional excitement—whose origin perhaps many Americans do not discern—which unquestionably will sooner or later lead us into war likewise against Nazi Germany, unless we awaken to the danger. And under the agreement between Germany, Italy, and Japan, war against any one of the three would, I understand, be war against all three.

Capt. Sidney Rogers, of the British Foreign Office, in his book *Propaganda in the Next War*, remarked that "Americans are more susceptible than most people to mass suggestion * * *." And propaganda has certainly acted on that principle. But has foreign propaganda so taken over our minds that we are now to be sucked into a war that is not ours, and in addition are to underwrite not only the financing but the winning of it?

I do not blame Britain for her efforts to influence us in her behalf. It would be a blow to our world if Britain were to fall, although her fall would not mean our fall, for I believe that we, as the greatest industrial Nation on earth, can certainly organize for our own protection. But I think the adequate defense of the United States is even more important than the defense of Britain.

Incidentally, if I may interpolate, in that perfectly magnificent speech of Mr. Winston Churchill yesterday, I noticed something which I wish to quote. He said:

What further form of assault will he make upon our island homes and fortress? Which, let there be no mistake about it, is all that stands between him and the domination of the world.

To that I do not agree, important as the maintenance of Britain is.

I go back, Mr. Chairman, to the late spring of last year, when Germany's ruthless seizure of Belgium and Holland, and eventually her subjugation of France, awoke the American people to the fact that our defenses were utterly inadequate. So greatly was the Congress impressed with their inadequacy that within the space of a few weeks the Congress appropriated no less than \$10,000,000,000 solely for the improvement of that defense.

In August last the President notified the Congress that he had placed at the disposal of Britain 50 destroyers in exchange for leases for air bases in certain sites in the West Indies and other nearby English islands or dominions. In common with many other Americans, I got the impression that this transfer of 50 destroyers—after Congress had feverishly appropriated \$10,000,000,000, partly at least because we needed more destroyers—had been accomplished through a surprising opinion by the Attorney General of the United States, and in spite of the fact that, according to Mr. Arthur Krock, in the *New York Times* of August 7—

high naval authorities told the Senate Naval Affairs Committee they opposed releasing any fighting vessels for 2 years "under any circumstances."

On November 9, 1940, it became known through the newspapers that of the planes produced by American factories 50 percent were being awarded to Britain and 50 percent were going to our own

defense. The headline on page 1 in the New York Times of November 8 said:

President allots planes to Britain on a basis of 50-50. Establishes rule of thumb for delivering new aircraft and war material produced.

This seemed a pretty substantial concession to British needs, in view of the well-known fact that our own defense was so defective. I take it that when Mr. Winston Churchill said yesterday what I have just quoted, he had in mind that low state of our defense.

But this 50-50 arrangement apparently did not give a true impression. For Secretary Stimson, appearing before this committee on January 30, stated, according to the New York Herald Tribune of January 31, that of the 2,800 combat planes produced in the United States during the entire year 1940, 85.7 percent were sent abroad, presumably to Britain, and 14.3 percent were kept here. He stated that at that time, according to the Herald Tribune, the Army had only 650 first-line combat planes of all types, none of which fulfilled the standards of modern air fighting in Europe. And a dispatch from Washington in the New York Herald Tribune of January 16 stated that the British were then getting 90 percent of all combat planes, including bombers and pursuit ships currently produced in the United States; that in November "practically all" of this country's production of fighter planes went abroad, and that few of the planes actually delivered to our Army force are to be considered modern in armament and defense equipment. This dispatch stated that our Army and Navy combined got only about 300 combat planes during the whole of 1940.

Both candidates for the presidency in the recent campaign pledged all aid to Britain short of war. Both gave the impression they opposed the entry of the United States into the war. It is a fair assumption that multitudes of citizens placed confidence in this fact, believing that whichever candidate were elected, the United States would stay out of war.

But since the campaign ended the President has been rather silent on the subject of short of war. His message to the Congress on January 6, most of which was devoted to the subject of the war, did not once contain the phrase "short of war." Soon after this message the present bill was introduced. Mr. Wendell Willkie, with some reservations, immediately endorsed the bill. This drew from Mr. Landon, as we well know, the statement that if Mr. Willkie had revealed his position before the Republican National Convention at Philadelphia last June he would not have been nominated for president, and that if Mr. Roosevelt had revealed his position before election he would not have been reelected.

The bill before this committee must be read in the light of this January 6 message of the President. That is obviously the situation. That message showed that in the President's mind it is America's mission to go out and enforce certain views, which he has expressed, on the whole world. That mission is, apparently, to establish—

four essential human freedoms—everywhere in the world.

He said,

This is no vision of a distant millenium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world obtainable in our own time and generation.

That is evidently the intention.

From my point of view as an average citizen these very words hardly create confidence in the President's program. From our American standpoint the ideals framed by the President are entirely desirable. But few things have been better established in history than the slowness with which nations accept and make their own the concepts and beliefs and philosophy of other nations. Those nations, like our own, which have evolved a form of popular government, have made it work. But many of the nations that have copied our democracy, or upon whom democracy has been imposed, have failed to make it work. Greece is such a country, though it is one of the countries we today class as a democracy. Some of the Latin-American countries, having copied the American form of government originally have later abandoned all pretense to democracy and have become dictatorships. Yet the President seemingly expects the United States to be able to convert the whole earth to our way of thinking "in our own time and generation." It seems to me a startling expectation.

A considerable part of the American people favor aid to Britain. The so-called Gallup polls make this clear. But it is even more clear that an even larger number of American people are opposed to the United States entering the war. A Gallup poll, published in the newspapers of February 2, finds that 85 percent of the people oppose our entry.

It was clearly apparent from statements emanating from Britain when the contents of the lease-lend bill were published that Britons themselves were amazed at the extent to which our administration was ready to go. I do not believe these 85 percent, if they understood what this bill means, would approve any such plan. If the bill were passed, even as amended, it seems to me the President would rightfully consider it a congressional mandate to start a world movement to enforce his views about democracy, as set forth in his message of January 6. I believe the bill before this committee is the first great grant of power to that end.

It is widely believed by many of us that the Nazi program calls for the conquest of the whole world and that if successful it would require all nations to conform to the Nazi philosophy. But this bill, in the light of the President's message of January 6, would be as far-reaching an attempt to force our philosophy on the peoples of the world as that of the Nazis themselves. That we most certainly do not want.

I believe this country should speedily put itself in position to defend itself against any nation or combination of nations that might attack it. That is the purpose of \$10,000,000,000 of the seventeen billions called for by the recent Budget message. The defense of our country is our first duty.

But the so-called lease-lend bill has little to do to, it seems to me, with the defense of the United States or its possessions. If under present law 90 percent of our plane production is being sent to other nations, no matter how great our need, what might be done if this pending bill became law? Might it not lead to the actual stripping of our defense, inadequate as that defense is said to be? In suggesting that I am, of course, not questioning anyone's motives whatsoever. I am merely questioning judgment.

This bill is a clear authorization for the giving away or selling, for any consideration which the President might find satisfactory, not only what new material our manufacturers might turn out but a part or even all of our existing Navy, air force, or matériel of any kind. The amendment adopted in the House February 9 would seem to approve the immediate transfer to Britain of \$1,300,000,000 worth of our existing air force or Navy; an amount, incidentally, representing the present cost, more or less, of 26 modern battleships.

This amendment, we are told, is to show that under the bill the plan would be not to transfer the whole of our air force and Navy but only part of it.

I do not want to see any of our air force or Navy transferred to any country, not while the conditions are such as to make Mr. Winston Churchill utter the remark yesterday which I quoted. Almost anything might be given away except human life. It could be given to any country whose defense at the moment the President deems vital to the defense of the United States. The terms and conditions of the transfer would be those "the President deems satisfactory."

In effect, the American people, probably the only solvent nation left on earth, are asked to endorse a promissory note without knowing the amount or the purpose thereof, nor even the names of all the makers. As security for that note will go first the savings of 130,000,000 American people as well as the lives of uncounted millions of our youth. And as further security we would give, in all human probability, our sacred liberty.

Our savings and our lives we would gladly give, if necessary, if by so doing we could bring true freedom to all of the rest of the world without losing our own freedom. But since, after the World War of 1914-18, the world emerged far poorer in material affairs and far less possessed of liberty, is it not likely we would emerge from the present war well-nigh shorn of all our liberties?

Britain is now spending \$42,000,000 a day in the war. This bill would authorize the President to commit us to the underwriting not only of the conduct of the war but of its successful outcome, not only as far as Britain is concerned, but any other nations the President might decide to support. Since our population is three times that of Britain, it is not unfair to suppose that should we enter the war we would spend from one hundred to two hundred and fifty million dollars a day. This would result in a cost of from thirty-six and one-half to ninety-one billion dollars a year. Many authorities promise that if we enter the war the war will be long. Perhaps it will be long in any event. It would take less than 4 years of war for the United States at the extreme rate just mentioned to incur a debt roughly equal to the entire national wealth.

Granting that the pending bill would not authorize the sending of American troops to Europe, yet the likelihood is great that the enactment of this bill would lead to a situation necessitating the sending of armies to Europe by the United States. Mr. H. N. Brailsford, in a book entitled "From England to America," published last July, makes clear that the one logical course for the war to take from Britain's standpoint is to reconquer continental Europe. He is perfectly clear on this point. The United States

in 1917 had to land more than 2,000,000 American soldiers on continental soil before the war could be won. Mr. Brailsford implies that the gaining of a foothold on the Continent and the reconquering of the Continent from the Nazis ought to be aided effectively by American troops.

Can it be doubted, unless there is a sudden collapse of the Axis Powers, that several times the 2,000,000 men we sent to Europe in 1917-18 would be required to reconquer the Continent? Can you picture the difficulty of making the initial landing on the Continent in the face of an army of 6,000,000 Germans? Can you picture the difficulties of maintaining supplies through a submarine-infested ocean?

A recent piece of news was that an order had been placed by our War Department for 4,500,000 casualty tags. Do you doubt that these would all be needed were we to commit ourselves to the reconquering of continental Europe from those who drove the British out in a few weeks, subdued Holland in 5 days, Belgium in 2 or 3 weeks, and France within 6 or 8 weeks after the real drive started?

I wish respectfully to make the following suggestions to the committee:

First. Before the Congress acts on this bill, Britain should be asked to state her war aims, and the American people should be frankly told what they are. Only in the light of a knowledge of such aims can this Congress know how far to go. Is Brailsford right—does Britain really plan to reconquer continental Europe? If not, what is her war plan? With what accomplishment will she be satisfied to make peace? We ought to know. Would any member of this committee sign a blank check in payment of, or even let a contract for, the construction of a building not knowing either its design, its size, its purpose, or even its location?

Second. Before acting on this bill the Congress or the Executive should tell the country now and from time to time about the state of the country's armament. The American people are entitled to be told in words they can all understand, and they are entitled to be kept informed. They are entitled to feel that information given them is true, and that if the facts change materially they will be notified. The fact that 3 months after the country is informed that 50 percent of all planes produced are going to the American Army and Navy, the country finds that only 15 percent of our fighting planes are going to our forces and 85 percent abroad is disquieting to say the least.

Third. For what purpose would such a bill as this be passed? The answer given us is to preserve the American way of life. But Miss Dorothy Thompson recently admitted "it is highly probable that Great Britain will emerge from the war as some sort of Socialist economy." During recent months I have heard several unconfirmed stories of the growth of communism in Britain. The New York Times of January 13, under a headline "British Leftists Demand Control," had a column article about large Communist gatherings in London the previous day. Some 2,200 delegates from all parts of England, Scotland, and Wales participated and a resolution was passed that called for "a people's peace won by the working people of all countries and based on the right of all peoples to determine their own destiny." Is it quite certain, then, that to go to the defense of Britain is to go to the defense of democracy?

In this connection, I am disturbed by the appointment at this time of Mr. John A. Winant as our Ambassador to Britain, and by the announcement that Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen is going as his assistant or counsel. Britain has sent to us one of her ablest statesmen, and to assist him the able, experienced former consul general in New York City. We are sending men, who, it seems to be, possess much more limited experience.

Mr. Chairman, even now, after 10 years of depression, we are the freest and richest country on earth. We became what we are and we accumulated what we have, not because of the presence here in America of any such Marxian ideas from hatred-torn Europe as the class struggle, but because of their absence. I feel confident that the more we have to do with this war the more will our life be poisoned by the hatreds of Europe. And I greatly fear this bill would involve us completely in this war, and that the America we know would be overthrown. Perhaps similar fears are partly responsible for the fact that 85 percent of the American people are opposed to our entering the war.

Moreover, Congress, it seems to me, should clearly realize the possibility that once the United States is in the war an overnight shift of government in Britain, due, if to nothing else, to general war weariness, could easily take Britain out of the war and leave the United States alone at war with Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Further, to pass such a bill as this would be an abdication by this Congress of its obligation and duty under the Constitution of the United States. I am completely opposed to such abdication. The bill gives far too great power to one man. In such a crisis as this the judgment of no one man is enough—not even the President of the United States. If the Congress should now yield to the Executive in this matter it would probably lose its power to prevent the country from being presently swept into the war.

Mr. Chairman, I believe we ought to permit Britain to be supplied with a steady stream of munitions, not from our own meager Army, Navy, or air force, but from our mills and factories. That is an enormous advantage to her, the greatest we could possibly confer. I believe, incidentally, that if a single head were placed in charge of defense production, we could enormously speed up the supply. I believe we should not commit ourselves to Britain, however, or to any other country, beyond a point where we can stop that commitment if at any time in the future our Government believes it to be in the high interest of the United States to stop it.

I believe we should under no circumstances permit our naval vessels to convoy merchantmen. I believe we should not permit our merchant vessels to enter the war zones. I believe we should not permit the war vessels of other nations to be repaired in our ports. I believe that when those 85 percent told the Gallup poll they were opposed to our entering the war, they meant we should do none of those things that would almost certainly lead to our involvement in the war. They are opposed to America going to war, whether through the back door or the front.

Britain tells us she is in desperate condition—that she is fighting for her life. That, tragically enough, appears to be the truth. She is asking, I understand, for cash or credits—is saying that if that aid is not forthcoming in sufficient volume she will lose the war. I do not know that Mr. Churchill has said as much as this, but

according to the newspapers highly responsible Britons have made clear their belief that this is the fact. Certainly, Mr. Morgenthau has said so.

Yet while Britain may not have sufficient cash or securities there is one thing of which she has plenty and that is real estate. She has, I believe, in the West Indies about 110,000 square miles of territory. It is on some of the islands in this area that we have, by barter, secured 99-year leases on sites on which we are building, or propose to build, air and naval bases.

I believe the Congress should by appropriate action inform Britain of a desire to acquire those possessions. I believe there is a bill pending in the House, with which you are doubtless all familiar, calling for exactly this. The idea, of course, is not new. We could afford, in view of the military importance of these possessions, to pay a high price for them—we could pay at the same rate per square mile as we paid for the Virgin Islands, which would mean, about 16 billion dollars. Deducting the world war debt of 6 billions, would leave Britain a credit in America of 10 billion dollars. That would last her a long time. All the 10 billions should be spent solely for munitions or other goods in the United States. When that was exhausted, if it were, we could decide what to do next. If the war should end earlier than some think it will, there would be some billions of dollars to be spent by Britain in the United States, a fact which would be of great help in easing us out of the war atmosphere into an atmosphere of peace. For the United States to possess these islands would be to strengthen and consolidate her own position. And it is high time the United States thought about her own position.

Two distinguished war correspondents, both of whom have been in Europe much of the time the past 2 years, has each independently and privately expressed to me the fear that what is likely to happen out of the present war if it lasts long enough is the thorough economic and social exhaustion of Europe, following which in their opinion Russia would quietly move into control. This would certainly seem to be a strong possibility.

For the United States, from whatever motives, to throw itself into this present conflict would lead in as brief time as 2 or 3 years to the utter exhaustion economically and socially of this free and rich republic. Then with the highly organized communistic network that has been developed in the United States, could not Russia as quietly and as effectively take control here? That, I believe, is the great danger that lurks in the background.

We Americans should not have to commit suicide.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally, have you any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. A few. Mr. Hart, you say you are a New York lawyer?

Mr. HART. I have practiced in New York, Senator, but I have not practiced law anywhere for a long time. I am a silent member in a firm of which I was the head, at Utica, N. Y.

Senator CONNALLY. You are now a silent member of the firm?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir; I spend all my time, practically, in connection with the New York State Economic Council.

Senator CONNALLY. Is that a State appointed agency?

Mr. HART. No, sir; it is entirely unofficial.

Senator CONNALLY. Just a voluntary organization?

Mr. HART. A voluntary organization.

Senator CONNALLY. Are you connected with any business concern, director or manager?

Mr. HART. I am a director in a few organizations, Senator.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you mind telling us some of them?

Mr. HART. No, sir. I am a director in the Utica Mutual Insurance Co., of Utica, N. Y.; in the Allied Fire Insurance Co., of Utica. Those are the principal ones.

Senator CONNALLY. You maintain a home in New York City, do you not?

Mr. HART. I maintain a home in New York City and one in the country near Utica, at New Hartford.

Senator CONNALLY. Your whole argument is based upon the assumption that if we pass this bill we are certain to get into the war?

Mr. HART. We would be extremely likely to.

Senator CONNALLY. I say, your thesis, your whole hypothesis upon which you base your whole argument, is that if this bill is passed it means that we are to get into the war. Is not that true?

Mr. HART. That is the principal reason; yes.

Senator CONNALLY. If we do not get into the war, your argument is out the window, is it not?

Mr. HART. But we will never know whether we will get into it or not.

Senator CONNALLY. You are a lawyer, and you know when a question is asked a witness is supposed to answer that question and not ask another one.

Senator JOHNSON of California. That is not quite so.

Senator CONNALLY. I yield to the Senator from California.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I do not want you to interrupt the witness. He is certainly answering the questions, and for you to instruct him that his duty is to answer a certain way is wholly improper, in my opinion.

Senator CONNALLY. No more improper than your instructions to the Senator from Texas as to how he shall ask questions.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I am talking to you.

Senator CONNALLY. I am talking to both of you. [Laughter.]

Senator JOHNSON of California. You are talking to the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed with the questioning.

Senator CONNALLY. I am not trying to flabbergast the witness. He is a smart lawyer, not as smart as the Senator from California, but still a smart lawyer, and he should know how to answer questions.

Senator JOHNSON of California. What do you mean by that?

Senator CONNALLY. I mean just what I said.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You do not know what you said.

Senator CONNALLY. You know what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us have peace, gentlemen, at least in the committee. [Laughter.]

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Hart, I am not trying to bullyrag you. I just asked you, if this bill were to be passed and we do not get into the war as a result of it, then your argument is passé, is it not?

Mr. HART. I do not think that question can be answered, Senator, because obviously I cannot guarantee the truth of what I say. I am

telling what I deeply believe the likelihood, if not the almost certainty. Five years from now, if you come and point out that we did not get into the war, I shall certainly agree that my fears were not entirely justified. But I have great fear of our getting into war.

Senator CONNALLY. I understand that. I know you fear it. You said awhile ago that your argument was predicated upon the theory that the passage of this bill was almost certain to get us into the war, and then I asked you, if it did not get us into the war, whether or not your argument would be largely out the window.

Do you desire to answer that question? You do not have to.

Mr. HART. I do not think I can answer that question "Yes" or "No." I would require more time to answer it than I think you would want to give.

Senator CONNALLY. We have plenty of time. The longer we talk about it the further away we shall be, on your theory, from the war.

You say you favored our going into the World War?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. But later, after the World War, you decided that we had been partially dragged in by propaganda?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Did you regard the sinking of American ships by Germany, with American citizens on them, on the high seas, as propaganda?

Mr. HART. Naturally not. That was not the propaganda I had in mind.

Senator CONNALLY. You remember that happened, did it not?

Mr. HART. I certainly do.

Senator CONNALLY. You were in favor of our going into the war because that did happen, were you not?

Mr. HART. That was one of the reasons.

Senator CONNALLY. Was not that the major reason, that Germany had disregarded our rights at sea and destroyed our ships and murdered our citizens, not once, but repeatedly over a period of about 3 years?

Mr. HART. Senator, I gradually fell for the propaganda, as nearly everybody else did, that we should get into this war of Europe, mix into it, take a hand in it. I fell for the propaganda that we were going to make the world safe for democracy.

Senator CONNALLY. Oh, now——

Mr. HART. I fell for that, I admit.

Senator CONNALLY. You did not favor going into the European war simply to make the world safe for democracy, did you?

Mr. HART. Not simply; no.

Senator CONNALLY. You said a moment ago that you were led by propaganda to advocate getting into the World War to make the world safe for democracy.

Mr. HART. Propaganda to the effect that if we did not fight then, we would fight later, the same old propaganda as now.

Senator CONNALLY. Sinking our ships and murdering our citizens on the high seas were not major considerations in your attitude on the World War?

Mr. HART. They were some of the considerations.

Senator CONNALLY. Just merely some or large ones?

Mr. HART. They were part of the picture.

Senator CONNALLY. Part of the picture?

Mr. HART. But the propaganda was so varied that it is pretty hard to analyze it, certainly at this date, and allot the proper amount of weight which it should get.

Senator CONNALLY. You have read the declaration of war Congress made, have you not?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Did it say anything about making the world safe for democracy? That was not mentioned in it, was it?

Mr. HART. Mr. Wilson used the phrase. Perhaps he thought that was unnecessary.

Senator CONNALLY. You said you read the declaration of war made by Congress. Did you read it or not?

Mr. HART. I read it at the time, I am sure.

Senator CONNALLY. Was there anything in that declaration about our entering the World War to make the world safe for democracy?

Mr. HART. I have not read the declaration of war since about the time it was adopted.

Senator CONNALLY. Is it your recollection that that was in there?

Mr. HART. I do not recall, but certainly the phrase "to make the world safe for democracy" was in the mind of everybody. It was in my mind.

Senator CONNALLY. It had nothing on earth to do with the declaration of war by Congress. If you read the declaration you will see it was not mentioned and had nothing to do with it. President Wilson did in one of his addresses use the phrase "make the world safe for democracy." That was a long time after the sinking of our ships and murdering of our citizens on the high seas repeatedly.

You refer to the agreement between Germany, Italy, and Japan. You say that war against any one would be against three. Do you know why Japan was included in the tripartite agreement by Germany and Italy?

Mr. HART. I do not know that I could tell you.

Senator CONNALLY. They are in a wholly different part of the world, and it is not your view that Italy and Germany induced Japan to come into the Axis system purely as a threat to the United States?

Mr. HART. I could not say about that, Senator. I formed a very definite opinion at the time of the formation of the Axis——

Senator CONNALLY. I asked for your belief; I did not ask for the facts——what your belief is.

Mr. HART. My belief is that probably the major reason why Japan went into the combination with Germany was the rather unfriendly attitude of the United States.

Senator CONNALLY. That just simply accentuates the fact that she might have been brought into the Axis to quicken the security of the United States, does it not?

Mr. HART. Well——

Senator CONNALLY. She did not like us anyway, and she might have been more easily induced to join the Axis as a military and naval power against the United States. Have you any opinion on that?

Mr. HART. Only general. I do not pretend to a great knowledge of Japanese conditions, but I have the general impression that, to a

considerable extent, an unfriendly attitude on the part of the United States drove Japan into the arms of the Axis. I think there is evidence, probably considerable, to support that.

Senator CONNALLY. If that is true, she was driven into it as a threat against us, was she not?

Mr. HART. So far as she was concerned. It might not have been as a threat against us. I formed the impression, Senator, from a casual reading of the papers, that she has been very careful not to offend us. Isn't that the case?

Senator CONNALLY. I do not know. I am asking for your belief and opinion.

On page 4 of your statement you say that we have recently appropriated \$10,000,000,000 for national defense. You approve of that, do you not?

Mr. HART. Do I approve it?

Senator CONNALLY. Yes.

Mr. HART. Absolutely.

Senator CONNALLY. What are we spending all these \$10,000,000,000 for? Against whom?

Mr. HART. Against all comers, any attacker.

Senator CONNALLY. England also? Would it have been necessary to send \$10,000,000,000 to protect ourselves against England?

Mr. HART. Most certainly not at any present moment or at any time we can envisage in the future, but we cannot say that at some distant time England may not be so friendly as she is today.

Senator CONNALLY. Right now what is the immediate danger that requires us to arm and spend 10 or 15 billion dollars for national defense?

Mr. HART. The unsettled condition of the world.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you say it was Russia?

Mr. HART. I think Russia is a very dangerous factor.

Senator CONNALLY. The fear of Russia was one of the reasons why you advocated spending the 10 or 15 billion dollars for national defense?

Mr. HART. Because I fear any country that has ambitions such as Russia, any country that has ambitions such as Germany, any country that has ambitions such as Italy, or any other country.

Senator CONNALLY. You think it was necessary to spend several billion dollars to defend ourselves against Russia, Italy, Japan, or Germany?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir. I think we made a great mistake when we scrapped our fleet before.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, I agree with you on that.

You referred to the two candidates for President. Mr. Willkie and Mr. Roosevelt, and their views during the campaign. They both advocated aid to Britain, did they not?

Mr. HART. But always short of war.

Senator CONNALLY. Always short of war.

Mr. HART. They never left that out; and that is what I think stuck in the minds of the people. We all favor aid to Britain.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you favor aid to Britain?

Mr. HART. I think we are giving the greatest possible aid we could to Britain in making it possible, such as Congress did by repealing or changing the neutrality law, for her to come here and buy goods.

Senator CONNALLY. You think we are affording a great deal of aid to Britain by letting her buy here in our own markets and paying cash on the barrel head and letting them take the goods away in their own ships? That is the kind of aid you advocate?

Mr. HART. That is what Congress advocated at the time.

Senator CONNALLY. Let us confine it to your opinion.

Mr. HART. I think that was the most tremendous piece of aid that country possibly could give.

Senator CONNALLY. And you are in favor of the continuance of that?

Mr. HART. It is the law of the land.

Senator CONNALLY. If her funds should give out, or her dollar exchange should give out, we would have to stop that, would we?

Mr. HART. Not if we purchase these islands.

Senator CONNALLY. Oh, yes; I forgot about the islands—the real-estate transaction.

Mr. HART. The islands are of apparently very little use to Britain, and would be of great strategic use to us. If it is important for us to own the Virgin Islands, isn't it just as important for us to own them?

Senator CONNALLY. I do not know how important it is to own the Virgin Islands. I would not want to make a comparison.

You also say that the President made a speech in which he expressed the fact that it is desirable that essential freedom should be in effect everywhere in the world.

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Then you say that while the President's aims and views are desirable, you regard his speech, and the passage of this bill in the light of that speech, as a commitment to enforce those ideals everywhere in the world, do you not?

Mr. HART. I would say so; yes.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you do say so?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Senator CONNALLY. You mean, then, you regard the mere expression by the President of the fact that it would be desirable to have these liberties everywhere in the world as a pledge, if we pass this bill, to enforce those liberties everywhere in the world with armies and navies?

Mr. HART. Yes, Senator.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you think that is fair?

Mr. HART. I think it is a fair interpretation.

Senator CONNALLY. As a lawyer who has spent a lifetime battling in a courtroom, do you think that is a fair conclusion?

Mr. HART. I think it is entirely fair in the light of the President's readiness to spell out a mandate.

Senator CONNALLY. Spell out what?

Mr. HART. To spell out a mandate.

Senator CONNALLY. I just want to get your answer. Do you sincerely and earnestly believe that if we pass this bill we have got to go, with an Army and Navy, down into the Hottentot country to see that those people have freedom and freedom of speech, and that we have got to go everywhere on earth—to the Gobi Desert, and see that those nomads have liberty of speech and liberty of freedom—and

spend our money, and use our Armies and Navies to get that to them? Do you believe that?

Mr. HART. I believe that to be true.

May I say, in furtherance of that answer, Senator, that I read the speech made by Mr. John Winant before the League of Women Voters on February 8. I mentioned Mr. Winant's appointment as being, it seemed to me, significant, and it is significant because of the fact that he is interested far more in a part of the people, it seems to me, than he is in all of the people. I think his primary interest is in social welfare.

Senator CONNALLY. I did not ask you anything about Mr. Winant, Mr. HART. May I just quote from his speech?

Senator CONNALLY. If you think it answers the question, you may.

Mr. HART. I think it throws light on it.

Senator CONNALLY. I was asking for your own belief and your own sincerity in saying you thought that if we passed this bill it would become the Nation's duty to send the Army and Navy everywhere in the world and establish, by force of arms, all of these four outstanding freedoms. I think you said you did.

Mr. HART. I think the bill is so sweeping that the President could construe it that way.

Senator CONNALLY. I am not talking about the President. I am talking about you. You said that your construction was that, if we passed this bill, in the light of the President's speech, it would become our duty to send the Army and Navy everywhere in the world to enforce these freedoms.

Mr. HART. I did not say it was our duty, and what I meant to say was that I think the President could spell out the mandate from the Congress to go into it as he saw fit.

Senator CONNALLY. Everywhere in the world?

Mr. HART. Just as he says.

Senator CONNALLY. I say, everywhere in the world?

Mr. HART. I would say just as the President has said.

Senator CONNALLY. I wanted to get how well balanced your sympathies and prejudices were with that expression.

You say something to the effect that if we pass this bill we become committed to spend three times as much as the British Empire is spending on the war.

Mr. HART. Well, that, of course, is the roughest kind of estimate, but it is based on the fact that our costs are exceedingly high. Our World War cost was terrific. Just as Great Britain's cost in this war is far higher than it was in the World War, our cost will be far higher.

Senator CONNALLY. You say—

Since our population is three times that of Britain, it is not unfair to suppose that should we enter the war we would spend from one hundred to two hundred and fifty million dollars a day. This would result in a cost of from thirty-six and one-half to ninety-one billion dollars per year.

Do you really believe that?

Mr. HART. That is qualified somewhat by the last sentence, where I say—

It would take less than 4 years of war for the United States at the extreme rate just mentioned—

Senator CONNALLY. I think you are correct in that "extreme rate."
Mr. HART (continuing)—

to incur a debt roughly equal to the entire national wealth.

Senator CONNALLY. Later on you say that by giving them \$10,000,-000,000 that would be all they would need for the war.

Mr. HART. No, sir. I did not say that would be all they needed. I said when that was gone we could decide what would be done.

Senator CONNALLY. Let me see what you said.

Mr. HART. I interpolated that. You won't find that in there, but it is in the stenographic record.

Senator CONNALLY. Here is what you said:

Deducting the unpaid World War debt of \$8,000,000,000, would leave Britain a credit in America of \$10,000,000,000. That would last her a long time.

Mr. HART. And then I interpolated the statement that when that was gone, if that time was reached, we could then decide what else we could do.

Senator CONNALLY. Let me ask you one more question. You voted for Mr. Willkie, did you not, for President?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, he will be here tomorrow.

Mr. HART. I understand so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson, have you any questions?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper?

Senator CAPPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. Mr. Hart, you use one argument which has been used by other witnesses here, and which I am afraid I do not understand and shall be happy if you will clarify it. You stated that, according to best sources of information—that is, these polls that have been taken—a great majority of the people, say 85 percent, which was the figure used, favor aid to Britain and that about the same percentage, 85 percent, are opposed to our entering into the war. Is that right?

Mr. HART. I do not think I said that 85 percent favored aid to Britain. I do not know what the figure is.

Senator GREEN. That is one of the figures. It was a very large percentage?

Mr. HART. A very large percentage; yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. Now, if a very large percentage of the people of this country, say 85 percent, for illustration, favor both those things—aid to Britain and opposition to our going to war—why do you find it impossible for the President of the United States, and his opponent in the last Presidential election, Mr. Willkie, and Members of the President's Cabinet, Republicans and Democrats alike, and a majority of the Members of the House of Representatives, including some Republicans as well as Democrats, and possibly a majority of the Senate of the United States, of both parties, to feel the same way? Why do you think it is either unintelligent or unpatriotic for them to be in favor of both of these ideas?

Mr. HART. I am not questioning their patriotism in the least, Senator.

Senator GREEN. You must be questioning their intelligence, if it is an impossible combination.

Mr. HART. No; I do not think it is questioning their intelligence.

Senator GREEN. What does it reflect?

Mr. HART. I think, for one thing, Senator, in these polls, or some of them, the questions have been leading questions. I think that as the reports have been interpreted, the headlines have been frequently such as to themselves constitute propaganda.

For instance, I have the report of this February 2 Gallup poll—this is much less conspicuous than some of the others—the one from which I quoted, in which it said 85 percent.

The top headline, in big print, says—

Aid to Britain Seen as Blocking War.

The next headline says:

Seventy Percent Believe Such Help Is a Big Factor in Keeping Us Out.

The next size headline says—

Eighty-five Percent Oppose Our Entry.

I have observed that where these polls are reported—at least, in some papers—there has been, no doubt, an effort unconsciously to favor the side which the headline writer favors. I do not know. I am not questioning his motive at all, but I am saying that they very likely—the persons who interpret these reports—unconsciously participate in this propaganda.

I have never seen a report on one of those polls where the fact that a very large proportion of the 85 percent did not favor war was the feature and where those who favored aid to Britain was a secondary matter. It has always been the other way around.

Senator GREEN. But I understood you to admit that a great majority of the people in the United States favored both keeping out of war and giving aid to Britain. You believe that, do you not?

Mr. HART. I said that a large proportion of the people favor aid to Britain. That is reflected here by this 70 percent.

Senator GREEN. And keeping out of war?

Mr. HART. And I said that even a larger percentage favor keeping out of war.

Senator GREEN. Then a very large percentage favors both keeping out of war and aiding Britain; is that right?

Mr. HART. Since you have raised the point—

Senator GREEN. I say, the difficulty in my mind, and a fact which I find hard to reconcile, is your argument that it is unintelligent or unpatriotic, or both, for public officials to take the same point of view as the public.

Mr. HART. Well, the people who answer these polls, like most of the American people, are very busy people. They aim specifically to reach those of all classes, which is as it should be. It should reflect a cross-section. Unquestionably, a very large number of those do not have time or the opportunity to follow much that is going on.

But I would like to put in the record, since you bring the point up, that this is how they got the figure of 70 percent—

Senator GREEN. I do not care about the exact figures.

Mr. HART. It isn't that. It is the form of the question put. This is quoting from Dr. Gallup. He said—

Seventy percent of those interviewed in the national cross-section chose the statement—

One of two statements presented to them—

sending war material to England is helping to keep us out of war, because if Britain can keep Germany in check there is less chance that we will have to fight the Germans later on.

Seventy percent O. K.'d that.

Senator GREEN. Do you approve of that?

Mr. HART. I am not saying whether I approve it.

Senator GREEN. I am asking you to give you the opportunity to say so.

Mr. HART. Obviously, the more assistance that goes to Britain, not only from here but from her dominions and anywhere else, the stronger she will be; but I am asking this: Is it likely that 70 percent of those interviewed, or any great number of them, were in position to express a well-founded opinion on such a question?

Twenty-three percent believed the second statement put to them:

Sending war materials to England is bringing us closer to getting into the war because once we start helping we won't be able to stop short of war.

Seven percent said they were undecided or had no opinion.

There was a difficult question to answer, that required, for an intelligent answer, a certain amount of knowledge; and it is my opinion, as I say, that not a great many people have time to inform themselves where they could answer.

When we come to the question to which 85 percent said no, this was the question:

If you were asked to vote on the question of the United States entering the war against Germany and Italy, how would you vote—to go into the war or to stay out of the war?

Fifteen percent said to go in and 85 percent said to stay out.

The point I want to make is that that probably reflected more accurately the main thing they had in mind, which was to stay out of the war.

Senator GREEN. Another main thing they had in mind was to give aid to Britain, was it not?

Mr. HART. So far as the other figures reflect anything, they certainly reflected that.

Senator GREEN. But then you intimate that that might be an unintelligent choice on their part, that they did not have the opportunity for contemplation that you have had.

Mr. HART. No; I do not put it that way. I would simply say that in the nature of things the question that they answered 15 percent and 85 percent, "Do we want to go in or do we want to stay out?" was much more susceptible of being answered correctly than the other.

Senator GREEN. But do you think that is an impossible combination of views to have? I mean, would an intelligent person like yourself find it impossible to have both such ideas?

Mr. HART. Senator, I am not posing as such an all-fired intelligent person. I get my information and ideas from a day-to-day

pretty close following of the newspapers and magazines and the radio. I suppose I spend 2 or 3 hours a day on those altogether in trying to find out what the truth is.

Senator GREEN. Now, you have these sources of information—newspapers, radio, and gossip on the streets. Do you not think that these public officials to whom I have made reference, the President and his Cabinet and the Senators and Representatives, have equally good, if not perhaps better, sources of information?

Mr. HART. I do not think gossip on the street is a source of information I mentioned.

Senator GREEN. You mentioned radio and newspapers.

Mr. HART. I did not mention gossip.

Senator GREEN. Are your sources of information broader than the newspapers and the radio?

Mr. HART. Naturally not.

Senator GREEN. Do you not think that these other public officials, who are giving almost all their time to this question, may have other sources of information also?

Mr. HART. Certainly.

Senator GREEN. Equally as good sources of information?

Mr. HART. Certainly. That might not necessarily mean their judgment was entirely accurate.

Senator GREEN. May I repeat my original question, then?

If a very large majority of the people of this country, having these sources of information that you have—the newspapers and radio—came to the conclusion that there are two main objectives that they have at present—one is to keep out of war and the other is to give aid to Britain—and if public officials like the President, Members of his Cabinet, and the Members of the Senate and the Members of the House came to the same conclusion that those are their two main objectives, why do you maintain that that position is illogical or unintelligent or unpatriotic?

Mr. HART. I have not at any time said it was unpatriotic.

Senator GREEN. That is the whole basis of your argument.

Mr. HART. Not at all. I am questioning the judgment of the belief that we should go in.

Senator GREEN. But I understood your position to be that if we proceed to give aid to Britain we would go to war.

Mr. HART. I think, sir; we have been giving aid to Britain in the form of letting her come and buy goods here, and that I wish to see continued.

Senator GREEN. But you think that if we continue to give aid to Britain that is a step toward going to war?

Mr. HART. I said that if this bill was passed, with far more powers than England expected him to be given—she was amazed, according to the papers—then, in the light of the other circumstances—

Senator GREEN (interposing). Putting it in another way, are you willing to agree that the position of the public officials who agree with the majority of the people—the hope that we may keep out of war and at the same time give aid to Britain—is an intelligent position to take?

Mr. HART. I assert absolutely that the officials have got to make the decision. I take it that in this country, this Democracy or this

Republic of ours, the very purpose of such a hearing as this is to give opportunity to representatives of the public whom the committee may wish to have come in, to come in and say what they think, and I am simply telling you what an average citizen thinks about it.

Senator GREEN. But my question was something different. I know you are not trying to evade an answer, but your answers are evasive. I want to know whether that position which some of us take is unintelligent?

Mr. HART. I do not think it is sound.

Senator GREEN. Then, you think it is unintelligent?

Mr. HART. Why use the word "unintelligent"? I would say it is unsound.

Senator GREEN. What is another phrase you would use to describe it?

Mr. HART. What is another phrase?

Senator GREEN. Is it unintelligent to choose two inconsistent things?

Mr. HART. I would say it is imprudent.

Senator GREEN. Do you regard the two choices as an illogical combination?

Mr. HART. Senator, if we take the results of the two polls as of equal validity, we have a score right here of 85 to 70. That would certainly raise a question of the prudence of it.

Senator GREEN. I do not see that it raises a question. In the minds of all the 85 percent both those choices are consistent. In fact, I think that the principal argument to be made for the bill is that it does give aid to Britain and therefore helps to keep us out of war. Your argument is that aid to Britain tends to bring us into war. The argument of the other side is that aid to Britain helps to keep us out of war. I understood your position to be that that was an inconsistent position.

Mr. HART. I am not talking about aid to Britain. I am talking about the aid of this bill, with far greater powers than are needed.

Senator GREEN. In answer to Senator Connally's question, you intimated that aid to Britain would have to cease unless further steps were taken to give her aid when her dollar-exchange resources were exhausted. Did you not say that?

Mr. HART. I said, when this \$10,000,000,000 balance is exhausted we would have to take other steps to do something else.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

Mr. HART. But, incidentally, Senator, the purchase of those islands at that figure, or whatever figures might be of the same general amount, would, as I understand it, remove Britain from the limitations of the Johnson Act, and thereafter she could float loans here, if she could, and judging by the perfectly enormous amount of sympathy for Britain, she could float loans here.

Senator GREEN. Let me ask you a question to clarify the situation. Do you think advocating aid to Britain and advocating keeping this country out of war are inconsistent?

Mr. HART. Will you repeat that question, Senator, please?

Senator GREEN. Do you think it is inconsistent to advocate keeping out of war and at the same time advocate further aid to Britain?

Mr. HART. Well, I do not know that the question of consistency or inconsistency comes up here. I came here to speak about this bill—the wisdom of this bill—and I am opposed to this bill.

Britain has been getting aid here through the right to buy, given by a previous Congress when the neutrality legislation was modified. Now we are up against the Johnson Act. I am trying to make the suggestion or endorse somebody else's suggestion of the purchase of the islands, which would clear the whole question up. Wouldn't it?

Senator GREEN. I have asked you a question. I have not been able to get an answer to that. Suppose I get an answer before I answer yours?

Mr. HART. I thought I answered.

Senator GREEN. I asked you whether the two positions are inconsistent—to advocate keeping out of war and to advocate further aid to Britain—and you declined to answer. I am not going to press for an answer.

Mr. HART. No; I am not declining to answer. I am trying to think what would be an intelligent answer. You say the consistency or inconsistency between aid to Britain and keeping out of war? Well, that is a question that I can't answer in an instant, but I do not agree that our keeping out of war depends on our aid to Britain.

In fact, I quoted Mr. Winston Churchill in his speech of yesterday as indicating that apparently he does not think much of our defenses. That is what our Congress thought last summer when it appropriated \$10,000,000,000. That is why I say, let us make jolly well sure that we do not get into a position where if England falls we will be defenseless, because the apparent position today is that we can go ahead and build up our productive capacity of our munitions and factories and that we will be safe enough because our productive capacity is great, although we have not built up to any extent at all our air force or other parts of our services.

I think that is a dangerous condition, and yet that is what apparently prevails today.

Senator GREEN. That is very interesting, but I would be more interested to know if you thought those two objectives are inconsistent, because it seems to me that that is the whole basis of your argument. But I won't pursue the question further, because obviously it is an embarrassing question to you, and I do not wish to embarrass you.

Mr. HART. It is not embarrassing at all. I wish to give a sensible answer.

Senator GREEN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. Am I correct in finally concluding that our foreign policy should stem from the proposition that America is going to survive no matter who wins in Europe, Asia, or Africa?

Mr. HART. That is the fundamental proposition.

Senator VANDENBERG. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reynolds?

Senator REYNOLDS. Mr. Hart, in pursuance of an inquiry directed to you by Senator Connally, he asked you if you did not think we were helping England by providing them with the opportunity of buying supplies. You said "Yes," did not not?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. We are selling arms to them at the present time?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. Before the arms embargo was lifted Germany, Italy, England, or anybody else could not buy arms in this country?

Mr. HART. Yes. That is my understanding.

Senator REYNOLDS. At the present time England is buying arms?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. At the present time Germany could buy arms, could she not?

Mr. HART. In theory she could. Maybe she is getting them through Russia, of course.

Senator REYNOLDS. I know, but it so happens that there is no distinction made between Great Britain and Germany?

Mr. HART. Germany has the privilege of buying them.

Senator REYNOLDS. If she could get them; is that not true?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. In further reference to that, if we had not lifted the arms embargo it would have hurt England considerably?

Mr. HART. Very much so.

Senator REYNOLDS. For the reason that England is the only one in a position to get those arms from this country and take them to the British Isles?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. In your prepared statement here I observe that you made reference to the fact that there are 110,000 square miles of land in the Western Hemisphere that belong to Great Britain, and you suggested that we buy that property from them.

In connection with that, have you considered the fact that all of these possessions of Great Britain in the Western Hemisphere are economic liabilities?

Mr. HART. There is no doubt about that.

Senator REYNOLDS. They have a population of only 40,000 people, and they have no economic value.

Mr. HART. The only value would be a military one.

Senator REYNOLDS. There is a very bad economic condition there.

Mr. HART. We would be buying some headaches; no question about that.

Senator REYNOLDS. Do you not think that the President made the best deal for America when he secured leases on the property for 99 years, without our assuming the obligation of caring for the people who would be found inhabiting the properties of the British Empire in this section of the world?

Mr. HART. Well, there is an advantage, I suppose, in the fact that we would not—

Senator REYNOLDS. The only reason for acquiring them would be for national defense?

Mr. HART. National defense; yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. Of course, nobody considers us a neutral, and if we were absolutely neutral it would be to the detriment to Great Britain would it not?

Mr. HART. Yes. It would be to us if we did not devote the time, or, rather, the money, to building our own defense.

Senator REYNOLDS. If we were to put a ban on exports to any of the belligerents to that extent, in the question of neutrality, that would be to the detriment of Great Britain, would it not?

Mr. HART. Very much so, I should think.

Senator REYNOLDS. Of course, you know that Brazil, for example, in South America, has put a ban on exports to any of the belligerents? You knew that?

Mr. HART. I think I have heard it; yes.

Senator REYNOLDS. You further knew that some of the countries of South America—at least Brazil—are so absolutely neutral that they have recently prohibited any newspaper in Brazil being published in a foreign language? You know that do you not?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Senator REYNOLDS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Yes; Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hart, I was interested in two definite statements you made in your formal statement on page 14. The first one I underlined is:

I believe we should under no circumstances permit our naval vessels to convoy merchantmen.

Do you believe, as a lawyer, Mr. Hart, that any provision we could make in a law which we adopt here would change the President's right under the Constitution to act in regard to this matter as the Commander in Chief of the Navy?

Mr. HART. Senator, I put that in before the bill was amended in the House committee providing that nothing in this bill should be construed as allowing convoying, so that I do not suppose we ought necessarily to change it, although I think if this Congress believes that convoying would be dangerous I think the Congress should change the existing law.

Senator GILLETTE. Do you think that the Congress by legislative act can change the authority of the President under the Constitution, regardless of the House amendment or the adoption of it?

Mr. HART. I would expect that the Congress, if it cared to exercise its influence, could bring about such a result if it deemed it important enough.

Mr. GILLETTE. Do you think that such an amendment if adopted would be an expression of opinion on the part of Congress that might be influencing on the Chief Executive, rather than any curtailment of his rights and authority under the Constitution?

Mr. HART. Anyway, Congress would have said what it meant.

Senator GILLETTE. It would have amounted to that and nothing more?

Mr. HART. I would say it might amount to more than that if the Congress might want to put enough punch to it.

Senator GILLETTE. The second statement that you made that I was interested in occurs just following that:

I believe we should not permit our merchant vessels to enter the war zones.

If we pass the bill that is now before us, do you believe that that authority would be conferred on and delegated to the President?

Mr. HART. I should think it would be.

Senator GILLETTE. In that connection, I want to direct your attention to a statement made by the British Prime Minister in his speech of yesterday afternoon, and I quote:

We need most urgently an immense and continuous supply of war materials and we need them here and we need to bring them here. We shall need a great mass of shipping in 1942, far more than we can build ourselves, if we are to maintain and augment our war effort in the West and in the East.

Now, do you not think, Mr. Hart, that that is a clear and definite statement of the Prime Minister that there will be greater need for merchant vessels than they can supply during this coming year, with all their resources?

Mr. HART. Greater than they can supply, very likely, in their own shipyards, but have they not placed orders in our shipyards here for merchant vessels?

Senator GILLETTE. I am not familiar with those facts. I am just asking.

Mr. HART. That is my understanding; and with this transaction about the islands, or some other similar transaction, if one could be worked out, which would remove Britain from the effect of the Johnson Act, that would certainly put her in position where she could float loans and get additional funds here, and with that build ships.

Senator GILLETTE. Now then, it is an explicit statement that they do not expect to have the vessels available for their needs and must get them elsewhere?

Mr. HART. In other words, Senator, that is a statement of Britain's position, and, coming from that high source, we must take that as authentic. Now, that ought not necessarily to decide what our position is going to be. That has to be determined in the light of the interest of the United States.

Senator GILLETTE. I am in most hearty agreement with that.

Mr. HART. And that I am sure the Congress will give.

Senator GILLETTE. And I quote that as a preface to these questions. Because of the explicit assertion of necessity that they will have to look elsewhere for shipping, I call your attention to the provisions of this bill, defining a defense article, among other things, as vessels and boats, and, in subsection (1) of section 3, authorizing the President to manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards, or otherwise procure, any defense article and dispose of it.

Now I ask you as a lawyer, under that authorization, and the definition of a defense article as a vessel or boat, and the authorization to manufacture them in shipyards or otherwise procure them, if we pass this bill have we not delegated to the President authority to manufacture that shipping which is needed and dispose of it under this later authority, "or otherwise procure," which could very well mean the ships belonging to neutral nations or other belligerents that are in our ports at the present time, and that he could procure them on such terms as he wishes and transfer them, under the authority of subsection (2), under the authority to otherwise dispose of them? Is that not a fact?

Mr. HART. It seems to me it is, Senator.

Senator GILLETTE. Now I shall direct your attention to the first phrase of section 3, "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law."

I shall now read a provision of the present law, our neutrality law, which says that whenever the President shall have issued a proclamation, it shall thereafter be unlawful, until such proclamation is revoked, for any American vessel to be armed, except with small arms and ammunition, which the President may deem necessary to preserve discipline.

Now if this bill is passed that prohibition on arming American vessels will have been abrogated, will it not?

Mr. HARR. I should certainly think so.

Senator GILLETTE. And the President would be able to send these vessels into war zones armed?

Mr. HARR. I should think so.

Senator GILLETTE. Now the House has adopted an amendment to a bill similar to the one pending here, which provides in effect that there shall be nothing in the bill as passed by the House that would permit the sending of American ships into combat zones, as defined by section 3 of the Neutrality Act.

I call your attention to the fact that the Neutrality Act has two provisions relative to the sending of our merchant vessels, the one to which the House amendment refers and the one that is contained in section 2 of the Neutrality Act, which provides that, whenever the President shall have issued this proclamation, it shall thereafter be unlawful for any American vessel to carry any passengers or any articles or materials to any state named in such proclamation.

Have you read the House amendment?

Mr. HARR. I have not read the last one. I did not read the amendments adopted last Saturday. I have the others.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, the House amendment, if you will permit me to call attention to it, refers to section 3, the combat area, and has no reference whatever to this prohibition contained in section 2.

If we pass this bill in its present form or as amended by the House, containing the provision, "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law," that prohibition of sending American vessels to carry passengers or materials to belligerent states will be abrogated and annulled, will it not?

Mr. HARR. I should think so; yes.

Senator GILLETTE. I want to direct your attention to one more thing. In this pending measure section 9 provides, referring to all these powers:

The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.

Now, if that means anything, does it not mean—I am asking you as a lawyer—that the President, through any department, the Navy Department, the War Department, the Maritime Commission, or any officer, may carry out any authority conferred under this Act?

Mr. HARR. Senator, you ask me that as a lawyer, and it is many years since I practiced law, but I think that would be the effect.

Senator GILLETTE. Then, the authority which is conferred on him to transfer, under such terms as he may deem proper, any vessel or boat, under such terms as he determines, can be exercised through the Navy Department, through the War Department, through the Maritime Commission, or any other agency or officer of the United States?

Mr. HART. I should think so.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all.

Mr. HART. And, Senator, I would like to add this as an answer to your question, sir. In passing on this bill and granting this authority, among others, as you have just outlined, it seems to me that we are not only legislating for the period of the emergency or the period of the war but in the light of events taking place at the present time, we are legislating for that period that will come after the war; and we hear a great deal about that.

There is an organization in New York called the Interdemocracy Federal Unionists whose object is, as you know, union now between the English-speaking peoples. It is being pushed, as far as I can see, principally by people of other countries, or people who are one generation away from other countries, involved.

I do not question their motives at all, but I certainly do question what they propose to do. This throwing of the United States into one federal group along with Britain and Canada and Australia and New Zealand and all other English-speaking countries—incidentally leaving out India, with 380 million people; they don't count—for us would be to scrap the Declaration of Independence, to scrap the Constitution of the United States, and undo the last 160 or 170 years. We would be going into partnership with a country that would be obviously nearer to bankruptcy politically, socially, and economically. I am not criticizing Britain. I may have the greatest sympathy for her, but certainly, in my opinion, that is not what this 85 percent of the American people want to see done. I do not think it is what the Congress or any considerable number of people want to see done.

In that connection, the new Ambassador to Britain, in a speech which he made to the League of Women Voters last week, indicated he had this in mind when he said:

A further opportunity will come to you and the international labor organization when the war has been won for democracy. Then we must be prepared to concrete the peace. Only by finding a common basis of world citizenship—

We are going to scrap our independence, apparently—

and by accepting far-reaching and progressive social change can we hope to secure the economic and social security which will make any peace real and lasting.

Those are only two of many things going on today that indicate to me that there are schemes, it seems to me, in this bill; one, to give all power to the Executive so that we may wage war that, in his judgment, the interests of the United States determine; and, in the second place, that we may take any steps after the war which would, in my opinion, involve throwing away or scrapping the United States Constitution. I think the American people are unqualifiedly opposed to that.

Senator GILLETTE. At the risk of repetition, I would like to ask just one more question. I want again to refer to the Prime Minister's statement that they will not be able to take care of shipping their things and the authority that his act gives to the President to manufacture or otherwise procure, which would enable him to take possession, under such terms as he sees fit, of the shipping of other nations that might be in our ports, as well as manufactured here.

Mr. HART. I want to repeat what I said before. I am unalterably opposed, and have always been, to nazi-ism or fascism or commun-

nism, although I am a little surprised to see that in the United States the dictators in Germany and Italy come in for all the attention and the dictator in Russia seems to get very little attention from us. I am opposed to all of them. I stand absolutely for our form of government.

Senator GILLETTE. I am sure we have much company in that, and that very few people will differ with you with regard to their attitude on this bill in that connection.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I have a question or two.

Mr. Hart, Senator Gillette questioned you as to whether Congress could put a limitation on the matter of convoys, in view of the constitutional provision making the President Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. I do not wish to enter into any prolonged constitutional argument at this point, but is it not perfectly feasible that, if Congress wishes to put a limitation on convoys, they can put in a little provision providing that no funds appropriated heretofore or hereafter shall be used for the purpose of conveying ships into war zones?

Mr. HART. I should certainly think so.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. As a lawyer, there is no question about that being a perfectly legitimate provision?

Mr. HART. Congress still has the purse strings.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. They still have. If they pass this bill I do not know how long it will last.

Mr. HART. Neither do I.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Senator Connally and Senator Green went into the question of aiding Britain at some considerable length. Do you see anything in this bill about aid to Britain?

Mr. HART. No.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. This is a blank check for the President to extend aid to any country?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. To Russia, or anybody that he might deem wise?

Mr. HART. He could drop England tomorrow and take up Russia.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Assuming among the same sources as predicated the destroyer deal, through the public press, that England was to bring great pressure to bear in the direction of appeasing Russia to protect and strengthen the British position in the Orient, there would be nothing to hinder the President from giving three or four hundred airplanes to Russia, as we sold 2 million dollars' worth of machine tools that were needed for ourselves?

Mr. HART. Nothing whatever. As a matter of fact, as I understand it, the House has refused to pass an amendment which would prohibit giving material or furnishing it to Russia.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. So there is nothing in this bill which mentions or refers to Great Britain, is there?

Mr. HART. Not as I understand it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And there is no limitation on what form the aid to Great Britain may take?

Mr. HART. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. A so-called distinguished military expert, Major Eliot, who was in here the other day, testified it might be necessary for the United States to fight a war in the Orient, 8,000 miles from home, for the purpose of protecting British supply lines to the Middle Eastern army.

Under this bill there is nothing to prevent the President's bringing about exactly that situation, is there?

Mr. HART. No.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Hart, there has been reference to Prime Minister Winston Churchill's speech yesterday—or, rather, his testimony before the committee, because that is what it was intended to be—in which he made a statement that they would have to have help in the way of ships.

Do you know whether it has been a fact that the British have been keeping their ships on normal trade routes and denuding trade routes of American vessels by taking over our vessels? •

Mr. HART. I have heard about that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you know anything about Canada's position to aid Great Britain?

Mr. HART. In a general way. As I understand they are still being paid in full.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It is a fact that no such measure as this has either been passed in Canada or proposed in Canada and that Canada is still demanding and receiving dollar exchange for the goods which they furnish to Great Britain?

Mr. HART. I understand so.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Canada is vastly expanding her industrial production with the idea that it will be used in competition with us after the war is over?

Mr. HART. I have no doubt of that.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Hart, Senator Connally and Senator Green again went over the purpose and the aims of this bill. I do not want to press you too strongly, but since they brought up the matter again I think we might as well go into it again. It is aimed to aid Britain. The President in his annual message said,

We look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

Of course, we were all sold on that already, and we have always maintained it in this country. Would you understand that to be an aim to impose that upon the world, if necessary?

Mr. HART. That is the inference.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Wouldn't you understand this bill to authorize the President to do anything he wishes or sees fit to do in that direction?

Mr. HART. I think that was intended.

Senator CLARK of Missouri (reading):

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.

Of course, that is an ideal. It is granted to us under the Constitution. Do you understand that would include the imposition of freedom of worship and expression in Russia, for instance?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri (continuing):

The third is freedom from want--which, translated into world terms, means understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants--everywhere in the world.

That is an aim which we have always maintained in this country and which we have been unable ourselves even to approach for the last 8 or 10 years. Do you understand that means that the United States is about to engage in a program of relieving the whole world from any question of want?

Mr. HART. That appears to be it.

Senator CLARK of Missouri (continuing):

The fourth is freedom from fear--which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor--anywhere in the world.

The United States has always advocated reduction of armament, even to the extent of sinking a very large proportion of our first-line battle fleet. Do you understand that this would set the United States on a crusade to relieve any country in the world from fear of aggression?

Mr. HART. If it does not mean that, I don't know what it does mean.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Taken in connection with the fact that this bill is not specific in any particular, and taken in connection with the President's annual message when he said, "That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation," Mr. Hart, do you think you were unfair in the construction you put upon it in response to Senator Connally's question?

Mr. HART. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye, have you any questions?

Senator NYE. None, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glass is absent.

Senator Byrnes is also absent, I believe.

But, Mr. Hart, may I ask you one or two questions?

Mr. HART. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not find any authority in this bill to convoy ships, do you?

Mr. HART. I understand it could be implied.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, just a minute, please. You have read the bill. I am asking you a very simple question. Do you find any provision in this bill which you construe as authorizing the convoying of ships?

Mr. HART. I would think it probably could be done under the bill before amended in the House. As it is before this committee, I would say there is probably justification for putting in that restriction. In other words, Senator, I think it probably does--it is so all-fired broad.

The CHAIRMAN. I know it is broad. But I think that is a very simple question. Do you find any authority in the bill to send any of our ships, either merchant or naval vessels, for the purpose of participating in the war, Mr. Hart, into the war areas of Europe, or into the danger zones?

Mr. HART. I do not believe it is specifically there.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you just one question because it has been expressed here so frequently, under the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law." You are familiar with legislative terms as a lawyer, of course. Is that any different from an ordinary provision generally and usually inserted into statutes in nearly all of the States—simply declaring that "all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed"?

Mr. HART. I suppose it is kind of a quick way to avoid having to look up all of the laws that might be inconsistent.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly. But the purpose of the bill is stated in section 3, that the President, through the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government, to manufacture in our own arsenals, or otherwise procure—which I assume means to purchase or to procure in any way he can, except I doubt if anybody is justified in implying that it authorizes larceny by the President, or any other head of the Government. So I assume it means procure by any lawful means "any defense article." Of course, the "defense article" is broad. It includes ships, it includes airplanes, it includes practically anything for ordinary defense purposes.

Then he is authorized to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of these defense articles. That is the broad power that is given. Under universal rules of construction, Mr. Hart, is not the language "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law" to be construed to suspend only those laws that directly prevent the exercise of the powers granted?

Mr. HART. I think there is a general principle something like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't there a universal rule?

Mr. HART. That, I cannot say.

The CHAIRMAN. We are getting social advantages throughout the world, guaranteeing the freedom of speech, the freedom of worship, the freedom of religion, and so on. The four great freedoms to which you have referred certainly would not directly stand in the way of manufacturing or otherwise lawfully procuring defense articles and subsequently selling those defense articles or giving away those defense articles to any nation whose defense the President deems vital to our defense, would it?

Mr. HART. I don't know that it would. But these four things are so broad and so vague that I don't know what they might be interpreted to mean.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't find anything in this bill to authorize the President to establish freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and security?

Mr. HART. That is just the point, Senator. This bill coming just a few days after the message of January 6, I think it was, would be read—and I think justly so if it were passed—in the light of that message on the state of the Union.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the President would read into the act and the passage of this bill by the Congress a mandate or authority to carry out his broad general statements made in his message?

Mr. HART. Personally, I think he would.

The CHAIRMAN. That is carrying the program of vilification rather far, Mr. Hart. I will not argue the point with you here because it is purely a matter of argument.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one further question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Vandenberg.

Senator VANDENBERG. Mr. Hart, Senator George asked you whether there is anything in this bill which bears upon an authorization to convoy or to send our ships into belligerent zones. Take the last line on page 2, the third word—the President being authorized to “transfer” any of these defense articles anywhere he pleases. May not the word “transfer” mean transport? And if it means transport, may it not mean safely transport? Is not the word “transfer” one of the broad things involved in this delegation of power which might lead in the direction that you have indicated?

Mr. HART. I should certainly think so, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. As a lawyer, Mr. Hart, you think the word “transfer,” when used in conjunction with the words sell, exchange, lease, and lend would authorize the delivery into a danger zone?

Mr. HART. Yes; certainly, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. With another law standing squarely on the statute books against it?

Mr. HART. Yes; in view of the words “or otherwise dispose of.”

The CHAIRMAN. “Or otherwise dispose of”?

Mr. HART. Which follow.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you interpret those words to mean?

Mr. HART. I would interpret the whole combination of words as being the effort to describe any kind of a sending.

The CHAIRMAN. The mere selling or the exchanging or the leasing or the lending—don't those words all fall into a family of words?

Mr. HART. I would place that interpretation upon this, and I feel that the President would.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We thank you very much, Mr. Hart.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Hart, the chairman in his examination of you referred to the section upon which I had interrogated you, subsection (1) of section 3, and he asked you if you thought in that connection that the President was authorized to commit larceny. Apparently the chairman was referring to my question or my examination, which was the only question asked you with reference to the matter.

As I recall it, my question was whether under that authority conferred, “To otherwise procure”, it might go to the procuring of vessels of other nations in harbors under such terms as the President thought justified. Did you understand it in that way, or did you understand that I was suggesting that the President commit grand larceny?

Mr. HART. No, sir. I did not understand you to suggest that the President would commit grand larceny.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to take this occasion to say that my question was not predicated upon your question, Senator Gillette; but it was predicated upon various questions, as I think the record will show, that have heretofore been asked about what the President might do and how he might proceed.

Senator GILLETTE. I thank the chairman. Probably I assumed too much importance in the question I asked?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hart.

Mr. HART. May I have one word in closing, Senator, for brevity?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HART. There is no doubt but that a large number of people in this country favor aid to Britain and want to see Britain win. In my opinion, the passing of this bill, with its sweeping terms, would leave, as it came to be understood, a great deal of feeling in the country, or a degree of feeling and unsettlement that might result in holding up the speed of getting every aid to Britain that is desired to be given her. Just how, I don't know. But many people do oppose the bill.

On the other hand, I believe that by following that method, or some method similar to that of taking over the islands and thereby wiping out Britain's debt and establishing a huge credit, there would instantly be available funds out of which Britain could purchase goods for a long time to come, so that—and I leave this thought with you—the result might be that Britain might get far more aid than she would through this. And certainly this Congress and the people would keep in closer touch with what is going on.

Senator JOHNSON of California. But that would not be this bill.

Mr. HART. That would not be this bill. That would not be this bill unless this bill were amended.

Senator JOHNSON of California. You cannot amend this bill. You can't do anything to this bill. This bill has to be passed, whether the people want it or not. It has to be adopted and it has to be part of our law.

Mr. HART. I am recommending a substitute; I am recommending the substitution of the other measure for this, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much, Mr. Hart. You may be excused.

Mr. HART. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Will Mrs. Rosa M. Farber please come forward?

STATEMENT OF ROSA M. FARBER, ACTING NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, MOTHERS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please give the Secretary your name and address and the name of the organization, if any, for which you appear.

Mrs. FARBER. I am Rosa M. Farber, acting national chairman of the Mothers of the United States of America, with national headquarters at Detroit, Mich. We organized in October 1939 for the purpose of opposing legislation which tends to lead us into war. Active members of this organization are mothers, many of them having three, four, and five sons of military age. We have members whose eldest sons were in the World War and who have young sons who are now of military age.

So that we will not be misunderstood, may I state here that we are not pacifists. We are ready and willing to fight and have our sons fight to defend our country—but we repudiate the contention that only on foreign continents can we defend the United States of America.

We are in favor of national defense, and, in addition, we demand that our defense be strengthened by keeping arms, munitions, and supplies here and not lend, lease, or give away any of our defense

equipment. We are interested in national defense from the primary viewpoint of defending our own homes from invasion, internal as well as external.

Letters come to our office from mothers in every State begging that something be done to avoid a repetition of the senseless tragedy of 1917.

In opposing H. R. 1776 I will not discuss the bill from its political, economic, or military aspects. These phases have already been thoroughly covered by experts.

In opposing this bill, I speak for the mothers who are concerned first, with keeping this Nation out of foreign wars; second, with preserving the institution of the home as we know it in the United States of America.

On the statue in front of the Hall of Archives is inscribed these words, "What is past is prologue." Giving a practical interpretation to these words, we recognize this bill to be a momentary culmination of past steps in national economics and future greater regimentation that will detrimentally affect our homes.

In order to grasp the significance of this measure in the present setting, it must be considered, not as a single piece of legislation, but as one part of a series.

With the advent of the New Deal came the N. R. A., the A. A. A., and a host of other alphabetical symbols indicating in retrospect, it would seem, a premeditated drive toward ultimate dictatorship. In other words, an alien economy is being superimposed upon our American economy. And the one feature to which the American Mothers are bitterly opposed, is the unwarranted and unjustified militarization of our Nation.

I hold in my hand a reproduction of the front page of the Chicago American of November 11, 1918—Armistice Day. Note the headline "American aims accomplished." We thought on November 11, 1918, that "armistice" and "peace" were synonymous terms. We were led to believe that wars were over and that peace, freedom, and liberty had been enthroned everywhere for all time. But now we wonder if the headline over the masthead, "Red flag over Kaiser's palace," was more indicative of our war aim accomplishments.

However, had we analyzed the headlines and wisely appraised the situation we would have realized that fighting had merely stopped and that armistice merely means a cessation of hostilities.

It is a matter of record that almost immediately after the armistice, plans were being made all over the world in every nation for bigger and better wars. As a matter of fact, wars have raged and millions have been killed since the end of that war to end wars.

Let me refer to a very startling situation right here in the United States. More than 2 years ago Senator Bennett C. Clark called our attention to some things being done right here which should have scared us then far more than this bugaboo of invasion is supposed to scare us today. Let me quote from Senator Clark's article in the Country Gentleman of January 1939:

There is in existence the draft of a complete set of laws prepared by the War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments for the most sweeping grant of powers to the President. They provide the foundation work for powers comparable to those of Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin. They range from a veiled

authority for a press censorship to a veiled authority of a general draft of labor, but with no suggestion of a draft of capital.

They have not been publicized except to the extent that I was able to do so by introducing them myself and then reporting them adversely from the Senate Committee on Munitions, all purely as an attempt at information of the public. It was never the intention of the bureaucrats who prepared them that they should be forwarded to the Congress for consideration and action. It was their hope that the proposed measures should lie moldering in the archives of the two departments until a state of war was declared. Then they would be sent in haste to the Congress to be passed under whip and spur with hysteria ready to shout "traitor" at any Senator or Representative who dared oppose them or even ask that they be carefully examined. I wish that every American man and woman could be familiarized with the provisions of this modest beginning for a totalitarian government in America when we are once again committed to the shambles.

In the event we are under the impression that defending the Western Hemisphere is an idea developed to meet the present so-called emergency, let me quote again from the same article—

I have heard one of the highest ranking officers in the United States Army harangue the guests in his official residence to the effect that it was our duty to retain the Philippines—violating our national pledge—in order to maintain a part in a general defense scheme of French Indochina, British Hongkong and Singapore, Dutch West Indies, and Australia against "a northern power," which I naturally assumed to be Japan. I have heard leading members of the "Cliveden set" in England—possibly the leading couple—preach to a group of United States Senators the theory that England should make the best terms possible with Nazi Germany to work out world affairs, but with the additional pregnant demand that our Nation must go along with Great Britain "ship for ship, gun for gun, and man for man."

And again, if we are under the impression that the present huge expenditure for defense material was brought because these are "ominous times" today, let us listen to Senator Clark again, writing in the same article over 2 years ago:

There are Americans who conceive it to be the duty of the United States to act as a sort of policeman of the world and to squander billions upon billions of dollars upon huge Naval and Military Establishments—not for the defense of the United States, but to be ready at the drop of a hat to conduct a war half around the world and to send American boys to fight 7,000 miles from home to protect a handful of American investments in the Orient.

In the steps leading up to the presentation of this dictator war bill 1776, you may recall that about a year ago Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison proposed that Congress give the President emergency war powers in peacetime.

Prior to that by many years a strange thing happened, even before President Roosevelt received his first nomination for the presidency. In his well-known book, *After Seven Years*, the former chief "brain truster," Raymond Moley, tells us that "McGoldrick and McBain prepared a memorandum on presidential war powers."

May I point out here, gentlemen, that this memorandum was prepared in the spring of 1932, before Hitler came into power and before Germany rearmed.

This is the reason, gentlemen, that we are apprehensive about this bill 1776.

This is the reason, gentlemen, that we are skeptical and dubious when a voice comes over the air saying, "I hate war." "I will keep war from our shores."

Did the President indicate a hatred of war in his "quarantine the aggressor" speech in Chicago in October 1937?

Did the President indicate a hatred of war in his Charlottesville speech in June 1940, characterized by some as a personal declaration of war?

How much peace was in the President's recent message to Congress when he proposed to police the world? Was he thinking then of the welfare of the United States or was he thinking of the power to be gained under this bill?

There have been many news stories recently about the registration and mobilization of women. We want to know how the women are to be regimented and mobilized in the President's program of enthroning liberty and freedom everywhere. What is this emergency that demands the registration of men, women, young men, young women, boys, and girls, in camps, and where else? We understand that the war plans referred to previously provide that every female over the age of 16 shall be subject to the command of the Government.

Are these news stories part of a propaganda program to entice our women into accepting the program of regimentation laid down for them in the industrial mobilization plan; a plan, the wording of which is—in most cases—so specific as to require no comment? But, since courageous gentlemen in the halls of Congress have exposed this plan—thereby giving our women the opportunity to learn of the dangers incorporated in it for them—we believe that in all this rush to war, we should note carefully the following salient points it proposes, bearing on the control of women in a war economy.

The purpose of the woman wage-earners division is to divert the 10,000,000 women and girl workers over 16 years of age from the work they are already engaged in (industry, commerce, and the professions) to work in munition factories and other industries necessary for successful completion of the war.

The woman wage-earners division has a subdivision called section of woman labor required for service with troops whose duty it is to locate women and recruit them for duty with the armed forces.

The social and economic welfare division, among its other duties, provides for social contact and aid during leisure hours of employed women.

The minors division would be directed to take cognizance of the fact that the emergency may require the employment of children under 16 in industry or agriculture.

Proponents of this rush into war bill have persistently reiterated it contains nothing which will interfere with existing laws for the protection of the rights of labor.

We contend this is a bill to push us into war, and, therefore, put the industrial mobilization plan into effect and again turning to that plan we find that it provides for the legal council division of the Bureau of Women and Minors—a division that will have the double function of:

First. Recommending the suspension of legislation in various States which now restrict the hours and working conditions of women and minors in industry, which are referred to as "expedient rather than necessary."

Second. Securing approval of public opinion for such recommendation.

The Bureau of Women and Minors is one of several bureaus under the War Labor Administration. Its personnel is appointed by the

President through the War Labor Administrator. In the words of the plan, "the Bureau is in itself primarily an advisory rather than an administrative agency." Thus the provisions of the industrial mobilization plan which affect women and children will, in all probability, be administered by some other agency.

There is nowhere in the plan any provision that women will administer the details of the plan which deals with women and children or that they will even act in an advisory manner in connection therewith.

There is no indication that women's organizations, welfare agencies, or individual women have been consulted on the details of the plan which directly affects women and minors.

It is evident that just as women were not consulted in the writing of the provisions for their regimentation in the industrial mobilization plan, they have not been consulted in this push-to-war plan. We repeat, gentlemen, this bill is part and parcel of an alien program to destroy the security of our homes, the respect for our women, and nullify the God-given right of parenthood over children.

It may well be that this legislation has confused and fooled some Senators and Congressmen, some business and professional men, but—make no mistake about it—it is not fooling the mothers. That is why the mothers of this Nation are rising up in angry and bitter protest against this push-us-into-war bill 1776.

We suggest for your consideration that history proves the wisdom of heeding the voice of motherhood.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. I have none.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg, have you any questions?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. I have none.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys?

Senator VAN NUYS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Farber, you may be excused.

The committee thanks you for appearing before us.

Mrs. FARBER. Mr. Chairman, the mothers thank you for listening.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge Matthews?

STATEMENT BY HON. JOHN A. MATTHEWS, NEWARK, N. J.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge Matthews, will you please give the reporter your name?

Judge MATTHEWS. John A. Matthews, 744 Broad Street, Newark, N. J. I preside in the Chancery Court of the State of New Jersey. My courtroom is 1260 Broad Street, Newark, N. J. I am appearing individually and as the father of seven sons and a daughter—not to leave her out of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a prepared statement?

Judge MATTHEWS. I have a statement. I regret I do not have a copy for all of you, Mr. Chairman, because I am an individual and I dictated this to my secretary and had it transcribed in five copies, the other copies going to the newspapermen.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed with your formal statement.

Judge MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee. I appear before your honorable committee as an individual citizen from the State of New Jersey. I am the father of seven sons—and one daughter. One of our sons is presently registered under the conscription law, another a junior in college would be eligible were war to come to us or were we to go to it, two others in prep schools would be eligible in the near future were the calamity of war to be brought upon us, while the other three face the future in blissful unawareness of the threatened danger to their older brothers.

The mother of these sons and I, like the mothers and fathers of all American sons have a deep concern about this so-called lease-lend bill. I think I can speak for other mothers and fathers, gentlemen, because I have been the recipient of more than 10,000 letters in reply to a broadcast which I made at my own expense over a small station in my own State, reaching New York and New Jersey. And in all of those letters the mothers have pleaded with me to keep my voice raised and continue my efforts in order to keep their sons out of war.

I know that I speak the views of the vast majority of such mothers and fathers in what I shall say to your committee about the dangerous implications of this bill to their sons, for I have been the recipient of more than 10,000 letters as a result of radio broadcasts that I have made on the subject, "Keep America Out of War and Keep War Out of America."

I look upon this bill as primarily an attempt on the part of the administration to get congressional sanction for what they didn't dare to before the election, for what they promised not to do during the election campaign, and for what they fear to do in contravention of their preelection pledges unless you of the Congress by passing this bill say, "go ahead and we will share the popular blame."

What are these acts which the administration didn't dare do, which they promised not to do, and which under this bill they seek to persuade the Congress into approving their doing?

Generally speaking, they are acts of undeclared war. Specifically, these acts either expressed or hidden in the implications of this bill are the following:

First, allowing the President to give the ships of belligerent nations in our ports to any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States. This authority flows from the words "otherwise procure any defense article" contained in subsection (1) of section 3 of the bill. You can "otherwise procure" belligerent ships by seizing them. Under subsection (2) of section 3 the President can sell, transfer—and that can mean transport. In fact, gentlemen, transfer means to take something some place. I transfer this paper by taking it from here and putting it there. I transfer a ship by transporting it.

Now, repeating, under subsection (2) of section 3 the President can sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of these

belligerent ships. Such action by the President, I say as a lawyer, would be an undeclared act of war.

I have heard a lot of discussion here this morning about whether or not you can do this. Would the President steal? Of course he would not. But the President can find a way by which he can seize them. And if he does seize them and give them to Britain, for instance, or to Russia, or to whomever else he might give them under this bill, then he is performing an act of undeclared war, in my humble legal and, if you will for the nonce, judicial opinion.

The second power that I say is an act of undeclared war is allowing the President "to test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order any defense article for any such government." The exercise of this authority, contained in subsection (3) of section 3, is so palpably an act of war that its mere recital suffices to show it to be such. How else can you interpret opening up our naval bases to belligerent ships to be repaired and outfitted than that it is allowing the belligerent to fight from those bases.

Moreover, to do such a thing sections 23, 24, and 33 of the United States Code, title 18, would have to be superseded by this act 1776.

Now, this act does not contain, as acts usually do, "anything in any other acts inconsistent with this act." No; it takes that omnibus method, "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law."

Therefore, notwithstanding the provisions of those three sections, the President could do these things.

Now, what do those sections provide? In my quotation of these sections I think you will pardon me if I tell you that I have not checked them with the code. I read them in the New York Times in the report of Secretary Hull. The New York Times date is January 31, 1911. But I am sure the Secretary quoted them correctly. He is an excellent lawyer.

Section 23 makes it unlawful to fit out or arm in the United States a vessel with intent that it shall be employed in the service of a foreign belligerent against a power or people with which the United States are at peace.

Section 24 makes it unlawful to increase or augment in our ports the force of a ship of war or other armed vessel belonging to a belligerent power.

Section 33 makes it unlawful during a war in which the United States is neutral to send out of our jurisdiction any vessel built, armed, or equipped as a vessel of war for delivery to a belligerent nation.

And not only would this act have to supersede these provisions of our law, it would have to disregard international law. The Hague Convention XIII of 1907 states in article VI that the supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral power to a belligerent power, of warships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is forbidden.

Article XVII states that in neutral ports belligerent warships—may only carry out such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them seaworthy, and may not add in any manner whatsoever to their fighting force.

Article XVIII states that belligerent warships may not make use of neutral ports for "replenishing or increasing their supplies of war material or their armament."

May I interpolate and say that this thought occurred to me this morning, that the gentleman or gentlemen, or whoever they may have

been, who drafted this bill seemed to have in mind specifically mentioning all of the things that now we are forbidden to do by these sections that I have quoted, and by the Hague Convention, and to give that permission in this bill *ipsissimis*, as it were.

Now, I know that Secretary Hull has indicated that the Hague Convention is not applicable to the present European war because it provides in article XXVIII that it shall not apply unless "all the belligerents are parties to the Convention," and that Great Britain and Italy are not parties to it. However, the argument of the Secretary that this is not an ordinary war and that these provisions of the United States Code and of the Hague Convention, which are declaratory of international law on this subject, can be ignored by the United States because Germany and Italy violated other articles of the Hague Convention with respect to other neutral nations is an excuse rather than a reason for our passing this section of act 1776. Indeed, as far as England is concerned in this so-called extraordinary war, she has violated it with respect to our shipping and mails and she had mined the Norwegian coast line before Hitler invaded Norway.

There are many other things which she has done, perhaps of necessity, in violation of international law. And I recall very definitely the protest of Secretary Hull. As I remember, he sent a fairly reasonable note to the other side; but I don't remember what the answer was or whether we ever got one.

I make that point to show that, when they say "because Italy and Germany have violated the Convention, we are not bound by it," it is really an excuse, gentlemen, rather than a reason for passing this section.

The important point of the whole matter is, however, that regardless of casuistic interpretations or distortions of law, this authority to allow England to fight from American naval bases is, in fact, an act of undeclared war.

Third, allowing the President to use our Navy or part of it to convoy ships containing food or munitions or any implement of warfare to the belligerents. This authority is equally patent under subsection (2) of section 3 of the bill.

I construe "transfer" to give him the authority to do just that. There has been a lot of discussion here this morning about the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy. But my purpose is this. This bill looks for congressional approval of this act of war. And I say that the President will not dare do it in the face of his specific pledges to the American electorate unless you approve this bill.

In addition to these specific acts of undeclared war which this bill seeks to get Congress to approve of, the whole tenor of this proposed law breathes belligerency. It equivalently says in its provision in subsection (1) of section 3, "or otherwise procure any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States," that the President of our country shall not only have a virtual dictatorship to do what this bill empowers him to do, but that this dictatorship shall make him the chief of police of the world. Under this provision the President can release weapons to any government anywhere provided he, and he alone, deems the defense of that nation vital to the defense of the United States. Presently, of course, the nations envisioned by the bill are

England, Greece, and China. But by this bill he could do the same for Indochina, Spain, unoccupied France, as well as for that international Al Capone, Russia. Such power gives the President a seat in the game of power politics with virtually all of the resources of our country to gamble with. And it is the history of this game of power politics that human lives follow the loss of material resources.

Let us look at this thing realistically. The island of England is threatened, and has been for months, with attack across the twenty-odd miles of channel separating it from a European mainland virtually in complete control of Germany. That plight of England excites our human sympathy. We of this country have thus far aided England in stalling off that attack. Most Americans want us to continue to give such aid, and indeed any and all additional aid short of war to save England from invasion.

But that's only part of the picture. The England that we want to help—that is most of us—is also an Empire called Great Britain. Her far-flung seats of empire, many of them the results of ruthless conquest, are also threatened in this war by Germany, and less and less by Italy, and, at least, according to the press, by Japan.

This bill 1776 virtually enables the President to take over the defense of any or all of these subjugated seats of empire. Singapore and Dakar are the geographical names you hear mentioned most often, one a British seat of empire, the other presently a French position. But we don't know how Petain and Laval have made out today. And there are many other seats of empire all over the world.

Now, it may be that Japan will seek Singapore and that there may ultimately be a Germano-French control of Dakar. I interpolate here that I wasn't even half as scared as the headlines in the newspapers would have you scared about the bombing time from Dakar to—well, where was it? I don't know whether it was Topeka or some other place out in the West.

And it may be too that other erstwhile key points to the trade routes of the world may pass out of British hands into German, perhaps Italian, perhaps Russian, perhaps Japanese hands. Or if the Axis, so-called, subsists, maybe there will be pan-European and pan-Asiatic collaboration for a so-called economic new order.

Now, should we here in America endanger the lives of our sons and our already threatened from within democratic way of life by taking over Britain's war to save these seats of her empire? If the answer is yes, because otherwise we would be in the international economic dog house, I would reply that this Western Hemisphere with its reasonable military approaches in our control is as necessary economically to Europe and the world, yes, more so, than they are to us economically.

I put aside as fantastic—and again as a lawyer and a judge I choose the word carefully—any successful invasion of a reasonably defense-prepared America by any or all powers of the world. I do so, not alone on the experience of history and the facts of our geography, but on the testimony of aviation, military, and naval experts of our own country who know whereof they speak, both from experience and from their study in their respective avocations.

Indeed, I think I may safely say to your committee that an honest appraisal of all of the testimony pro and con, this bill, to which the public have had access in the press and otherwise, conclusively

proves that even in its allegedly present condition of unpreparedness our Nation cannot be successfully invaded at present, and our Nation fully prepared in material and spiritual defense can never be successfully invaded.

The crisis, therefore, which this bill is alleged by its proponents to avert, is presently not our crisis, and need not be in the future unless we foolishly, yet wickedly, dissipate our defense and our spirit by involvement in this war. England's crisis, as far as the invasion of her homeland is concerned, is not our military, though heartily and sympathetically we have been and are willing to continue to make it such, short of involvement in this war.

But the American people, I am confident, do not want to make Britain's crisis of empire ours, either factually or sentimentally. Indeed, students of democracy know that empires can continue to exist only by the military and governmental control of the seats and subjects of empire.

This bill, as I read it, commits us to aid the British Empire rather than the British people.

There is just another point that I would like to make in my prepared statement, after which I will be glad to answer any questions anent what I have said.

Prescinding from aid to preserve Britain's seats of empire, there is no aid beyond financing purchases of munitions and implements of warfare that we presently can give England short of war that we are not presently giving her. Therefore, this bill with its admittedly dictatorial powers could well be dispensed with in favor of an outright gift of dollars to England to finance her defense required implement of warfare or defense materials.

In view of all of these facts the conclusion seems inescapable to me that this bill purviews not only aiding England in the defense of her homeland but it also plainly purviews taking over England's war, when, as, and if England's home island falls. Such a course would mean that we abandon our role as a republic, a representative democracy, and embark upon a course of imperialism that will mean, as it has meant for all empires, war, death, desolation, and ultimate destruction. We may not like the threatened new order in Europe. We may and perhaps should consider it a threat to our way of life. But the way to avoid that threat is not to don the ideological accouterments of dictatorship and go to Europe to fight dictatorship but to buckle on the armor of American democracy and defend our way of life against all comers, military or economic.

That is my statement, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Harrison, have you any questions.

Senator HARRISON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys?

Senator VAN NUYS. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Judge MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, may I just call your attention to one more thing that I thought would be brought out in the questioning? It will take me but a minute.

In preparing my manuscript I thought of the continual statement of men of intelligence and sincerity that Britain is our last line of defense and that we can't survive without her. I had read Senator Beveridge's Life of John Marshall, and knowing the Senator by reputation as a historian, I thought I remembered that he had drawn a picture of that same situation away back in the years 1807 to 1812. Fisher Ames, a New England Anglophile of those days is quoted by Senator Beveridge as follows:

Great Britain is fighting our battles and the battles of mankind, and France is combating for the power to enslave and plunder us and all the world.

Likewise, John Rutledge of South Carolina is quoted by Beveridge, page 5, as follows:

I have long considered England as but the advanced guard of our country * * *. If they fall we do.

Then, the Senator quoted again at page 10 from John Lowell, of Boston, as follows:

What did the Chesapeake incident, what did impressment of Americans, what did anything and everything amount to, compared to the one tremendous fact of Great Britain's struggle with France? All thoughtful men know that Great Britain alone stood between us and that slavery which would be our portion if France should prevail.

And again, he quoted Timothy Pickering, the Senator from Connecticut, whose wife was an Englishwoman, the daughter of an officer of the British Navy, who in 1804 had plotted the secession of New England and had enlisted the support of the British Minister to accomplish it.

Senator Beveridge says:

He charged that all embargo measures were in "exact conformity with the views and wishes of the French Emperor * * * the most ruthless tyrant that has scourged the European world, since the Roman Empire fell." Suppose the British Navy were destroyed and France triumphant over Britain—to the other titles of Bonaparte would then "be added that of Emperor of the two Americas": for what legions of soldiers "could he not send to the United States in the thousands of British ships, were they also at his command?"

Over and again these quotations from Beveridge we have this wonderful statement of John Adams, which throws light upon the debate today.

Our gazettes and pamphlets tell us that Bonaparte * * * will conquer England, and command all the British Navy, and send I know not how many hundred thousand soldiers here and conquer from New Orleans to Passamquoddy. Though every one of the bugbears is an empty phantom, yet the people seem to believe every article of this bombastical creed and tremble and shudder in consequence. Who shall touch these blind eyes?

And finally Jefferson said—and I quote from Beveridge:

The object of England, long obvious, is to claim the ocean as her domain. * * * We believe no more in Bonaparte's fighting merely for the liberty of the seas, than in Great Britain's fighting for the liberty of mankind.

Then, Senator Beveridge, after all of these quotations, said this at page 6:

Never did Americans more seriously need emancipation from foreign influence than in the early decades of the republic—never was it more vital to their well-being that the people should develop an American spirit, than at the height of the Napoleonic wars.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, for allowing me to add that to my statement.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. May I ask one question before the witness leaves the stand?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Judge, I do not wish to prolong this hearing with a discussion of historical matters, but since you have read these very pertinent quotations from some of the leaders of former days, I want to ask this question. It is a fact, is it not, that Timothy Pickering came from Massachusetts rather than Connecticut. But Timothy Pickering, John Lowell, and Fisher Ames were leaders of the group in Massachusetts who not only favored aid to England at that time, but when the United States a little later was forced into the War of 1812 against the intolerable outrages as the Chesapeake incident and others, they got up a secession movement in the midst of war and tried to get secession and join England?

Judge MATTHEWS. Senator Beveridge speaks of that in his life of John Marshall.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much, Judge Matthews.

The committee will now recess until 2:15.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the committee recessed until 2:15 p. m.)

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the committee reconvened at 2:15 p. m., and proceeded further as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Joseph Curran.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CURRAN, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL MARITIME UNION, CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND PRESIDENT OF THE GREATER NEW YORK INDUSTRIAL UNION COUNCIL, NEW YORK CITY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Curran, will you please give your name, address, and organization, if any, for which you appear?

Mr. CURRAN. My name is Joseph Curran. I appear as president of the National Maritime Union, affiliated with the C. I. O., and the Greater New York Industrial Union Council, as president.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a prepared statement, I observe, and if you wish, you may proceed with your formal statement, all questions being postponed until you finish with it, if you desire to take that course.

Mr. CURRAN. Thank you, sir; I would like to have it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be followed.

Mr. CURRAN. A great propaganda campaign is now being conducted in this country to confuse the American people and make

them believe that the passage of the lease-lend bill and the giving of "all aid to Britain" would be the means of keeping us out of war.

It is the considered judgment of the American workers that this is a complete fallacy. Our experience in the First World War showed that a constant flow of munitions, Army and Navy materials, ships and destroyers and planes to Great Britain can do nothing other than lead us into war. We automatically become a belligerent.

If participation in the present European war were not a basis for this bill, why did the administration refuse to accept an amendment in the House which would have barred the sending of men overseas and refuse to accept another which would bar convoys of American vessels?

Labor in America is unalterably opposed to war. This was made clear in a statement sent this committee by President Philip Murray of the C. I. O., in which he stated:

The American people are determined to remain at peace rather than be drawn into the blood bath of Europe. The reason for this is that we know that war means an end to our democratic way of life, our democratic institutions, and the very ideals which we are attempting to preserve.

This bill is one of the most dangerous departures from our democratic way of life ever given serious consideration by the Congress of the United States. In its implications this proposed piece of legislation is downright Fascist—and I am using the word "Fascist" with full understanding of what it means to the people of those countries where it has been established.

In the first place, the lease-lend bill hands over to one man, the Chief Executive, complete dictatorial powers. It will give him full authority over those elements in our national economy which determine our living standards. He would be able to rule by decree. He would be able to wipe out with a stroke of the pen many of the gains the people, and especially the working people, have won over generations of hard struggle.

The mere fact that the power to determine what is to be manufactured and sold would rest in the hands of one man is enough, in our opinion, to warrant every representative of the American people voting against this bill.

In the second place, the bill would in effect repeal any existing guaranties of civil liberties and trade-union rights—guaranties which, in addition to being our proudest tradition, are absolutely necessary for the protection of our living standards. Low as these living standards are, they can be and undoubtedly will be depressed still further under stress of war economy. It is in fact just such legislation as this which best enables antilabor industrialists to destroy the American people's only effective weapon for maintaining and improving their working conditions—the trade unions.

Thirdly, this bill is a war measure rather than a defense measure. It will destroy whatever semblance of neutrality we still have left and will put us definitely in the present European war. This is perhaps the greatest single danger in the bill.

The ravages of war, physical, economic, and mental, are well known to all of us. But these things fall hardest on the workers, the people who are forced to do the fighting and the dying, but who get none of the profits.

We all know what war does to the national economy. It is geared up and expanded out of all proportion to the people's ability to maintain it with their post-war income. Depression must inevitably result.

I don't want to go too deeply into the specific proposals contained in the bill. That has been done many times already, and I do not think that they are too important. H. R. 1776 is an outright war measure. We have to base our approval or opposition on the simple question: Do we want to get into this war—or don't we? Nothing more, nothing less. All discussion about the extent of our participation, the sacrifices that will be necessary, limits on expenditures and the like—all these things, it seems to me, are beside the point. If we are thrust into the war we will be committed to full participation whether we like it or not. There will be no limit to expenditures or anything else. And as for sacrifices, we know already who will do the sacrificing and who will get the profits.

It is our belief, too, that the American people as a whole know these things and have definite feelings about this bill and about our participation in the European war.

The average person, especially the workers, the trade unionists, know more about H. R. 1776 than the proponents of this bill would have you believe. They too see this measure strictly as a war bill. With them the question is: Do we want war—or don't we? If we want war, we want this bill. If we don't want war, then we don't want this bill. The two are inseparable in the minds of the American people. And if this measure were put before the people in a democratic referendum, we all know what the answer would be. It would be overwhelmingly "No."

Memories of the First World War are fresher in our minds than certain propagandists, certain publishers, and industrialists would like to have us believe.

For example, we are not unmindful of the casualties in that war—8,000,000 dead; 21,000,000 wounded and otherwise incapacitated; seven or eight million missing or taken prisoner—in other words, 35,000,000 persons, wage earners or potential wage earners, removed from the world's economy, either permanently or temporarily. That equals the wage-earning population of a pretty good-sized country, a country almost as big as the United States.

The thing that stands out in the trade unionists' mind, however, is this: Out of that 35,000,000 men and boys, fully 95 percent were either workers or came from workers' families. It may be more than 95 percent—but it is extremely doubtful if more than 5 percent of our fighters come from other sources.

Another thing we remember about the first World War is its cost in money. Our Federal Budget for the year 1916, the year before we entered the first World War, was a little over a billion dollars. The total cost of the war, however, was nearly \$30,000,000,000—not counting what it has cost us since it ended. For the fiscal year ending June 1940, before we are actually into the second World War, Federal appropriations ran to \$13,000,000,000. Now, if this war is going to cost as much in proportion to this thirteen billion as the first war cost in proportion to one billion, the workers of this country, who are compelled to foot the bill, are in for a great deal of suffering.

There are some who contend that, because the wealthy are taxed the highest, they are the ones who stand the financial cost of modern wars. That is a misconception. The persons who actually pay the financial cost of war are those who get the least when the national income is distributed—the low-income groups, the wage earners. These are the people who have to take what is left after profits are skimmed off. The bill for this war, as usual, will be paid by the workers. Profits will go where they usually go.

Now, there is a third way in which workers pay for wars and which is fresh in our memories from the last time. That is the loss of trade-union rights and of gains they have won over a long period. It is workers' organizations which sustain the fiercest attacks from antilabor industrialists and whose civil liberties are most endangered.

Periods of hysteria such as has been created today are selected by anti-union forces for fresh attacks on us for two reasons: One, in the confusion created by war hysteria and supported by a war administration, they can get away with more violations of civil liberties than they could in peacetime. Two, they are anxious to silence the progressive trade unions because we are the most articulate of their opponents and we fight hardest to preserve what we have.

Here is an example of what I mean. You will recall that, last fall, not long after the "all-out aid" campaign got under way, workers in the Kearney shipyards in New Jersey struck for some slight wage increases. They wanted 67 cents an hour instead of the 55 cents they were getting. The company took the position that "defense" profits are their exclusive property and refused the increase—although ship-building profits in wartime are proverbial. They finally forced the workers into a strike.

Immediately a howl of rage went up from employer agents, paid and voluntary. In the press, over the radio, and in the Halls of Congress, these shipyard workers, striking for simple wage increases on the basis of increased production and rising living costs, were subjected to the most vicious attacks. They were called "reds," Communists, "fifth columnists," Trojan horses, saboteurs, and a few other things—all because they wanted 11 cents an hour out of the millions in profits garnered by their employers.

Congressman Cox, of Georgia, got up on the floor of the House and charged the workers with treason. Think of it. Here was a handful of workers, most of them family men whose loyalty to the United States is unquestioned, charged with treason.

President Roosevelt, in a recent fireside chat, said that strikes in defense industries would not be tolerated. Well, we know what that means. If strikes are not tolerated, it means that manufacturers, no matter what profits they make, can cut wages and lengthen hours in their plants—and the workers have no defense.

Congressman Smith in the closing weeks of the last session of Congress, introduced a bill which would make punishable by death—by death, mind you—any willful act tending to slow up or hamper the work in any defense industry, or in any industry even indirectly connected with defense. This bill was in reality aimed at the workers—the theory being that their efforts to organize into unions would interfere with national defense.

The present lend-lease bill is a dictatorship bill. It means the abdication of Congress. It would give the President power to nullify any and all social or labor legislation enacted in the past few years. It would give him the power to regulate labor, destroy trade-unions, and take away from the people many of the civil rights they now possess.

There are forces in this country—bankers, industrialists, ship-owners—who see in this war an opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of their European rivals. They see a chance to get themselves a slice of the gigantic colonial empire built up by the great powers of Europe—empires which they are realistic enough to know are the real spoils of this war.

John T. Flynn, one of the country's foremost economists, recently reported that the British Government at the beginning of the war appropriated \$146,000,000 for propaganda purposes in this country. This, along with the fact that the press and other propaganda agencies are almost exclusively in the hands of war-profiteering interests, should show conclusively for whose benefit this propaganda campaign is being carried on.

Those forces which would take us into the present war are old acquaintances of ours. We have met them on the domestic front. They took the lead in attacking the Wagner Act, in attacking the Wages and Hours Act. They fought social security, old-age pensions, the Youth Act. They were exposed by the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee as seeking by the foulest means to destroy civil liberties in this country, as engaging in outright labor spying, as seeking to destroy the American labor movement—and even causing strikers to be murdered on picket lines.

Now they are working night and day to get us into the European war. With their million-dollar propaganda machines, they are trying to create what will appear to be a public demand for the lend-lease bill, and other war measures. These are the forces who hail a 10-billion-dollar armaments program as "security," but who used to scream with rage at the 800-million-dollar W. P. A. "spending spree." They said \$11 a week would make W. P. A. workers soft.

They are the same people who rave about national defense, who play demagogically on our genuine hate for Hitlerism and at the same time attempt to establish the same abhorrent system here.

If these people are anti-Fascist, where were they when the people of Spain were fighting for their lives? What were they doing when the armed forces of Hitler and Mussolini were marching across the Spanish countryside, threatening the legally elected Spanish Government? Democracy was in danger then, fighting for its very existence—in one of the last European strongholds. But England and France, and even the United States Government, were not interested. They could have stopped Hitler then.

And now they have the gall to wrap themselves in the American flag, pose as anti-Fascists, and try to insult the American workers as "fifth columnists." What hypocrisy! The progressive American trade unions, as well as the American people, were anti-Fascist back in the days when many American industrialists were praising Mussolini for making the trains run on time, and hailing Hitler for "accomplishing a twentieth century miracle."

If these people were really sincere about national defense if they really wanted to defend our civilization and our democracy, they would lose no time in seeking enactment of legislation to put 11,000,000 unemployed to work. They would lose no time in taking steps to protect the National Labor Relations Act and the Wage-Hour Act. They would pass the American Youth Act, the antilynch bill, and the poll tax bill, the La Follette labor espionage bill. They would extend unemployment insurance to those great bodies of American workers now excluded from its provisions. They would seek revision of tax legislation, not to cover small incomes but to cover excess profits and large incomes. They would turn the antitrust laws away from the trade unions, whose only crime is organizing workers, and turn them against the real violators, the real criminals—the huge predatory corporations and rapacious business interests who use their power to rob the American people.

If they were really interested in our country's welfare, these things would be done. That would be a step in the direction of real national defense, a step with which the trade unions and the people could and would gladly go along.

There is one more test of their sincerity. We are being told continually that the republics of South America are a sort of Achilles' heel in our national defense. We are told that Hitler's real aim is to establish a foothold in South America and, with that as a base, work his way gradually northward.

The best defense against Hitler penetration in any Latin-American country would be democracy in that country. Any population, honestly and thoroughly convinced that it is fighting for democracy, is the toughest kind of proposition for invaders.

If we fear Hitler penetration in Latin-America, why not work for democracy down there? The main reason, in our opinion, is that democracy in Latin-America is about the last thing that some American industrialists and bankers want.

In fact, there is every reason to believe that they fear democracy in Latin-America more than they fear Hitler. If some of the South American republics were democracies in fact as well as in name, colonial exploitation there would be closed to these great bankers and industrialists. They would not be able to use what they call peons in the iron mines of Chile for 3 or 4 years, destroy their health, and send them home to die. And certainly there is no one today who believes that most bankers and industrialists are more interested in democracy than in exploitation.

Of course, they will say they are. They will contend that their sole aim in going into this war is to defend democracy. But you and I know that they don't mean it. If they did, they would permit Latin-America to build democracy and they would extend democracy in this country.

Defending democracy is a twofold job. First, you have to preserve what you already have in the way of civil liberties, trade-union gains and improved living standards. Second, you have to extend these things to larger groups of the population that do not as yet have them.

Whom do I mean?

Well, first, there is a small segment of our population that can be estimated roughly at about 80 million people—men, women, and children—some two thirds of the entire American people.

A survey made several months ago by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Home Economics, and the W. P. A. shows that two-thirds of the families in this country have incomes averaging less than \$70 a month or \$16 a week. And that is for families, and not individuals.

Nearly half the American people, the survey showed, belonged to families whose average income is less than \$50 a month. Further, it showed that 4,000,000 families, or 14 percent of the population of the country, the richest country in the world, lived year-in year-out on annual incomes averaging \$312.

Think of it! Entire families existing on \$6 or \$7 a week! These groups do not have any democracy to defend. Democracy cannot be exercised on empty stomachs.

Secondly, there are some 15 million Negro and white people, in certain States in the South, who are denied the right to vote through the operation of the cumulative polltax imposed on them by plantation owners and industrialists. Generation after generation, these men and women, citizens of our country, are denied the right to exercise the most elementary right of a free people—the right to vote. Whose democracy then are these people asked to defend?

Thirdly, there is another large section of our population variously estimated at from 8 to 10 million. Men and women who are unemployed because society has nothing for them to do, no place for them to work. As long as that condition exists, democracy does not exist. It cannot exist for these people.

When these people are asked to send their sons and husbands abroad to defend democracy, they have a right to ask, What democracy? And when the propagandists prattle about their devotion to the democratic ideal, we have a right, based on our experience, to ask, Are we being fooled again?

There is another test of the sincerity of American business. At the same time that they are paying high-powered publicists to sell us the slogan, "All-out aid to Britain," we have a right to inquire into their activities in behalf of that country. And what do we find?

We all know the stories about French, English, and German industrialists who, during World War I, continued to sell each other implements and supplies of war. American business is not averse to the same practice. Today, Standard Oil is carrying gasoline to both sides in the European war. She carries supplies to Britain, to Spain (where they are reshipped to Italy and Germany), and to Japan. And this, in spite of the supposed embargo on gasoline, scrap iron, and other supplies to Japan.

On the one hand, we lend a hundred million dollars to China to fight Japan, and, on the other hand, shipments to Japan from this country show a sharp increase. As a matter of fact, instead of shipments being hampered by the embargo, they seem to have been spurred.

These examples of playing both sides in the war are probably what American businessmen would call utter neutrality. An example is a recent trip of a Standard Oil tanker, the *W. H. Libby*. Not long

ago she went to Cartagena, Colombia, and loaded up with oil, which she took to Freetown, West Africa, for British use. Then she hurried back to Carapito, Venezuela, for another load of oil, which she took this time to Teneriffe, in the Canary Islands, where the cargo was transferred to a German and an Italian tanker.

Incidentally, the crew of that ship found Teneriffe a very busy port. A steady stream of Standard Oil tankers pulling in and out. In the harbor, when the *W. H. Libby* left, were three German and five Italian tankers, the crew reported.

What is probably happening as a result of this traffic is that a German and a British plane passing each other on bombing trips are both using oil from the same source, carried in ships of the same company.

There is another aspect of defense which this committee should consider. That is the sale and transfer of American merchant ships to foreign countries. One of the principles on which the present Maritime Commission construction program is based is that the merchant marine is a sort of auxiliary to the Navy. It is sometimes called the second line of defense.

Just a few weeks ago Congress appropriated \$300,000,000 to build 200 new merchant ships. This was a special construction program, in addition to the regular 5-year building program.

Since the beginning of the war, however, the Maritime Commission has approved the sale or transfer of more than 300 ships to foreign countries, thus depleting the merchant fleets we are supposed to be building up. The press has carried stories to the effect that material needed in our defense is lying in warehouses in foreign ports because of lack of tonnage to bring it here.

If that seems illogical, what about this? Most of these transfers are to Great Britain. Yet Great Britain has more shipping under her control now than ever before in her long maritime history. It is not generally known but, upon the invasion of the various countries in Europe, Great Britain acquired 10,000,000 additional tons of shipping which gave her 45 percent of the world's total merchant shipping.

The joker is that a large part of this tonnage is not being used for war purposes. If the British Government wants ships for war purposes so badly, let her use these ships. Then we can keep our own ships at home. They refuse to allow American shipping to take over these trade routes even temporarily. We would like to know why.

It is proverbial that munitions makers, steel manufacturers, and other industrialists sell to both sides in a war. It is somewhat hypocritical, therefore, for them to hire propagandists to popularize a slogan calling for "all out aid to Britain." If their hearts are bleeding for the British Government, let them stop selling supplies to Britain's enemies.

It is a little hypocritical, also, for them to attack the trade-unions as "fifth columnists" for no other reason than that we are for real neutrality in the present war. We are for neutrality, for real neutrality, just as we are for real national defense. We are for defending democracy on any and all fronts. We are against H. R. 1776 because it will put us directly in the war and will curtail instead of extend democracy in this country.

Before closing I want to disassociate myself and the organizations I represent from certain other opponents of this bill. They come before you to oppose this measure, not on the grounds that they are opposed to war but on the ground that they are not satisfied with some phases of it. It is my contention that they don't represent the great body of our people, who are honestly opposed to this bill, because it is a war measure. Let me repeat that, in the opinion of the American workers, the lend-lease bill is not a defense measure—it is a war measure. If it becomes a law, Congress will have abdicated. Our neutrality will cease to exist, all verbal guaranties to the contrary notwithstanding. We will be thrust into the present European conflict without a formal declaration of war. One man, with dictatorial powers, will be able to rule by decree. Democratic safeguards will have ceased to exist.

In conclusion I want to say to this committee that, when it comes to real national defense, defense of the people's rights, and security, no one has to worry about the American workers. American workers are loyal. They are patriotic. They will defend their country and its institutions against attack from any source, foreign or domestic. They will also defend their organizations from attack—whether the attack comes cloaked in the mantle of patriotism or in any other guise.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson, have you any questions?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capper? Have you any questions?

Senator CAPPER. Mr. Curran, about what is the total membership of your organization?

Mr. CURRAN. The total membership of which organization—the National Maritime Union?

Senator CAPPER. The Maritime Union.

Mr. CURRAN. It fluctuates, because of the constant lay-up of ships, and the sale and transfer. They go into other industries. It runs between 52,000 and 60,000.

Senator CAPPER. And you think very generally they approve of the views you have expressed here in this statement?

Mr. CURRAN. Yes.

Senator CAPPER. And to what extent do labor organizations generally, in your opinion, go along with you in this position?

Mr. CURRAN. Well, I think the great majority of American workers.

Senator CAPPER. They feel as you do about this?

Mr. CURRAN. They want no part of this war.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. I would like to ask Mr. Curran a question. There was a great deal of talk, Mr. Curran, about the profits made

by the working people out of the last war, their high wages. I have heard more complaint about the fact that some working people in shipyards were able to buy a silk shirt than I heard about the boys who died in France. Did you hear that rumor?

MR. CURRAN. I heard it—from the same sources that are pushing the propaganda on this bill today.

Senator SHIPSTEAD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys?

Senator VAN NUYS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Curran, yours is a maritime union, you said?

MR. CURRAN. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. The work for them I assume depends upon the United States being able to keep its vessels under the American flag upon the high seas?

MR. CURRAN. That is naturally correct.

Senator PEPPER. And if for any reason the American-flag vessels were driven off the high seas it would work to the detriment of your union, would it not?

MR. CURRAN. Well, it would, and it has. For a long period of years the American shipping has not enjoyed free trade on the high seas.

Senator PEPPER. Is any law or any force exerted against American vessels attempting to go to any parts of the world to trade?

MR. CURRAN. No; it was the usual international trade practices that prevented it.

Senator PEPPER. Those were methods of commercial competition and not obstructions of forces that were laid down; were they not?

MR. CURRAN. Some people would call them methods of international commerce.

Senator PEPPER. In no sense of the word, whatever they may be—and I am not implying any approval of them—but what I am asking is that American vessels have not been forbidden by force by any nation to enter the ports of the world, have they?

MR. CURRAN. Well, it depends on how far you go with the definition.

Senator PEPPER. Now, I think you know what I mean by "force." I mean either by the decree of the Government, enforceable by its naval power, or air power, or some other method of exerting that force.

MR. CURRAN. The forces used are economic forces and trade treaties, I feel. At one time three-fourths of the American merchant marine was laid up.

Senator PEPPER. I asked you the question whether you know of any instance in which, by force, by any threat of armed force, American vessels have been forbidden to enter any of the ports of the world, to your knowledge?

MR. CURRAN. Over what period of time?

Senator PEPPER. In the last 10 years, we will say.

Mr. CURRAN. No; I do not; no.

Senator PEPPER. Now, if we were to assume that Hitler should win this war, and were to say that no American vessel would be permitted to enter a European port, would that have any adverse effect upon the members in your union?

Mr. CURRAN. I imagine it would have the same effect on all Americans—they would resent it, and would act against it.

Senator PEPPER. But I say that would mean that if the ships could not sail to those ports your men would lose jobs, would they not?

Mr. CURRAN. That is a natural assumption; yes.

Senator PEPPER. And if Mr. Hitler, and his associate, Mr. Mussolini, were to come to be the complete masters of the trade of Europe, they would of course have the power in such a case to say who would come to Europe to trade with them, and the terms and conditions upon which they would come, would they not?

Mr. CURRAN. Yes—the pirates of Tripoli also did that once.

Senator PEPPER. Yes; that is right. What happened to the pirates of Tripoli?

Mr. CURRAN. America resented it.

Senator PEPPER. What happened to the pirates of Tripoli?

Mr. CURRAN. America resented it and sent a fleet over there.

Senator PEPPER. We sent a fleet over there?

Mr. CURRAN. And we would probably do the same thing in that case.

Senator PEPPER. They sent sailors on that fleet, did they not?

Mr. CURRAN. That is right.

Senator PEPPER. They actually engaged in hostilities with those pirates, did they not?

Mr. CURRAN. That is correct.

Senator PEPPER. So that is a case in which the United States actually got into a conflict on the other side of the world? You say that if such a thing as that were to happen the United States would send the fleet again, would it?

Mr. CURRAN. If any powers dictated to the American people that they could not live in the world—yes, the American people no doubt would react and would take proper steps so that they would live regardless of them.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose Hitler were master of Europe and should lay down the terms and conditions under which alone we could trade with Europe; and suppose we did not like those terms and conditions; then what would you think we would do?

Mr. CURRAN. Well, I cannot very well deal with hypothetical cases. I cannot experiment. I imagine the American people have the initiative, they have the will and the spirit to act upon that situation when it arises.

Senator PEPPER. What I am trying to do, Mr. Curran, is to make an honest inquiry of you, as a representative of labor for whom I have great respect, as to whether or not you had considered all the possible economic angles of this conflict as they might affect labor, almost as much as anybody else in this country, if not more?

Mr. CURRAN. Yes; and I want to make it very clear—I made it very clear that I have no use for Hitler, Mussolini, or any other dic-

tator, but I have my own opinions about the war situation in Europe and their continued wars.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think there is any danger that if Hitler wins the war he would commit acts or take steps that would be economically discriminatory against the United States, which would have any adverse effect on American labor?

Mr. CURRAN. Well, now, putting it that way, based on his past activities we can expect anything from him—if we are going to deal in hypothetical cases.

Senator PEPPER. Well, Hitler is not a hypothesis, he is a dreadful reality, is he not?

Mr. CURRAN. Well, you are sure that these things are going to happen?

Senator PEPPER. Not at all sure; I am merely asking whether or not there is any possibility in your opinion that Hitler will do that if he wins this war.

Mr. CURRAN. In my opinion there are all sorts of possibilities in this European situation. It is hard for anybody to conjecture or to venture an opinion as to what will finally take place.

Senator PEPPER. Well, I will put it in just a little different way. Do you think there is any possibility that if Hitler should become the master of all of Europe and England he would so organize the labor supply of that continent that that continent would be able to undersell this continent to cut this country out of the markets to which it now has access, and thereby curtail the number of American ships engaged in foreign trade, and thereby, the number of jobs your members have?

Mr. CURRAN. Well, yes; that is correct; and it would affect the entire economy of the United States, not only the members of my particular organization, but the entire American people.

Senator PEPPER. Yes; but if they stopped the ships from going on the high seas, your people would feel it first—at least they would be among the first, would they not?

Mr. CURRAN. Well, we have been feeling it.

Senator PEPPER. Therefore you want your ships to be upon the high seas—you want your men to have jobs?

Mr. CURRAN. We have had nothing to say on that score.

Senator PEPPER. That is the only way your men can have jobs, is it not, Mr. Curran?

Mr. CURRAN. We have raised the question, when they transferred and sold 160 ships; thousands of seamen were cast on the beach, and no furor was created over the fact then, and that is only last year, and the year before; and they were not driven off by Hitler, they were driven off by salesmen.

Senator PEPPER. By salesmen from whom?

Mr. CURRAN. Those who sold the ships.

Senator PEPPER. Well, who manned those ships?

Mr. CURRAN. American seamen manned them.

Senator PEPPER. You mean they manned them before the sale?

Mr. CURRAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Then after the sale, to whom did they belong?

Mr. CURRAN. They were sold principally to Great Britain.

Senator PEPPER. Well, they were sold to Great Britain, and then Great Britain put them into war use, did she not?

Mr. CURRAN. Yes; I believe they did. I believe they did.

Senator PEPPER. And I daresay this country had some concern about its citizens going into war zones, but it was not America that created the danger—the British were not trying to sink those ships, were they?

Mr. CURRAN. Well, you are asking me something there that I am not in a position to answer, who sank them, because I do not know that they have been sunk, these ships.

Senator PEPPER. I just want to ask you this, Mr. Curran, in conclusion. Do you visualize a totalitarian world, dictated to by dictators, as a world in which the American seamen will have the best opportunity for a job in the future?

Mr. CURRAN. Absolutely not.

Senator PEPPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Curran, do I understand your proposition correctly to be that under the sale of American vessels to Great Britain, Great Britain has been permitted to continue her normal trade routes while American trade routes have been denuded of American vessels, with the result of throwing American seamen on the beach?

Mr. CURRAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You understand that when we are asked now to appropriate \$300,000,000 for 200 new vessels, some of which, under this bill, may be turned over to Great Britain—very probably will be—there is no hope in that for employment of American seamen?

Mr. CURRAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. In other words, instead of just taking vessels from us, which she possesses in abundance, according to your statement, more than she has had in her entire history, Great Britain insists on our taking vessels off our trade routes, throwing American seamen out of employment, and turning those vessels over to let her supply herself with munitions?

Mr. CURRAN. That is true.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is it not a fact that Great Britain has not taken vessels off her own trade routes?

Mr. CURRAN. That is what I wanted to make clear. At the present time in the Pacific trade routes the British are carrying on normal operations with their vessels. There are estimated to be 6,000,000 tons trading in the Pacific, running in direct competition, in many cases, with American ships.

There was a proposal offered—and it was carried by the press throughout the country and created some discussion—of the American operators taking those routes over temporarily in order that those ships be released for war uses, and the British, as I understand it, refused to accept that offer, and they are as yet still trading in the Pacific.

If you will note the lists of the various departures in San Francisco and San Pedro, Calif., you will discover a greater number of British ships trading normally to Japan at the present time.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you know whether or not it is a fact that up until the end of December we had actually transferred 149 vessels to Great Britain of over 2,000 tons each?

Mr. CURRAN. I know that to be a fact, yes. The press carried it, and we knew it. We had them all listed.

In one particular instance an entire fleet was sold and the seamen who shipped aboard those ships at New York were dumped on the beach in Houston, in San Francisco, and in San Pedro, and were told to get back to New York in the best way they could. That was the Black Diamond Steamship Co.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. There have been somewhere in the neighborhood of 300 vessels of all sizes transferred since the beginning of this war, have there not?

Mr. CURRAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. If the British would transfer their own vessels from their own normal trade routes to the carrying trade for the British Empire in this war and permit the United States vessels to take over that, even temporarily, that would supply a continuous source of employment to American seamen, would it not?

Mr. CURRAN. We believe it would.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And at the same time protect and promote the purposes for which Congress deliberately passed the present Merchant Marine Act and the Maritime Commission Act, which was to build up both vessels and personnel necessary for the United States in the event that we got into a war?

Mr. CURRAN. That is correct.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. By throwing our seamen on the beach and turning over our vessels to the British, do we serve either of the announced purposes of the Maritime Commission Act?

Mr. CURRAN. We could not, for this reason: Our seamen are definitely afraid of what happened after the last war. After the last war the American fleet was laid up completely, and after this war we are afraid that the American Merchant Marine will be very nearly nothing, in view of the fact that the vessels are being traded off as fast as they are built, and when the time comes to put the American fleet on the seas the only one that will have the merchant fleet is the country that bought the entire merchant fleet from us.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Assuming Senator Pepper's fond saying that we take our vessels off the neutral trade routes and turn them over to Great Britain, does not that paralyze any effort for us to have a merchant marine to compete in those neutral routes after the war, assuming Great Britain wins the war?

Mr. CURRAN. That is natural. I believe that to be true.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Is it not a fact that we actually took 122 American vessels away from the trade routes, which are now available, and which necessarily threw the men on the beach—if they were not sold to some foreign power—for service in neutral trade routes on the part of the United States throughout the world?

Mr. CURRAN. There are about some 120 to 130 vessels that have been withdrawn from those services. Where they have gone it is hard to discover. There seems to be a shortage of ships now, based on the statements carried in the press, and there are defense materials lying in the warehouses in the far eastern ports and other ports, with no ships to bring them here, of American make.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You mean that in spite of the fact that the United States has constructed or previously had entirely adequate shipping for bringing to the United States those materials from the Far East or from other places that we need for absolutely defensive purposes, we have not received that material because our ships have either been sold or converted to some other purposes?

Mr. CURRAN. That is correct.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Curran, as a man who has devoted his life to a study of these matters, what will be the effect of the transfer of our ships upon our commerce in competition with any foreign country after the war?

Senator Pepper has asked you about our commerce in a totalitarian world after the war. What about our commerce if we have no ships and no trained seamen to sail them after the war, in any event?

Mr. CURRAN. We believe, if the present trend is continued of sale and transfer of vessels as fast as they are built and those on order, that the United States will be a very small, if any, factor in international commerce and trade when the war is over.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. And the hundreds of millions of dollars that we have appropriated for the building of the American mercantile fleet, both for commercial purposes and for naval auxiliaries, will have been wasted; is that correct?

Mr. CURRAN. That is our belief.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator White?

Senator WHITE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe I have asked every Senator if there are any questions.

Senator NYE. Mr. Chairman, just one question, please.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye.

Senator NYE. Mr. Curran, do you know whether you are expressing in any degree the thought of Mr. John L. Lewis on this general subject, or have you been in conference with him?

Mr. CURRAN. I have not spoken to Mr. Lewis for some time, and I am afraid I could not say.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be excused, Mr. Curran.

Mr. CURRAN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your attendance.

STATEMENT OF RALPH TOWNSEND, OAKLAND, CALIF.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name, address, and what, if any, organization you represent in your appearance here this afternoon?

Mr. TOWNSEND. My name is Ralph Townsend and I am a resident of Oakland, Calif.

In testifying here I am not a spokesman for any organization. Friends and acquaintances who urged me to come are identifiable as groups which want American neutrality. I am not, I repeat, an authorized spokesman for any of these. I am speaking as one of the great body of what you may call average Americans—those who are not individually important, but are collectively so because we are America's largest single group—the salaried city people, the farm people, professional people, employed workers and so on. We,

of this population segment, would bear the brunt of any hardships arising from war, and that is why those of us devoted to this country and conversant with the evidence want peace so long as no nation molest us.

I became especially interested in this issue of American avoidance of foreign entanglements when I was abroad as a Foreign Service man of our Department of State. I served in Canada and China, and I learned enough of the rottenness of international politics, and the differences between publicity versions of affairs and the actualities, to wish to do my part of peace for this country after I was back in this country.

Some books and magazine articles I wrote on foreign affairs brought contacts with numerous people who wanted American neutrality. I have been speaking and writing from time to time in this cause for about 7 years.

In submitting evidence for your consideration, I wish to say at the outset that I cannot claim the distinction of being anybody of prominence. My eligibility to sit in this seat and talk to you as I am talking now arises solely from the fact that I am a citizen of a country whose government still allows such a procedure.

It is because I value the privilege of living under a representative government I wish to continue to do so, and that is why I am here to oppose bill H. R. 1776.

Whatever passage of this bill might or might not do for Britain, all of us are pretty clear as to what it would immediately do for America. That it would assist representative government in Europe is open to doubt. That it would curtail it in our own country as certain.

Let me be specific with certain claims of the proponents:

(1) Though acknowledging that the bill would assign dictatorial powers to the President, they assert that these dictatorship powers are needed to increase the Government's efficiency.

In answer, gentlemen, I wish to point out that the plain and confirmable facts of history do not support that contention. There is no reliable connection between getting a dictatorship and getting administrative efficiency. The two most severe dictatorships in the world—that of Stalin in Russia and Chiang Kai-shek in China—have long records of chronic inefficiency. Other examples are numerous. In South America, for instance, the most efficient government is that of Argentina, and it happens to be the one which ordinarily is nearest to our conception of representative government. On the other hand, some of the most persistently inefficient regimes in Latin America have been among the ones most dictatorial.

Turkey and Russia were the most autocratic nations of Europe before the World War of 1914, and they were among the most inefficient. In the China revolution of 1911 against the old monarchy, the cry was that centralized personal authority ought to be done away with in the interests of efficiency. That same cry was sounded to substitute representative government for dictatorial government in the French Revolution of 1789, and again in the French Revolution of 1871.

Instances generally similar could be cited at great length, from ancient or modern history. For centuries the Roman Republic of antiquity, a representative government, was the most efficient government in the world, and while it remained a representative republican

government it successfully repelled its foes. When finally subjugated it was not a republic—it had become an imperial dictatorship.

It may be said in attempted refutation of these observations that the examples from such distances of time do not apply to our situation now. But for the sincere and thoughtful person there is certainly an inescapable inference in this multitude of examples, drawn from so many different historical periods. For while material conditions may vary greatly, human character varies but little. There have been efficient and inefficient dictatorships. But in the preponderance of cases, that is to say, in the general pattern of history, the evidence shows no efficiency advantage in turning a representative regime into a dictatorial regime. Examples from recent history point the same way as those from older history.

France the free Republic in the war beginning in 1914 made a splendid showing. France the semiautocracy of 1870 and France the Daladier dictatorship of 1939-40 made a miserable showing. Dictatorship can add to the authority of governments, but it seems frequently to decrease the morale of populations. And in a hard war, morale is vitally important. In a long war morale is generally decisive, other considerations being reasonably equal. Present-day Germany seems to have gained in efficiency under a dictatorship. But contrasted with that very prominent example of an apparent advantage, we see numerous examples to the contrary. Parliamentary Italy of 1915-18 made a better showing than dictatorship Italy in 1940-41.

Probably the most competent defensive warfare exploit of this century was staged by the Dutch of South Africa in the Boer War which ended in 1902. That was when Britain invaded the two small republics pioneered and built up by Dutch farmers—the war which began Winston Churchill's career of saving democracy. According to the reports of the United States military intelligence which I have consulted, the Dutch there, fighting as citizens of freely representative governments, fought so well that to overrun and subdue them England had to send to South Africa more than 200,000 troops, when the total Dutch population attacked—men, women, children—numbered only about 178,000. At that the Dutch held out for more than 2 years.

From such cases it is clear that the spirit of a population—its pride in its institutions, its conviction that it is fighting a genuinely defensive war—is an asset vastly more precious than any presumptive gains from imposing more executive power in one man. In this connection, viewing our own situation, we can assuredly state as a fact that many millions of Americans will feel the deepest despair if bill H. R. 1776 is allowed to become law, and many, many more millions may be inevitably expected to feel the contagion of this despair. Let us remember that France collapsed in 1940 because its troops had not the will to fight for a regime that had become nauseous to them. The dictatorship at their back was almost as distasteful as the one in their front.

Some of the proponents of bill H. R. 1776 are saying that we must pass it to avoid the fate of France. Their comparison seems to me unfortunate for their point. We do not forget that Daladier had dictatorial powers for many months before France entered the war in September of 1939. When France experienced serious fighting for the first time, in May of 1940, Daladier had been dictator for about a

year and a half. But as already noted, dictatorship France in this war did not show up nearly as well as free government France in 1914.

However we look at the matter, gentlemen, the known facts, in just perspective, point against assigning dictatorship powers to our President. Furthermore, we must take into account the differing temperament of peoples. Mr. Roosevelt has said, and said I think very accurately, that Americans are not among the populations who take kindly to dictatorial rule. From what I can learn regarding America now, most of the individuals who are for the bill are for it because of the misleading publicity in support of it. It is simply not credible that an average American citizen will support it if he knows its full implications.

Our internationalist writers and speakers are constantly condemning the people of Germany and Italy for surrendering the measure of representative government which they possessed. Yet these same internationalist writers and speakers now demand that we here in America surrender our present quantum of free government under far less provocation. For 15 years Germans continued republican government under the hardest imaginable conditions of insufficient food, threatened civil war, reparations payments, shriveled national resources, exhausted currency assets and recurrent threats of French occupation. Are we in America, in our economic plenty, to surrender our popular liberties more readily than in their acute hardship?

We have noted how the events of our time fail to support the claim that dictatorship powers would mean increased efficiency. In conjunction with that fact let us reflect that the proponents of the bill have not pointed out a single instance where the President really needed added authority to get proper cooperation for the defense of the United States, using the term "defense" in its clear and proper meaning.

Now let us pass on to another claim of the proponents of the so-called lend-lease bill.

(2) They claim that this is a war between democracy and dictatorship.

I find that when cornered with evidence, the internationalists invariably drop that thesis, for the simple reason that they cannot support it.

The initial conflict in Europe in 1939 was between Germany and Poland, both of which were a long way from being democracies. So it is difficult to see how the war could be over the issue of democracy where none existed. Britain aided one dictatorship against another, that was all. During years previous the London and Paris governments were under visible pressure from strong home factions to back the Moscow regime against the Hitler regime. And increasingly they displayed readiness to do so. The Moscow dictatorship, as every informed person knows, is considerably more severe than the Berlin dictatorship. In Berlin preachers are locked up for political activities, but in Moscow they have been killed off for their religious activities. Germany puts private property under restrictions. Russia confiscates it. So in the London government's choice of making a partner of Moscow we have a good idea of just what sort of democracy was to be saved.

Furthermore, only about one-eighth of the population of the British Empire have a voice in the government ruling them. Some sixty-odd million Britishers rule some 440,000,000 subjects. There is normally a wide measure of representative government in England itself, and in the white-populated possessions. But this is nothing more than the democracy which might exist for the board of directors of a plantation run by peon labor. And we know from official British admissions that the methods of maintaining authority for the British invaders in these possessions do not differ significantly from the methods Hitler has employed to maintain authority in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Several thousand British Indians were shot by British authorities in the independence agitation riots of the 1920's, just as Irish were shot in Ireland for the same offense. During the last two decades, according to British Indians, about a quarter of a million of India's population have been jailed for indulging in requests for some of that democracy Britain allegedly fights for.

I am not citing these particulars to suggest that we include Britain on America's publicity hate list. I should like to see these artificially stirred hate campaigns dropped all around. I point out the foregoing by way of answering in a specific way the specific claim of our war seekers that Britain is fighting for democracy. Mindful that nearly a quarter of the world's population is unwillingly under British rule, the democracy claim is demonstrably false, apart from the recent eagerness of the London government to serve the Soviets. Refuting the democracy claim is becoming trite. But the refutation will have to go on as long as the falsification continues.

Equally false is the claim that China is a democracy. I have repeatedly challenged the persons making that claim to name anybody in all the 4,000 years of China's history who gained power by popular election. Thus far I have had no instance supplied to me. Probably no country in the world has remained farther from democracy than China. It is the only country, so far as I can learn, where human slavery in the real meaning of that word—buying and selling human beings for manual work—persists with legal recognition. The Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship, at least accounts, had gone no farther toward abolition than requiring registration of slaves and a tax on them.

It is certainly unfair to the American public to represent such a country as a democracy. It is officially called a republic. But all China's rulers since this designation was adopted have got their jobs by civil war and kept them by assassination and extremely severe repressions of opposition and suspected opposition.

Neither China nor Japan is a democracy, and the conflict between them is in no sense a clash over that idea. Of the two, Japan is much closer to full representative government, and up to 1937, when the present China war began, the authority of the freely elected Diet approximated that of the British Parliament. From what I can learn, there is not yet in Japan any exercise of personal authority as great as President Roosevelt already enjoys here in America.

But though there is in normal times a wide measure of representative government in Japan, structurally the nation is not a democracy even in theory or pretense, and it never was. So of the three contenders for supremacy in East Asia—China, Japan, and Russia—not one is a democracy, and none is likely to be one within our span of

history. I cannot find an instance of any democracy ever having existed anywhere in Asia at any time. America's popular deception on this point arises from the habit of war seekers of calling all nations on the preferred publicity list "democracies" and their opponents "dictatorships," regardless of realities.

Gentlemen, the use of even one false claim in an issue as serious as urging people into a war is a very grave act. Yet we find the proponents of this proposed bill, which is really a war bill, using not one but many falsifications. We may rightly defer to differing opinions in realms of opinion. But when in addressing the public they cite as a fact what they know is not a fact, as in the matter of calling China a democracy, and adhere to that after their attention is called to the misrepresentation, we must conclude that for reasons not stated they are trying to get us into a war rather than trying to keep us out. It is because of such symptoms that informed Americans devoted to this country are now thoroughly aroused. We do not fail to note such tricks as the effort to classify Russia as a democracy by making references to the dictators in a manner to exclude Stalin.

(3) Let us consider another commonly voiced claim—that we cannot hold our own economically if we permit the coalition of Germany, Italy, and Japan to triumph in this war.

Gentlemen, that is not supportable in terms of reasoned estimates based on known facts. I refer to our Department of Commerce trade data.

Only about 5 or 6 percent of our national income is derived from foreign trade, whereas in Germany and Japan, for example, the dependency upon foreign trade is much greater. The Japanese, to judge from such figures as I have been able to get, normally derive between a fourth and a third of their national income from foreign trade.

This means that these nations in their own interests alone will seek all the foreign trade possible. We have the best values in many commodities, and we are the world's best market for many commodities. Our cotton is better than any the Japanese could expect to grow in China, so textile authorities state, and we have many other things offering the best money's worth. But the main reason we may expect other nations to continue buying in America is that they wish to sell in America. All that follows a natural principle of economics, tending toward a natural equilibrium of interchange on any free-trade basis.

The current clamor about cheap labor competition is likewise demonstrably in error in many particulars. Britain has a labor reservoir of more than 300,000,000 people in India willing to work on the average for a few cents a day. But with all that, there are factors which have prevented Britain's becoming dispenser to the world because of that cheap labor. Differences in personnel efficiency are important. Our high purchasing power home market enables us to manufacture in mass-production quantities at 6 or 7 dollars per day per man and turn out goods cheaper than they can be turned out in China or India where wages are 10 cents a day. That does not apply in all lines, but it applies in enough to assure our strong position, whoever wins this war. There is no more reason to fear economically a China under Japanese influence than there is to fear an India under

the British flag. The Japanese have had Korea for 30 years, and Korean wages are lower than those of Japan, but Japan has never turned this Korean low-wage power to any significant account in world trade.

One point of importance is that, as nations grow industrially, they become more valuable to us as customers than menacing to us as competitors. If we itemize the fields wherein Japan competes with us, we may estimate that we lose possibly 25 or 30 million dollars a year by Japanese competition, theoretically. But at the same time Japan as a customer buys from us to the extent of some 250 or 300 million dollars a year. That seems to be a general economic tendency, and I can find no instance of our losing more from any nation's competition than we gained by that nation's increased purchases as its industrial needs expanded.

(4) The foregoing points have a bearing on the likelihood of other nations attacking us. I am not competent to offer comments on strictly military and naval aspects, but there are some economic aspects upon which I may offer related remarks.

Of these, we go upon the estimate that any war between the United States and the German-Japanese alliance would be a protracted naval war—perhaps years of piracy and counterpiracy, because of the difficulty of either side invading the vital territory of the other. Such a state of things could be better borne by us than by any others, for the reason that we are more nearly self-sufficient than they. Hence, they on their part would have so much to lose by an indeterminate sea war as compared with the dubious chances of victory over us that they might be expected in self-interest to go to great lengths to avoid trouble with us. Known factors of supplies and geographical sources of supplies warrant that statement, though detailing the intricacies of it would entail too many figures to incorporate here.

In brief, our geographical position and our economic assets make our trade amity much to be desired by every nation, while by the same considerations the hazards of attacking us are very great.

(5) Another claim of the interventionist element in America is that Britain and China are fighting our wars.

This claim we cannot accept. We have noted that representative government was not and could not be an issue in either conflict. Nor is maintenance of personal liberty an issue. The nations we are asked to aid are seen to be as harsh as those we are asked to fight if we look at India, the French policy in Syria, and the British dealings with Arabs in Palestine and with the Irish in Ireland early in the 1920's.

It is preposterous to hail Winston Churchill as the champion of weaker nations when we recall that he got his start as a newspaperman applauding England's grab of the two Dutch republics of South Africa, each of which had a degree of democracy never known in England itself. It is similarly preposterous to refer to the British as battling for international honor when we remember that to get us into the World War in 1917 they solemnly declared they had no territorial aims, when, as later evidence showed, the secret territorial treaties were all the while in Lloyd George's safe. Without an exception, the British betrayed every ally in the World War, and did so by plan rather than accident. The Arabs who fought on assurances

of independence were simply annexed when the war was over. To cite events of ancient history in this connection would have no conclusive significance. But the events cited relative to Britain's deceptions of our country in 1917 occurred within the careers of the same British officials now appealing to us again. In fact, Winston Churchill was one of the cabinet members who in 1915, as he himself relates in his book called *The World Crisis*, helped arrange one of the foulest of the secret spoils deals, and this same man continued to abet the pretense of "no material aims" with which the British Government baited Americans into the war.

We average Americans were not consulted in the making of these current wars. Yet we are now asked to help pay for them with enormously increased taxes in money and perhaps later levies in blood. The number of the proposed bill is pertinently remindful. There was a 1776 earlier in our history, when our national conviction was that we would resist taxation without representation. It was Britain then, as now, that wanted the taxes, without permitting us any say-so in the British wars for which those taxes were needed.

We were never so servile as a weak colony as we seem to be today as a sovereign nation, the strongest, counting everything, in all the world. And in the Orient we see Dictator Chiang Kai-shek similarly free with our money in a lesser degree. His party came into power by civil war in 1927 on the slogan of running us and the British out, and dropped that theme only when expediency called for some of our help. There is nothing in the record to warrant supposing that China as the victor would be more to our taste than Japan as the victor. A likely result if Japan lost would be the ascendancy of the Soviet Union in East Asia. There are reasons for believing that the Soviets in China would bring trade paralysis there exactly as at home in Russia.

With reference to the so-called "open door," we cannot fail to note that nobody has done more to close it than Dictator Chiang Kai-shek. I refer to page 303 of the United States Department of Commerce Yearbook for 1938. During the first 10 years of Chiang's rule, China's imports fell from \$859,000,000 in 1927 to \$610,000,000 in 1929, \$367,000,000 in 1931, \$211,000,000 in 1934, and \$167,000,000 in 1937. Only about \$7,000,000 of this yearly loss can be explained by Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931. The main factor in decreasing China's imports thus by about 80 percent in one decade was Chinese anarchy, civil strife, and banditry, and official anteforeignism. Our annual sales in China become so negligible that the profits from that trade come nowhere near equaling the cost of our pirate patrol and garrisons maintained in China to protect it.

(6) And lastly this is demonstrably not a war against "aggressors." As for territorial expansion, Britain gained a million and a half square miles—equal to half the area of the United States—in the World War alone. There has been no agitation among our internationalists to liberate the three Baltic Nations reported annexed by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940. There was no outcry over the Soviet annexation of Outer Mongolia, previously considered a part of China, in 1922-23.

Many more such instances could be cited. Of course what is wrong in one place is not morally mitigated by duplication elsewhere. The

point is that the preponderance of virtue which our interventionists assign to certain nations is not discoverable in fact, and the illusion of it is achieved only by the evasion of comparative evidence. We should be in bad company in any foreign coalition, fighting for any set of powers. Because the proposed bill would further project us into an evil war, a war considerably resulting from the provocative policy of the nation we are supposed to aid, those of us conscious of current publicity deceptions are working to defeat the proposed bill.

For the record let me say that I have no bias of nationalities in this matter. Fifteen years ago when there was a mild hate campaign in our press against Britain, I spoke out against it, and I should do so again.

I have always opposed every trend toward despotic government in this country, regardless of which faction advocated it. I have said we do not need to fight alien systems of government abroad to prevent them here at home. I have never suggested making any concession to any nation at any time, and I should be among the first to oppose such a course.

But let us make war a last choice, not a first. Let us not sacrifice our most precious asset of morale—the consciousness of a justly defensive cause—by making ourselves the aggressor. That is what this proposed bill will do—make America the unmistakable aggressor against nations which have not sought objectively to molest us.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Connally, have you any questions?

Senator CONNALLY. Mr. Townsend, where do you live in California?

Mr. TOWNSEND. In Oakland, Calif.

Senator CONNALLY. Oakland?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. In what business are you engaged?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, I was a teacher. After I came back from abroad I taught at Stanford and at Mills, and then I was with a power company there. The last two years and a half or so I have been working on some books.

Senator CONNALLY. Writing books?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; some now and then, and some magazine articles now and then.

Senator CONNALLY. Have you done any lecturing?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Some; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. How long were you in the Foreign Service?

Mr. TOWNSEND. About two and a half years.

Senator CONNALLY. When did you go in?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It was about the end of 1930, and I resigned, I think it was, in April of 1933.

Senator CONNALLY. Where were you stationed in the Foreign Service?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I was stationed about a year in Montreal, and the rest of my service abroad in China.

Senator CONNALLY. In China?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You say this is not a war against aggressors. Do you regard Mr. Hitler as an aggressor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; in the Polish thing I think he would be called that—he took the initiative—and also in the Low Countries, I think, in Holland and Belgium, he was the aggressor.

Senator CONNALLY. Was he an aggressor in Czechoslovakia?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I should say so; yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. And in Poland? You have named Poland.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. I mentioned that.

Senator CONNALLY. In Holland?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; distinctly so.

Senator CONNALLY. That is, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Holland. How about Denmark?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; Denmark. From the evidence we now have, he was apparently distinctly the aggressor.

Senator CONNALLY. That is what we are talking about. We are not talking about what we are going to get next year. We are talking about the information we now have.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Was he an aggressor in Belgium?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Definitely so.

Senator CONNALLY. How do you figure out, if he has been an aggressor in the conquest of all five of those countries, that he is not an aggressor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Because the British, who are opposing him, have not opposed comparable aggressions by other countries, and they have not at all been backward in the matter for themselves.

Senator CONNALLY. You said this was not a war against aggressors.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, they are both aggressors, if we take the current period of history.

Senator CONNALLY. Let us take one at a time. We are handling Mr. Hitler now. You agree that Mr. Hitler is an aggressor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Are you acquainted with Mr. Mussolini?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I have heard of him.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you call him an aggressor when he went down to Ethiopia?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I do not know. I am doubtful of it. There were a lot of border raids there, and he had a lot of trouble, such as we had in Mexico in 1916. He occupies the country, but I don't know who shot first and who was the provoking agency.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you read the papers?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, I would want to know more about that.

Senator CONNALLY. You would not want to be in every place that is invaded in order to know who invaded it?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir; but you can't—

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you know about Ethiopia and Mr. Mussolini. Was he an aggressor or a defender in Ethiopia?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I do not know.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not know?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. How about Greece? Was Mr. Mussolini an aggressor in Greece?

Mr. TOWNSEND. That again is doubtful. The contention of the Rome Government was that Greece made itself a partner of a belligerent by sheltering the British Fleet. If that is true, under inter-

national law Greece was the aggressor, because the aggressor is not determined by invasion, but the one who first commits an act of hostility. If Greece sheltered the British Fleet, Greece was the aggressor.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not know whether Mussolini was an aggressor in Greece, when he sent an army out of Albania into Greece, invaded the country, and killed a great many Greeks?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It would depend upon the provocation. If his claim was true, that the Greeks had made themselves an ally of the British—

Senator CONNALLY. Will the clerk of the committee get me a dictionary, if there is one around here?

So you would not say that Mussolini was necessarily an aggressor in Greece?

Mr. TOWNSEND. If Greece first committed an act of hostility against him, Greece was the aggressor.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you know, and you have been reading. You say you are one of the informed Americans in the statement here. You say, "We informed Americans." Some of us are not. Tell us, Was he an aggressor in Greece or was he a defender of the Greeks? Who attacked first? Did the Greeks attack Mussolini?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I do not know, because, I repeat, if they sheltered the British Fleet, that was an act of hostility.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not know whether they sheltered it or not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You do know that he marched into Albania?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. On the basis of your information, he was the aggressor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir; if the Greeks committed an act of hostility, they were the aggressor, regardless of soil invasion.

Senator CONNALLY. All right. You do not know whether they were or not. Let us take Albania. Was Mussolini an aggressor in Albania?

Mr. TOWNSEND. He would distinctly appear to be the aggressor.

Senator CONNALLY. He would appear to be?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not know? Have you any decided views on that? You have taken up nearly the world and told us who were dictators and who were not and which were democracies and which were not. You are a man who spent a lot of years abroad and who has written books that you want people to buy and read and believe after they read them. Can't you tell us whether Mussolini was an aggressor in Albania or not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. If the accounts that we got in the paper were true, he was distinctly the aggressor in Albania.

Senator CONNALLY. He was distinctly the aggressor in Albania?

Mr. TOWNSEND. If these accounts were true.

Senator CONNALLY. So he is an aggressor, after all?

Mr. TOWNSEND. If the papers told the truth. I do not know.

Senator CONNALLY. Japan went into China. You are quite familiar with Japan and China, having spent a lot of time in China?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Was Japan or China the aggressor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. You mean in the present war?

Senator CONNALLY. I mean what happened over there in the last 3 or 4 years.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, it was a mixed-up situation.

Senator CONNALLY. Mixed up?

Mr. TOWNSEND. A mixed-up situation. The Japanese had certain investments over there, and there was a state of anarchy and a good bit of banditry. Sometimes they could not tell whether the trouble made against their property was government-inspired or banditry. It was a mixed-up situation. Finally they evidently decided they would clear the whole thing up.

Senator CONNALLY. Who?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The Japanese, because there had been many years of a chaotic and anarchical state.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, you are not prepared to say that Japan was the aggressor in the case of the invasion of China and the bombing of cities and civilian populations and a swarming army all over China? Is that aggression or not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Wait a minute. The nation which is on the other soil, of course, is morally on a dubious footing to begin with. Japan was on Chinese soil. They did have investments there which the Chinese failed to protect. In response to the provocations, the Japanese replied in the manner we know. Whether the provocations were justified or not, I do not know.

Senator CONNALLY. You say that there was Japanese property over there that the Chinese were not protecting?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. And because of that the Japanese dropped bombs and killed women and children. That was not aggression?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It was replying to trouble, much as we did at Nanking in 1927, on a larger scale.

Senator CONNALLY. Will you please stick to China and Japan in the last 2 or 3 years. I am not interested in the history of China. I know you can give it to us, but let us talk about what has been happening in China in the last 3 or 4 years.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Would you regard the Japanese as the aggressor in that incident or not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, it is difficult to answer such a complex question with a "yes" or "no." There were many provocations.

Senator CONNALLY. Well, we have got to know aggression. You do not know whether there was aggression in China. How long were you over there?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I was over there the first time about a year and a half.

Senator CONNALLY. Was the war going on at that time?

Mr. TOWNSEND. There's always a war going on there.

Senator CONNALLY. Was this present war going on over there?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir; I was over there in the summer of 1937, when this thing happened. I was not on the scene; I was about 200 miles away.

Senator CONNALLY. What were you doing there? You were not in the Government then?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir; I was going around the world.

Senator CONNALLY. For whom?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Myself.

Senator CONNALLY. Were you representing somebody?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir; I was just taking a trip.

Senator CONNALLY. Now, Mr. Townsend, you speak of the dictatorial powers that this bill is alleged to contain, and I believe you say that it would give the President plenary power to destroy civil liberties, and things of that kind.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, some of the clauses in the thing, I think, could be interpreted by him in that way.

Senator CONNALLY. You say, on page 5, "It is simply not credible that an average American citizen will support it if he knows its full implications."

Well, the bill has been printed, has it not, and has appeared in the papers, and people have been able to read it?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You do not believe that anybody, just an average citizen, if he knows what is in it, would vote for the bill; is that right?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, it is a thing you need to read rather carefully to see all its possibilities.

Senator CONNALLY. Now, you are aware, are you not, that both Hitler and Mussolini have publicly spoken words of the utmost scorn for democracies, have you not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; I have heard that with my own ears.

Senator CONNALLY. So that they are not in sympathy with a democracy—either one of them—are they?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Not a bit.

Senator CONNALLY. One other question and I think I shall finish.

You say that in Japan the Government there does not exercise anything like the authority—

Mr. TOWNSEND. I say no one man does.

Senator CONNALLY. Let us see if that is what you said. Here is what you said when you wrote it:

From what I can learn, there is not yet in Japan any exercise of personal authority as great as President Roosevelt already enjoys here in America.

Is that right?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. You say, "It is because of such symptoms that informed Americans devoted to this country are now thoroughly aroused."

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. In other words, people for this bill are not informed? Is that what you mean?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, of course, many of them have deep sympathies over in Europe or deep antipathies over in Europe, and even if they are informed, they are very much concerned with getting a particular result over there and wish us to help achieve that result.

Senator CONNALLY. Let us see what you say: "It is because of such symptoms that informed Americans devoted to this country are now thoroughly aroused."

In other words, people supporting the bill are not devoted to this country or are not informed, or if they are devoted to this country, they are not informed?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, I do not think that summarizes it exactly. Most of the people I know who are ardently for this appear to have sympathies in Europe.

Senator CONNALLY. I am talking about what you said here. You did not say anything about sympathies. You said, "It is because of such symptoms that informed Americans devoted to this country are now thoroughly aroused."

What did you mean by that if you did not mean that?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I mean those who have exclusively their hearts here, who have no allegiances—sentimental allegiances—abroad and who discern this trend away from our established traditions of representative government.

Senator CONNALLY. You think we would be as well off if Britain were destroyed and fell and the fleet collapsed?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think we are just as well prepared to take care of either contingency.

Senator CONNALLY. It would not make any difference to our safety?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I would not say it would not make any difference to our safety. The defeat of any major power affects the equilibrium of world politics, but we could handle ourselves.

Senator CONNALLY. You have no sympathies on either side?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I have tried to be neutral.

Senator CONNALLY. Are you?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I am entirely British by blood. I would be sorry to see England destroyed, but I think an American is duty-bound to be neutral in this thing.

Senator CONNALLY. You are absolutely neutral?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator CONNALLY. Your testimony is quite neutral. Have you not devoted a great part of your article to a denunciation of Great Britain?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Insofar as I wish to oppose somewhat I consider fallacies intended to ally us with Great Britain. It is not that I wish to attack Great Britain. I could take any other country and make the same kind of harsh remarks. I am doing it in Britain's case because they are trying to get us as allies. I will do it if any other country tries to get us as allies.

Senator CONNALLY. Why did you not denounce Hitler and Mussolini, too?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Because they are not trying to get us as an ally. Heavens alive, we know what they are up to. The papers are not printing what the British have been up to, which we should remember, and that is why I repeat what I said.

Senator CONNALLY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS of Utah. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Townsend, you do not favor any aid at all to England, do you?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir—that is, any partnership of our Government in a foreign war seems to me highly improper.

Senator PEPPER. I did not ask you that. I asked you if you favored any aid at all to England.

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Do you favor any that we have already given England?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir. I think it is deplorable.

Senator PEPPER. You would take back all the planes, all the ammunition, and all the guns?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir; I would take back nothing. I merely would not go any further with the business.

Senator PEPPER. But you would, if you had it in your power, undo what we have done so far?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, if I could have had the say-so from the beginning.

Senator PEPPER. You would not have done it?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Not even after Dunkirk, when the British were stripped of implements of war to defend themselves, and perhaps when they were in gravest danger? Not even then would you have done what President Roosevelt did and let them have machine guns and ammunition?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir. I think the British thoroughly forfeited any sympathy by their attitude toward us at, during, and after the World War.

Senator PEPPER. For something they may have done which you did not like 20 years ago, no matter what the situation is now, you would not give them any aid?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It is not that we wish to hold a grudge; it is that we learn the necessity for being careful and the difference between the proclaimed motives in a war and the real motives.

Senator PEPPER. You are interested in our defense, are you not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Are we stronger now, by reason of England's being up and fighting, than we would have been if England had been assaulted and crushed by Hitler right after Dunkirk?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I should answer that by saying that we are strong enough to take care of ourselves in any contingency.

Senator PEPPER. Are we stronger now, with England up and fighting Hitler, than we would have been right after Dunkirk if Hitler had attacked and crushed England?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Of course, if we are going to fight him, we would be stronger as an ally of the British than fighting alone, if that was a necessity.

Senator PEPPER. Is it your answer that we are stronger, by England's fighting Hitler, now than we would have been if Hitler had crushed England after Dunkirk?

Mr. TOWNSEND. If you wish an answer "Yes" or "No" on that—it is a somewhat complicated question—I must answer "Yes."

Senator PEPPER. We are stronger. So in that case aid to England was an aid to the defense of America, was it not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Only insofar as we were making ourselves a potential belligerent. If we are going to be a belligerent, we need all the allies we can get.

Senator PEPPER. Suppose we are talking in terms of defending ourselves and being able to defend ourselves against assault and an assault against our interests, which the totalitarian powers may later do?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, it seems to me that we increase the hazards of trouble so much by making ourselves an intimate ally of a belligerent.

Senator PEPPER. Have we increased the hazard of Hitler's attacking us here in this Western Hemisphere by helping England hold against Hitler?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Do you think we are less able to defend ourselves in this hemisphere now than we would have been if Hitler had crushed England after Dunkirk?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir. I won't be so foolish as to say that. We are, of course, better able to defend ourselves, but, at the same time, more likely to become involved in war.

Senator PEPPER. What would get us in war with Hitler? In the case of Poland, they had some territory which was historically German. Hitler wanted that. It was not what Poland did, but what Hitler wanted.

Mr. TOWNSEND. They had some territory which they should have given back.

Senator PEPPER. What got Czechoslovakia into war with Hitler? Was it what they did or what Hitler wanted?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Apparently he wanted a base there, because the British were going to rearm Poland. He wanted Czechoslovakia as a base.

Senator PEPPER. What got Hitler into war with Denmark? What they did or what he wanted?

Mr. TOWNSEND. In the case of Holland and Belgium it was a case of what Hitler wanted. In the case of Norway it was a somewhat different legal situation.

Senator PEPPER. You do not believe in all these stories about Hitler's having penetrated Norway a long time before with spies?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I imagine he would do just that.

Senator PEPPER. Was what Hitler did in Norway related to what Norway did? What he did in Norway was not related to what Norway did but was related to what he wanted done?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Under international law a neutral that fails to impel invasion or to repel a violation of its neutrality by one belligerent forfeits its neutrality.

Senator PEPPER. So you say Norway got just retribution?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; not just retribution.

Senator PEPPER. It is a fair assumption that that country got into the war not because of what it did but because of what Hitler did?

Mr. TOWNSEND. In most of the cases, except Poland, I think there was a provocative attitude.

Senator PEPPER. So you regard Hitler as being justified in the assaults he made against the Poles?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No. The action in the Lowlands was quite unjustified.

Senator PEPPER. So in every case he had ample justification, did he?
Mr. TOWNSEND. That was totally unrighteous, too, in Czechoslovakia.

Senator PEPPER. How about Poland?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I am not so sure about Poland. It may be that they had some real ground in that case.

Senator PEPPER. So you are rather sympathetic toward Hitler; he has acted with complete justification under colorful justification in what he has done, and he is not such a bad fellow after all?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; I will not allow that misconstruction of what I said. I have stated the actions in most of these countries, in all of them except Poland—

Senator PEPPER. In that case we find Hitler assaulting these people not because of what they did but because he wanted to gobble up their territories. Would not the same reasoning apply to this country?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I am not sure that it was to get territory in the Low Countries. It was to get at his main opponents.

Senator PEPPER. He was willing to sacrifice the rights of a particular people who had not disturbed him in order to get the loot that he wanted from somebody else?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It indicates certainly that he was willing to commit a totally illegal act in order to get nearer to his opponents.

Senator PEPPER. So that the country that did no wrong but was not able to reply upon international law and justice and morality got that result.

Do you mean to say that we have any greater expectancy in international law?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I would like to make this comment, Senator, that the totally unrighteous violations there are grievous and deplorable in no greater degree than the British going 6,000 miles to democratic republics in South Africa.

Senator PEPPER. Did we go to the aid of England in the Boer War? Why do you bring that up? Because England fought the Boers we have no right to aid England when they are unlawfully attacked by somebody else? Is that international law?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Neither is international law.

Senator PEPPER. And that isn't justice either, is it?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir.

Senator PEPPER. Now, let me turn to page 15 of your statement, if I may. You say there—

that is what this proposed bill will do—make America the unmistakable aggressor against nations which have not sought objectively to molest us.

Is that what you mean to say?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think I stated it correctly.

Senator PEPPER. Has Hitler made any attempt to molest us in this country?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I don't think so.

Senator PEPPER. Have you ever heard of any people who are called "fifth columnists"?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. What do you think they were doing over here, if not molesting us?

Mr. TOWNSEND. You will find those groups of noisy sympathizers.

Senator PEPPER. They are just harmless? It is the sort of an affair with which we need not be concerned?

Mr. TOWNSEND. A number of factions have existed throughout our history.

Senator PEPPER. Then Hitler's going into some country is just technically wrong?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I have not condoned it. I have said that it is something that should be stamped out. I have no assurance that the German Government authorized and controlled these activities.

Senator PEPPER. Do you honestly want to tell this committee that you do not know of your own knowledge that Hitler today has spies and propagandists in this country trying to destroy our safety and security? Do you mean to tell us that?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I know that he probably has publicity agents and probably a great many spies. I have heard these Nazi sympathizers, and so on. I haven't paid much attention to them because I thought they were simply local people without foreign allegiance.

Senator PEPPER. So you have not paid much attention to the facts of sabotage and "fifth columnists" and spies?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I haven't followed that. I mean I have followed that.

Senator PEPPER. But you have not been very much agitated about it? You have not regarded that as being an attempt on their part to molest us in this country?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I am talking about an attack on the country.

Senator PEPPER. You don't think they would attempt to destroy us and attack our country economically either? Do you think they have any designs on us?

Mr. TOWNSEND. All nations have. But we are well prepared to hold our own against any of them.

Senator PEPPER. I suppose you think that Hitler has not molested—to use the usual word—the people in South America through his henchmen and propagandists?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I use the term "molest" to mean some active violence against them. He probably has plenty of them down there.

Senator PEPPER. You don't think any of the explosions in this country or down there could be traceable to his soldiers?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The Government should certainly go after them and see if they can discover any offense.

Senator PEPPER. Have you noticed the newspapers where, according to the Associated Press—

Mr. TOWNSEND. I haven't had a chance to.

Senator PEPPER. You have not had a chance to read the paper where there was the Associated Press announcement that German reconnaissance planes yesterday roared down on Reykjavik, Iceland, and machine-gunned the British airdrome there? The first paragraph reads:

German reconnaissance planes yesterday roared down on Reykjavik, Iceland, approximately 1,000 miles from continental North America, and machine-gunned the British airdrome, the German high command reported today.

The planes had to fly at least 600 miles if they left from a base in Norway to reach Iceland, which is only 400 miles east of the tip of Greenland in the Western Hemisphere.

That is reaching over a little in this direction.

Mr. TOWNSEND. He is attacking the British base. I wouldn't call that an attack on us or on this continent.

Senator PEPPER. Did it always belong to England?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The British grabbed it illegally, I might say.

Senator PEPPER. When?

Mr. TOWNSEND. After the occupation of Denmark, Iceland declared its independence, and then the British went up there and occupied it, presumably to keep Hitler from getting there first.

Senator PEPPER. That is not a long way from the North American Continent, is it? Some people assert that they can't come over in this direction. But that is not a long way from the North American Continent, yet they seem to be able to fly their planes there and machine-gun airdromes.

Mr. TOWNSEND. That is a lot nearer to where he is than this side of the Atlantic where we live.

Senator PEPPER. So you don't think there is any reason for us to concern ourselves about the outcome of this struggle?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir. I say that we should arm and be prepared for any contingency, but we should not take a course which would invite hazards or multiply hazards to an extent greater than they are already.

Senator PEPPER. Did you think that we should arm very extensively 5 years ago to protect ourselves against some great menace?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. I have been in favor at all times of a strong Army and Navy.

Senator PEPPER. Had you been afraid of England and France attacking this country?

Mr. TOWNSEND. You never know. The sentiment in Great Britain was very much against us in the 1920's.

Senator PEPPER. You thought there was some danger that they might attack us in the 1920's?

Mr. TOWNSEND. You don't know. At various times they have changed very abruptly toward us.

Senator PEPPER. Although we have gotten along fairly well for about a hundred years?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I wouldn't say pretty well. We almost had a little trouble in the Venezuela boundary matter in President Cleveland's administration. They were not so good during the Civil War. But on the whole I think it is a fairly good record.

Senator PEPPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Guffey, have you any questions?

Senator GUFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray?

Senator MURRAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Nuys?

Senator VAN NUYS. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Townsend, a short time ago you had a colloquy with the Senator from Texas relative to what constitutes an aggressor.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Or an aggression.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. I believe you took the position that there could be an act of aggression other than an actual invasion of a country?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think international law will sustain me, Senator—John Bassett Moore and several others, although I do not recall all of them right off the bat—in saying that the aggressor is the one first committing an act of hostility of the magnitude of an act of war against another nation.

Senator GILLETTE. Interfering with some other nation's rights?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. The Senator from Texas sent for a dictionary in connection with that colloquy and there was brought in a Funk and Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary published in 1935.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE. And because of the smallness of the volume the Senator's attention was diverted and he did not notice that it was there. So I shall read the definition that is contained therein.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Before you do that, Senator, may I put in the word that in law, words sometimes have different meanings than the ordinary dictionary meanings. So a law dictionary would be more reliable on that point than the ordinary desk dictionary.

Senator GILLETTE. Undoubtedly. But I am just referring to the authority that the Senator sent for. An aggressor is defined as "one who commits an aggression."

An aggression is defined as "an unwarranted inroad or encroachment upon the rights of another, whether prompted by hostility or not."

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. I am sure the Senator from Texas wanted that in the record.

Those are all the questions I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barkley?

Senator BARKLEY. Just one question. I was not here in time to hear your full statement, but I notice on page 2 you make this statement:

The two most severe dictatorships in the world—that of Stalin in Russia and Chiang Kai-shek in China—have long records of chronic inefficiency.

Are we to interpret that sentence as indicating that you are in sympathy with the Japanese as against Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well; no, sir. If you will read the text there you will find that I was trying to illustrate the proposition that a dictatorship does not mean efficiency. I have heard some comments that this bill H. R. 1776 is needed in the interest of efficiency. My general argument there is to show that dictatorships do not necessarily confer efficiency on a Government; and I mentioned some inefficient dictatorships.

Senator BARKLEY. The whole problem before Congress and the country is not simply a matter of efficiency, is it; but there is some question of principle and policy?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. There are many other considerations. I try to deal with several.

Senator BARKLEY. That language is not to be interpreted as indicating that you are in sympathy with Japan as against Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir. I tried to be neutral in all these foreign matters.

Senator BARKLEY. You are neutral as between the two?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, Senator; because I was over there and I saw much that was not so well understood in America. You would not say that the Japanese are justified. The Japanese are invaders there, and that puts them in a bad light. There were a great many provocations, shootings, and murders over a period of years. So there was friction of a very chronic nature.

Senator BARKLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green, have you any questions?

Senator GREEN. Mr. Townsend, continuing your colloquy with Senator Connally, you said that you are unwilling to designate Germany as the aggressor in its invasion of Norway because of certain things that might have happened before, did you not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Germany might be the aggressor there. Under international law, if I remember correctly, a neutral which does not repel a violation of its neutrality by one belligerent forfeits its neutrality. Of course, that would not be moral condonement. But it would be to an extent.

Senator GREEN. You are unwilling to designate Germany as the aggressor for that reason?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I am not sure of my ground legally on that point. I would have to look it up.

Senator GREEN. You are unwilling at the present time, in view of what you were going to call German aggression——

Mr. TOWNSEND. In the Norwegian case.

Senator GREEN. I am talking about the Norwegian case.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I will not pass judgment without looking that up further.

Senator GREEN. Notwithstanding Germany's invasion of Norway? Now, suppose Hitler invaded the United States of America tonight: would you also have doubts as to designating Hitler the aggressor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Absolutely not. He would definitely be the aggressor.

Senator GREEN. Notwithstanding our sale of 50 destroyers to England?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Of course, we have committed an act which is interpretable as an act of war. But you are on elastic ground as to whether or not it is an act of war. Who can say.

Senator GREEN. But you say in the case of Norway because there was a claim that Norway had allowed British ships to anchor in Norwegian waters, and in the other case, as the Germans claim, we have sold destroyers to England. If in the case of Norway you are in doubt as to its being an act of war why would you not be in doubt as to the invasion of America being an act of war?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I suppose it depends upon the diplomatic warnings and interchanges which preceded it. If Hitler had so notified us that it was an act of war and we still went ahead, it might be so interpreted.

Senator GREEN. In the case of Norway they did not go ahead after exchanges from Hitler?

Mr. TOWNSEND. International law is a little clearer in the Norwegian situation.

Senator GREEN. Are they comparable cases?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; not exactly, Senator; because there was Norway, a helpless neutral that did not want to fight. She wasn't strong enough to repel a violation of her neutrality.

Senator GREEN. Let's go one step further. Suppose this act which we are discussing was passed and the President acted under it, and then Germany invaded America; would you be in doubt as to who would be the aggressor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It would depend upon the extent of the President's acts. If he makes himself a belligerent partner of Britain, we would be the aggressor.

Senator GREEN. If he acted under this bill, Mr. Townsend, I understand you to complain he would do that very thing.

Mr. TOWNSEND. The bill states his powers. It does not state he will use them in any manner. It does not state how he will use them.

Senator GREEN. But if he does exercise the powers that the bill gives him, according to your claim, Mr. Townsend, if the Germans invade America Germany would not be the aggressor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think international law would support me in that.

Senator GREEN. I just wanted to get your point of view.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The principal question that I wanted to ask this witness, Mr. Chairman, has been cleared up by Senator Gillette.

I want to ask the witness if he has been able to find out from the cross-examination the purpose for which Senator Connally sent for that big dictionary. I think that was cleared up by Senator Gillette.

In view of Senator Pepper's remarks about Iceland, I want to ask this question. Iceland is occupied at the present time by British troops, is it not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I read that it is.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Just as Norway is occupied and as a large part of France is occupied, and as a part or all of Belgium and Holland is occupied by the Germans?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, Senator. Both are illegal.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Assuming that all of these occupations are illegal, the British have not hesitated—and I think very properly—to bomb German airdromes in Norway, in Belgium, in Holland, and in France, and any other military objectives in those countries, have they?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Isn't it rather unreasonable to regard it as an act of aggression when the Germans bomb the British military occupation which they consider illegal, and just as much so as when the British bomb the German occupation?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It would seem so. Iceland happens to be close to the line of the Western Hemisphere, and the British can occupy it and keep a war base there, perhaps. That is not a comparable proposition.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. It might be used by the British for the purpose of offense as well as defense, might it not?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Just as these bases that have been established in Norway and in these other countries might be used just as easily for purposes of defense as for purposes of offense.

Mr. TOWNSEND. The British have never been backward in taking small neutrals. In the World War they overran Greece just as rapidly as the Germans overran Belgium.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. I am not defending the occupation of any country; but it seems a poor rule that will not work both ways.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; it is.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. What I am inquiring about are the questions introduced by the Senator from Florida. Although Iceland has declared its independence, nevertheless it is being occupied by the British.

Since Senator Green asked you about it, I will ask you this question. The Germans claimed that they invaded Norway by reason of the fact that the British, in violation of international law, mined neutral waters of Norway and Norway was not strong enough to prevent the illegal act. Is that true?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. You recall that in 1916 down here in Mexico the Government was too weak to prevent the incursions by very strong armed forces under various bandits, particularly Pancho Villa, who ravaged a part of the United States, and when Mexico could not protect us against those raids President Wilson—in my opinion very properly—sent an armed expedition under that great General Pershing into Mexico for the purpose of protecting our rights. Speaking of those aggressions in Mexico, who was the aggressor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Mexico, because under international law a government recognized as sovereign must be able to prevent the acts of banditry even by irresponsible elements. If it cannot do so, then it forfeits its eligibility to immunity from counterattack.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Who was the aggressor at Vera Cruz, when we sent troops there and landed the marines and bluejackets and a whole brigade of infantry under General Funston because an old bandit refused to salute the American flag? In other words, there are many ramifications of the question of aggression.

Mr. TOWNSEND. The point that I am interested in is the moral principle.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. The question that I am interested in is whether we should go around the world to repel invasion. I understood that to be the purpose of your representations.

Mr. TOWNSEND. That is right. You would have a fine trip.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. France and Spain were very great aggressors against the poor Riffians; and they even bombed unprotected villages.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Do you understand that there is any obligation on the part of the United States to go abroad and wage a war on behalf of the Riffians?

Mr. TOWNSEND. That was given a different publicity treatment. It was given a good deal of glamor. The bombing of the Rifians, in the American publicity estimates, was a little different thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

If not, you may be excused, Mr. Townsend.

Is Miss Cathrine Curtis present?

STATEMENT OF MISS CATHRINE CURTIS, CHAIRMAN, WOMEN'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES OUT OF WAR

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please state your full name and address and the organization represented by you, if any, in your appearance before the committee, unless it is in a formal statement.

Miss CURTIS. I have a formal statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You may present your formal statement before any questions are asked by any of the Senators, if that is agreeable to you.

Miss CURTIS. That is agreeable, Mr. Chairman.

I am Cathrine Curtis, chairman of the Women's National Committee to Keep the United States Out of War, with offices at 535 Fifth Avenue in New York and also in Washington.

I am here to speak for those innumerable thousands of women who do not want this country to become involved again in a European trade war. I shall also pay tribute to those brave men and women who suffered untold hardships and deprivations to found a new and free country—who gave their lives and their all in the wars of 1776 and 1812—wars fought to free this country from the tyranny, intolerance, oppression, and debt burden of the Old World.

I have appeared before various committees on Capitol Hill, but never before have I come before you to discuss an issue that in any way compares with the importance of this one.

For many years my work and my activities have been in connection with the defense and preservation of our American traditions—and of our representative constitutional Government—and of our free enterprise system in which our women have such a tremendous stake.

Never before has any issue stirred me as has this outrageous, un-American deceitful bill, H. R. 1776. This is probably because in my veins courses the blood of men and women who gave their lives in founding this Republic and in fighting for its independence and liberty.

My great great-grandfather, Captain Eliphalet Curtis, organized the first group of men to go from Connecticut to Massachusetts to fight in the War of the Revolution in 1776.

Others did equally noble service for that cause, and all of them came from England to this country seeking liberty and opportunity.

Our forefathers and foremothers were born in these recurring European trade wars. They knew from birth the suffering, the heartaches and oppression it caused; the destruction of life and property that were its continual byproducts; that it served as a definite blockade to individual expression and its ultimate result was regimentation and annihilation.

They fled the Old World order with its militarized regimentation and government oppression, preferring to brave the dangers of the unknown sea and New World, in their attempt to enjoy opportunity and individual freedom.

History reveals the colonial women played an active part in building the homes and clearing the ground for agricultural activities. Once that was done, they settled down to establishing a new economic order.

Meantime, the costs of wars being waged by nations in Europe were mounting. England, with her control of the seas, was able to draw heavily upon her overseas possessions. The colonists, through increased taxes, soaring costs of manufactured products, and mounting demands for lumber—for naval construction—were compelled to pay more and more of those war costs, until finally, they refused to contribute anything to Europe's military machine and its war economy and declared themselves a free and independent nation.

But the Revolution did not end Europe's attempts to dictate and control our trade and economy. European nations realized, if the Republic was successful, it would prove a major threat to their class system and economic order. It would establish that individual activity rather than regimented collectivism was the sound way of life and that national advancement and security could be obtained through individual initiative rather than by militarized force.

When England tried to recover control of the Colonies through trade control in the War of 1812, our women again stepped into the breach. Following the Revolution England continued to control all patents relating to the spinning and weaving of cloth. She passed laws forbidding the export of spinning and weaving machinery, of the tools used in the manufacture of such machinery, and even the emigration of mechanics trained in the construction of such machinery.

By keeping this much-needed equipment from the New World, England hoped we would be forced to bow to her rule by trade, even if we had cast off her rule by law.

Our women helped play an important part in defeating that attempt—through their activities in the home industries which they had helped establish here.

Indeed, our women have played an important part in founding, protecting, and preserving our Republic. Therefore, is it any wonder you find us now opposed to this bill?

You must now appreciate why our women are dismayed—that, in this great crisis in defense of their homes and liberties they find themselves apparently deserted by some of those who fought so valiantly for women's protection in that last great crisis—the attempt to pack the Supreme Court.

It is because we do know and do appreciate these facts that we cannot see any difference between the conditions in Europe in the days when our forefathers left there and today.

What is going on in Europe today? Who among us really knows?

Let's look at Europe in the light of events that have happened there during the last 8 years.

First, of course, came the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in January of 1933.

His rise to power was shortly followed by a fire in the Reichstag Building, out of the flames of which rose the dread hobgoblin of threatened Soviet invasion and Communist control of the German people. A threat of invasion, curiously enough.

What use did the Nazi Party make of that propaganda—manufactured invasion threat?

They used it to force through the Reichstag a law that in general principles parallels this one now before you. I say in general principles—because the real basis of that law, as of this, was to nullify that country's constitution, make its legislative body impotent, and place in one man's hands the power of enacting law by executive edict, all done in the name of preparing that country to defend itself against a hypothetical invader—Bloody Joe Stalin.

So Hitler got his power, but with limitations. Oh, yes—that dictator-creating law had specific limitations. Let me read them to you. I quote from article 5 of the German Enabling Act of March 23, 1933, which became the legal base for all future political acts of the National Socialists:

This law becomes effective on the day of its publication. It becomes invalid on April 1, 1937; it further becomes invalid if the present national cabinet is replaced by another.

And, Mr. Chairman, I should like the privilege of inserting that law in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do so.

Miss CURTIS. We all know that national cabinet has not been replaced by another—because that law gave into its hands the power to suppress all opposition.

And what of the clause invalidating it on April 1, 1937? It must be that Hitler—by executive decree—has halted the calendar in Germany because that date has not yet officially arrived there.

Of what use are limitations when—in the same law—you give the individual the power to wipe out those limitations?

What has this German Enabling Act accomplished? It has helped change the map of continental Europe, slaughtered millions of men, women, and children of Norway, Finland, the Low Countries, France, Austria, and other countries too numerous to mention—as well as to cause the rise of the ghettos once more throughout Europe.

And what of the threatening invader—Bloody Joe Stalin? Why, he's being served breakfast in bed in Germany's star guest chamber—as he is in our own, for that matter. He is now enjoying favored-nation status with Germany. He is also enjoying, favored-nation status with us—and England is carrying on some kind of a courtship with him for some kind of a wedding.

But before that law helped turn Europe into a slaughterhouse, what else did it help bring about there?

It made Germany the arsenal for national socialism, nazi-ism, facism.

Within 3 years after its adoption it gave France, Leon Blum and his new deal.

Within a few months after taking office, he had laws passed similar to our Wagner Act, Wages and Hours Act, A. A. A., and W. P. A. He also promoted centralized planned economy, assumed that prosperity could be achieved by heavy governmental spending, introduced controlled prices, gave France an unbalanced budget and kept it unbalanced; revalued the currency, harassed and restricted private industry,

and destroyed its morale by making it a public whipping boy to conceal the failures of his own administration—all resulting in lowered production, less jobs, and a lowered standard of living for his country.

In other words, Mr. Blum gave France the new-deal prosperity formula of less work, more pay, less production, more debt, and less liberty.

Although France always had been basically nationalistic, he adopted internationalism—continual meddling in other nation's affairs—as the principal plank of his foreign policy.

He courted Soviet Russia, gave aid to the Spanish Communists—and to the Communists and left-wing elements in his own country, the right to operate openly under government protection. In addition, he gave them government jobs and furthered the communistic doctrines of worker-control of industry, riotous government spending, and unbalanced budgets.

And what did all this lead to in France?

It reduced France, in the eyes of other world powers, to the status of almost a second-rate nation with the result that her former ally, Britain, began trade negotiations with her former enemy, Germany.

Then, gentlemen, 6 years after Germany had adopted her dictatorial law, we find representatives of British and German industrial cartels at a conference table at Dusseldorf planning a trade pact whereby, through government subsidies from each nation, Britain and Germany would enter a trade combine to crush opposition from all other countries including our own.

I want to quote you from the London Economist of March 25, 1939:

It is a very great pity that the bursting of the international crisis has affected the fate of the agreement concluded at Dusseldorf last week by representatives of the Federation of British Industries and its German counterpart, the Reichsgruppe Industries. For compelling reasons of a general nature the government have been prompt to declare that the agreement must be regarded as still-born. Mr. Stanley on Wednesday and the prime minister on Thursday shared the regret that political considerations have killed the agreement.

The Economist goes on to state that this agreement did not condemn the German methods of doing business—rather it agreed to discard British business methods and replace them with those devised by the Nazi regime. It states—that insofar as obtaining from Germany any agreement for that country to abandon its subsidization of exports it created a project for joint Anglo-German subsidies, and to prove that the London Economist quotes the following paragraph from the Dusseldorf agreement:

The two organizations realize that in certain cases the advantages of agreements between the industries of countries or of a group of countries may be nullified by competition from the industries in some other country that refuses to become a party to the agreement. In such circumstances it may be necessary for the organizations to obtain the help of their governments, and the two organizations agree to collaborate in seeking that help.

Can anyone conceive our Government agreeing to enter into such an agreement with Germany? Would any member of this committee sponsor legislation for such a proposal? What then does this paragraph really mean so far as we are concerned?

It means that the Federation of British Industries agreed to seek British Government subsidies to help German trade against the trade of these United States.

And now we are being asked to subsidize British trade against that of Germany and our own.

What was the international crisis that burst upon the horizon of Europe in March of 1939 and caused the suspension of the Dusseldorf negotiations to subsidize German trade with British money?

I turn to the pages of the New York Times for the mid-March period and believe I find the answer. I quote you a series of wireless dispatches to that paper from Paris to New York:

[New York Times, March 18, 1939]

PARIS, March 17 (P. J. Phillip, wireless to Times).—With the avowed object of turning France into a vast workshop for national defense, Premier Edouard Daladier, in agreement with his cabinet, today asked Parliament to approve within the next 2 days a five-line bill giving the Government full power to rule by decree in all matters affecting national defense * * *.

The new full powers bill * * * is very wide in its terms and may lead to a kind of industrial and economic mobilization which will, in effect, suppress the 40-hour law and turn over to military production many factories that are at least partly engaged in civil work.

Appearing before the commission the Premier confirmed that he intended to use the powers granted to him to speed up armaments production and declared that he regretted not having proceeded more rapidly in changing the 40-hour work rule.

[New York Times, March 18, 1939]

PARIS, March 18.—Dictatorial powers for the remainder of this year were conferred upon Premier Edouard Daladier today by the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of 321 to 264.

Tomorrow it will be the turn of the Senate to vote them, and, if it does as is expected, parliamentary rule will be in effect suspended in France until M. Daladier sees fit to permit its resumption.

[New York Times, March 20, 1939]

PARIS, March 19.—Putting his dictatorial powers for national defense into immediate operation, Premier Edouard Daladier has decreed absolute silence on himself and his ministers with respect to all decisions taken.

And the French Senate ratified Daladier's request for these special powers by the massive vote of 286 to 17.

And so France received her dictator-creating law under the guise of turning that nation into a vast workshop for national defense.

But what did it really mean to France? I quote again from the New York Times, from an editorial of March 21, 1939, which stated:

[New York Times, March 21, 1939]

DALADIER TAKES CHARGE

By a vote of less than 3 to 2 in the Chamber of Deputies but by more than 20 to 1 in the Senate, Premier Edouard Daladier has gained the power to rule France by decree. Parliament steps aside. In constitutional theory President Lebrun might nullify a decree by refusing to promulgate it. In practice he cannot, since he is himself a creation of the two chambers. So Daladier rules alone, over the ineffective opposition of the parties of the left.

France is, in effect, at war * * *.

Now let's see where that dictator law led France?

Hitler moved into Poland—Britain forgot her plans made at Dusseldorf—declared war on Germany, called upon her ally France to stand by her.

France found herself under the control of a one-man government with complete power to put her into war without consulting the people's representatives regardless of the fact that she was totally unprepared; partly because of political mismanagement and partly because much of her defense equipment had been sent to Communist Spain.

I should like to quote again from dispatches in the New York Times:

[New York Times, September 3, 1939]

PARIS, September 2 (A. P. story).—Premier Edouard Daladier today received implied authority from the Chamber of Deputies to declare war on Germany. * * *

The power to declare war was vested in a war budget bill of 69,000,000,000 francs, which the sober deputies, many wearing army uniforms, adopted unanimously by a show of hands after hearing M. Daladier say the Government was still willing to negotiate if Germany would cease hostilities in Poland. * * *

The Premier told the finance committee after the chamber session that he planned to call the chamber to approve an actual declaration of war if that became necessary, but he may simply ask for approval after, rather than before, the action is taken.

[New York Times, September 4, 1939]

PARIS, Monday, September 4 (P. J. Phillip, wireless to Times).—Since 5 o'clock yesterday afternoon a state of war has existed between France and Germany. "Existed" is the only war that described what has happened, for war has not been declared. * * *

It was not until 8:30 o'clock last night that Premier Edouard Daladier, in the name of the French Government, announced officially by radio that a state of war existed. * * *

As war had not been officially declared in the manner of former years, there was no meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, and since necessary credits had been voted Saturday, it was considered there was no need for such a meeting. * * *

It seems to me that no one can consider these facts relative to European events as I have detailed them to you, without realizing how rapidly we too are being pushed along the self-same road to war under this bill before you.

The technique in Europe was first to whip the public into hysteria through propaganda—manufactured threats of invasion. Next came the cry for centralized power for national defense. Then came the demand for dictator powers, and finally war, with all its terrible destruction.

To date, in this country, we have had the propaganda—manufactured threats of invasion—the hue and cry for centralized powers to give us national defense. Now we have the demand for the dictator-creating legislation. How can we avoid war?

We are told by proponents of this 1776 measure that the only real problem facing this country today is one of aiding England, because she is our first line of defense and fighting our battle. They maintain that speedy adoption of this measure is necessary in order that we may buy time to adequately arm and protect ourselves. And, in the same breath, they demand that we give one man the power to strip us of the few, pitiably defensive weapons—both on hand and on order.

If their position is correct, then they are in effect, saying that this is our war, but we will not fight it. Rather, in shameful cowardice, they suggest we buy our protection with the blood of thousands of sons of another nation.

I repeat—if their position is correct—then what has happened to the blood and iron of our men and women who founded this great Republic? That blood and iron that carried us through Bunker Hill and Valley Forge to Yorktown? That blood and iron that carried on through the burning—by England—of this very Capitol in 1812—that saw us through the dread days of the Wilderness and Gettysburg to Appomattox?

Has that same blood and iron, by some strange, sleight of hand, been turned to vinegar and sawdust? Are we women to believe that our men now are willing to cower and hide behind the shell-torn bodies of the men and women of other nations? If this is true then who is responsible for destroying our great heritage of courage and fortitude?

This may be true, for I think we are all conscious of the well-advanced program to devalue the United States of America in the eyes of its own citizens.

But we women refuse to believe this of our menfolk. We contend the real problem facing this Nation today is not one of either aiding England or buying time for our own defense against some propaganda-built invader.

We believe this is an outrageously false statement.

We are convinced the only real problem facing our people as a result of the consideration of this legislation is shall we through adoption of H. R. 1776 in any form, scrap the liberty, freedom, and inherent rights of man established for us by our forefathers and foremothers in A. D. 1776?

We must decide whether we will—by adoption of the principles incorporated in this proposed legislation—return to the servitude of colonial status or through complete rejection of those false principles retain our status as a free and independent Nation.

Our women challenge the proponents of this legislation to take it to the people stripped of hysterical disguises, with its real, though concealed, grand larceny of our liberties revealed to public gaze, and we know, as well as they, what the answer will be.

Complete repudiation!

They dare not risk that. They dare not drop their fancy phrases such as "fighting for democracy," "enthroning liberty everywhere." They dare not tell our people the truth—tell them they are seeking to trick us into discarding our own system of industrial capitalism to become a colonial supporter of the military capitalism of Europe.

But the proponents of this bill claim it will keep war from our shores and will prevent the need of our youth never again being sent to fight on foreign soil.

In view of the statement of Attorney General Jackson in his destroyer opinion—that, in order to interpret the intent of Congress in adopting any law, the interpreter must first determine what Congress did and did not say, did and refused to do in considering the legislation that created the law.

Congress already has—by its vote in the House last week—given the President power under this bill to:

1. Invite foreign wars to our shores.
2. Use our wealth, productive machinery, and manpower for “enthroning liberty” in any part of the world he may select.
3. Pledge during the coming months any amount of our wealth he so pleases, to be “loaned” or “given away,” starting July 1.
4. Send another A. E. F. to any part of the world he desires.

These things now are possible under this bill because Congress has rejected all proposals to:

1. Bar belligerent vessels from our harbors for repairs.
2. Refused to designate the countries to whom he shall “lend” or “lease” our wealth.
3. Place any limitation or “ceiling” on the ultimate amount of our wealth he may pledge after June 30, and
4. Rejected all proposals to bar sending our troops to foreign shores.

Again, they claim, Britain needs the facilities of our shipyards and airplane plants if she is to stand the onslaught of the foe.

If she is so short of tonnage that her very life is threatened through lack of sufficient bottoms in which to carry the products of our industrial capitalism to her shores, how is it that, according to official figures of the United States Department of Commerce, she increased her export trade to Central and South America during the months of September, October, and November of last year by 10 percent over previous months? Where did she get the shipping tonnage to carry that increased export trade?

Proponents also claim she needs the facilities of our airplane-producing machinery in order to build the places needed to fend off air attacks of the would-be invader.

Yet, according to syndicated news stores that appeared in the Nation's press on the 19th of last month under the signature of E. V. Durling, this would not seem to be quite correct. Mr. Durling wrote:

British aircraft firms are supposedly harrassed by the demand for fighting planes. United States firms are answering hysterical demands from Britain for warplanes. Yet aircraft manufacturers in England are making commercial planes for export and offering them for sale in South America.

We are convinced this is not a war to enthrone liberty “everywhere in the world.” It is just another of Europe's recurring trade wars, through which Britain is endeavoring to enthrone her trade control everywhere, and we are being asked to scrap our industrial capitalistic system in order to enable her to do so.

Proponents of this measure insist its speedy passage is necessary in order to enable the President to give the aid Britain needs to maintain what they claim to be our first line of defense. Again and again they have been asked to state just what aid this bill will provide that cannot already be given under existing law. Again and again they have dodged answering that question, invariably by endeavoring to raise before our horrified eyes the thread of this “propaganda-manufactured” invader.

Why do they persist in ignoring that question? Is it because this bill provides only three types of aid not already allowed under existing law, namely:

1. Shipping the products of our industrial capitalistic machinery into the war zones in our ships.

2. Possible convoying of those ships by our naval vessels.

3. Indirect repeal of the Johnson Act and extending credits to those nations that still refuse to repay the loans made to them in their last European trade war.

Send the materials of war into the war zones in our ships, convoy them with our naval vessels, and a ship flying our flag will be sunk. Then we are in this war, and under a military dictatorship.

Why do they fear admitting this possibility? They say our President will never make use of such powers. If he does not intend to use them, why is he seeking them? In an attempt to bluff other nations? Suppose his bluff is called? What then? Does anyone here think he will back down? Will someone please cite one instance in the past where our President has backed down when his bluff has been called? Can anyone tell of any emergency power given him which he has willingly returned?

Why do they evade the issue of repealing the Johnson Act? We believe the answer is because they know a vast majority of our people oppose its repeal, and they dare not take that issue directly and clearly to the people.

They speak of mandates given by the people in the last election. Will they please explain where, and when, and in just what language either candidate in the last election specifically proposed any such measures as are in this bill? Both candidates continually declared that, if elected, they would continue aid to Britain under existing law—namely, cash and carry—and would seek no measures that would tend to create the need for another American Expeditionary Force.

The people have been given no opportunity to vote on the issues incorporated in this measure. If they are given that opportunity, they will answer in a clear and ringing "No."

Why all this rush, rush, rush to force this bill through without time for ample discussion of the real issues involved? I believe that question is answered in a conversation I recently had with a highly intelligent individual just arrived from southern California.

He and his friends knew practically nothing of this bill, had not seen a copy of it, had not had an opportunity to study its wording and complete implications. He told me that he and those in his area knew only what the papers and radio had told them.

That from what they had read and heard they believed this measure should be speedily passed in order to prevent an early invasion of southern California by Hitler.

How carefully and skillfully have the facts of this bill been kept from the public. It would seem an amazingly well-organized program is in high gear to force this bill through before the American people can wake up.

Consider a member of the British Cabinet, acting as an Ambassador, coming to Capitol Hill asking for schedules and urging speed, speed, speed! And this done just as the bill was to go to the House floor for discussion.

Is he laboring under the hallucination that this country still is a British colony?

And now these hearings before this committee are about to close. They have been well managed and carefully staged, with the closing

act given to Indiana's wandering and wondering son, just returned from his circus-like tour of British pubs and London slums.

His return is preceded by a radio talk by Britain's Prime Minister urging us to "put your confidence in us."

I consider these words an insult to the national honor of this country, which, for 150 years, has put its confidence in itself and not in any foreign nation.

Have we become so soft, so weak, so disorganized in our national defenses, is the morale of our people so low, is our fighting spirit so depleted that our only salvation is to place our confidence in some foreign power?

Has this country sunk so low that it now fails to produce men with the courage and fortitude of George Washington, of John Paul Jones, of Perry, of Admiral Farragut, and those other great heroes who made us free and independent of all foreign powers?

Mr. Churchill told us his country does not want our armies—only "the tools"—implying, of course, only the war tools of our industrial productive machinery. But we women have long memories, and our memories of 1915, 1916, and 1917 are not pleasant ones. We remember only too well that during those years Allied chieftains told us they did not want our men—only our tools and credit, even as they are saying now.

Are these statements any more true today than 22 or 23 years ago? We fear not—particularly in view of the following quotations from the London Economist of November 16, 1940:

We must hope for her (the United States) eventual participation in the struggle with all the strength of an armed continent.

The Economist then discusses the arguments favoring nonparticipation by us in this struggle and proceeds to riddle each of them with the following statement:

What, then, should we in England hope for—a larger or earlier slice of a smaller cake, or a smaller slice of a much larger cake?

If the answer is to be given from the somewhat narrower viewpoint of our own material needs, it must be that we should prefer America to be a non-belligerent in 1941, belligerent in 1942. We must hope for her eventual participation in the struggle with all the strength of an armed continent.

Does history show that any European nation has ever considered any other nation except from the viewpoint of their own material and selfish needs?

Do you think that these published statements, together with the news that our Government is printing 4½ million casualty tags for our Army, intend to dispel our fears or give us any confidence in statements that Europe will not again ask for—and receive—another A. E. F.?

Recently these United States of America have been given a new name—the "arsenal for democracy." I protest that name and the far-reaching implications it carries.

This country was founded as a republic—not as a democracy—with provisions for the rights of minorities to be protected, and on that foundation of government we have built our structure of industrial capitalism which is totally different than the military capitalism of the Old World.

Military capitalism is founded upon force and destructure and can be maintained only under a regimented, militarized government. It is, therefore, masculine.

Industrial capitalism is based upon individual creativeness and productivity and prospers only under individualized government. It is, therefore, feminine.

The soldier is the foundation of the European economic system.

The woman is the foundation of our economic system.

The soldier is the European symbol of collectivism.

The woman is the symbol of our individualism.

The soldier is honored in Europe.

The woman is revered in these United States.

If we are to be made an "arsenal for democracy," we will be forced from an industrial economy into a military economy, whose sole purpose is to manufacture goods and implements to destroy wealth and to destroy life.

If we adopt this military economy, then our liabilities will far surpass our assets, and we will be forced into a dictatorship, which, after all, is nothing but a receivership for a bankrupt nation.

And, as I close, I should like to call your attention to the remarks of George Washington, Father of Our Country. In referring to our country's flag, he said:

We take the stars from the Heavens and the red from the mother country—separating it with white stripes, showing we have separated from her. And white shall go down to posterity as representing liberty.

And the additional words of that famous man, spoken as he laid down his pen after signing the Constitution, I quote:

Should the States reject this excellent Constitution, the next will be drawn in blood.

Members of this committee, Members of the Congress, if you pass this 1776 bill in any form at all, it is my firm and honest belief that you will dye red with the blood of our boys the white stripes of our flag of liberty. And the repeal of this bill will be effected only through the blood of civil strife!

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, Senator Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nye?

Senator NYE. None, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper?

Senator PEPPER. Miss Curtis, do you believe in any aid to England at all?

Miss CURTIS. I believe in all possible aid to these United States of America; first, last, and all the time. Any aid to Britain that may be provided under our neutrality law, naturally I would have to respect as the law of our land.

Senator PEPPER. Thank you. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK of Missouri. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shipstead?

Senator SHIPSTEAD. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the other Senators have now gone.

Thank you, Miss Curtis, for your appearance before us.

Miss CURTIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Miss Kathleen Norris in the room?

Apparently she is not here.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to present a telegram from Father Edward Lodge Curran, director, Anti-war Crusade, and have it inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

Senator JOHNSON of California. This telegram is addressed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and it reads as follows:

Due to speaking engagements in Middle West unable to reach Washington Monday. Had hoped that the committee would have called me earlier.

As director of the Antiwar Crusade of the International Catholic Truth Society, I consider the lend-lease bill to be both unconstitutional and unethical.

It is unconstitutional in its entirety because it seeks to give to the President powers which the President is not empowered to receive under article II of the Federal Constitution.

It is unconstitutional because it demands that Congress relinquish its own treaty-making, revenue-disbursing powers to the President and that Congress confer upon the President powers which Congress has no right to delegate under article I of the Federal Constitution.

It is unconstitutional because section 3 of the lend-lease bill would permit the President to enter into political, military, and commercial treaties with any foreign power he pleases, without referring such treaties to the Senate and without securing the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present in accordance with section 2 of article 2 of the Federal Constitution.

It is unconstitutional because it would constitute the President a dictator for the defense of foreign nations.

It is unethical because section 6 of the lend-lease bill would permit the President to take unexpended moneys in the Treasury, moneys already appropriated or to be appropriated for other purposes such as Social Security, veterans' pensions, etc., and spend such moneys in domestic munitions markets, or according to section 8 in foreign munitions markets, for the defense of any foreign nation whom the President chooses, without securing a cent of consideration and therefore to the detriment of the domestic projects for which the moneys were originally appropriated.

It is unethical because it would permit the President to use American money and American munitions for the defense of Soviet Russia, the Axis Powers ally of Nazi Germany, or for the defense of world communism, should the President so desire.

It is unethical because it places in the hands of the President the uncontrolled power to provoke us into war, contrary to the ethical principle that war must always be the last resort.

It is unethical because it would permit the President to strip our Nation of vital defenses and provoke warfare against us at a time when according to military testimony our air force is woefully inadequate and unprepared.

I call on the religious leadership of this country, Catholic and Protestant and Jewish, to silence the beating of war drums by preaching the gospel of peace. I call on the religious leadership of this country to expose the unethical and unconstitutional and warmongering aspects of this lend-lease bill which permits the President to plunge us into foreign warfare by subterfuge.

We wish no foreign warfare and we wish no entangling alliances with foreign nations. Therefore we wish no unconstitutional and unethical lend-lease bill. This dictatorship bill must be defeated in its entirety. No political compromises by the President and no congressional amendments can conceal the unconstitutional and unethical character of this bill.

One thousand six hundred American citizens gathered tonight in the Taft Auditorium, Cincinnati, join with me in sending this telegram which I hope will be read publicly and included in the record.

REV. EDWARD LODGE CURRAN,
Director, Antiwar Crusade, Brooklyn, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be included in the record.

Is there any other witness you desire to call?

Senator JOHNSON of California. There is no other witness that I have to call.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, some of us had hoped that it might be possible for John T. Flynn to appear. He was one of the most important witnesses expected to appear for the opposition. He is one of the leading economists of the United States. Unfortunately he was stricken with an illness. He was scheduled to appear last Thursday. He was stricken with illness such that last night he was unable to talk over the telephone. However, he is attempting to prepare a statement, and I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, if it is possible for his statement to be produced before the closing of this record that it may be included in the record. It will deal entirely with economic matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that consent will be given, Senator Clark. I know that Mr. Flynn was requested to come down earlier in the week.

Senator CLARK of Missouri. He was stricken with "flu," complicated by very acute laryngitis.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you have no other witness, Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON of California. No other witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the committee will be in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., the committee adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, February 11, 1941, at 10 a. m.)

(The following communications was ordered to be printed in the record:)

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 7, 1941.

HON. WALTER F. GEORGE,

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR GEORGE: We, the undersigned citizens of the United States, subscribe to the doctrine and discipline of one or another of the many religious organizations of which we are members, but we do not officially represent any religious organizations as such in this communication. We sincerely believe, however, that the spiritual principles and unchanging moral laws which we in common with the great majority of our fellow citizens hold as a precious heritage from our ancestors, and which we hope and intend to transmit unimpaired to our children's children, should be openly proclaimed as the motivating power of our national policies relating to the war in Europe, which threatens our own national security and commercial interest and our own religious and civic liberties.

What we confess on this fundamental point of the American way of life has been as openly and as strongly upheld by all our Governments, through their Chief Executives, when occasion arose for such proclamations, and in their consequent practical applications—from George Washington, through Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson, to Franklin D. Roosevelt. The common consent—indeed the common urging—of our people has always been behind our Government when the very fundamentals of our Nation's religious and civil liberties and of our democratic way of life were threatened.

We therefore act as individual citizens or as citizens cooperating in groups and committees when we jointly request your committee to take notice of and give consideration to our conviction that the lend-lease bill should be promptly passed substantially in its present form, and as promptly enacted into law to the end that the national policy of defending our spiritual, moral, and material interests shall be given proper instruments.

That such defense of our national interests is most effectively carried on by the fullest possible aid to Great Britain and her Allies is recognized by us in common with the great majority of our fellow citizens. As a long step in the right

direction, we close by again urging speedy and unanimous passage and enactment of the lend-lease bill.

Yours respectfully,

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

Special Editor of the Commonwealth, New York; Member of the Executive Committee of the Inter-Faith Committee for Aid to the Democracies; Member of Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies; Vice Chairman of the American Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities; and Member of the Executive Board of the Committee of American Catholic Citizens for Aid to Great Britain and the Democracies.

NOTE.—The above letter has been approved by most of the executive committees of the above-named organizations and by those whose names are signed, in their individual capacities, below. It may be added that these names represent only a few of the hundreds of thousands of other names which are being collected to this or similar statements of support of the administration's foreign policies by members of all our principal religious organizations throughout the country. The Inter-Faith Committee for Aid to the Democracies alone estimates that more than 50,000 clergymen of all the denominations will have signed that committee's resolution adopted at a meeting in New York December 23, 1940, when this committee was organized.

Washington, D. C.: Rt. Rev. Msgr. John A. Ryan, D. D., Catholic University of America; Rev. Maurice E. Sheehy, Catholic University of America; Rev. Edwin M. Ryan, professor of South American Church History and Executive Secretary of the Institute of Ibero-American Studies, Catholic University of America; Rev. Walter Farrell, O. P., Dominican House of Studies, Catholic University of America.

New York: Rev. Charles J. Callan, O. P.; Rev. John A. McHugh, O. P.; Rev. Charles D. Martineau, O. P.; Miss Josephine M. Miele (teacher); Miss Theresa M. Napoli; Hawthorne.

New York City: Euphemia VanRensselaer Wyatt (Mrs. Christopher Wyatt), 133 East Sixty-second Street; Elizabeth D. (Mrs. Edward C.) Bailly; Edward J. Cornelis; Philip W. Donidon; Peter J. Downey; Nora Falvey; Louise M. Capara; Anne Doyle; John Slater; Wallace A. Arist; Rose F. Hill; Martha B. Cornelis; Rev. George B. Ford; Chaplain, Newman Club, Columbia University; Frederick W. Rice, 35 Claremont Avenue; May J. McLaughlin, 454 Riverside Drive; Josephine C. Dealy, 26 Donald Place, East Rockaway; Madeline Hooke Rice, 35 Claremont Avenue; Cecilia H. Hecht, 35 Claremont Avenue; Robert P. Hamilton, 35 Claremont Avenue; Portia G. Hamilton, 35 Claremont Avenue; Barry Byrne; Oscar R. Paronick; Annette Cromin Byrne; John F. O'Ryan, major general, retired; Dr. William Agar, Columbia University; Prof. Carlton J. H. Hayes, Columbia University, N. Y.; Rev. Vincent C. Donovan, O. P.; Maurice Lavenaux; Dr. Becket Gibbs; Miss Julie K. Vernan; Mr. Charles Moulton; Grenville Vernon; Rev. Moorhouse; T. I. Miller, S. J., Head of Department of Political Philosophy and the Social Sciences in Fordham University Graduate School.

Chicago: Alexander Gust Koclanes; John J. McMahon (Oak Park, Ill.); John Williams; Lee Roy Johnson; Jacob Blumenthal; Morris J. Hannum; Clinton D. Thomas; M. H. Danielson; David J. Meade; Daniel F. Lane; William Roche; Michael Caruso; Norman Scully; Joseph P. Mullen; Russell A. McCune; David Mack; Sam Applebaum; Edward N. Ambrose; Theodore C. Koclanes.

Prof. Francis E. McMahon, Notre Dame, Ind.; Herbert C. F. Bell, Professor of History, Wesleyan University, Former President of the American Catholic Historical Association; Rev. Lawrason Riggs; St. Thomas More Hall, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; Francis D. White, Portsmouth Priory School, R. I.; T. B. Campbell.

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